Party bans: deterrence or backlash?
Evidence from the Basque Country

Online Appendix

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Appendix A

Descriptive statistics and placebo tests, local elections

Table A1: Descriptive statistics, local elections

Variable Name	Treated		Control		Total	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
Turnout	0.643	0.601	0.616	0.575	0.632	0.591
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.100)	(0.0928)	(0.107)	(0.104)
Batasuna votes	0.148	0.270	0.207	0.397	0.171	0.320
	(0.167)	(0.211)	(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.179)	(0.213)
Null votes	0.0463	0.0214	0.0444	0.0182	0.0455	0.0201
	(0.0898)	(0.0191)	(0.0904)	(0.0150)	(0.0900)	(0.0177)
Batasuna Support	0.194	0.291	0.251	0.416	0.217	0.340
	(0.165)	(0.209)	(0.179)	(0.190)	(0.173)	(0.210)
Vote Share Basque Nationalists	0.656	0.627	0.714	0.741	0.678	0.671
	(0.276)	(0.292)	(0.247)	(0.229)	(0.266)	(0.275)
V. Share Federal Left	0.0909	0.0803	0.0981	0.0717	0.0937	0.0770
	(0.127)	(0.108)	(0.119)	(0.0943)	(0.124)	(0.103)
V. Share Federal Right	0.0826	0.0625	0.0474	0.0382	0.0688	0.0530
	(0.123)	(0.0958)	(0.0800)	(0.0628)	(0.109)	(0.0852)
V. Share Other Local Parties	99.15	99.20	99.12	99.12	99.14	99.17
	(0.279)	(0.289)	(0.223)	(0.203)	(0.259)	(0.261)
Population size	10087.3	10092.2	6338.5	6567.9	8613.9	8713.5
	(38455.7)	(37998.0)	(13143.4)	(12950.6)	(31117.6)	(30760.9)
Municipalities	152	153	98	98	250	251
N	749	305	485	196	1234	501

Treated: municipalities in which Batasuna was banned in 2007. Batasuna support is the sum of Batasuna votes and Null votes. 2007 excluded from the sample. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table A2: Effects of the 2007 ban, placebo test, local elections

	Turnout	Null Votes	Batasuna Support	All Basque Nationalists
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$I(\text{Post 2007}) \times I(\text{Ban in 2007})$	0.00129	-0.00581	-0.0739	-0.0665
	(0.00525)	(0.0101)	(0.0179)	(0.0261)
$I(\text{Post 1995}) \times I(\text{Ban in 2007})$	-0.00735	0.00762	0.0174	0.0135
	(0.00603)	(0.00967)	(0.0107)	(0.0200)
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-ban presence × election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1735	1735	1735	1735
Municipalities	251	251	251	251

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. The placebo treatment is equal to zero in 1987, 1991, 1995, and equal to the treatment from 1999 onwards. Support for Batasuna is measured as the sum of Batasuna votes and Null votes, as a fraction of total votes. Nationalist support is the sum of Support for Batasuna, PNV, EA, PNV-EA, and Aralar, as a fraction of total votes. In all regressions, 2007 is excluded from the sample. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size.

	Federal Left	Federal Right	Other local parties
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$I(\text{Post 2007}) \times I(\text{Ban in 2007})$	0.00854	-0.0109	0.0756
	(0.00671)	(0.00534)	(0.0296)
$I(\text{Post 1995}) \times I(\text{Ban in 2007})$	0.00782	0.00372	-0.0312
	(0.00675)	(0.00550)	(0.0210)
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓
Pre-ban presence × election FE	✓	✓	✓
N	1735	1735	1735
Municipalities	251	251	251

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. The placebo treatment is equal to zero in 1987, 1991, 1995, and equal to the treatment from 1999 onwards. Federal left is the sum of PSOE, IU, Podemos, Los Verdes, and Equo, as a fraction of total votes. Federal Right is the sum of PP, Ciudadanos, Unidad Alavesa, Centro Democrático y Social, and UPyD. Other local parties are votes that are neither for Nationalists, Federal Left or Federal Right. In all regressions, 2007 is excluded from the sample. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size.

Table A3: Descriptive statistics, correlates of vote loss

Variable Name	Treated	Control	Total
ln(1+#Terror Attacks)	0.158	0.171	0.163
	(0.487)	(0.440)	(0.468)
Close	0.204	0.153	0.184
	(0.404)	(0.362)	(0.388)
ln(Population in 2007)	7.293	7.700	7.452
	(1.737)	(1.461)	(1.644)
Batasuna Support in 2003	0.152	0.164	0.157
	(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.150)
Municipalities	153	98	251

Treated: municipalities in which Batasuna was banned in 2007. Standard deviations in parentheses. Batasuna support is the sum of Batasuna votes and Null votes (in 2003, Null Votes). # Terror attacks is the number of ETA attacks in the municipality in the 10 years prior to the 2007 ban. Close is a dummy equal to one if in 2003, the absolute difference in vote share between Federal and Basque parties was below 10%. The source of information about the ETA attacks is the Global Terrorism Database.

Robustness check: regional elections - descriptive statistics and results

This section reports the effects of a longer ban in local elections on support for Batasuna in the Basque regional elections. This exercise is useful for two reasons. The first is that there was one regional election in 2005, just two years before the 2007 ban, which allows me to test whether treated and control municipalities were performing differently shortly before the treatment. The second reason is that Batasuna presented a common regional candidature across municipalities, which makes support for Batasuna in regional elections a better measure of preferences and support for the political movement. In addition to considerations of identity (Basque elections are seen as national elections for Basque Nationalists), Basque regional elections are high-stake elections, where Batasuna can obtain a significant share of the seats and wield influence, as opposed to the Spanish General elections and the European elections.[1]

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[1]Batasuna did not always contest the Spanish elections. For instance, in 2000, in the last Spanish election before the 2003 ban, it asked voters not to participate.

At the regional level, Batasuna was banned for one election, but its legal status remained the same across all municipalities.

To estimate this effect, I use data on the municipal results of regional elections in the Basque Country from 1986 to 2012, which present a very similar party system to that of the local elections.[2] At the regional level, Batasuna escaped the ban in 2005 and so could contest that regional election, but it could not do so in 2009, when it called for a null vote, as it did in the local elections during the ban. Hence, I measure support in 2009 with the share of null votes, and to be consistent across years I define support for Batasuna as $\frac{Batasuna\ votes + Null\ votes}{Total\ votes}$.

I compare differences in support before (1986-2005) and after the heterogeneous enforcement of the ban in local elections (2009-2012), according to the legal status of Batasuna in the 2007 local election. The main summary statistics for either group are displayed in table A4. Table A5 reports difference-in-differences estimates. Column 1 in table A5 reports that a longer ban at the local level leads to less support in regional elections. The effect is small compared to local elections, where Batasuna is usually more successful, but still meaningful and significant. A longer ban reduced the support for Batasuna by 1.2pp, which is slightly less than 5% of their post-ban average support, and 7% of its standard deviation. In column 2, I add a lead of the treatment variable to see whether treatment and control municipalities were performing differently in the 2005 regional elections, just two years before the 2007 ban. The point estimate shows that this was not the case, supporting the common trends assumption.

The subsequent columns account for the decrease in vote for Batasuna under the ban, revealing a very similar pattern to that presented by the local elections: the point estimate falls from -0.0115 to 0.00144 after accounting for differences in voting behavior across treated and control municipalities in the 2007 local election.

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[2]The electoral districts are the three provinces making up the Basque Autonomous Community: Araba/Álava, Bizkaia/Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa/Guipúzcoa, and the electoral rule is d'Hondt within each district. Regional elections took place in 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2012.

Table A4: Descriptive statistics, regional elections

Variable Name	Treated		Control		Total	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
Turnout	0.735	0.699	0.736	0.693	0.736	0.697
	(0.0923)	(0.0743)	(0.0894)	(0.0705)	(0.0911)	(0.0728)
Batasuna votes	0.205	0.176	0.248	0.204	0.222	0.187
	(0.134)	(0.210)	(0.130)	(0.228)	(0.134)	(0.217)
Batasuna Support	0.205	0.250	0.248	0.299	0.222	0.269
	(0.134)	(0.174)	(0.130)	(0.171)	(0.134)	(0.174)
Null votes	0.00538	0.0786	0.00507	0.0989	0.00526	0.0865
	(0.00897)	(0.108)	(0.00510)	(0.125)	(0.00768)	(0.116)
Population size	8238.0	7965.3	5173.3	5171.8	7034.1	6874.6
	(31561.8)	(29896.8)	(10771.1)	(10351.1)	(25540.8)	(24242.7)
Municipalities	152	153	98	98	250	251
N	898	306	581	196	1479	502

Treated: municipalities in which Batasuna was banned in 2007. Batasuna support is the sum of Batasuna votes and Null votes. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table A5: Effects of the 2007 ban on support for Batasuna in regional elections

	Batasuna Support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$I(\text{Post } 2007) \times I(\text{Ban in } 2007)$	-0.0115	-0.0125	-0.0125	0.000398
	(0.00583)	(0.00428)	(0.00428)	(0.00581)
$I(\text{Post } 2005) \times I(\text{Ban in } 2007)$		0.00113	0.00111	0.00109
		(0.00453)	(0.00453)	(0.00453)
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-ban presence × election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
$I(\text{Post } 2007) \times$ Pre-ban Support (local)			✓	✓
$I(\text{Post } 2007) \times$ Support in 2007 (local)				✓
N	1981	1981	1979	1979
Municipalities	251	251	250	250

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. In 2009, the vote share of Batasuna is computed as the share of null votes. Pre-ban support and support in 2007 refer to local elections. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size.

Descriptive statistics and placebo tests, street violence

Table A6: Descriptive statistics, street violence, monthly

Variable Name	Treated		Control		Total	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
I(Street Terrorist Episode)	0.0297	0.0401	0.0290	0.0466	0.0294	0.0427
	(0.170)	(0.196)	(0.168)	(0.211)	(0.169)	(0.202)
# Street Terrorist Episodes	0.0558	0.0705	0.0361	0.0583	0.0481	0.0657
	(0.428)	(0.463)	(0.232)	(0.297)	(0.365)	(0.406)
Municipalities	153	153	98	98	251	251
N	1989	2142	1274	1372	3263	3514

Treated: municipalities in which Batasuna was banned in 2007. The unit of observation is a month by municipality. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table A7: Effects of the 2007 ban on street violence, placebo test

	ST Episodes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
I(Post May 2007) $\times$ I(Ban in 2007)	0.204	0.000162	-0.0155
	(0.0813)	(0.0197)	(0.0196)
I(Post October 2006) $\times$ I(Ban in 2007)	-0.00966	-0.00966	-0.00966
	(0.0191)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)
Sample	Until May 2007	Full	Except May 2007
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓
Pre-ban presence $\times$ Month FE	✓	✓	✓
N	3500	6750	6500
Municipalities	250	250	250

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. The dependent variable is given by the monthly number of street terrorism attacks.

	I(ST Episode)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
I(Post May 2007) $\times$ I(Ban in 2007)	0.113	0.00277	-0.00574
	(0.0390)	(0.0119)	(0.0119)
I(Post October 2006) $\times$ I(Ban in 2007)	-0.0163	-0.0163	-0.0163
	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)
Sample	Until May 2007	Full	Except May 2007
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓
Pre-ban presence $\times$ Month FE	✓	✓	✓
N	3500	6750	6500
Municipalities	250	250	250

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if there is one or more episode of street terrorism in a month.

Additional robustness tests and heterogeneity analyses

Table A8: Effect on null votes, 2003 ban

	Null Votes (1)	Null Votes (2)	Batasuna Support (3)
$I(\text{Year}=2003) \times I(\text{Ban in 2007})$	-0.0110 (0.0191)	0.0202 (0.0188)	0.00597 (0.0163)
$I(\text{Post 2007}) \times I(\text{Ban in 2007})$			-0.0676 (0.0206)
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓		
Pre-ban presence × election FE		✓	✓
Sample	Until 2003	Until 2003	Full
N	1234	1234	1735
Municipalities	250	250	251

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. In all regressions, 2007 is excluded from the sample. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size.

Table A9: Entropy Balancing estimates

	Batasuna Support (1)	All Basque Nationalists (2)
$I(\text{Post 2007}) \times I(\text{Ban in 2007})$	-0.0683 (0.0280)	-0.0625 (0.0283)
Municipality FE	✓	✓
Pre-ban presence × election FE	✓	✓
N	1659	1659
Municipalities	237	237

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Support for Batasuna is measured as the sum of Batasuna votes and Null votes, as a fraction of total votes. Nationalist support is the sum of Support for Batasuna, PNV, EA, PNV-EA, and Aralar, as a fraction of total votes. In all regressions, 2007 is excluded from the sample. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size. Estimates weighted according to entropy balance weights, as described in the text.

Table A10: Allowing for heterogeneous post-ban effects

	Batasuna Support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
I(Post 2007) $\times I$(Ban in 2007)	-0.0630	-0.0698	-0.0694	-0.0702
	(0.0188)	(0.0176)	(0.0177)	(0.0185)
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-ban presence $\times$ election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-ban characteristics $\times$ Post 2007	Population, Terror, and Street Violence attacks	Nationalists, Batasuna, and Spanish parties vote shares	All	All + pairwise interactions
N	1733	1733	1733	1733
Municipalities	250	250	250	250

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Support for Batasuna is measured as the sum of Batasuna votes and Null votes, as a fraction of total votes. Population is measured with the average municipality size before the ban. Terror attacks are measured with the log of terror attacks from 1997 to 2006, Street Violence attacks are measured with the log of street violence attacks from April 2006 to April 2007. All political variable controls are pre-2003 averages. Nationalist support is the sum of Support for Batasuna, PNV, EA, PNV-EA, and Aralar, as a fraction of total votes. Spanish support is the sum of support for PP, CDS, UA, PSOE, PSOE, and IU, as a fraction of total votes. In all regressions, 2007 is excluded from the sample. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size. Estimates weighted according to entropy balance weights, as described in the text.

Table A11: Heterogeneous effects by pre-ban support

	Batasuna Support	
	(1)	(2)
I(Year $\geq$ 2007) $\times I$(Ban in 2007)	-0.0641	-0.0777
	(0.0182)	(0.0185)
I(Year $\geq$ 2007) $\times I$(Ban in 2007) $\times$ Pre-Ban Support	0.0649	0.203
	(0.177)	(0.194)
I(Year $\geq$ 2007) $\times I$(Ban in 2007) $\times$ Variance of Pre-Ban Support		-2.433
		(0.592)
Municipality FE	✓	✓
Pre-ban presence $\times$ election FE	✓	✓
I(Year $\geq$ 2007) $\times$ Pre-Ban Support	✓	✓
I(Year $\geq$ 2007) $\times$ Variance of Pre-Ban Support		✓
N	1476	1476
Municipalities	249	249

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Support for Batasuna is measured as the sum of Batasuna votes and Null votes. Pre-ban support is a 1987-1999 average. All interacted variables are in deviations with respect to the cross-sectional mean. Range of pre-ban support: [-0.215,0.532]. Range of (de-meaned) variance of pre-ban support: [-0.0102,0.2626]. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size. Sample: excluding 2003 and 2007.

Appendix B

Instrumental variables estimates

The heterogeneous enforcement of the ban in 2007 is related to the ability of the local party to find candidates without links with Batasuna in the past. Although the criteria employed by the public prosecutor for denouncing local lists was only known ex-post (i.e. after presenting the lists), Batasuna would have been able to anticipate these arguments. Indeed, their strategy was to deny any connection with EAE-ANV until the Courts had taken a final decision. If the ability to find *clean* candidates is related to the level of support for Batasuna, then this is absorbed by the municipality fixed effects, and D-i-D delivers the causal effect of interest. But if the differential ability is related to an unobservable change in support at the moment of the ban, then $E(\epsilon_{mt_{\text{Post 2007}}} - \epsilon_{mt_{\text{Pre 2007}}}|\text{Ban in 2007}) < E(\epsilon_{mt_{\text{Post 2007}}} - \epsilon_{mt_{\text{Pre 2007}}}|\text{Legal in 2007})$ and D-i-D would overestimate the negative effects of the ban on political support. To see whether this is the case, I use the rule established by the public prosecutor to denounce the Batasuna (EAE-ANV) lists to construct an instrument that relies on a weaker identification assumption.

In May 2007, the public prosecutor, drawing on police reports about links between the EAE-ANV lists and the previously banned organizations, sent a report to the Supreme Court aimed at preventing a number of EAE-ANV candidates from standing at that month's local election. In the preamble, the public prosecutor states his intention of denouncing lists when:

*"... from a **quantitative** point of view, at least three candidates with a relevant and direct relation with the banned party, including candidates in recent elections or party officials. To reach this figure, in principle, the elections before 1995 are not taken into account, nor the candidates known to belong to EAE-ANV"*

*"from a **qualitative** point of view, that any of the candidates participating in previous elections in direct representation of the banned parties had been elected and have had an institutional role (mayor, councilor, regional MP, provincial MP), which in itself is doubly indicative of their occupying a relevant place on the electoral lists; and, therefore, of their importance in the structure of the banned organization, and that is socially identified as a party official of the banned party, which grants the whole candidature a continuity that*

frustrates the execution of the verdict dictated by the Supreme Court"

In short, the public prosecutor denounced all lists with three or more former Batasuna candidates, among whom at least one had been elected as a councilor or MP for Batasuna in the past. Although the public prosecutor did not strictly adhere to this rule and not all lists denounced by the public prosecutor ended up being banned, this criterion based on observables and set ex-post (i.e. after the lists were presented) is a good predictor of decision subsequently taken by the Supreme Court, which gave rise to the actual heterogeneity in the legal status of Batasuna in the 2007 local election.[3] The definition of links used by the public prosecutor refers to candidates in the 1995 and 1999 local elections, considering the candidates on the lists of the banned candidatures in 2003 as merely minor links, although the latter had also received media attention before the prosecutor issued this report.[4] Note also that the measure of such links simply requires a comparison of names across electoral lists and the results for different years, and, hence, it is perfectly observable and does not depend on police investigations.

I collect data on the quantity and quality of the links of each municipal list with previously banned organizations from two sources. The first corresponds to the report made by the public prosecutor, which contains information about the lists denounced.[5] The second is a media report, which also contains information for the remaining candidatures.[6] I combine data from the two sources, taking the largest number of links as the true value for those municipalities for which information is available in both sources. For those municipalities for which there is no information available and where Batasuna was legal in 2007, I assume there were no links at all. For those municipalities for which there is no information available and which were not present in 2007, I assume that the number of links is equal to the size of the electoral list. Figure 1 shows the evolution over time of Batasuna's electoral presence in four groups of municipalities, according to their number of former councilors (FCo) and former candidates (FCa). It shows that the group with three or more former candidates and one or more former councilors is the group that that was hit hardest by the 2007 ban, which is

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[3]In addition to the public prosecutor, the State Lawyer also presented her own report to the Supreme Court, which largely overlaps with that of the public prosecutor, but without stating any precise criteria.

[4]El País, April 2007.

[5]Link to the formal denounciation, accessed April 13, 2016.

[6]Link to media information, accessed April 13, 2016.

consistent with the criteria stated by the public prosecutor. Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of the electoral support for Batasuna for the same groups of municipalities. The figure shows how the group that was most affected by the ban -with three or more former candidates and one or more former councilors- was typically the third group with most support before the ban, but it became the group with the lowest level of support afterwards, starting in 2007 and persisting after the end of the ban. Hence, this is both the group that was hit hardest by the ban and whose relative performance was worse on the lifting of the ban.

**Figure 1: Electoral presence, by number of links**

Figure 2: Electoral support, by number of links

I exploit this criteria, based on observables, to construct an instrument for Batasuna being legal in 2007, as follows. To simplify notation, I write the model in first differences, where Δ is the difference between the average post-ban level of support and the average pre-ban level of support. The reduced form reads as follows:

$$\Delta Support_m = \gamma I(FormerCouncilors_m \geq 1) + \pi I(FormerCandidates_m \geq 3)$$
$$+ \theta\big(I(FormerCouncilors_m \geq 1) \times I(FormerCandidates_m \geq 3)\big) + \Delta \epsilon_m$$

Because the public prosecutor denounces lists with (a) at least one former councilor and (b) three or more former candidates, the excluded instrument is the interaction of (a) and (b). The IV is a triple difference estimator (DiDiD) given by:

$$\hat{\theta}^{DiDiD} = [\Delta \overline{Supp}_{FCa\geq 3}^{FCo\geq 1} - \Delta \overline{Supp}_{FCa<3}^{FCo\geq 1}] - [\Delta \overline{Supp}_{FCa\geq 3}^{FCo=0} - \Delta \overline{Supp}_{FCa<3}^{FCo=0}]$$

where $Supp$ stands for support for Batasuna, FCo stands for Former Councilors and FCa stands for Former Candidates.

Its expectation is given by:

$$E(\theta_m|FCo \geq 1, FCa \geq 3) + [E(\Delta \epsilon_{m_{FCa\geq 3}} - \Delta \epsilon_{m_{FCa<3}}|FCo \geq 1)] - [E(\Delta \epsilon_{m_{FCa\geq 3}} - \Delta \epsilon_{m_{FCa<3}}|FCo = 0)]$$

Therefore, the identification assumption is that:

$$E[\Delta \epsilon_m|FCa_m \geq 3, FCo_m \geq 1] - E[\Delta \epsilon_m|FCa_m < 3, FCo_m \geq 1]$$
$$= E[\Delta \epsilon_m|FCa_m \geq 3, FCo_m = 0] - E[\Delta \epsilon_m|FCa_m < 3, FCo_m = 0]$$

Namely, that the pre-post difference in unobservables between those with more and less than three former candidates is the same for those with a former councilor and those without a former councilor. This is a parallel trend assumption for the change in the outcome (rather than for the outcome), over the number of former candidates (rather than over time), between those with a former councilor and those without. Table A12 reports descriptive statistics for each of these variables, by 2007 legal status.

Table A12: Descriptive statistics, linked candidates

Variable Name	Treated	Control	Total
I(Former Councilor)	0.915	0.265	0.661
	(0.280)	(0.444)	(0.474)
Former Candidates	5.229	1.316	3.701
	(1.819)	(1.118)	(2.481)
I(Former Candidates ≤ 3)	0.954	0.153	0.641
	(0.210)	(0.362)	(0.481)
I(Former Councilor)$\times$ I(Former Candidates≤ 3)	0.895	0.0408	0.562
	(0.307)	(0.199)	(0.497)
Municipalities	153	98	251

Treated: municipalities in which Batasuna was banned in 2007. For banned municipal-
ities with no information, I(Former Councilor)=1 and Former Candidates=List size.
Standard deviations in parentheses.

In practice, instead of first-differences I use fixed effects and interact all the relevant variables with a post-2007 dummy. I also include fixed effects (interacted with a post 2007 dummy) for the number of former candidates, so that the comparison is within municipalities with the same number of former candidates. Table A13 reports the first stage, which indicates that the interaction between more than three former candidates and a former councilor (i.e., the excluded instrument) predicts well the legal status in 2007. Table A14 reports instrumental variables results. Column 1 reports the baseline results, corresponding to the specification in table A13. Although the results are imprecise, the point estimate is qualitatively similar to the difference-in-differences estimate in table 1, albeit slightly larger in magnitude (8pp vs. 6pp). In column 2, I separately control for the number of former candidates for those with at least one former councilor and for those without. This is analogous to including group-specific trends in a standard difference-in-differences regression, and the results, which are similar, suggest that the identification assumption is plausible. In column 3, I exclude from the sample those municipalities for which I had no information on links and were not present in 2007 (and for which I assumed that the number of links was equal to the size of the electoral list); in column 4, I consider only municipalities with two or three former candidates. Overall, these estimates, although imprecise, suggest that the difference-in-differences estimates are not biased upwards and are capturing a causal effect of the total effect of the 2007 ban on electoral support.

Table A13: First Stage

	(1)
	$I(\text{Post } 2007) \times I(\text{Ban in } 2007)$
$I(FCo \geq 1) \times I(FCa \geq 3) \times I(\text{Post } 2007)$	0.473
	(0.134)
Municipality FE	✓
Year FE	✓
Former Candidates FE $\times$ I(Post 2007)	✓
$I(FCo \geq 1) \times$ I(Post 2007)	✓
Kleibergen-Paap F	12.454
N	1735
Municipalities	251

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. 2007 is excluded from the sample. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size.

Table A14: Instrumental Variables estimates, support in local elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Batasuna Support	Batasuna Support	Batasuna Support	Batasuna Support
$I(\text{Post } 2007) \times I(\text{Ban in } 2007)$	-0.0883	-0.106	-0.107	-0.160
	(0.0909)	(0.0638)	(0.0643)	(0.0789)
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Former Candidates FE $\times$ I(Post 2007)	✓	✓	✓	✓
$I(FCo \geq 1) \times$ I(Post 2007)	✓	✓	✓	✓
$FCa \times I(FCo \geq 1) \times$ I(Post 2007)		✓	✓	
Excluding missing links			✓	
Only $FCa = 2$ or $FCa = 3$				✓
Kleibergen-Paap F	12.454	26.069	25.745	19.018
N	1735	1735	1412	450
Municipalities	251	251	203	65

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Support for Batasuna is measured as the sum of Batasuna votes and Null votes. In all regressions, 2007 is excluded from the sample. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size.

Figure 3 displays the first stage and the reduced form. Circle sizes are proportional to the number of municipalities in each group, which is quite heterogeneous. In the figure, former candidates are normalized (Normalised Former Candidates=–(Former Candidates–2)). Except for one outlier (corresponding to one municipality) at -4 normalized former candidates, which column 4 in table A14 shows is not driving the results, most of the action comes from the difference in legal status for those with 3 or 4 former candidates (-1 or -2 normalized candidates in the graph). It is within this group that the differences in legal status due to having a former councilor emerge, and it is within this group (in particular, for those with 3 former candidates, or -1 normalized former candidates in the figure) that I observe the differences in support driving the results.

Figure 3: Effect of the 2007 ban on support for Batasuna, local electons, IV

First Stage, Legal in 2007

Legend:
- Former Councilor
- No Former Councilors

Note: Normalized Former Candidates= −(Former Candidates−2)
Circle sizes proportional to #municipalities per group

Reduced form, (Support Post − Support Pre)

Legend:
- Former Councilor
- No Former Councilors

Note: Normalized Former Candidates= −(Former Candidates−2)
Circle sizes proportional to #municipalities per group

Regarding the effect on support in regional elections, table A15 reports instrumental variables estimates. Column 1 reports the baseline results, corresponding to the first stage specification in table A13. Although the results are imprecise, the point estimate is qualitatively similar to the difference-in-differences estimate in column 1 of table A5. In column 2, I separately control for the number of former candidates for those with at least one former councilor and for those without, which is analogous to including group-specific trends in a standard difference-in-differences regression. In column 3, I exclude from the sample those municipalities for which I had no information on links and were not present in 2007 (and for which I assumed that the number of links was equal to the size of the electoral list); in column 4, I consider only municipalities with two or three former candidates. The results are quite stable across specifications, with point estimates ranging between 1pp and 2pp.

Table A15: Instrumental Variables estimates, support in regional elections

	(1) Batasuna Support	(2) Batasuna Support	(3) Batasuna Support	(4) Batasuna Support
$I(\text{Post 2007}) \times I(\text{Ban in 2007})$	-0.0216	-0.0182	-0.0114	-0.0150
	(0.0307)	(0.0227)	(0.0223)	(0.0281)
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Former Candidates FE $\times$ I(Post 2007)	✓	✓	✓	✓
$I(FCo \geq 1) \times$ I(Post 2007)	✓	✓	✓	✓
$FCa \times I(FCo \geq 1) \times$ I(Post 2007)		✓	✓	
Excluding missing links			✓	
Only $FCa = 2$ or $FCa = 3$				✓
Kleibergen-Paap F	11.425	21.182	20.724	14.416
N	1981	1981	1609	514
Municipalities	251	251	203	65

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. All regressions control for a cubic in municipality size.