

Appendix

Gender Quotas in Swedish Parties

Table A1. Gender quota characteristics and implementation years in Swedish political parties.

Party	Year	Mandatory quotas and placement mandates (hard quotas)	Targets and recommendations (soft quotas)
Left party	1987	Share of women at least equal to the female share of the constituency	
	1993	Minimum 40% of either sex	
	1997	Minimum 50% female	
Social democrats	1987		Minimum representation of 40% women at all party levels
	1990		Equal representation of the sexes
	1993	50%, plus mandatory alternation of male and female names	
Green party	1987	40%	
	1997	50%, plus minus one person	
Liberal party	1974		40%
	1984		50%, plus mandatory alternation of male and female names
Christian democrats	1987		Minimum 40% of either sex
Center party	1996		Equal representation of the sexes
Conservative party	1993		Equal representation of the sexes

Source: Authors' own classification based on Krook et al. (2009) and Freidenvall et al. (2006).

Estimate of voter support

To test if there is a gender difference in preference vote support we estimate the regression equation

$$P_{it} = a_{it} + \beta_1 w_i + L_{it} + Q_{it} + \gamma_{mp} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where the outcome variable, P_{it} , is individual i 's share of the total preference votes of the party in election t . Our main parameter of interest is β_1 , the dummy variable for being a woman. It captures the difference in the proportion of preference votes received by women and men. L_{it} is vector of dummy variables for each list rank between 1 and 19 and one dummy for having a list rank of 20 or higher. To account for the fact that the effect of ranking on the proportion of preference votes could be dependent on the size of the party group, we interact these fixed effects with four categorical dummy variables for the size of the party group. Next, Q_{it} is the vector of individual control variables that we include as controls in section 6 (see also the detailed list Table A2 below).¹ Finally we include fixed effects for the interaction between election period, party and municipality to compare the preference vote difference between women and men who are on the same list in the same election.

We present the results in Table A2. Column 1 shows the results without controlling for list rank and individual level controls. In column 2 we add the controls for list rank interacted with group size, and in column 3 we add individual level controls.

Table A2. OLS estimates of the gender difference in the proportion of preference votes, 1998-2006.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Woman	-2.34 (0.18)	-1.22 (0.13)	-1.20 (0.14)
List rank F.E		x	x
Individual level controls			x
Observations	34,935	34,935	31,098

Notes: Parentheses contain robust standard errors. All coefficients are scaled up by 100 to let the point estimates be interpreted as 1.0 = 1 percentage point. All specifications include fixed effects for the interaction of year, municipality and party.

The results show that women receive fewer preference votes than men. Conditional on only the fixed effects for the interaction of year, municipality and party, women receive 2.3

¹ As we are interested in the average difference between all women and men we omit the interaction term between being a woman and having children.

percentage points fewer preference votes than men. However, about half of this difference can be attributed to men holding a higher list rank than women. The inclusion of the large set of individual controls cannot explain any of the difference between women and men.

Individual Control Variables

Table A3. Description of Control Variables

Family responsibilities	Dummy variable for having at least one child aged between 0 and 18
	Dummy variable for getting at least one (more) child between t and $t+1$
Competence	Income residual from a Mincer style regression that includes flexible controls for gender, age, occupation, education and municipality. Transformed to Z-Score. See Besley et. al. (2013) for complete description of competence measure.
Labor market changes	Dummy variable for increasing one's real income by more than 25 percentage points between t and $t+1$
	Dummy variable for changing one's sector of employment between t and $t+1$
Moving	Dummy variable for changing residence to another municipality between t and $t+1$
Age	Dummy variables for age categories of 18-29, 30-49, 50-60, 61-64, and 65 or above.
Education	Years of education
Income	Log of real income
Immigrant	Dummy variable for being foreign-born
Occupation	Dummy variables for ten employment sectors
Incumbent	Dummy variable for being elected in the previous election period
Current position/ranking within the party group	Fixed effects for each rank order on the ballot. To account for the fact that the effect of ranking on the probability of re-election could be dependent on the size of the party group, we interact these fixed effects with four categorical dummy variables for the size of the party group.

Table A4. OLS estimates of competition and probability of re-election.

	Re- Election	Top Ranked Next Election	Retention	Conditional Re-Election
Woman	-1.47 (0.99)	-1.20 (0.46)	-2.12 (0.89)	0.57 (0.96)
Woman * Competition	10.78 (4.16)	4.56 (2.05)	8.24 (3.57)	6.82* (3.92)
Competence	2.89 (0.40)	1.08 (0.22)	1.00 (0.32)	2.94 (0.45)
Women*Children	-3.29 (1.09)	-1.87 (0.63)	-2.66 (0.96)	-1.63 (1.11)
More Children	-2.08 (1.15)	-0.50 (0.68)	-0.44 (1.04)	-1.50 (1.38)
Children	2.96 (0.75)	1.34 (0.47)	1.53 (0.68)	2.03 (0.75)
Moved	-55.00 (0.72)	-10.11 (0.46)	-69.80 (0.68)	-26.30 (4.45)
Occupation Change	-0.88 (0.53)	1.68 (0.29)	-2.04 (0.47)	0.99 (0.55)
Wage Change	10.32 (0.87)	4.15 (0.58)	7.52 (0.81)	8.25 (1.14)
Age 18-29	22.42 (1.72)	7.64 (0.73)	9.08 (1.67)	23.16 (1.98)
Age 30-49	24.99 (1.39)	9.07 (0.58)	14.03 (1.26)	21.31 (1.57)
Age 50-64	23.75 (1.21)	6.29 (0.53)	14.85 (1.13)	19.24 (1.44)
Retirement age next period	-12.14 (0.93)	-5.71 (0.48)	-6.78 (0.87)	-8.87 (1.00)
Ln (Real income)	2.63 (0.31)	0.83 (0.14)	1.90 (0.28)	2.47 (0.39)
Years of Education	0.31 (0.09)	0.18 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.52 (0.11)
Immigrant	-0.55 (1.05)	-0.19 (0.60)	-1.23 (0.86)	0.26 (1.27)
Incumbent	1.69 (0.61)	0.29 (0.32)	-0.87 (0.49)	2.84 (0.70)
Observations	46,873	46,873	46,873	33,618

Notes: Parentheses contain robust standard errors. All coefficients are scaled up by 100 to let the point estimates be interpreted as 1.0 = 1 percentage point. All specifications include fixed effects for the interaction of year, municipality and party.

In Table A3, we provide the estimates from the first alternative hypothesis test together with the estimates for all individual level controls. Due to space constraint, we do exclude the 10 controls for employment sectors and the 50 dummies for list rank fixed effects interacted with party group size. Moreover, we only show the estimate for when we use the block difference in votes to measure competition. Below, we will briefly discuss these results for each group of control variables.

Starting with the competence measure from Besley et al. (2013) we can see that is strongly and positively related to career promotions, corroborating that this actually captures something that is valued in politics.

For the role of differential family responsibilities between men and women, we can see that these play a key role in explaining women's career disadvantage relative to men. The point estimates between being a woman and having children suggests that the relative career disadvantage for women with respect to being re-elected is twice as large as for those without children. This can be attributed to a lower relative retention rate for women with children. Differential family responsibilities also play a key role in women's lower probability of reaching the top ranked position. The un-interacted point estimates for having children suggest that men with children do not seem to suffer any disadvantage in their careers.

We now turn to the other factors that could lead to politicians opting out of politics. These are also important explanatory factors, especially for candidates who are retained. That both occupational change and wage change have a strong association with becoming top ranked could be explained by the fact that becoming top ranked sometimes implies that the candidates get a full time appointment as politicians.

What stands out for the age categories is that politicians that are going to retire, or have retired, are much more likely to take a step back in their political careers. For full time politicians, this might be obvious, but the relationships are too large to be explained by this small subset of politicians, which indicates that retirement is a central factor for part-time politicians taking a step back in their political careers.

Wage and education both have the expected signs. Politicians that do well in the private labor market also do well in politics. Those with higher education also seem to do much better. The size of these point estimates helps us put the estimated disadvantage of women into context. The estimate of women's average career disadvantage is of about the same as that of having ten years less education, or having half as high a wage. The estimate for being an immigrant has a weak association with all our measures.

Finally, the estimate for incumbency is very small. However, this does not say that incumbents do not hold a large career disadvantage. It is simply due to the fact that incumbency has already been factored into the current list rank. Although we cannot show these, it is worth noting that those at the top of the list do hold a very large advantage as compared to those further down the list.