

# Supplementary Appendix for “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents”

This appendix contains a summary of the procedures by which we compiled the data in Table 1 in the main text (A.1), a summary of the various methods of electoral manipulation that we encountered in the cases that we coded as executive takeovers in Table 1 (A.2), proofs of those technical results that do not follow directly from the discussion in the text (B.1-B.2), and additional empirical tests and results for the candidate choice experiments (C.1-D.1).

## A.1 Table 1

We compiled Table 1 by examining all downward changes from the “Free” or “Partly Free” rating in Freedom House’s annual rating of democracy around the world for all available years (1973-2018). Whenever available, we used Freedom House’s justifications for a status change in its annual reports (Freedom House 1978-2019) as well as independent sources to categorize each downgrade into one of several categories. These categories are based on similarities in the nature of the political process that led to the downgrade (actors and institutions involved, stated motives, etc.) and emerged in the process of iterative reclassification of these downgrades by the author and multiple research assistants.

Based on the total 197 downgrades, we identified five distinct categories: executive takeovers (88 cases), military coups (46 cases), anarchy/instability (21 cases), authoritarian deliberations (15 cases), and civil war/violence (14 cases). We explain the distinction between executive takeovers and military coups in the main text; anarchy/instability refers

to instability due to organized crime, state failure, collapse of key political institutions, etc.; authoritarian deliberalizations occur when an unelected authority, typically a monarch or a military leader, limit electoral competition and/or civil liberties; civil war/violence refers to instances of civil war and ethnic violence. The remaining 13 downgrades were either ambiguous, occurred due to a change in Freedom House's methodology in 1993, or appear to be in error.

The complete data is available for download at the author's personal website:  
<http://campuspress.yale.edu/svolik/>.

## A.2 The Menu of Manipulation

This is a comprehensive list of the various methods of electoral manipulation that we encountered in the cases that we coded as executive takeovers in Table 1. This evidence supports two points that motivate our theoretical analysis: i) *it is pre-election manipulation (rather than election-day fraud) that is the primary method by which incumbents subvert democracy*, with election-day fraud serving as a measure of last resort; ii) *pre-election manipulation encompasses a diverse number of incremental and complementary forms that jointly add up to an "uneven playing field" that systematically undermines the fairness of electoral competition by favoring the incumbent.*

### 1. Measures targeting the opposition:

- *Barring of opposition parties and groups*: a ban on religious parties (Tunisia 1998); barring opposition parties from registering due to false pretenses (Kyrgyzstan 2000, Uzbekistan 1992); barring potential candidates from registering due to false pretenses (Azerbaijan 2003, Kyrgyzstan 2000, Tunisia 1998); barring specific opponents from competing as candidates (Iran 1987, Iran

1981); an outright ban of some or all opposition parties (Mauritania 2003, Cambodia 1995, Lebanon 1995, Uzbekistan 1992, Turkmenistan 1992, Sudan 1983, Djibouti 1982, The Gambia 1981, Madagascar 1978, Madagascar 1976, Cameroon 1976, Sri Lanka 1975); restrictions on the activities of political parties (Liberia 1988); barring elected opposition lawmakers from taking their seats (Venezuela 2016); the expulsion by the supreme court of the main opposition candidate in a presidential election from his party (Nicaragua 2018).

- *Limits on the activities of opponents during elections:* Burundi 2014, Ethiopia 201; opposition candidates detained around the election (Mauritania 2003); limits on opposition party's access to media during the campaign (Cote d'Ivoire 1993); nominally allowing candidates of all ethnicities to compete, but one ethnicity dominates (Djibouti 1984); parliamentary candidates selected from state lists only (Kazakhstan 1994); administrative districts redrawn to limit the influence of ethnic minorities (Slovakia 1996); representatives of opposition parties barred from polling stations (Mauritania 2003); the use a state of emergency to restrict the opposition's campaign (Sri Lanka 1982).
- *Changes to the electoral system that disadvantage the opposition:* El Salvador 1976; attempts move from PR to FPTP to avoid the need for coalition partners (Slovakia 1996); extreme gerrymandering (Malaysia 1974); shortened campaign season (Kazakhstan 1994, Cote d'Ivoire 1993); allowing for only non-partisan candidates in legislative elections (Cote d'Ivoire 1987, Kenya 1986, Comoros 1984, Djibouti 1984); parliamentary seats set aside to be appointed by the president (Egypt 1993); strategic postponing of local elections (Senegal 2008, Ukraine 2010); the president alters the order of parliamentary and presidential elections (Guinea 1993); a single-party legislature gets the authority to nominate

presidential candidates (Turkmenistan 1992); change in parliamentary rules on coalition formation (Ukraine 2010); support for puppet opposition parties (Uzbekistan 1992).

- *Intimidation:* Gambia 2011, Tanzania 1993; opposition members arrested (Burundi 2014, Bahrain 2009, Zambia 1993, Uzbekistan 1992, Cote d'Ivoire 1987, Sudan 1983, Vanuatu 1982, Sri Lanka 1982, The Gambia 1981, India 1975, Venezuela 2016, Serbia 2018); opposition leaders barred from leaving the country (Gabon 2009); opposition members conscripted (Cote d'Ivoire 1987); political opponents executed (Iran 1981); opponents/critics prosecuted on false pretenses (Burundi 2014, Ukraine 2010, Kyrgyzstan 2009, Philippines 2005, Russia 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2000, Cambodia 1995); the government foments gang violence against opposition (Malta 1982); mass arrests prior to a planned opposition protest (Nepal 1993); an opposition leader killed under suspicious circumstances (Nepal 1993); state of emergency used to prosecute opposition (India 1975); mobs used to intimidate opposition (Paraguay 1987); political opposition threatened with violence (Kyrgyzstan 2009, Cote d'Ivoire 1993, Yugoslavia - Serbia and Montenegro 1993, Uzbekistan 1992, Paraguay 1987, Kenya 1986, Djibouti 1984, Iran 1981, Paraguay 1976); troops used to suppress protestors (Bolivia 1995); the adoption of a law that allows for the harassment of the opposition and minority groups (Uganda 2014); individuals associated with the opposition referendum campaign were harassed and arrested (Turkey 2017); a prominent politician brutally beaten (Serbia 2018); politicized audits of several opposition parties (Hungary 2018).
- *Increasing the incumbent's control over the electoral administration:* the creations of election commissions that favor the incumbent's party (Ukraine

2010, Azerbaijan 2004, Venezuela 2016); attempts to influence a nominally independent election supervisor to favor the ruling party (Antigua and Barbuda 1991, Nicaragua 2018); lifetime appointments to the electoral commission by the president (Liberia 1988); limits on the ability of election observers to monitor polls (Azerbaijan 2004, Zimbabwe 2001); preventing the formation of an independent electoral commission (Mauritania 2003); the parliament passed a judicial reform bill that allowed governing party-dominated judicial bodies to replace most electoral commission judges (Turkey 2017).

- *Privileges for incumbent party members*: selective benefits in all elements of civic life to members of ruling party (Paraguay 1987); pressuring civil servants to become members of the ruling party (Nicaragua 2018); the ruling party abused state resources for campaigning (Hungary 2018).

## **2. Measures targeting the civil society:**

- *Censorship and media control*: Russia 2004, Kazakhstan 1994, Cape Verde 1987, Cote d'Ivoire 1987, Comoros 1984, Djibouti 1984, Sudan 1983, Vanuatu 1982, Djibouti 1982, Gambia 2011, Ukraine 2010, Ethiopia 2010, Tanzania 1993, Liberia 1988, Turkey 2017; censorship of domestic and foreign media (Tunisia 1998); newspapers censored (Uzbekistan 1992, India 1975); censoring of ostensibly anti-Islamic material to co-opt members of an Islamic opposition (Egypt 1993); media coverage biased in favor of the incumbent during an election (Azerbaijan 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2000, Ethiopia 1993, Malaysia 1974, Yugoslavia - Serbia and Montenegro 1993); media ownership used to avoid coverage of political scandals (Antigua and Barbuda 1991); government control of radio broadcasts (Liberia 1988, Cote d'Ivoire 1987, Maldives 1987, Kenya

1986, Comoros 1984, Sudan 1983, Vanuatu 1982, Sri Lanka 1982); government control of television broadcasts (Liberia 1988, Cote d'Ivoire 1987, Kenya 1986, Sudan 1983); use government media for propaganda (Iran 1987, Sudan 1983, Iran 1981); nominally independent media closely controlled by the government (Paraguay 1987); independent journalists replaced with those loyal to the government (Yugoslavia - Serbia and Montenegro 1993); state media not allowed to report on opposition parties or leaders (Tanzania 1993); journalists arrested or threatened with imprisonment (Sierra Leone 2013, Guinea 1993); journalists expelled from the country (Ethiopia 2010); independent newspapers fined for "disinformation" (Cambodia 1995); opposition media harassed (Sierra Leone 2013, Antigua and Barbuda 1991); strict registration requirements for journalists (Zambia 1993, Tanzania 1993); libel lawsuits against journalists (Thailand 2005, Russia 2004, Maldives 1987); press/libel laws adopted that suppresses criticism of the government (Tunisia 1998, Slovakia 1996, Cote d'Ivoire 1993, Kenya 1993, Guinea 1993); a press law that places financial strain on the media (Slovakia 1996); undue pressure on the management of media organizations (Thailand 2005, Russia 2004, Paraguay 1987, Malta 1982, Sri Lanka 1982, The Gambia 1981); violence against journalists (Kyrgyzstan 2009, Philippines 2005); misinformation (false reports of a coup plot to justify delaying a democratic transition, Guinea 1993); a ban on foreign media (Turkmenistan 1992); a ban on private ownership of photocopiers (Turkmenistan 1992); a ban on private radio stations (Liberia 2001); websites with content critical of the government blocked (Bahrain 2009); financial co-optation of previously independent news organizations (Thailand 2005, Guyana 1974); government control of appointments to editorial boards and

oversight commissions (Slovakia 1996); government revokes press accreditations (Nepal 2005); international news organizations banned (Liberia 2001); adoption of a law allowing the government to shut down newspapers without court approval (Cambodia 1995); limits on access by the press to government-operated printing and distribution channels (Kazakhstan 1994); regulation of the ownership of satellite dishes (Tunisia 1998); certain media outlets shut down (Liberia 1988, Vanuatu 1982); the publication of critical media/newspapers suspended (Bahrain 2009, Gabon 2009, Cambodia 1995, Iran 1981, Madagascar 1976); private electronic media temporarily banned from broadcasting (Lebanon 1995); harassment of journalists critical of the government (Serbia 2018, Nicaragua 2018); politicized media regulation (Hungary 2018).

- *Limits on the freedom of assembly*: a ban on all outdoor meetings (Cote d'Ivoire 1993); a ban on large religious assemblies (Tanzania 1993); public assembly permits to opposition groups denied (Lebanon 1995); government authorization required for public assembly (Guinea 1993); the adoption of a law allowing the arrest of any member of an organization that held a gathering that became violent (Cote d'Ivoire 1993); allowing police to impose curfews (Zimbabwe 2001); legal limits on the freedom of assembly (Montenegro 2015, Burundi 2014, Senegal 2008, Azerbaijan 2004, Mauritania 2003, Zimbabwe 2001, Slovakia 1996, Cape Verde 1987, Paraguay 1987, Iran 1987, Kenya 1986, Djibouti 1984, Djibouti 1982, Iran 1981); limits on the freedom of assembly due to the declaration of martial law (Thailand 2005); limits on the freedom of assembly due to the declaration of state of siege or state of emergency (Bolivia 1995, Zambia 1993, Egypt 1993, Sri Lanka 1982); restrictions on the freedom of assembly in select regions (Liberia 1988); restrictions on labor unions (Tunisia

1998, Cote d'Ivoire 1987, Malta 1982, Djibouti 1982, Iran 1981); the use of "agitators" within protests to justify suppression (Cote d'Ivoire 1993).

- *Violence*: violence against protestors (Nicaragua 2018, Montenegro 2015, Gabon 2009, Senegal 2008, Azerbaijan 2004, Mauritania 2003, Cote d'Ivoire 1993, Yugoslavia - Serbia and Montenegro 1993, Nepal 1993, Guinea 1993, El Salvador 1976, Paraguay 1976, Malaysia 1974); government promoted ethnic violence (Kenya 1993); violence by student affiliates of political parties (Bangladesh 1993); violence conducted by the government as well as other political parties (Ethiopia 1993); violence conducted by the military (Liberia 1988).
- *Intimidation of NGOs and human rights activists*: Nicaragua 2018, Gambia 2011, Philippines 2005, Tunisia 1998; legal restrictions on NGOs (Uganda 2014, Indonesia 2013, Ethiopia 2010); limits on charities due to fears of their independence (Slovakia 1996); printers unwilling to publish materials for human rights groups (Tunisia 1998); government denounces and violent attacks occur against clergy that supported anti-government protesters (Nicaragua 2018).
- *Restrictions on academic freedom*: Ukraine 2010, Russia 2004; the adoption of a law extending government control over universities (Slovakia 1996); the removal of public intellectuals from prominent academic posts (Slovakia 1996, Yugoslavia - Serbia and Montenegro 1993); the dismissal of university administrators as retribution for student protests (Ethiopia 1993); students and faculty that express support for an anti-government protest movement are repressed (Nicaragua 2018).
- *Restrictions on other civil liberties*: arrests without charges (Egypt 1993); long pre-trial periods (Tunisia 1998, Egypt 1993); adoption of a law forbidding

criticism of the president (Zimbabwe 2001); restrictions of the freedom of religion (Kyrgyzstan 2009); restrictions on the freedom of expression (Slovakia 1996); legal restrictions on the use of minority languages (Slovakia 1996); restrictions on the rights of ethnic minorities (Dominican Republic 2015); lack of basic due process for those detained or charged with terrorism offenses during the state of emergency (Turkey 2017); lack of basic due process for those detained during the suppression of anti-government protests (Nicaragua 2018).

### **3. Measures that expand the powers of the executive:**

- *Constitutional expansion of executive powers:* the president gains the authority over the hiring/dismissal of judges (Russia 2004, Turkmenistan 1992); presidential powers shifted to the prime minister (Slovakia 1996); members of the executive and the military required to have an approval by the president to testify in Congress (Philippines 2005); the president gains the power to unilaterally appoint ministers (Kazakhstan 1994, Paraguay 1987); the president assumes all legislative, executive, and juridical powers (Turkmenistan 1992); the president cannot be impeached (Kazakhstan 1994, Uzbekistan 1992); the president temporarily allowed to rule by decree (Bolivia 1995); the office of prime minister abolished (Comoros 1984); the office of vice president abolished (Uzbekistan 1992); the executive uses a politically subservient judiciary to curtail the powers of an opposition-controlled legislature (Venezuela 2016); the prime minister's post eliminated in favor of a more powerful presidency (Turkey 2017).
- *Constitutional extension the executive's term in office:* constitution amended to allow the ruling executive to run for additional terms (Dominican Republic

2015, Djibouti 2010, Togo 2002, Lebanon 1995); the length of the presidential term extended (Senegal 2008); a referendum to extend the tenure in power for the ruling party (Sri Lanka 1982).

- *Actions by the executive that strengthen its influence over the judiciary:* Kazakhstan 1994, Liberia 2001; the president unconstitutionally removed a supreme court justice (Liberia 1988); the president pressures judges to reverse rulings (Zimbabwe 2001).
- *Measures that strengthen the president's/prime minister's control of the executive:* anti-corruption campaign as a pretense for a political purge (Yugoslavia - Serbia and Montenegro 1993); the dismissal of high ranking cabinet ministers to consolidate power (Slovakia 1996); the prosecution of a vice president for alleged attempts to overthrow the government (Liberia 1988); the creation of the office of prime minister in order to appoint an ally (Uzbekistan 1992); civil servants forced to join the governing party (Kenya 1986); elected executive officials at the municipal level have been replaced with government appointees (Turkey 2017).

#### **4. Measures targeting voters:**

- *Electoral fraud:* Gambia 2011, Kyrgyzstan 2009, Philippines 2005, Azerbaijan 2004, Kazakhstan 1994, Cote d'Ivoire 1993, Yugoslavia - Serbia and Montenegro 1993, Kenya 1993, Ethiopia 1993, Liberia 1988, Paraguay 1987, Guyana 1974, Guatemala 1974, Madagascar 1976; voting without identification allowed (Mauritania 2003); tally sheets altered (Haiti 2000, Kyrgyzstan 2000); ballot shortages (Central African Republic 1999); votes counted centrally rather than locally (Guyana 1973); ballots forged (Kyrgyzstan 2000); large overseas absentee

vote goes almost exclusively to the incumbent (Guyana 1973); vote totals manipulated to keep parties under the threshold for parliamentary representation (Russia 2004); ballot box stuffing (Haiti 2000, Kyrgyzstan 2000); vote buying (Mauritania 2003, Kyrgyzstan 2000, Antigua and Barbuda 1991); voting by proxy (Mauritania 2003, Kazakhstan 1994); multiple voting (Mauritania 2003); voters pressured to vote for the governing party, misuse of government resources for campaigning (Serbia 2018).

- *Election day violence*: Philippines 2005, Haiti 2000, Bangladesh 1993, Guyana 1973; pardoning of those accused of violent intimidation during an election campaign (Zimbabwe 2001); voter intimidation (Ethiopia 2010, Kazakhstan 1994, Ethiopia 1993, Antigua and Barbuda 1991, Serbia 2018).

## B.1 Manipulation with Exogenous Platforms

When candidate platforms are fixed, the only strategic decision on our setting is the incumbent's optimal choice of the amount of manipulation  $\mu$ . Given our assumptions about the distribution of  $\epsilon$ , the incumbent's probability of victory is

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Pr(V_A - V_B \geq 0) &= \Pr(\alpha(\mu M + \epsilon) - 2(1 - \alpha)(1 - \pi)x_S(\mu) \geq 0) & (A.1) \\
 &= \Pr\left(\epsilon \geq \frac{2(1 - \alpha)(1 - \pi)x_S(\mu)}{\alpha} - \mu M\right) \\
 &= \frac{\sigma - \left[\frac{2(1 - \alpha)(1 - \pi)x_S(\mu)}{\alpha}\right] - \mu M}{2\sigma},
 \end{aligned}$$

where

$$x_S(\mu) = \frac{x_A + x_B}{2} + \frac{\delta\mu^2}{2(x_A - x_B)}.$$

The value of  $\mu$  that maximizes the probability of victory in (A.1) with respect to  $\mu$  is

$$\mu^* = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \times \frac{Mx_A}{\delta(1-\pi)}. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Accounting for the fact that the probability of the incumbent's victory can be at most one and our assumption that  $\mu \leq 1$ , the incumbent optimally manipulates to the fullest extent,  $\mu^* = 1$ , if

$$\pi > 1 - \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) \frac{Mx_A}{\delta}.$$

The following proposition summarizes our analysis of the case with exogenous platforms:

**Proposition 1.** *Suppose the candidates' platforms are located symmetrically around the electoral median,  $x_B = -x_A$ . Then*

(i) *the optimal amount of manipulation is*

$$\mu^* = \begin{cases} \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) \frac{Mx_A}{\delta(1-\pi)} & \text{if } \pi \leq 1 - \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) \frac{Mx_A}{\delta}; \\ 1 & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$

(ii) *the optimal amount of manipulation  $\mu^*$  is (weakly) decreasing in civic virtue  $\delta$  and increasing in polarization  $\pi$ , the share of uninformed voters  $\alpha$ , technology of manipulation  $M$ , and the extremism of candidates' platforms (summarized by  $x_A$ .)*

Figure A.1 illustrates the comparative statics in Proposition 1 by plotting the equilibrium amount of manipulation  $\mu^*$  and the corresponding probability of the incumbent's victory as a function of polarization  $\pi$ .<sup>1</sup> Figure A.2 plots the (expected) equilibrium share of informed, uninformed, and all votes for the incumbent as a function of

---

<sup>1</sup>Parameter values:  $\alpha = 1/2$ ,  $\delta = 1$ ,  $\sigma = 1/4$ ,  $M = 1/2$ ,  $x_A = 1/4$ ,  $x_B = -1/4$ .




Figure A.1: Equilibrium amounts of manipulation  $\mu^*$  (solid) and the probability of the incumbent’s victory (dashed) as a function of polarization  $\pi$

polarization  $\pi$ . The discontinuities in both figures result from our assumption that  $\mu \leq 1$  and the fact that the probability of the incumbent’s victory can be at most one. That is, there are levels of polarization  $\pi$  so large that the incumbent will optimally manipulate to the fullest extent, which in turn assures his victory.<sup>2</sup>

## B.2 Manipulation and Platform Choice by Policy-Motivated Candidates

The assumption of policy-motivated candidates implies that, as long as the incumbent and the challenger adopt platforms that fall between their ideal policies,  $x_A, x_B \in [\theta_B, \theta_A]$ , their

<sup>2</sup>The levels of  $\pi$  that yield these corner solutions could be avoided by adding a direct cost of manipulation that would make  $\mu > 1$  suboptimal for any parameter value.




Figure A.2: The incumbent's vote share among informed (solid), uninformed (dashed), and all (dotted) voters as a function of polarization  $\pi$

respective payoffs are

$$\begin{aligned}
 U_A(x_A, x_B, \mu) &= -\Pr(V_A - V_B \geq 0)(\theta_A - x_A) - \Pr(V_A - V_B < 0)(\theta_A - x_B) \quad \text{and} \\
 U_B(x_A, x_B, \mu) &= -\Pr(V_A - V_B \geq 0)(x_A - \theta_B) - \Pr(V_A - V_B < 0)(x_B - \theta_B).
 \end{aligned}$$

Maximizing the incumbent's payoff with respect to  $\mu$  and both candidates' payoff with respect to their own platforms  $x_A$  and  $x_B$  yields the first-order conditions

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{M(x_A - x_B)}{2\sigma} - \frac{\delta\mu(1 - \alpha)(1 - \pi)}{\alpha\sigma} &= 0 \\
 \frac{\mu M + \sigma}{2\sigma} - \frac{x_A(1 - \alpha)(1 - \pi)}{\alpha\sigma} &= 0 \\
 \frac{\mu M - \sigma}{2\sigma} - \frac{x_B(1 - \alpha)(1 - \pi)}{\alpha\sigma} &= 0.
 \end{aligned}$$

The unique solution to this system of three equations about three unknowns is

$$\mu^* = \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)^2 \frac{\sigma M}{2\delta(1-\pi)^2}, \quad x_A^* = \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) \frac{\mu^* M + \sigma}{2(1-\pi)}, \quad \text{and} \quad x_B^* = \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) \frac{\mu^* M - \sigma}{2(1-\pi)}.$$

Note that the incumbent's equilibrium platform  $x_A^*$  is to the right of the challenger's platform  $x_B^*$  by a positive constant that is increasing in polarization  $\pi$  and the share of uninformed voters  $\alpha$ ,

$$x_A^* - x_B^* = \frac{\alpha\sigma}{(1-\alpha)(1-\pi)} > 0.$$

Because  $\mu^*$  above is increasing in  $\pi$ , just as in the setting with exogenous platforms, there may be values of  $\pi$  large enough for  $\mu^*$  to be constrained by our assumption  $\mu \leq 1$ . Specifically, the incumbent optimally manipulates to the fullest extent,  $\mu^* = 1$ , if

$$\pi > 1 - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \sqrt{\frac{\sigma M}{2\delta}}.$$

The following proposition summarizes our analysis of the case with endogenous platforms:

**Proposition 2.** *In the model with policy-motivated candidates,*

(i) *the optimal amount of manipulation is*

$$\mu^* = \begin{cases} \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) \frac{Mx_A}{\delta(1-\pi)} & \text{if } \pi \leq 1 - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \sqrt{\frac{\sigma M}{2\delta}}; \\ 1 & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$

(ii) *the equilibrium amount of manipulation  $\mu^*$  is (weakly) decreasing in civic virtue  $\delta$  and increasing in polarization  $\pi$ , the share of uninformed voters  $\alpha$ , and the technology of manipulation  $M$ ;*

- (iii) the equilibrium platforms  $x_A^*$  and  $x_B^*$  are decreasing in civic virtue  $\delta$  and increasing in polarization  $\pi$ , the share of uninformed voters  $\alpha$ , and the technology of manipulation  $M$ ;
- (iv) the distance between the incumbent's and the challenger's equilibrium platforms,  $x_A^* - x_B^*$ , is positive and increasing in polarization  $\pi$  and the share of uninformed voters  $\alpha$ .

## C.1 Candidate Choice Experiment I

The (representative) survey took place in October (pilot) and December (main round) 2016 and was executed by the survey agency *Consultores*. The survey sampled six respondents per survey location. Each six-tuple of respondents was randomly assigned to see candidates with the following democracy and policy positions:

- $D^+$ : “Planea reformar el sistema electoral y nominar nuevos miembros políticamente imparciales para el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y del Consejo Nacional Electoral.” (“Plans to reform the electoral system and nominate new impartial members to the Supreme Court and the Electoral Commission”).
- $D^-$ : “Planea mantener el sistema electoral como está y mantener la composición actual del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y del Consejo Nacional Electoral.” (“Plans to maintain the electoral system and the composition of the Supreme Court and the Electoral Commission”).
- $L$ : “Planea poner más dinero en las misiones bolivarianas que le han dado educación y salud para los pobres” (“Plans to give more money to Bolivarian missions, which have provided education and health care for the poor”).

<p><b>CANDIDATO 1:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tiene <b>60 años</b> de edad</li> <li>• Está <b>casado</b> y tiene <b>un hijo</b></li> <li>• Planea <b>poner más dinero en las misiones bolivarianas</b> que le han dado educación y salud para los pobres</li> <li>• Planea <b>mantener el sistema electoral como está y mantener la composición actual del</b> Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y del Consejo Nacional Electoral</li> <li>• su <b>deporte favorito es el béisbol</b></li> </ul>	<p><b>CANDIDATO 2:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tiene <b>56 años</b> de edad</li> <li>• Está <b>casado</b> y tiene <b>un niño y una niña</b></li> <li>• Planea <b>cerrar todas las misiones bolivarianas</b> que le han dado educación y salud para los pobres</li> <li>• Planea <b>reformar el sistema electoral y nominar nuevos miembros políticamente imparciales para el</b> Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y el Consejo Nacional Electoral</li> <li>• su <b>deporte favorito es el fútbol</b></li> </ul>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Figure A.3: An example of a candidate-choice scenario

- *R*: “Planea cerrar todas las misiones bolivarianas que le han dado educación y salud para los pobres” (“Plans to close all Bolivarian missions, which have provided education and health care for the poor”).

The politically irrelevant attributes were randomly chosen from the following sets (C1 value, C2 value):

- Age: (40, 44), (44, 40), (48, 50), (52, 48), (56,60), (60,56)
- Children: (un hijo, un niño y una niña), (un niño y una niña, un hijo), (dos niños, una hija), (una hija, dos niños), (un hijo, dos niñas), (dos niñas, un hijo)
- Favorite sport: (béisbol, fútbol), (fútbol, béisbol)

Figure A.3 shows an example of a candidate-choice scenario as seen by the respondents.

### C.1.1 Across-Subject Treatment Assignments

After seeing a candidate-choice scenario, respondents were first asked to vote for a candidate and then to give an approval rating of each candidate on a scale from 1 to 10. Table A.1 presents a summary of candidate approval ratings across the three treatment

Table A.1: Approval Ratings

Treatment Condition	Approval Rating		Difference	
	C1	C2	C2-C1	(95% C.I.)
T1: $LD^+$ v. $RD^+$	5.66	4.28	-1.37	(-2.12,-.62)
T2: $LD^-$ v. $RD^+$	4.57	5.03	.46	(-.27, 1.19)
T3: $RD^-$ v. $RD^+$	3.69	5.15	1.48	(.82, 2.13)

*Note:* 95% confidence intervals in parentheses are based on the t-test

conditions. This summary and its implications parallel Table 2 in the main text: A comparison of T1 and T2 (using T1 as a benchmark) shows a decrease in C1’s mean rating, an increase in C2’s mean rating, and an increase in the rating differential in favor of C2. The latter is statistically significant at the .01 level. A comparison of T3 and T2 (using T3 as a benchmark) shows an increase in C1’s mean rating, a decrease in C2’s mean rating, and an increase in the rating differential in favor of C1. The latter is statistically significant at the .05 level.

### C.1.2 Across-Subject Treatment Assignments: Heterogeneous Effects

**The 10-point left-right self-placement scale:** The 10-point left-right self-placement measure is based on a question that was introduced by the statement “In politics, we often speak of the left and the right. On a scale where 1 denotes the left and 10 denotes the right, where would you place. . . ?” For anchoring purposes, the respondents were then asked to place on the scale a series of politicians: “a politician who wants to nationalize all companies, increase taxes on the rich, and nationalize hospitals,” “a politician who wants to privatize government-owned enterprises, lower taxes on the rich, and privatize all hospitals,” Nicolás Maduro, Hugo Chávez, and Henrique Capriles. Finally, the respondents were asked, “And where would you place yourself?”




Figure A.4: T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

**T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark):** Figure A.4 plots C2’s average vote share by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale for treatment conditions T1 (circles, solid line) and T2 (diamonds, dashed line); Table A.2 presents subgroup-level binomial tests for equal proportions and OLS results. Figure A.5 and Table A.3 present analogous results for approval ratings.

Table A.2: T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value	
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		BTP	OLS
1	1.82	(55)	5.00	(40)	3.18	.778	.711
2	10.00	(10)	16.67	(12)	6.67	1.000	.707
3	0.00	(11)	0.00	(6)	0.00	–	1.00
3	28.57	(7)	11.11	(9)	17.46	.809	.403
5	38.64	(44)	40.82	(49)	2.18	.998	.800
6	44.44	(18)	44.44	(9)	0.00	1.000	1.000
7	45.45	(11)	73.33	(15)	27.88	0.300	.090
8	54.55	(22)	72.22	(18)	17.68	0.412	.179
9	60.00	(10)	64.29	(14)	4.29	1.000	.803
10	63.10	(84)	84.11	(107)	21.02	0.002	.001

*Note:* p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions (BTP) and OLS




Figure A.5: T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.3: T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark): Approval ratings by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

	Left-Right		Approval Differential (C2-C1)		Difference	p-value
	Self-placement	T1	(N)	T2		
1	-7.136	(59)	-6.511	(45)	0.624	0.399
2	-5.455	(11)	-5.75	(12)	-0.295	0.877
3	-5.667	(12)	-6.667	(6)	-1	0.372
4	-2.857	(7)	-4.667	(9)	-1.81	0.473
5	-0.667	(45)	-0.544	(57)	0.123	0.914
6	-1.368	(19)	-0.8	(10)	0.568	0.817
7	0.846	(13)	2.941	(17)	2.095	0.327
8	1.208	(24)	2.952	(21)	1.744	0.305
9	1.538	(13)	2.267	(15)	0.728	0.775
10	2.385	(91)	4.491	(114)	2.107	0.016

*Note:* p-values are based on the t-test

**T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark):** Figure A.6 plots C2's average vote share by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale for treatment conditions T3 (circles, solid line) and T2 (diamonds, dashed line); Table A.4 presents subgroup-level binomial tests for equal proportions and OLS results. Figure A.7 and Table A.5 present analogous results for approval ratings.




Figure A.6: T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.4: T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2		Difference	p-value	
	T1 (N)	T2 (N)		BTP	OLS
1	3.33 (30)	5 (40)	1.67	1	0.863
2	0 (8)	16.67 (12)	16.67	0.648	0.36
3	40 (5)	0 (6)	-40	0.354	0.098
4	50 (8)	11.11 (9)	-38.89	0.221	0.045
5	73.68 (38)	40.82 (49)	-32.87	0.005	0
6	66.67 (15)	44.44 (9)	-22.22	0.521	0.187
7	66.67 (9)	73.33 (15)	6.67	1	0.692
8	69.57 (23)	72.22 (18)	2.66	1	0.832
9	95 (20)	64.29 (14)	-30.71	0.064	0.027
10	78.82 (85)	84.11 (107)	5.29	0.45	0.362

*Note:* p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions (BTP) and OLS




Figure A.7: T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.5: T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark): Approval ratings by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1) T1 (N)	Approval Differential (C2-C1) T2 (N)	Difference	p-value
1	-4.2609 (59)	-6.5111 (45)	-2.2502	0.012
2	-4.1429 (11)	-5.75 (12)	-1.6071	0.368
3	-0.2857 (12)	-6.6667 (6)	-6.381	0.027
4	-0.9 (7)	-4.6667 (9)	-3.7667	0.119
5	2.4118 (45)	-0.5439 (57)	-2.9556	0.002
6	1.5238 (19)	-0.8 (10)	-2.3238	0.312
7	2.9167 (13)	2.9412 (17)	0.0245	0.99
8	1.6 (24)	2.9524 (21)	1.3524	0.381
9	6.55 (13)	2.2667 (15)	-4.2833	0.038
10	3.8478 (91)	4.4912 (114)	0.6434	0.428

*Note:* p-values are based on the t-test

**Left-right scale based on attitudes toward inequality:** The alternative, inequality based measure of left-right economic attitudes is based on the question “Some say that the government should reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree?”

**T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark):** Figure A.8 plots C2’s average vote share by the inequality-based scale for treatment conditions T1 (circles, solid line) and T2 (diamonds, dashed line); Table A.6 presents subgroup-level binomial tests for equal proportions and OLS results. Figure A.9 and Table A.7 present analogous results for approval ratings.




Figure A.8: T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Table A.6: T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value	
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		BTP	OLS
1	8.54	(82)	21.21	(66)	12.68	0.05	0.076
2	30.65	(62)	35.09	(57)	4.44	0.749	0.575
3	45.45	(55)	73.33	(60)	27.88	0.004	0.001
4	60.27	(73)	81.61	(87)	21.34	0.005	0.002

*Note:* p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions (BTP) and OLS




Figure A.9: T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the inequality-based scale

Table A.7: T1 v. T2 comparison (using T1 as a benchmark): Approval ratings by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-5.3333	(90)	-3.8472	(72)	1.4861	0.075
2	-2.4	(65)	-1.6562	(64)	0.7437	0.466
3	-0.7097	(62)	2.8	(65)	3.5097	0.001
4	2.2338	(77)	4.05	(100)	1.8162	0.063

*Note:* p-values are based on the t-test

**T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark):** Figure A.10 plots C2's average vote share by the inequality-based scale for treatment conditions T3 (circles, solid line) and T2 (diamonds, dashed line); Table A.8 presents subgroup-level binomial tests for equal proportions and OLS results. Figure A.11 and Table A.9 present analogous results for approval ratings.




Figure A.10: T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Table A.8: T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value	
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		BTP	OLS
1	33.9	(59)	21.21	(66)	-12.69	0.165	0.103
2	51.02	(49)	35.09	(57)	-15.93	0.145	0.06
3	79.59	(49)	73.33	(60)	-6.26	0.591	0.454
4	83.33	(72)	81.61	(87)	-1.72	0.94	0.803

*Note:* p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions (BTP) and OLS




Figure A.11: T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the inequality-based scale

Table A.9: T3 v. T2 comparison (using T3 as a benchmark): Approval ratings by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-2.0133	(90)	-3.8472	(72)	-1.8339	0.059
2	0.473	(65)	-1.6562	(64)	-2.1292	0.023
3	2.8033	(62)	2.8	(65)	-0.0033	0.997
4	4.3614	(77)	4.05	(100)	-0.3114	0.693

*Note:* p-values are based on the t-test

Table A.10: The Candidate Choice Experiment: Across-Subject Treatment Assignments

<b>Treatment Condition C1 v. C2</b>	<b>Percent Voting for C2 (95% C.I.)</b>	<b>Percent Abstaining (95% C.I.)</b>
T1: $LD^+$ v. $RD^+$	37.46 (31.85, 43.41)	5.98 (3.69, 9.45)
T2: $LD^-$ v. $RD^+$	53.52 (47.54, 59.41)	9.55 (6.64, 13.49)
T3: $RD^-$ v. $RD^+$	63.64 (57.20, 69.64)	23.17 (18.71, 28.31)

*Note:* 95% confidence intervals in parentheses are based on the binomial test for proportions.

### C.1.3 Accounting for Abstentions

Abstentions include respondents who say that they will not turn out to vote (“no votaría”) or declare an intention to vote blank (“no inscrito”).

As Table A.10 shows, there is no statistically significant change in turnout for the T1 v. T2 comparison, but a significant decline in turnout in T3 (relative to T2.) Figures A.12 and A.13 suggest that, in T3, a fraction of leftists would rather abstain than choose between two rightist candidates. This may account for the larger and statistically more significant results for approval ratings (relative to % vote share) in the T3 v. T2 comparisons above. Nonetheless, even abstaining respondents rate the  $D^+$  candidate more favorably than the  $D^-$  one (2.05 for C1 versus 1.71 for C2, even though the difference is not statistically significant.)




Figure A.12: Abstention rates by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale




Figure A.13: Abstention rates by the inequality-based scale

### C.1.4 Within-Subject Treatment Assignments

After seeing one of the three treatment scenarios discussed in the subsection “Across-Subject Treatment Assignments,” each respondent was asked “And now suppose that candidate 1 would change his position on [ISSUE] and instead propose to [POSITION]. [ISSUE] and [POSITION] we randomly assigned to correspond to one of the five following platform shifts:

- W1:  $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$  to  $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$
- W2:  $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$  to  $LD^+$  v.  $RD^-$
- W3:  $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$  to  $LD^{--}$  v.  $RD^+$
- W4:  $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+$  to  $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$
- W5:  $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+$  to  $RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$

The  $D^{--}$  treatment read “Planea aumentar el número de chavistas entre los miembros del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y del Consejo Nacional Electoral” (“Plans to increase the number of Chavistas on the Supreme Court and the Electoral Commission”).

Tables A.11 and A.12 summarize the vote and approval rating shifts resulting from the five within-subject treatment assignments.

Table A.11: Within-Subject Analysis: Percent Voting for Candidate 2

Treatment Condition Control → Treatment	Percent Voting for C2 (95% C.I.)		Diff.
	Control	Treatment	
W1: $LD^+$ v. $RD^+$ → $LD^-$ v. $RD^+$	37.76 (29.91, 46.28)	51.54 (42.65, 60.33)	13.78 (1.34, 26.21)
W2: $LD^+$ v. $RD^+$ → $LD^+$ v. $RD^-$	37.14 (29.25, 45.75)	25.00 (18.33, 33.03)	-12.14 (-23.53, 0.76)
W3: $LD^-$ v. $RD^+$ → $LD^{--}$ v. $RD^+$	53.52 (47.54, 59.41)	58.25 (52.27, 63.99)	4.72 (-3.78, 13.23)
W4: $RD^-$ v. $RD^+$ → $LD^-$ v. $RD^+$	60.94 (51.89, 69.32)	52.70 (44.36, 60.90)	-8.23 (-20.63, 4.16)
W5: $RD^-$ v. $RD^+$ → $RD^-$ v. $LD^+$	66.67 (57.14, 75.05)	80.69 (73.13, 86.58)	14.02 (2.46, 25.58)

Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses are based on the binomial test for proportions.

Table A.12: Within-Subject Analysis: Approval Ratings

Treatment Condition Control → Treatment	Approval Differential C2-C1 (95% C.I.)		Diff.
	Control	Treatment	
W1: $LD^+$ v. $RD^+$ → $LD^-$ v. $RD^+$	-1.18 (-2.25, -0.11)	0.16 (-0.94, 1.25)	1.34 (-0.19, 2.86)
W2: $LD^+$ v. $RD^+$ → $LD^+$ v. $RD^1$	-1.58 (-2.64, -0.52)	-2.98 (-3.95, -2.01)	-1.40 (02.83, 0.03)
W3: $LD^-$ v. $RD^+$ → $LD^{--}$ v. $RD^+$	0.46 (-0.27, 1.19)	0.80 (0.06, 1.55)	0.35 (-0.69, 1.39)
W4: $RD^-$ v. $RD^+$ → $LD^-$ v. $RD^+$	1.15 (0.19, 2.11)	0.59 (-0.44, 1.62)	-0.56 (-1.96, 0.84)
W5: $RD^-$ v. $RD^+$ → $RD^-$ v. $LD^+$	1.81 (0.89, 2.72)	4.11 (3.23, 4.98)	2.30 (1.04, 3.56)

Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses are based on the t-test.




Figure A.14: W1 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

### C.1.5 Within-Subject Treatment Assignments: Heterogeneous Effects

**The 10-point left-right self-placement scale:** Figures A.14-A.22 plot C2's average vote share by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale for each treatment condition; Tables A.13-A.21 present subgroup-level binomial tests for equal proportions. Figures A.15-A.23 and Tables A.14-A.22 present analogous results for approval ratings.

Table A.13: W1 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	3.33	(30)	3.45	(29)	0.11	1
2	14.29	(7)	14.29	(7)	0	1
3	0	(5)	16.67	(6)	16.67	1
4	50	(2)	50	(2)	0	1
5	42.86	(21)	55.56	(18)	12.7	0.639
6	33.33	(6)	40	(5)	6.67	1
7	50	(8)	87.5	(8)	37.5	0.281
8	54.55	(11)	77.78	(9)	23.23	0.54
9	66.67	(6)	100	(5)	33.33	0.521
10	59.52	(42)	86.49	(37)	26.96	0.016

Note: p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.15: W1 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.14: W1 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Approval ratings by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-6.7812	(32)	-7.0323	(31)	-0.251	0.766
2	-5.5714	(7)	-5.5714	(7)	0	1
3	-5.3333	(6)	-4.8333	(6)	0.5	0.852
4	0	(2)	-0.5	(2)	-0.5	0.939
5	-0.087	(23)	1.4	(20)	1.487	0.429
6	-1.8571	(7)	-1	(7)	0.8571	0.804
7	1.1	(10)	5	(10)	3.9	0.099
8	1.1667	(12)	2.5833	(12)	1.4167	0.543
9	1.875	(8)	3.75	(8)	1.875	0.467
10	2.2955	(44)	5.1951	(41)	2.8997	0.038

Note: p-values are based on the t-test




Figure A.16: W2 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^+$  v.  $RD^-$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.15: W2 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^+$  v.  $RD^-$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	0	(25)	3.7	(27)	3.7	1
2	0	(3)	25	(4)	25	1
3	0	(6)	0	(5)	0	–
4	20	(5)	0	(5)	-20	1
5	34.78	(23)	28.57	(21)	-6.21	0.906
6	50	(12)	50	(12)	0	1
7	33.33	(3)	33.33	(3)	0	1
8	54.55	(11)	50	(12)	-4.55	1
9	50	(4)	25	(4)	-25	1
10	66.67	(42)	31.11	(45)	-35.56	0.002

Note: p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.17: W2 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^+$  v.  $RD^-$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.16: W2 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^+$  v.  $RD^-$ ): Approval ratings by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-7.5556	(27)	-6.9643	(28)	0.5913	0.464
2	-5.25	(4)	-5.5	(4)	-0.25	0.937
3	-6	(6)	-6	(6)	0	1
4	-4	(5)	-6.4	(5)	-2.4	0.339
5	-1.2727	(22)	-1.1667	(24)	0.1061	0.948
6	-1.0833	(12)	-0.9167	(12)	0.1667	0.952
7	0	(3)	0.3333	(3)	0.3333	0.961
8	1.25	(12)	0.3333	(12)	-0.9167	0.72
9	1	(5)	-2.2	(5)	-3.2	0.483
10	2.4681	(47)	-1.74	(50)	-4.2081	0.002

Note: p-values are based on the t-test




Figure A.18: W3 ( $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^{--}$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.17: W3 ( $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^{--}$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	5	(40)	8.89	(45)	3.89	0.784
2	16.67	(12)	30.77	(13)	14.1	0.722
3	0	(6)	0	(6)	0	–
4	11.11	(9)	0	(8)	-11.11	1
5	40.82	(49)	51.02	(49)	10.2	0.417
6	44.44	(9)	71.43	(7)	26.98	0.568
7	73.33	(15)	78.57	(14)	5.24	1
8	72.22	(18)	84.21	(19)	11.99	0.627
9	64.29	(14)	78.57	(14)	14.29	0.676
10	84.11	(107)	84.91	(106)	0.79	1

Note: p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.19: W3 ( $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^{--}$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.18: W3 ( $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^{--}$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Approval ratings by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-6.5111	(45)	-6.9778	(45)	-0.4667	0.605
2	-5.75	(12)	-4.8462	(13)	0.9038	0.653
3	-6.6667	(6)	-6.8333	(6)	-0.1667	0.862
4	-4.6667	(9)	-5.5556	(9)	-0.8889	0.618
5	-0.5439	(57)	-0.1579	(57)	0.386	0.705
6	-0.8	(10)	2.9	(10)	3.7	0.138
7	2.9412	(17)	3.4706	(17)	0.5294	0.775
8	2.9524	(21)	4.65	(20)	1.6976	0.28
9	2.2667	(15)	3.125	(16)	0.8583	0.717
10	4.4912	(114)	4.6814	(113)	0.1902	0.788

*Note:* p-values are based on the t-test




Figure A.20: W4 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.19: W4 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2		Difference	p-value
	T1 (N)	T2 (N)		
1	5.26 (19)	3.57 (28)	-1.69	1
2	0 (4)	0 (6)	0	–
3	0 (2)	33.33 (3)	33.33	1
4	80 (5)	0 (6)	-80	0.034
5	72.73 (22)	52 (25)	-20.73	0.247
6	100 (6)	75 (4)	-25	0.83
7	66.67 (6)	57.14 (7)	-9.52	1
8	42.86 (7)	87.5 (8)	44.64	0.2
9	100 (9)	100 (8)	0	–
10	72.34 (47)	80 (50)	7.66	0.517

Note: p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.21: W4 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.20: W4 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Approval ratings by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-4.4	(25)	-7.1429	(28)	-2.7429	0.012
2	-3.125	(8)	-4.125	(8)	-1	0.627
3	-2.6667	(3)	-1.3333	(3)	1.3333	0.826
4	0.8333	(6)	-2.2857	(7)	-3.119	0.179
5	2.2	(25)	1.037	(27)	-1.163	0.383
6	3.8571	(7)	0.6667	(6)	-3.1905	0.286
7	1.8889	(9)	1.8889	(9)	0	1
8	-0.75	(8)	4.875	(8)	5.625	0.04
9	6.7778	(9)	5.3333	(9)	-1.4444	0.202
10	3.0588	(51)	4.2115	(52)	1.1527	0.372

Note: p-values are based on the t-test




Figure A.22: W5 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.21: W5 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2		Difference	p-value
	T1 (N)	T2 (N)		
1	0 (11)	57.89 (19)	57.89	0.005
2	0 (4)	66.67 (6)	66.67	0.147
3	66.67 (3)	66.67 (3)	0	1
4	0 (3)	66.67 (3)	66.67	0.386
5	75 (16)	84 (25)	9	0.76
6	44.44 (9)	91.67 (12)	47.22	0.06
7	66.67 (3)	66.67 (3)	0	1
8	81.25 (16)	70.59 (17)	-10.66	0.758
9	90.91 (11)	83.33 (12)	-7.58	1
10	86.84 (38)	92.31 (39)	5.47	0.68

Note: p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.23: W5 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Table A.22: W5 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$ ): Approval ratings by the 10-point left-right self-placement scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-4.0952	(21)	1.1304	(23)	5.2257	0.005
2	-5.5	(6)	2	(6)	7.5	0.078
3	1.5	(4)	1.6667	(3)	0.1667	0.981
4	-3.5	(4)	1.25	(4)	4.75	0.359
5	2.6154	(26)	5.1481	(27)	2.5328	0.029
6	0.3571	(14)	3.7857	(14)	3.4286	0.077
7	6	(3)	4.6667	(3)	-1.3333	0.744
8	2.7059	(17)	3.1176	(17)	0.4118	0.816
9	6.3636	(11)	3.5	(12)	-2.8636	0.176
10	4.8293	(41)	6.1463	(41)	1.3171	0.232

Note: p-values are based on the t-test

**Left-right scale based on attitudes toward inequality:** Figures A.24-A.32 plot C2's average vote share by the the inequality-based scale for each treatment condition; Tables A.23-A.31 present subgroup-level binomial tests for equal proportions. Figures A.25-A.33 and Tables A.24-A.32 present analogous results for approval ratings.




Figure A.24: W1 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Table A.23: W1 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2		Difference	p-value
	T1 (N)	T2 (N)		
1	8.33 (36)	11.11 (36)	2.78	1
2	33.33 (36)	48.28 (29)	14.94	0.333
3	42.86 (28)	66.67 (24)	23.81	0.15
4	57.89 (38)	77.78 (36)	19.88	0.115

*Note:* p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.25: W1 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the inequality-based scale

Table A.24: W1 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Approval ratings by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-5.3659	(41)	-5.6842	(38)	-0.3184	0.741
2	-2.0263	(38)	-0.973	(37)	1.0533	0.467
3	-0.8529	(34)	1.5	(32)	2.3529	0.135
4	2.5	(38)	5.0811	(37)	2.5811	0.09

Note: p-values are based on the t-test




Figure A.26: W2 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^+$  v.  $RD^-$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Table A.25: W2 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^+$  v.  $RD^-$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	8.7	(46)	11.76	(51)	3.07	0.871
2	26.92	(26)	9.09	(22)	-17.83	0.228
3	48.15	(27)	28.57	(28)	-19.58	0.224
4	62.86	(35)	38.89	(36)	-23.97	0.075

*Note:* p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.27: W2 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^+$  v.  $RD^-$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the inequality-based scale

Table A.26: W2 ( $LD^+$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^+$  v.  $RD^-$ ): Approval ratings by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-5.3061	(49)	-4.7593	(54)	0.5469	0.574
2	-2.9259	(27)	-4.0741	(27)	-1.1481	0.392
3	-0.5357	(28)	-2.8333	(30)	-2.2976	0.177
4	1.9744	(39)	-1.4615	(39)	-3.4359	0.03

Note: p-values are based on the t-test




Figure A.28: W3 ( $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^{--}$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Table A.27: W3 ( $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$   $\rightarrow$   $LD^{--}$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	21.21	(66)	29.58	(71)	8.37	0.355
2	35.09	(57)	44.64	(56)	9.56	0.398
3	73.33	(60)	79.31	(58)	5.98	0.585
4	81.61	(87)	82.56	(86)	0.95	1

*Note:* p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.29: W3 ( $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^{--}$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the inequality-based scale

Table A.28: W3 ( $LD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^{--}$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Approval ratings by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-3.8472	(72)	-3.3562	(73)	0.4911	0.627
2	-1.6562	(64)	-0.4848	(66)	1.1714	0.273
3	2.8	(65)	3.125	(64)	0.325	0.716
4	4.05	(100)	3.9596	(99)	-0.0904	0.912

Note: p-values are based on the t-test




Figure A.30: W4 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Table A.29: W4 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	24.14	(29)	18.92	(37)	-5.22	0.833
2	48	(25)	36.67	(30)	-11.33	0.566
3	80.65	(31)	66.67	(33)	-13.98	0.326
4	75.68	(37)	75.61	(41)	-0.07	1

Note: p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.31: W4 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the inequality-based scale

Table A.30: W4 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow LD^-$  v.  $RD^+$ ): Approval ratings by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-2.7838	(37)	-4.325	(40)	-1.5412	0.2
2	-0.8788	(33)	-1.3429	(35)	-0.4641	0.749
3	3.1471	(34)	2.7353	(34)	-0.4118	0.765
4	3.5227	(44)	3.6591	(44)	0.1364	0.908

Note: p-values are based on the t-test




Figure A.32: W5 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Table A.31: W5 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$ ): Fraction of respondents voting for candidate 2 by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	% Voting for C2				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	43.33	(30)	69.44	(36)	26.11	0.059
2	54.17	(24)	73.17	(41)	19	0.197
3	77.78	(18)	86.96	(23)	9.18	0.721
4	91.43	(35)	94.59	(37)	3.17	0.949

Note: p-values are based on the binomial test for equal proportions




Figure A.33: W5 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$ ): Differences in the candidates approval ratings (C2-C1) by the inequality-based scale

Table A.32: W5 ( $RD^-$  v.  $RD^+ \rightarrow RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$ ): Approval ratings by the inequality-based scale

Left-Right Self-placement	Approval Differential (C2-C1)				Difference	p-value
	T1	(N)	T2	(N)		
1	-1.2632	(38)	1.6923	(39)	2.9555	0.06
2	1.561	(41)	3.6744	(43)	2.1134	0.04
3	2.3704	(27)	4.5926	(27)	2.2222	0.12
4	5.3077	(39)	6.3	(40)	0.9923	0.257

Note: p-values are based on the t-test

Table A.33: Estimation results for a logit model of the candidate-choice experiment using a scale based on attitudes toward economic inequality

<b>Logit</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>95% C.I.</b>
$\beta_0$ ( <i>intercept</i> )	-3.043***	0.294	(-3.693, -2.485)
$\beta_1$ ( $LD^-$ v. $RD^+$ )	0.875***	0.201	(0.484, 1.272)
$\beta_2$ ( <i>i's left-right position</i> )	0.924***	0.092	(0.748, 1.109)
<b>Model Parameters</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>95% C.I.</b>
$\delta$	0.875	0.201	(0.481, 1.265)
$x_L$	3.067	0.174	(2.752, 3.432)
$x_R$	3.530	0.160	(3.231, 3.856)
$x_S(0)$	3.299	0.165	(2.996, 3.642)
$x_S(\mu)$	2.345	0.154	(2.041, 2.646)
$N$	542		
<i>Log-likelihood</i>	-299.72		

Note: The dependent variable is a vote for the candidate on the right. Standard errors and confidence intervals for model parameters obtained via simulation. Significance levels: \*10%, \*\*5%, \*\*\*1%.

### C.1.6 Model-based Estimates

Estimates using a scale based on attitudes toward economic inequality are presented in Table A.33 and portrayed in Figure A.34.




Figure A.34: The probability of voting for the candidate on the right as a function of attitudes toward economic inequality

## D.1 Candidate Choice Experiment II

Respondents were randomly assigned to three treatment conditions:  $RD^+$  v.  $LD^+$  (T1),  $RD^-$  v.  $LD^+$  (T2), and  $LD^-$  v.  $LD^+$  (T3). The labels  $D^+$ ,  $D^-$ ,  $L$ , and  $R$  correspond to the following democracy and policy positions:

- $D^+$ : “Planea actualizar el Registro Electoral Permanente para incluir a todos los venezolanos con derecho al voto.” (“Plans to update the Electoral Register to include all Venezuelans eligible to vote”).
- $D^-$ : “Planea eliminar del Registro Electoral Permanente a todas aquellas personas que no tienen una dirección correcta o completa, como direcciones de barrios o zonas rurales.” (“Plans to remove from the Electoral Register all those who lack a correct or complete address, like those in slums or rural areas”).
- $L$ : “Planea extender los controles de precios a todos los artículos de uso doméstico” (“Plans to extend price controls to all household goods”).
- $R$ : “Planea quitar los controles de precios y privatizar PDVSA” (“Plans to abolish price controls and privatize PDVSA”).

The politically irrelevant attributes were assigned the same way as in Experiment I. After seeing a candidate-choice scenario, respondents were first asked to vote for a candidate and then to give an approval rating of each candidate on a scale from 1 to 10.

Tables A.34 and A.35 present a summary of candidate vote shares and approval ratings across the three treatment conditions. A comparison of T1 and T2 (using T1 as a benchmark) shows a decrease in C1’s vote share and mean rating; both shifts are statistically significant at the .01 level (just like in Experiment I.) A comparison of T3 and

Table A.34: Candidate Choice Experiment 2: Percent Voting for C2

<b>Treatment Condition</b> <b>C1 v. C2</b>	<b>Percent Voting for C2</b> <b>(95% C.I.)</b>
T1: $RD^+$ v. $LD^+$	71.13 (65.50, 76.20)
T2: $RD^-$ v. $LD^+$	83.68 (78.79, 87.65)
T3: $LD^-$ v. $LD^+$	85.33 (80.70, 89.04)

*Note:* 95% confidence intervals in parentheses are based on the binomial test for proportions.

Table A.35: Candidate Choice Experiment 2: Approval Ratings

<b>Treatment Condition</b>	<b>Approval Rating</b>		<b>Difference</b>	
	<b>C1</b>	<b>C2</b>	<b>C2-C1</b>	<b>(95% C.I.)</b>
T1: $RD^+$ v. $LD^+$	3.78	6.49	2.72	(2.06, 3.38)
T2: $RD^-$ v. $LD^+$	2.92	7.09	4.17	(3.56, 4.78)
T3: $LD^-$ v. $LD^+$	2.81	7.21	4.40	(3.82, 4.99)

*Note:* 95% confidence intervals in parentheses are based on the t-test

T2 (using T3 as a benchmark) does not show a statistically significant increase in C1’s vote share or mean rating (unlike in Experiment I.)

In the paper and throughout this appendix, we focus on Candidate Choice Experiment I rather than II for two main reasons: First, when designing the economic platforms for Experiment II, we misjudged the unpopularity of abolishing price controls, which results in all subgroups along the left-right economic axis (on average) favoring the  $L$  platform. In turn, the vast majority of respondents – regardless of their left-right economic preferences as measured by self-placement on a left-right scale or attitudes toward economic inequality – favor the  $L$  economic position, which compromises the analysis of heterogeneous effects using these indicators of left-right economic preferences. Second, the design of Experiment II probes commitment to democracy among those on the economic right. Given the status quo in Venezuela in the fall of 2016, these voters however have an instrumental reason for

supporting democratic reforms as such policies make it more likely that their favored real-world candidate would replace the leftist incumbent government. Put differently, supporting a  $D^+$  position when doing so go against one's economic interest is more credible for those on the left in Experiment I than it is for those on the right in Experiment II.

## References

Freedom House. 1978-2019. *Freedom on the World*. New York: Freedom House.