Quarterly Journal of Political Science

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Institutional Prices Volume 9, 4 issues (2014)

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Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Print ISSN: 1554-0626
Online ISSN: 1554-0634

Editors-in-Chief:

Keith Krehbiel
Stanford University
Personal Homepage
E-mail: krehbiel@qjps.com

Nolan McCarty
Princeton University
Personal Homepage 
E-mail: mccarty@qjps.com

Indexed in: ISI SCI, SCOPUS, Social Science Citation Index, EconLit, JEL, Current Contents/Social and Behavioral Sciences, Google Scholar, RePEc, Summon by Serials Solutions, EBSCO Discovery Service.

Volume 4, issue 4

Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars

We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then all equilibria must involve dove, hawk, and deterrent strategies and the probability of war is positive (but less than one) in any given period. Wars ar...
Volume 4, issue 4

The Shape of Things to Come? On the Dynamics of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings

In this paper we examine the dynamics of suicide attacks and targeted killings in the Second Intifada. We find evidence that the targeted killings of Palestinian leaders by Israel reduce realized Palestinian violence. We find, however, that intended Palestinian violence is increasing at low levels o...
Volume 4, issue 4

A Reputational Theory of Two-Party Competition

I study a dynamic game of two-party competition in which party preferences are private information, exhibit serial correlation, and change with higher probability following defeat in elections. Assuming partisans care sufficiently about office, extreme policies are pursued with positive probability
Volume 4, issue 4

Utility Representations of Risk Neutral Preferences in Multiple Dimensions

I show that in a multidimensional spatial model, if an agent is risk neutral on each side of the policy space away from his/her ideal point, then his/her utility function is linearly decreasing not in the Euclidean, but rather in the city block distance to the ideal policy of the agent.
Volume 4, issue 3

Persistence in Political Participation

This paper uses discontinuities imposed by voting-age restrictions to identify the effect of past eligibility on subsequent participation decisions and partisan identification. It compares participation decisions and partisan affiliations of individuals who turned 18 just before past elections with
Volume 4, issue 3

Economic Shocks and Civil War

This article revisits the relationship between income per capita and civil conflict. We begin by documenting that the empirical literature identifies two different patterns. First, poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war. Second, civil war occurs when countries suffer negati...
Volume 4, issue 3

Candidate Faces and Election Outcomes: Is the Face–Vote Correlation Caused by Candidate Selection?

We estimate the effect of candidate appearance on vote choice in congressional elections using an original survey instrument. Based on estimates of the facial competence of 972 congressional candidates, we show that in more competitive races the out-party tends to run candidates with higher quality
Volume 4, issue 3

Two's Company, Three's an Equilibrium: Strategic Voting and Multicandidate Elections

In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between three or more office-seeking candidates. Recognizing that electoral equilibrium involves both candidates' and voters' strategies, we first prove existence of pure strategy electoral equilibria when candidates seek to...
Volume 4, issue 2

Congressional Careers, Committee Assignments, and Seniority Randomization in the US House of Representatives

This paper estimates the effects of initial committee seniority on the career histories of Democratic members of the House of Representatives from 1949 to 2006. When more than one freshman representative is assigned to a committee, positions in the seniority queue are established by lottery. Randomi...
Volume 4, issue 2

Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying

We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists' budget constraints and legis...
Volume 4, issue 2

The Effect of Outliers on Regression Analysis: Regime Type and Foreign Direct Investment

The presence of outliers and influential cases can dramatically change the magnitude of regression coefficients and even the direction of coefficient signs (i.e., from positive to negative or vice versa). When researchers ignore abnormal observations, especially with respect to dependent variables,
Volume 4, issue 2

Outlier, Measurement, and the Democracy-FDI Controversy

Choi (2009) offers a useful demonstration that Li and Resnick's (2003) analysis of the effect of regime type on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows is vulnerable to the impact of outliers. However, his first remedial method of controlling for outliers with a dummy variable leads to qualitatively...
Volume 4, issue 2

Understanding Outliers in Foreign Direct Investment Data Analysis

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Volume 4, issue 1

Corruption and Political Decay: Evidence from Bolivia

This paper studies the impact of corruption victimization on anti-government protest. It is argued that two features of corruption victimization are relevant for understanding its impact: its intensity level and the clarity of responsibility of the ruling government. Drawing upon survey data from th...
Volume 4, issue 1

Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation

Since 1932, when Justice Louis Brandeis remarked that in a federal system states can serve as "laboratories" of democracy, political decentralization has been thought to stimulate policy experimentation. We reexamine the political economy behind this belief, using a simple model of voting in central...
Volume 4, issue 1

Foreign Direct Investors as Agents of Economic Transition: An Instrumental Variables Analysis

Previous empirical analysis has noted a correlation between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and economic reformin Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, but has attributed the relationship to investors rewarding countries after reform decisions. Little attention has been paid to the fact that i...
Volume 4, issue 1

War Chests for Deterrence and Savings

I present a model of fund-raising in repeated elections where funds are raised to deter the entry of strong challengers, and to increase the probability of winning through campaign spending. The equilibrium relationship between war chests and incumbent strength is non-monotonic, because incumbents o...