Quarterly Journal of Political Science

About this Journal

Institutional Prices Volume 9, 4 issues (2014)

Electronic Only:
$440 in the Americas
€440 in all other countries
Print Only:
Add $36/€36pph
Combined:
Add $70/€70 +36pph

Individual Prices: Request
Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Print ISSN: 1554-0626
Online ISSN: 1554-0634

Editors-in-Chief:

Keith Krehbiel
Stanford University
Personal Homepage
E-mail: krehbiel@qjps.com

Nolan McCarty
Princeton University
Personal Homepage 
E-mail: mccarty@qjps.com

Indexed in: ISI SCI, SCOPUS, Social Science Citation Index, EconLit, JEL, Current Contents/Social and Behavioral Sciences, Google Scholar, RePEc, Summon by Serials Solutions, EBSCO Discovery Service.

Note: Please read this announcement from the QJPS editors.

Volume 1, issue 4

From the Editors-in-Chief

Volume 1, issue 4

Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making

We experimentally test competing theories of three-player majoritarian bargaining models with fixed, known disagreement values. Subjects are randomly assigned to three roles: a proposer and two types of voters. Each role is randomly assigned a disagreement value, i.e. a given amount of money he/she
Volume 1, issue 4

Informative Positive and Negative Campaigning

This paper develops a theoretical model of informative campaigning, both positive and negative. We argue that some information on a candidate can be transmitted more efficiently by his opponents and that negative campaigning, on average, facilitates a more informed choice by the electorate. In our m...
Volume 1, issue 4

Designing Institutions to Aggregate Preferences and Information

I consider the design of policy-making institutions to aggregate preferences and information. A pervasive incentive problem hinders the creation of desirable deliberative institutions; participants that expect to have minority interests have an incentive to misrepresent their information. Moreover,
Volume 1, issue 4

The Orientation of Newspaper Endorsements in U.S. Elections, 1940–2002

We study newspaper endorsements in state and federal elections, using a new data set with two samples. One sample focuses on big-city newspapers in the United States from 1940 to 2002. A second sample examines 92 newspapers, representing all regions of the country, over the period 1986 to 2002. We d...
Volume 1, issue 3

Context-dependent Voting

In recent decades psychologists have shown that the standard model of individual choice is often violated as choices are influenced by the decision context. We propose that voting behavior may be similarly influenced and we introduce a theory of context-dependent voting. Context-dependence implies t...
Volume 1, issue 3

Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance

In this paper we argue that religion and welfare state spending are substitute mechanisms that insure individuals against adverse life events. As a result, individuals who are religious are predicted to prefer lower levels of social insurance than will individuals who are secular. To the extent poli...
Volume 1, issue 3

Ethical Voters and Costly Information Acquisition

Game-theoretic and statistical models have emphasized the desirable information aggregation properties of large elections. However, such models do not explain why voters choose to acquire costly information. In this paper we use an ethical voter model to endogenize the decision to acquire informatio...
Volume 1, issue 3

Electoral Victory and Statistical Defeat? Economics, Politics, and the 2004 Presidential Election

The 2004 election has been interpreted as a resounding victory for conservative values. Was it in fact a mandate? The present analysis examines recent electoral outcomes and the 2004 election with particular reference to economic and political fundamentals. It compares the results of the 2004 electi...
Volume 1, issue 3

Erratum

Volume 1, issue 2

From the Editors-in-Chief

Volume 1, issue 2

Party and Incumbency Cues in Voting: Are They Substitutes?

A possible explanation for the rise of the incumbency advantage in U.S. elections asserts that party and incumbency are close informational substitutes. A common claim in the literature is that, as the salience of partisan cues decreased, voters attached themselves to the next available piece of inf...
Volume 1, issue 2

Whose Ear to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy-Making

Important conceptualizations of both interest groups and bureaucratic agencies suggest that these institutions provide legislatures with greater information for use in policy-making. Yet little is known about how these information sources interact in the policy process as a whole. In this paper we c...
Volume 1, issue 2

Satisficing and Selection in Electoral Competition

We model political parties as adaptive decision-makers who compete in a sequence of elections. The key assumptions are that winners satisfice (the winning party in period t keeps its platform in t + 1) while losers search. Under fairly mild assumptions about losers' search rules, we show that the se...
Volume 1, issue 2

What's the Matter with What's the Matter with Kansas?

Thomas Frank's What's the Matter with Kansas? asserts that the Republican Party has forged a new "dominant political coalition" by attracting working-class white voters on the basis of "class animus" and "cultural wedge issues like guns and abortion." My analysis confirms that white voters without c...
Volume 1, issue 1

From the Editors-in-Chief

Volume 1, issue 1

Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy

Success and failure of democracy are interpreted as different equilibria of a dynamic political game with cost of changing leadership and incomplete information about politicians' virtue. Unitary democracy can be frustrated when voters do not replace corrupt leaders, because any new leader would pro...
Volume 1, issue 1

Polls and Pounds: Public Opinion and Exchange Rate Behavior in Britain

This article examines the relationship between government popularity and exchange rate movements in Britain since 1987. It argues that: (1) unexpected drops in the government's public support lead to currency depreciations and increased exchange rate volatility, and (2) unanticipated depreciations h...
Volume 1, issue 1

A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making

We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be bad for all legislators, and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of station...
Volume 1, issue 1

Path Dependence

I eat my peas with honey. I've done it all my life. It makes 'em taste quite funny, but it keeps them on the knife.– an old Bostonian jump roping rhyme.