Quarterly Journal of Political Science

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Institutional Prices Volume 9, 4 issues (2014)

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Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Print ISSN: 1554-0626
Online ISSN: 1554-0634

Editors-in-Chief:

Keith Krehbiel
Stanford University
Personal Homepage
E-mail: krehbiel@qjps.com

Nolan McCarty
Princeton University
Personal Homepage 
E-mail: mccarty@qjps.com

Indexed in: ISI SCI, SCOPUS, Social Science Citation Index, EconLit, JEL, Current Contents/Social and Behavioral Sciences, Google Scholar, RePEc, Summon by Serials Solutions, EBSCO Discovery Service.

Note: Please read this announcement from the QJPS editors.

Volume 4, issue 3

Persistence in Political Participation

This paper uses discontinuities imposed by voting-age restrictions to identify the effect of past eligibility on subsequent participation decisions and partisan identification. It compares participation decisions and partisan affiliations of individuals who turned 18 just before past elections with
Volume 4, issue 3

Economic Shocks and Civil War

This article revisits the relationship between income per capita and civil conflict. We begin by documenting that the empirical literature identifies two different patterns. First, poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war. Second, civil war occurs when countries suffer negati...
Volume 4, issue 3

Candidate Faces and Election Outcomes: Is the Face–Vote Correlation Caused by Candidate Selection?

We estimate the effect of candidate appearance on vote choice in congressional elections using an original survey instrument. Based on estimates of the facial competence of 972 congressional candidates, we show that in more competitive races the out-party tends to run candidates with higher quality
Volume 4, issue 3

Two's Company, Three's an Equilibrium: Strategic Voting and Multicandidate Elections

In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between three or more office-seeking candidates. Recognizing that electoral equilibrium involves both candidates' and voters' strategies, we first prove existence of pure strategy electoral equilibria when candidates seek to...