

# **Asset Allocation with Private Equity**

**Other titles in Foundations and Trends® in Finance**

*Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance*

Amil Dasgupta, Vyacheslav Fos and Zacharias Sautner

ISBN: 978-1-68083-878-7

*The Implications of Heterogeneity and Inequality for Asset Pricing*

Stavros Panageas

ISBN: 978-1-68083-750-6

*Risk Sharing Within the Firm: A Primer*

Marco Pagano

ISBN: 978-1-68083-740-7

*The Economics of Credit Rating Agencies*

Francesco Sangiorgi and Chester Spatt

ISBN: 978-1-68083-380-5

*Initial Public Offerings: A Synthesis of the Literature and Directions for Future Research*

Michelle Lowry, Roni Michaely and Ekaterina Volkova

ISBN: 978-1-68083-340-9

*Privatization, State Capitalism, and State Ownership of Business in the 21st Century*

William L. Megginson

ISBN: 978-1-68083-338-6

# Asset Allocation with Private Equity

---

**Arthur Korteweg**

University of Southern California  
korteweg@marshall.usc.edu

**Mark M. Westerfield**

University of Washington  
mwesterf@uw.edu

**now**

the essence of knowledge

Boston — Delft

## Foundations and Trends® in Finance

*Published, sold and distributed by:*

now Publishers Inc.  
PO Box 1024  
Hanover, MA 02339  
United States  
Tel. +1-781-985-4510  
[www.nowpublishers.com](http://www.nowpublishers.com)  
[sales@nowpublishers.com](mailto:sales@nowpublishers.com)

*Outside North America:*

now Publishers Inc.  
PO Box 179  
2600 AD Delft  
The Netherlands  
Tel. +31-6-51115274

The preferred citation for this publication is

A. Korteweg and M. M. Westerfield. *Asset Allocation with Private Equity*. Foundations and Trends® in Finance, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 95–204, 2022.

ISBN: 978-1-68083-969-2

© 2022 A. Korteweg and M. M. Westerfield

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers.

Photocopying. In the USA: This journal is registered at the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by now Publishers Inc for users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC). The 'services' for users can be found on the internet at: [www.copyright.com](http://www.copyright.com)

For those organizations that have been granted a photocopy license, a separate system of payment has been arranged. Authorization does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as that for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale. In the rest of the world: Permission to photocopy must be obtained from the copyright owner. Please apply to now Publishers Inc., PO Box 1024, Hanover, MA 02339, USA; Tel. +1 781 871 0245; [www.nowpublishers.com](http://www.nowpublishers.com); [sales@nowpublishers.com](mailto:sales@nowpublishers.com)

now Publishers Inc. has an exclusive license to publish this material worldwide. Permission to use this content must be obtained from the copyright license holder. Please apply to now Publishers, PO Box 179, 2600 AD Delft, The Netherlands, [www.nowpublishers.com](http://www.nowpublishers.com); e-mail: [sales@nowpublishers.com](mailto:sales@nowpublishers.com)

**Foundations and Trends<sup>®</sup> in Finance**  
Volume 13, Issue 2, 2022  
**Editorial Board**

**Editor-in-Chief**

**Sheridan Titman**  
University of Texas at Austin  
United States

**Associate Editors**

Josef Zechner  
*WU Vienna University of Economics  
and Finance*

Chester Spatt  
*Carnegie Mellon University*

## Editorial Scope

### Topics

Foundations and Trends® in Finance publishes survey and tutorial articles in the following topics:

- Corporate Finance
  - Corporate Governance
  - Corporate Financing
  - Dividend Policy and Capital Structure
  - Corporate Control
  - Investment Policy
  - Agency Theory and Information
- Financial Markets
  - Market Microstructure
  - Portfolio Theory
  - Financial Intermediation
  - Investment Banking
  - Market Efficiency
  - Security Issuance
  - Anomalies and Behavioral Finance
- Asset Pricing
  - Asset-Pricing Theory
  - Asset-Pricing Models
  - Tax Effects
  - Liquidity
  - Equity Risk Premium
  - Pricing Models and Volatility
  - Fixed Income Securities
- Derivatives
  - Computational Finance
  - Futures Markets and Hedging
  - Financial Engineering
  - Interest Rate Derivatives
  - Credit Derivatives
  - Financial Econometrics
  - Estimating Volatilities and Correlations

### Information for Librarians

Foundations and Trends® in Finance, 2022, Volume 13, 4 issues. ISSN paper version 1567-2395. ISSN online version 1567-2409. Also available as a combined paper and online subscription.

## Contents

---

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Private Equity Institutional Details</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1	Fund Partnerships . . . . .	7
2.2	Fees . . . . .	12
2.3	Secondary Markets . . . . .	18
2.4	Co-Investments, Solo LP Investments, and Alternative Vehicles . . . . .	20
<b>3</b>	<b>Modern Portfolio Theory and Private Equity</b>	<b>21</b>
3.1	Theory . . . . .	22
3.2	An Empirical Application . . . . .	25
3.3	Problems with Mean-Variance Applications in PE . . . . .	29
<b>4</b>	<b>Performance Measurement</b>	<b>30</b>
4.1	Industry-Level Performance . . . . .	30
4.2	Fund-Level Performance . . . . .	40
4.3	General Partner Skill . . . . .	53
<b>5</b>	<b>Limited Partner Returns and Pricing Power</b>	<b>57</b>
5.1	Persistent Return Differences . . . . .	58

5.2	Specific Explanations for Access and Pricing Power . . . . .	60
5.3	Differing Goals . . . . .	65
<b>6</b>	<b>Diversification and Liquidity</b>	<b>68</b>
6.1	Diversifying Cash Flows . . . . .	69
6.2	Diversifying with Hot and Cold Markets . . . . .	71
6.3	The Secondary Market . . . . .	73
6.4	Diversification Trade-Offs . . . . .	74
6.5	Buyout Booms and Busts . . . . .	77
6.6	Theories of Optimal Allocation and Liquidity Management . . . . .	82
<b>7</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>89</b>
	<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>90</b>
	<b>List of Open Questions</b>	<b>91</b>
	<b>References</b>	<b>94</b>



# Asset Allocation with Private Equity

Arthur Korteweg<sup>1</sup> and Mark M. Westerfield<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*University of Southern California, USA; korteweg@marshall.usc.edu*

<sup>2</sup>*University of Washington, USA; mwesterf@uw.edu*

---

## ABSTRACT

We survey the literature on the private equity partnership arrangement from the perspective of an outside investor (limited partner). We examine how the partnership arrangement fits into a broader portfolio of investments, and we consider the methods and difficulties in performance measurement, both at the fund level and at the asset class level. We follow with a discussion of performance persistence and the skill and pricing power of both general and limited partners. We continue by examining the limited partner's problem of managing commitments and investments over time while diversifying across funds in light of both idiosyncratic and systematic shocks. We close with a summary of recent work on optimal portfolio allocation to private equity. Throughout, we consider how empirical and theoretical work match the particular institutional details of private equity, and we identify 27 open questions to help guide private equity research forward.

---

---

Arthur Korteweg and Mark M. Westerfield (2022), "Asset Allocation with Private Equity", *Foundations and Trends*<sup>®</sup> in Finance: Vol. 13, No. 2, pp 95–204. DOI: 10.1561/05000000062.

©2022 A. Korteweg and M. M. Westerfield

# 1

---

## Introduction

---

Institutional investors allocate an increasingly large share of their portfolios to private equity (PE) investments, such as venture capital (VC) and leveraged buyouts (BO).<sup>1</sup> In the decade following the global financial crisis of 2008, pension funds and endowments nearly doubled their allocations to private equity and real estate. These allocations represented almost 20% of assets under management for pension funds in many large, developed economies in 2017 and a similar fraction for endowments of U.S. higher education institutions in 2019.<sup>2</sup> Another sign of the increasingly important role of PE in portfolios is the current debate in the U.S. over whether to allow defined contribution pension plans, such as 401(k) plans, to invest in PE. At the same time, many companies have chosen to stay, or convert to, private firms, resulting in a decline in the number of publicly listed firms (e.g., Kahle and Stulz,

---

<sup>1</sup>For the purpose of this monograph, when we say private equity, we include all types, including venture capital, buyout, real estate, private debt, infrastructure, natural resources, and others.

<sup>2</sup>See Ivashina and Lerner (2018) for pension funds. The endowment number refers to the value-weighted average allocation across endowments, per the 2019 NACUBO-TIAA Study of Endowments, <http://products.nacubo.org/index.php/leadership/2019-nacubo-tiaa-study-of-endowments.html>.

2017). The combined result of these trends is that a large share of the economy is not traded in public markets.

The purpose of this monograph is to address the central question “What is the optimal portfolio allocation to private equity?” In doing so, we have two goals. The first is to survey the literature on the private equity partnership arrangement from an investor’s perspective, including how these partnerships fit into a broader portfolio. The second is to articulate a list of open questions in the literature. We identify 27 open questions that we believe will help to push research in private equity forward.

Investing in private equity means taking a stake as a Limited Partner (LP) in a fund or other vehicle run by a General Partner (GP). These stakes are delegated investments governed by Limited Partnership Agreements (LPAs) that specify contractual arrangements, including decision-making powers and fees. There are three core features of private equity investments that distinguish them from other investments an LP might make:

- (1) The LP makes capital commitments, and the GP has discretion over when to call capital from the LP and when to distribute it. Thus, it is the intermediary (GP), not the source of capital (LP), that determines the timing of investment and the quantity invested at any particular time.
- (2) LP stakes are not easily or frequently traded with other LPs, despite a growing secondary market, and LPs cannot redeem capital from funds prematurely. Thus, there is no well defined market price to determine fund-level performance and no easy exit mechanism for LPs.
- (3) Private equity funds are all differently created, bespoke investment vehicles, and investments in main PE funds are frequently paired with co-investment or other alternative vehicles. Similarly, there is significant variation in the level and structure of fees. Thus, comparing LPs’ investments and opportunities is difficult.

Some assets share some of these difficulties – parts of real estate and some illiquid bonds, for example – but the combination of the three makes private equity particularly interesting and worth studying.

The three core features interact with each other. For example, the GP's investment discretion (1), combined with the unavailability of market prices (2), gives the GP the scope to manipulate performance measures. As a result, it is difficult to determine how much risk a GP is taking and what is their skill level. The GP's investment discretion (1), combined with the bespoke nature of funds and co-investment vehicles (3), gives the GP the ability to offer slightly different investment packages to different LPs. As a result, there is scope for both GPs and LPs to exert bargaining or pricing power. The lack of mark-to-market valuations (2), combined with the fact that private equity funds are all risky and differentiated (3), implies that investment managers (LPs, such as pension funds and endowments) can take risks that are hidden from their principals.

As will become clear, there is no simple, cookie-cutter answer to the portfolio decision question. All LPs are not created equal, and depending on factors such as size, access, and skill, the optimal portfolio weight can be zero or it can be substantial. In light of this, questions of particular interest are:

- (1) How does the LP assess performance data given the measurement and agency problems created by delegating investment decisions to the GP? For example, how does one assess a GP's skill when the timing of all capital calls and distributions are at the GP's discretion?
- (2) How should the LP understand the bargaining problem with GPs? What gives a GP or LP pricing power, and how can that be exploited?
- (3) How much of a premium do and should LPs require for their grant of liquidity and investment discretion to the GP? How much of a premium is required to accept the inevitable performance manipulation?

We have organized our monograph to lead from a description of theoretical and empirical work toward open questions. To that end, we have included a substantial number of recent and unpublished working papers in our survey.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps paradoxically, research in private equity is simultaneously incomplete and of great relevance to wider questions regarding the incentives, financing, and pricing of investments.

The monograph proceeds as follows: Section 2 contains institutional details regarding PE firms, funds, and investors. For some readers this will be a review, but we include it because the institutional details are required to understand the decision rights that the LP grants the GP and how those decisions are usually executed. We also set up a discussion of the GP's incentives which will pervade our discussion of selected data and pricing power later in the monograph.

To understand why the institutional details of PE matter for LPs, one has to understand the uses and limitations of the benchmark portfolio choice model. To this end, Section 3 reviews a standard portfolio choice model, and we show how the characteristics of PE violate the model's core assumptions.

Section 4 describes the methods and problems with measuring performance in PE. We begin with industry-level performance, describing the methods and problems in constructing a private equity index, and discuss results on the risk loadings of aggregate PE investments. We then move on to the fund level, introducing common performance measures and recent innovations. We show how performance measures fail and how they can be manipulated, both by misreporting and by changing underlying economic activity. We conclude with a discussion of GP skill and fund return persistence.

Section 5 shifts the focus from PE investments to PE investors, and we examine the returns and pricing power of LPs. A core piece of the asset allocation problem for an LP is how to choose and manage relationships with individual GPs. We begin with an examination of persistent return differences for LPs and how they have changed over time. We then discuss theories and empirical results covering LP pricing

---

<sup>3</sup>We describe the results of unpublished papers as they appear at the time of this writing, with the caveat that some of these will change significantly between their current version and their published version.

power and differential access, including liquidity, information, search, and size. We conclude with an evaluation of the different goals of various LPs, particularly the non-financial goals of public institutions.

Section 6 focuses on LPs' diversification problem and their liquidity management problem, including the role of the secondary market. How should private equity commitments be spread across funds and through time? Diversification and liquidity are strongly connected because of the particular nature of cash flow and liquidity shocks in PE. We explore the implied trade-offs at the fund level and the relationship between the fund level and aggregate activity. We examine the various types of liquidity that have been introduced in the wider finance literature and how they apply to PE. We close with a summary of some recent work on optimal portfolio allocation to PE.

## References

---

- Acharya, V. V., O. F. Gottschalg, M. Hahn, and C. Kehoe (2013). “Corporate governance and value creation: Evidence from private equity”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 26(2): 368–402.
- Agrawal, A. and P. Tambe (2016). “Private equity and workers’ career paths: The role of technological change”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 29(9): 2455–2489.
- Albertus, J. F. and M. Denes (2020). “Private equity fund debt: Capital flows, performance, and agency costs”. Unpublished working paper. Tepper School of Business.
- Albuquerque, R., J. Cassel, L. Phalippou, and E. Schroth (2018). “Liquidity provision in the secondary market for private equity fund stakes”. Unpublished working paper. Boston College, Carroll School of Management.
- Aliaga-Díaz, R., G. Renzi-Ricci, H. Ahluwalia, D. M. Grim, and C. Tidmore (2020). “The role of private equity in strategic portfolios”. *Vanguard Research*.
- Andonov, A., Y. V. Hochberg, and J. D. Rauh (2018). “Political representation and governance: Evidence from the investment decisions of public pension funds”. *The Journal of Finance*. 73(5): 2041–2086.
- Andonov, A., R. Kräussl, and J. D. Rauh (2020). “The subsidy to infrastructure as an asset class”. Unpublished working paper. University of Amsterdam.

- Ang, A., B. Chen, W. N. Goetzmann, and L. Phalippou (2018). “Estimating private equity returns from limited partner cash flows”. *The Journal of Finance*. 73(4): 1751–1783.
- Ang, A., R. J. Hodrick, Y. Xing, and X. Zhang (2006). “The cross-section of volatility and expected returns”. *The Journal of Finance*. 61(1): 259–299.
- Ang, A., D. Papanikolaou, and M. M. Westerfield (2014). “Portfolio choice with illiquid assets”. *Management Science*. 60(11): 2737–2761.
- Anson, M. J. (2002). “Managed pricing and the rule of conservatism in private equity portfolios”. *Journal of Private Equity*. 5: 18–30.
- Anson, M. J. (2007). “Performance measurement in private equity: Another look”. *Journal of Private Equity*. 10: 7–21.
- Axelson, U., T. Jenkinson, P. Strömberg, and M. S. Weisbach (2013). “Borrow cheap, buy high? The determinants of leverage and pricing in buyouts”. *The Journal of Finance*. 68(6): 2223–2267.
- Axelson, U., M. Sørensen, and P. Strömberg (2014). “Alpha and beta of buyout deals: A jump CAPM for long-term illiquid investments”. Unpublished working paper. LSE, Dartmouth, and Stockholm School of Economics.
- Axelson, U., P. Strömberg, and M. S. Weisbach (2009). “Why are buyouts levered? The financial structure of private equity funds”. *The Journal of Finance*. 64(4): 1549–1582.
- Baker, M. and P. Gompers (2003). “The determinants of board structure at the initial public offering”. *Journal of Law and Economics*. 46(2): 569–598.
- Banal-Estañol, A., F. Ippolito, and S. Vicente (2017). “Default penalties in private equity partnerships”. Unpublished working paper. Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Universidad Carlos III.
- Barber, B. M., A. Morse, and A. Yasuda (2021). “Impact investing”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 139(1): 162–185.
- Barber, B. M. and A. Yasuda (2017). “Interim fund performance and fundraising in private equity”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 124(1): 172–194.
- Barberis, N. (2000). “Investing for the long run when returns are predictable”. *Journal of Finance*. 55: 225–264.



- Barberis, N. and M. Huang (2008). “Stocks as lotteries: The implications of probability weighting for security prices”. *American Economic Review*. 98(5): 2066–2100.
- Begenau, J. and E. Siriwardane (2020). “How do private equity fees vary across public pensions?” Unpublished working paper. Stanford Graduate School of Business.
- Berk, J. B. and R. C. Green (2004). “Mutual fund flows and performance in rational markets”. *Journal of Political Economy*. 112(6): 1269–1295.
- Bernile, G., D. Cumming, and E. Lyandres (2007). “The size of venture capital and private equity fund portfolios”. *Journal of Corporate Finance*. 13(4): 564–590.
- Bernstein, S., X. Giroud, and R. R. Townsend (2016). “The impact of venture capital monitoring”. *The Journal of Finance*. 71(4): 1591–1622.
- Bernstein, S. and A. Sheen (2016). “The operational consequences of private equity buyouts: Evidence from the restaurant industry”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 29(9): 2387–2418.
- Bharath, S., A. Dittmar, and J. Sivadasan (2014). “Do going-private transactions affect plant efficiency and investment?” *The Review of Financial Studies*. 27(7): 1929–1976.
- Biesinger, M., Ç. Bircan, and A. Ljungqvist (2020). “Value creation in private equity”. Unpublished working paper. Darmstadt University of Technology.
- Black, F. and R. Litterman (1990). “Asset allocation: Combining investor views with market equilibrium”. *Fixed Income Research*, Goldman Sachs.
- Black, F. and R. Litterman (1992). “Global portfolio optimization”. *Financial Analysts Journal*. 48(5): 28–43.
- Bollen, N. P. B. and B. Sensoy (2016). “How much for a haircut? Illiquidity, secondary markets, and the value of private equity”. Unpublished working paper. Vanderbilt University.
- Boucly, Q., D. Sraer, and D. Thesmar (2011). “Growth LBOs”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 102(2): 432–453.

- Boyer, B., T. D. Nadauld, K. P. Vorkink, and M. S. Weisbach (2018). “Private equity indices based on secondary market transactions”. Unpublished working paper. Brigham Young University.
- Brandt, M. W., A. Goyal, P. Santa-Clara, and J. R. Stroud (2005). “A simulation approach to dynamic portfolio choice with an application to learning about predictability”. *Review of Financial Studies*. 18: 831–873.
- Braun, R., T. Jenkinson, and C. Schemmerl (2020). “Adverse selection and the performance of private equity co-investments”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 136(1): 44–62.
- Braun, R., T. Jenkinson, and I. Stoff (2017). “How persistent is private equity performance? Evidence from deal-level data”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 123(2): 273–291.
- Brennan, M. J. (1998). “The role of learning in dynamic portfolio decisions”. *Review of Finance*. 1: 295–306.
- Brown, G. W., E. Ghysels, and O. Gredil (2020a). “Nowcasting net asset values: The case of private equity”. Unpublished working paper. University of North Carolina and Tulane University.
- Brown, G. W., O. R. Gredil, and S. N. Kaplan (2019). “Do private equity funds manipulate reported returns?” *Journal of Financial Economics*. 132(2): 267–297.
- Brown, G., R. Harris, W. Hu, T. Jenkinson, S. N. Kaplan, and D. T. Robinson (2021). “Can investors time their exposure to private equity?” *Journal of Financial Economics*. 139(2): 561–577.
- Brown, G., W. Hu, and B.-K. Kuhn (2020b). “Private investments in diversified portfolios”. Unpublished working paper. University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill.
- Buchner, A. and R. Stucke (2014). “The systematic risk of private equity”. Unpublished working paper. University of Passau and University of Oxford.
- Campbell, J. Y. and R. J. Shiller (1988). “The dividend-price ratio and expectations of future dividends and discount factors”. *Review of Financial Studies*. 1(3): 195–228.
- Cavagnaro, D. R., B. A. Sensoy, Y. Wang, and M. S. Weisbach (2019). “Measuring institutional investors’ skill at making private equity investments”. *The Journal of Finance*. 74(6): 3089–3134.

- Chakraborty, I. and M. Ewens (2018). “Managing performance signals through delay: Evidence from venture capital”. *Management Science*. 64(6): 2875–2900.
- Chen, P., G. T. Baierl, and P. D. Kaplan (2002). “Venture capital and its role in strategic asset allocation”. *Journal of Portfolio Management*. 28: 83–89.
- Chevalier, J. A. (1995). “Do LBO supermarkets charge more? An empirical analysis of the effects of LBOs on supermarket pricing”. *The Journal of Finance*. 50(4): 1095–1112.
- Choi, W., A. Metrick, and A. Yasuda (2013). “A model of private equity fund compensation”. In: *Global Macro Economy and Finance*. Ed. by F. Allen, M. Aoki, N. Kiyotaki, R. Gordon, and J. Stiglitz. Vol. III. *International Economic Association, Proceedings of the Sixteenth World Congress*. Palgrave Macmillan. 271–286.
- Chung, J.-W. (2012). “Performance persistence in private equity funds”. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
- Chung, J.-W., B. A. Sensoy, L. Stern, and M. S. Weisbach (2012). “Pay for performance from future fund flows: The case of private equity”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 25(11): 3259–3304.
- Cochrane, J. H. (2005). “The risk and return of venture capital”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 75(1): 3–52.
- Cochrane, J. H. (2021). “Portfolios for long-term investors”. Unpublished working paper. Stanford University.
- Cohn, J. B., E. S. Hotchkiss, and E. M. Towery (2021a). “The motives for private equity buyouts of private firms: Evidence from U.S. corporate tax returns”. Unpublished working paper. UT Austin, Boston College, and University of Georgia.
- Cohn, J. B., L. F. Mills, and E. M. Towery (2014). “The evolution of capital structure and operating performance after leveraged buyouts: Evidence from U.S. corporate tax returns”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 111(2): 469–494.
- Cohn, J. B., N. Nestoriak, and M. Wardlaw (2021b). “Private equity buyouts and workplace safety”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 34(10): 4832–4875.

- Couts, S., A. S. Gonçalves, and A. Rossi (2020). “Unsmoothing returns of illiquid funds”. Unpublished working paper. University of Southern California, University of North Carolina, and University of Arizona.
- Da Rin, M. and L. Phalippou (2017). “The importance of size in private equity: Evidence from a survey of limited partners”. *Journal of Financial Intermediation*. 31: 64–76.
- Davis, S. J., J. Haltiwanger, K. Handley, R. Jarmin, J. Lerner, and J. Miranda (2014). “Private equity, jobs, and productivity”. *American Economic Review*. 104(12): 3956–3990.
- DeGeorge, F., J. Martin, and L. Phalippou (2016). “On secondary buyouts”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 120(1): 124–145.
- DeLuce, A. (2020). “Private equity fees and terms study”. Callan Institute Research Study.
- Demiroglu, C. and C. James (2012). “How important is having skin in the game? Originator-sponsor affiliation and losses on mortgage-backed securities”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 25(11): 3217–3258.
- Dimmock, S. G., N. Wang, and J. Yang (2019). “The endowment model and modern portfolio theory”. *Working Paper*. Columbia University.
- Dimson, E. (1979). “Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 7(2): 197–226.
- Driessen, J., T.-C. Lin, and L. Phalippou (2012). “A new method to estimate risk and return of nontraded assets from cash flows: The case of private equity funds”. *The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*. 47(3): 511–535.
- Dyck, A. and L. Pomorski (2015). “Investor scale and performance in private equity investments”. *Review of Finance*. 20(3): 1081–1106.
- Eaton, C., S. T. Howell, and C. Yannelis (2020). “When investor incentives and consumer interests diverge: Private equity in higher education”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 33(9): 4024–4060.
- Emery, K. M. (2003). “Private equity risk and reward: Assessing the stale pricing problem”. *The Journal of Private Equity*. 6(2): 43–50.
- Ewens, M., A. Gorbenco, and A. Korteweg (2022). “Venture capital contracts”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 143(1): 131–158.

- Ewens, M., C. M. Jones, and M. Rhodes-Kropf (2013). “The price of diversifiable risk in venture capital and private equity”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 26(8): 1854–1889.
- Ewens, M. and M. Marx (2018). “Founder replacement and startup performance”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 31(4): 1532–1565.
- Fang, L., V. Ivashina, and J. Lerner (2015). “The disintermediation of financial markets: Direct investing in private equity”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 116(1): 160–178.
- Fisher, J. D., D. M. Geltner, and R. B. Webb (1994). “Value indices of commercial real estate: A comparison of index construction methods”. *The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics*. 9(2): 137–164.
- Fracassi, C., A. Previtro, and A. W. Sheen (2020). “Barbarians at the store? Private equity, products, and consumers”. Unpublished working paper. UT Austin, Indiana University, and University of Oregon.
- Franzoni, F., E. Nowak, and L. Phalippou (2012). “Private equity performance and liquidity risk”. *The Journal of Finance*. 67(6): 2341–2373.
- Fulghieri, P. and M. Sevilir (2009). “Size and focus of a venture capitalist’s portfolio”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 22(11): 4643–4680.
- Gârleanu, N., L. Kogan, and S. Panageas (2012). “Displacement risk and asset returns”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 105(3): 491–510.
- Gârleanu, N. and L. H. Pedersen (2018). “Efficiently inefficient markets for assets and asset management”. *The Journal of Finance*. 73(4): 1663–1712.
- Geczy, C., J. Jeffers, D. K. Musto, and A. M. Tucker (2021). “Contracts with (social) benefits: The implementation of impact investing”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 142(2): 697–718.
- Geltner, D. M. (1991). “Smoothing in appraisal-based returns”. *The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics*. 4(3): 327–345.
- Geltner, D. M. (1993). “Estimating market values from appraised values without assuming an efficient market”. *Journal of Real Estate Research*. 8(3): 325–346.

- Geltner, D., B. D. MacGregor, and G. M. Schwann (2003). “Appraisal smoothing and price discovery in real estate markets”. *Urban Studies*. 40(5–6): 1047–1064.
- Getmansky, M., A. Lo, and I. Makarov (2004). “An econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 74(3): 529–609.
- Giommetti, N. and M. Sørensen (2021). “Optimal allocation to private equity”. Unpublished working paper. Copenhagen Business School.
- Glode, V. and R. C. Green (2011). “Information spillovers and performance persistence for hedge funds”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 101: 1–17.
- Goetzmann, W. N., E. Gourier, and L. Phalippou (2019). “How alternative are private markets?” Unpublished working paper. Yale School of Management.
- Goetzmann, W., J. Ingersoll, M. Spiegel, and I. Welch (2007). “Portfolio performance manipulation and manipulation-proof performance measures”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 20(5): 1503–1546.
- Gompers, P. A. (1996). “Grandstanding in the venture capital industry”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 42(1): 133–156.
- Gompers, P. A., W. Gornall, S. N. Kaplan, and I. A. Strebulaev (2020). “How do venture capitalists make decisions?” *Journal of Financial Economics*. 135(1): 169–190.
- Gompers, P. A. and J. Lerner (1997). “Risk and reward in private equity investments”. *The Journal of Private Equity*. 1(2): 5–12.
- Gompers, P., S. N. Kaplan, and V. Mukharlyamov (2016). “What do private equity firms say they do?” *Journal of Financial Economics*. 121(3): 449–476.
- Gompers, P. and J. Lerner (2000). “Money chasing deals? The impact of fund inflows on private equity valuations”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 55(2): 281–325.
- Gorbenko, A. S. and A. Malenko (2014). “Strategic and financial bidders in takeover auctions”. *The Journal of Finance*. 69(6): 2513–2555.
- Gornall, W. and I. A. Strebulaev (2020). “Squaring venture capital valuations with reality”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 135(1): 120–143.

- Gourier, E., L. Phalippou, and M. M. Westerfield (2021). “Capital commitment”. Unpublished working paper.
- Gredil, O. R. (2022). “Do private equity managers have superior information on public markets?” *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*. 57(1): 321–358.
- Gredil, O. R., Y. Liu, and B. Sensoy (2020a). “Diversifying private equity”. Unpublished working paper. The Ohio State University.
- Gredil, O., B. Griffiths, and R. Stucke (2014). “Benchmarking private equity the direct alpha method”. Unpublished working paper. Tulane University.
- Gredil, O., M. Sørensen, and W. Waller (2020b). “Evaluating private equity performance using stochastic discount factors”. Unpublished working paper. Tulane University.
- Groh, A. P. and O. Gottschalg (2011). “The effect of leverage on the cost of capital of US buyouts”. *Journal of Banking and Finance*. 35: 2099–2110.
- Grossman, S. J. and J. E. Stiglitz (1980). “On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets”. *The American Economic Review*. 70(3): 393–408.
- Guo, S., E. S. Hotchkiss, and W. Song (2011). “Do buyouts (still) create value?” *The Journal of Finance*. 66(2): 479–517.
- Gupta, A. and S. Van Nieuwerburgh (2020). “Valuing private equity investments strip by strip”. Unpublished working paper. New York University, Stern School of Business.
- Gupta, A., S. T. Howell, C. Yannelis, and A. Gupta (2020). “Does private equity investment in healthcare benefit patients? Evidence from nursing homes”. Unpublished working paper. University of Pennsylvania, NYU, and University of Chicago.
- Haddad, V., E. Loualiche, and M. Plosser (2017). “Buyout activity: The impact of aggregate discount rates”. *The Journal of Finance*. 72(1): 371–414.
- Hansen, L. P. and R. J. Hodrick (1980). “Forward exchange rates as optimal predictors of future spot rates: An econometric analysis”. *Journal of Political Economy*. 88(5): 829–853.

- Harris, R. S., T. Jenkinson, and S. N. Kaplan (2014a). “Private equity performance: What do we know?” *The Journal of Finance*. 69(5): 1851–1882.
- Harris, R. S., T. Jenkinson, S. N. Kaplan, and R. Stucke (2014b). “Has persistence persisted in private equity? Evidence from buyout and venture capital funds”. Unpublished working paper. Darden School of Business.
- Harris, R. S., T. Jenkinson, S. N. Kaplan, and R. Stucke (2018). “Financial intermediation in private equity: How well do funds of funds perform?” *Journal of Financial Economics*. 129(2): 287–305.
- Harvey, C. R. and A. Siddique (2000). “Conditional skewness in asset pricing tests”. *The Journal of Finance*. 55(3): 1263–1295.
- Hellmann, T. (2002). “A theory of strategic venture investing”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 64(2): 285–314.
- Hellmann, T., L. Lindsey, and M. Puri (2007). “Building relationships early: Banks in venture capital”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 21(2): 513–541.
- Higson, C. and R. Stucke (2012). “The performance of private equity”. Unpublished working paper. London Business School and University of Oxford.
- Hochberg, Y. V., A. Ljungqvist, and A. Vissing-Jørgensen (2014). “Informational holdup and performance persistence in venture capital”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 27(1): 102–152.
- Hochberg, Y. V. and J. D. Rauh (2012). “Local overweighting and underperformance: Evidence from limited partner private equity investments”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 26(2): 403–451.
- Hüther, N. (2021). “Do private equity managers raise funds on (sur)real returns? Evidence from deal-level data”. Unpublished working paper. Indiana University.
- Hüther, N., D. T. Robinson, S. Sievers, and T. Hartmann-Wendels (2020). “Paying for performance in private equity: Evidence from venture capital partnerships”. *Management Science*. 66(4): 1756–1782.
- Hwang, M., J. M. Quigley, and S. E. Woodward (2005). “An index for venture capital, 1987–2003”. *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy*. 4(1): 1–45.



- Inderst, R., H. M. Mueller, and F. Münnich (2006). “Financing a portfolio of projects”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 20(4): 1289–1325.
- Ivashina, V. and J. Lerner (2018). “Looking for alternatives: Pension investments around the world, 2008 to 2017”. Unpublished working paper. Harvard University.
- Janeway, W. H., R. Nanda, and M. Rhodes-Kropf (2021). “Venture capital booms and start-up financing”. *Annual Review of Financial Economics*. 13: 111–127.
- Jeffers, J., T. Lyu, and K. Posenau (2021). “The risk and return of impact investing funds”. Unpublished working paper. University of Chicago.
- Jegadeesh, N., R. Kräussl, and J. M. Pollet (2015). “Risk and expected returns of private equity investments: Evidence based on market prices”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 28: 3269–3302.
- Jenkinson, T., W. R. Landsman, B. Rountree, and K. Soonawalla (2020). “Private equity net asset values and future cash flows”. *The Accounting Review*. 95(1): 191–210.
- Jenkinson, T., M. Sousa, and R. Stucke (2013). “How fair are the valuations of private equity funds?” Unpublished working paper. University of Oxford.
- Jia, N. and D. Wang (2017). “Skin in the game: General partner capital commitment, investment behavior and venture capital fund performance”. *Journal of Corporate Finance*. 47: 110–130.
- Johannes, M., A. Korteweg, and N. Polson (2014). “Sequential learning, predictability, and optimal portfolio returns”. *Journal of Finance*. 69: 611–644.
- Kahle, K. M. and R. M. Stulz (2017). “Is the US public corporation in trouble?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 31(3): 67–88.
- Kanniainen, V. and C. Keuschnigg (2003). “The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance”. *Journal of Corporate Finance*. 9(5): 521–534.
- Kaplan, S. N. and A. Schoar (2005). “Private equity performance: Returns, persistence, and capital flows”. *The Journal of Finance*. 60(4): 1791–1823.

- Kaplan, S. N. and B. A. Sensoy (2015). “Private equity performance: A survey”. *Annual Review of Financial Economics*. 7(1): 597–614.
- Kogan, L., D. Papanikolaou, and N. Stoffman (2020). “Left behind: Creative destruction, inequality, and the stock market”. *Journal of Political Economy*. 128(3): 855–906.
- Korteweg, A. (2019). “Risk adjustment in private equity returns”. *Annual Review of Financial Economics*. 11(1): 131–152.
- Korteweg, A. (2022). “Risk and return in private equity”. Unpublished working paper. University of Southern California.
- Korteweg, A. and S. Nagel (2016). “Risk-adjusting the returns to venture capital”. *The Journal of Finance*. 71(3): 1437–1470.
- Korteweg, A. and M. Sørensen (2010). “Risk and return characteristics of venture capital-backed entrepreneurial companies”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 23(10): 3738–3772.
- Korteweg, A. and M. Sørensen (2017). “Skill and luck in private equity performance”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 124(3): 535–562.
- Kraus, A. and R. H. Litzenberger (1976). “Skewness preferences and the valuation of risk assets”. *The Journal of Finance*. 31(4): 1085–1100.
- Kroll, Y., H. Levy, and H. M. Markowitz (1984). “Mean-variance versus direct utility maximization”. *Journal of Finance*. 39: 47–61.
- Laux, C. (2001). “Limited-liability and incentive contracting with multiple projects”. *The RAND Journal of Economics*. 32(3): 514–526.
- Ledoit, O. and M. Wolf (2004). “Honey, I shrunk the sample covariance matrix”. *Journal of Portfolio Management*. 31: 110–119.
- Lee, A. (2015). “How LPs are driving private equity fundraising”. *International Financial Law Review*.
- Lerner, J., J. Mao, A. Schoar, and N. R. Zhang (2022). “Investing outside the box: Evidence from alternative vehicles in private equity”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 143(1): 359–380.
- Lerner, J. and A. Schoar (2004). “The illiquidity puzzle: Theory and evidence from private equity”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 72(1): 3–40.
- Lerner, J., A. Schoar, and W. Wongsunwai (2007). “Smart institutions, foolish choices: The limited partner performance puzzle”. *The Journal of Finance*. 62(2): 731–764.

- Lerner, J., M. Sorensen, and P. Stromberg (2011). “Private equity and long-run investment: The case of innovation”. *The Journal of Finance*. 66(2): 445–477.
- Leslie, P. and P. Oyer (2009). “Managerial incentives and value creation: Evidence from private equity”. Unpublished working paper. Stanford University.
- Levy, H. and H. M. Markowitz (1979). “Approximating expected utility by a function of mean and variance”. *American Economic Review*. 69: 308–317.
- Li, Y. (2014). “Reputation, volatility and performance persistence of private equity”. Unpublished working paper. Federal Reserve Board.
- Litvak, K. (2004). “Governance through exit: Default penalties and walkaway options in venture capital partnership agreements”. *Willamette Law Review*. 40(4): 771–778.
- Litvak, K. (2009). “Venture capital limited partnership agreements: Understanding compensation arrangements”. *The University of Chicago Law Review*. 76(1): 161–218.
- Long, A. M. and C. J. Nickels (1996). “A private investment benchmark”. Unpublished working paper. Alignment Capital Group.
- Longstaff, F. A. (2009). “Portfolio claustrophobia: Asset pricing in markets with illiquid assets”. *American Economic Review*. 99: 1119–1144.
- Lopez-de-Silanes, F., L. Phalippou, and O. Gottschalg (2015). “Giants at the gate: Investment returns and diseconomies of scale in private equity”. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*. 50(July): 377–411.
- Ma, S. (2019). “The life cycle of corporate venture capital”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 33(1): 358–394.
- Malenko, A. and N. Malenko (2015). “A theory of LBO activity based on repeated debt-equity conflicts”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 117(3): 607–627.
- Markowitz, H. (1952). “Portfolio selection”. *The Journal of Finance*. 7(1): 77–91.
- Marquez, R., V. Nanda, and M. D. Yavuz (2015). “Private equity fund returns and performance persistence”. *Review of Finance*. 19(5): 1783–1823.

- Martos-Vila, M., M. Rhodes-Kropf, and J. Harford (2019). “Financial versus strategic buyers”. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*. 54(6): 2635–2661.
- Mathews, R. D. (2006). “Strategic alliances, equity stakes, and entry deterrence”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 80(1): 35–79.
- Maurin, V., D. Robinson, and P. Strömberg (2020). “A theory of liquidity in private equity”. Unpublished working paper. Swedish House of Finance.
- McCourt, M. (2018). “Estimating skill in private equity performance using market data”. Unpublished working paper. University of Melbourne.
- McKenzie, M. and W. Janeway (2008). “Venture capital fund performance and the IPO market”. Unpublished working paper. University of Cambridge.
- Metrick, A. and A. Yasuda (2010). “The economics of private equity funds”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 23(6): 2303–2341.
- Nadauld, T. D., B. A. Sensoy, K. Vorkink, and M. S. Weisbach (2019). “The liquidity cost of private equity investments: Evidence from secondary market transactions”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 132(3): 158–181.
- Nanda, R., S. Samila, and O. Sorenson (2020). “The persistent effect of initial success: Evidence from venture capital”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 137(1): 231–248.
- Opp, C. C. (2019). “Venture capital and the macroeconomy”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 32(11): 4387–4446.
- Pastor, L. and R. F. Stambaugh (2003). “Liquidity risk and expected stock returns”. *Journal of Political Economy*. 111(3): 642–685.
- Peng, L. (2001). “Building a venture capital index”. Unpublished working paper. Pennsylvania State University.
- Peters, R. H. (2018). “Volatility and venture capital”. Unpublished working paper. Tulane University.
- Phalippou, L. (2008). “The hazards of using IRR to measure performance: the case of private equity”. Unpublished working paper. University of Oxford.
- Phalippou, L. (2009). “Beware of venturing into private equity”. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 23(1): 147–166.

- Phalippou, L. (2010). “Venture capital funds: Flow-performance relationship and performance persistence”. *Journal of Banking & Finance*. 34(3): 568–577.
- Phalippou, L. (2013). “Yale’s endowment returns: Case study in GIPS interpretation difficulties”. *The Journal of Alternative Investments*. 15(4): 97–103.
- Phalippou, L. (2014). “Performance of buyout funds revisited?” *Review of Finance*. 18(1): 189–218.
- Phalippou, L. (2020). “An inconvenient fact: Private equity returns and the billionaire factory”. *The Journal of Investing*. 30(1): 11–39.
- Phalippou, L. and O. Gottschalg (2009). “The performance of private equity funds”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 22(4): 1747–1776.
- Phalippou, L., C. Rauch, and M. Ueber (2018). “Private equity portfolio company fees”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 129(3): 559–585.
- Preqin (2016). “Preqin special report: Private capital fund terms”.
- ProPublica (2009). “Yale’s financial wizard, David Swensen, says most endowments shouldn’t try to be like Yale”. URL: <https://www.propublica.org/article/yales-financial-wizard-david-swensen-says-most-endowments-shouldnt-try-to-b>.
- Rezaei, M. A. (2020). “Optimal design of limited partnership agreements”. Unpublished working paper. University of California, Berkeley.
- Ritter, J. R. and I. Welch (2002). “A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations”. *Journal of Finance*. 57: 1795–1828.
- Robinson, D. T. and B. A. Sensoy (2013). “Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, ownership, and cash flow performance”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 26(11): 2760–2797.
- Robinson, D. T. and B. A. Sensoy (2016). “Cyclicality, performance measurement, and cash flow liquidity in private equity”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 122(3): 521–543.
- Sagi, J. S. (2021). “Asset-level risk and return in real estate investments”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 34(8): 3674–3694.
- Schillinger, P., R. Braun, and J. Cornel (2019). “Distortion or cash flow management? Understanding credit facilities in private equity funds”. Unpublished working paper. Technische Universität München and Blackrock.

- Sensoy, B. A., Y. Wang, and M. S. Weisbach (2014). “Limited partner performance and the maturing of the private equity industry”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 112(3): 320–343.
- Sharpe, W. F. (1981). “Decentralized investment management”. *The Journal of Finance*. 36(2): 217–234.
- Sørensen, M. (2007). “How smart is smart money? A two-sided matching model of venture capital”. *The Journal of Finance*. 62(6): 2725–2762.
- Sørensen, M. and R. Jagannathan (2015). “The public market equivalent and private equity performance”. *Financial Analysts Journal*. 71(4): 43–50.
- Sørensen, M., N. Wang, and J. Yang (2014). “Valuing private equity”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 27(7): 1977–2021.
- Spaenjers, C. and E. Steiner (2020). “Do private equity investors create value? Evidence from the hotel industry”. Unpublished working paper. HEC Paris and Penn State University.
- Stafford, E. (2022). “Replicating private equity with value investing, homemade leverage, and hold-to-maturity accounting”. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 35: 299–342.
- Stambaugh, R. F. (1999). “Predictive regressions”. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 54: 375–421.
- Stein, C. (1956). “Inadmissibility of the usual estimator for the mean of a multivariate normal distribution”. In: *Proceeding of the Third Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability*. Ed. by J. Neyman. Berkeley. 197–206.
- Takahashi, D. and S. Alexander (2002). “Illiquid alternative asset fund modeling”. *The Journal of Portfolio Management*. 28(2): 90–100.
- Van Binsbergen, J. H., M. W. Brandt, and R. S. J. Koijen (2008). “Optimal decentralized investment management”. *The Journal of Finance*. 63(4): 1849–1895.
- Vayanos, D. and J. Wang (2012). “Theories of liquidity”. *Foundations and Trends in Finance*. 6(4): 221–317.
- Vayanos, D. and J. Wang (2013). “Market liquidity – Theory and empirical evidence”. In: *Handbook of the Economics of Finance*. Ed. by G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. M. Stulz. Vol. 2. Elsevier. Chap. 19. 1289–1361.

- Woodward, S. E. (2009). “Measuring risk for venture capital and private equity portfolios”. Unpublished working paper. Sand Hill Econometrics.
- Xia, Y. (2001). “Learning about predictability: The effect of parameter learning on dynamic asset allocation”. *Journal of Finance*. 56: 205–246.