Quarterly Journal of Political Science

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Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Print ISSN: 1554-0626
Online ISSN: 1554-0634

Editors-in-Chief:

Keith Krehbiel
Stanford University
Personal Homepage
E-mail: krehbiel@qjps.com

Nolan McCarty
Princeton University
Personal Homepage 
E-mail: mccarty@qjps.com

Indexed in: ISI SCI, SCOPUS, Social Science Citation Index, EconLit, JEL, Current Contents/Social and Behavioral Sciences, Google Scholar, RePEc, Summon by Serials Solutions, EBSCO Discovery Service.

Volume 8, issue 4

Electoral Rules and Clientelistic Parties: A Regression Discontinuity Approach

This paper studies the causal effect of electoral systems on the performance of clientelistic vs. programmatic parties. We argue that, contrary to majoritarian systems, proportional systems disfavor clientelistic parties as voters can hardly be pivotal for electing their local patron. We test this i...
Volume 8, issue 4

The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion

We examine how special interests, measured by campaign contributions from the mortgage industry, and constituent interests, measured by the share of subprime borrowers in a congressional district, may have influenced U.S. government policy toward subprime mortgage credit expansion from 2002 to 2007....
Volume 8, issue 4

The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850–1880

We employ a regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on close elections to estimate the rents from a seat in the U.S. Congress between 1850 and 1880. Using census data, we compare wealth accumulation among those who won or lost their first race by a small margin. We find evidence of significant r...
Volume 8, issue 4

Presidential Prospects, Political Support, and Stock Market Performance

I exploit the sudden and dramatic jolt that Osama Bin Laden's capture gave to Barack Obama's 2012 re-election prospects to gauge the relationship between presidential prospects and stock market valuation changes. Using campaign contributions as an indicator of political support, I find that followin...
Volume 8, issue 3

Who Decides? Coalition Governance and Ministerial Discretion

Who decides policy in a coalition government? Specifically, does the party occupying a ministerial portfolio control policy in that jurisdiction? This question is central to the study of coalitions but is rarely tested because of the problems in identifying and measuring policy. This paper sidesteps...
Volume 8, issue 3

Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures

While conventional wisdom holds that partisan bias in U.S. legislative elections results from intentional partisan and racial gerrymandering, we demonstrate that substantial bias can also emerge from patterns of human geography. We show that in many states, Democrats are inefficiently concentrated i...
Volume 8, issue 3

Equality of Educational Opportunity and Attitudes toward Income Inequality: Evidence from China

A substantial literature in comparative politics and political economy emphasizes the importance of income inequality in redistributive policies and regime transition. I argue that individual perceptions of equal opportunity affect the degree of resentment toward income inequality. Governments can i...
Volume 8, issue 3

Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory

This paper offers a short introduction to some of the fundamental results of social choice theory. Topics include Nash implementability, monotonic social choice correspondences, the Muller-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, anonymous and neutral social choice correspondences, sophisticated solutio...
Volume 8, issue 2

Safety in Numbers: Mainstream-Seeking Diffusion in Response to Executive Compensation Regulations

Research across subfields has explored questions of how and why one political actor's decisions are affected by others'. I investigate recent executive compensation disclosure regulations to make theoretical, substantive, and methodological contributions to the diffusion literature. I emphasize main...
Volume 8, issue 2

Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime

Lacking the informative feedback provided by competitive elections, an unfettered press and an active civil society, authoritarian regimes can find it difficult to identify which social groups have become dangerously discontented and to monitor lower levels of government. While a rise in public prot...
Volume 8, issue 2

Electoral and Policy Consequences of Voter Turnout: Evidence from Compulsory Voting in Australia

Despite extensive research on voting, there is little evidence connecting turnout to tangible outcomes. Would election results and public policy be different if everyone voted? The adoption of compulsory voting in Australia provides a rare opportunity to address this question. First, I collect two n...
Volume 8, issue 2

The Calculus of the Security Dilemma

Some scholars known as offensive realists claim that in the uncertainty of world politics, trust and cooperation between states is extremely unlikely. Others, such as defensive realists, claim that rational states are capable of finding ways to counteract the complications created by misperceptions
Volume 8, issue 1

The Vicious Cycle: Fundraising and Perceived Viability in US Presidential Primaries

Scholars of presidential primaries have long posited a dynamic positive feedback loop between fundraising and electoral success. Yet existing work on both directions of this feedback remains inconclusive and is often explicitly cross-sectional, ignoring the dynamic aspect of the hypothesis. Pairing
Volume 8, issue 1

Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule

I consider a heterogeneous federal system in which policy coordination is desirable but underprovided in the absence of a federal intervention. To improve policy coordination, the federal layer can intervene by imposing bounds on local policies. These federal bounds define a restricted policy space
Volume 8, issue 1

Legislative Responsiveness to Gerrymandering: Evidence from the 2003 Texas Redistricting

Do legislators respond to congressional redistricting? A central tenet of American legislative scholarship over the last 20 years argues that members of Congress maintain consistent ideological positions throughout their tenure, and thus do not generally adapt their voting records to changes in the
Volume 8, issue 1

Erratum