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Supplementary Online Appendices

How Cross-Cutting Discussion Shapes Support for Ethnic Politics: Evidence from an Experiment in Lebanon

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Appendices

A Experimental Design

This appendix provides more detail on the recruitment and randomization described in the main text. We organized 120 discussion groups in the Beirut and Mount Lebanon areas in the spring of 2016. Individuals with different sectarian (Christian, Sunni, and Shia) and economic (lower and upper socio-economic class) profiles were randomly assigned to participate in either homogeneous or heterogeneous sectarian discussions and either homogeneous or heterogeneous class discussions. Assignment to the two treatments was orthogonal following a 2x2 factorial design with 30 groups in each cell. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to one of four discussion group types: (1) same sect/same class, (2) mixed sect/same class, (3) same sect/mixed class and (4) mixed sect/mixed class.

Identifying lower and upper income participants. To determine whether potential participants were lower or upper class, eight questions about economic status were asked on the screening survey and these were used to create an index (following extensive piloting). The screening survey recorded answers about income, assets, leisure travel and dining, and electricity usage. Responses for each question were re-coded into three categories where one equaled poor, two equaled middle class, and three equaled rich. These scores were summed across the eight questions such that individuals with scores of 8-13 were considered lower income, individuals with scores of 19-24 were considered upper income and individuals with scores of 14-18 were middle income and were excluded from eligibility.

Obtaining target numbers of participants. We note that there were only a few instances in which discussions proceeded with fewer than six individuals or with individuals with different demographic profiles than anticipated.[1] The effects of the imbalance are plausibly the greatest for the cross-cutting groups. To address concerns, we control for the number of discussion participants in each group. We also checked to make sure that we did not accidentally have individuals who knew each other in the same discussion session. While 41 individuals in 26 sessions reported that they knew at least one person in their discussion group prior to the session, upon further investigation with the organizers we learned that these were mostly cases in which individuals had been transported together or met casually just before the session. We nonetheless control for the total number of people in the discussion that each participant reported knowing before the session.

A.1 Possible concerns about selection into participation

The way in which individuals were scheduled to participate in the discussions gives some cause for concern that there was selection into participation in a way that could have introduced imbalances in pre-treatment characteristics for individuals in different arms. Recall from the section on experimental design in the main paper that we recruited a total of 1200 individuals in order to obtain 720 participants and 480 back-ups. To obtain the 1200, we recruited 40 individuals of each of the six profile types (e.g. poor Sunni, rich Sunni, poor Shia, rich Shia, poor Christian, rich Christian) for each of the five discussion blocks. We block randomized individuals by profile type and discussion block with the the goal of obtaining 24 participants and 16 extras for each discussion block. Panel A of Table A.1 shows how the 40 individuals of each profile type were assigned and Panel B of

[1] There were seven instances in which groups proceeded with five rather than six individuals, either because an insufficient number showed up or because a participant left before the discussion was concluded. This affected three same/same groups, 2 mixed sect/same class groups, 1 same sect/mixed class group, and 1 mixed/mixed group.

Table A.1 shows the target number of participants per treatment. The targets were set this way because we anticipated needing a different number of backups for each experimental condition.[2]

Table A.1: Illustration of potential selection into participation

		Mixed sectarian	
		N	Y
Mixed class	N	9	9
	Y	10	12

Panel A: Treatment assignment ($n = 40$)

		Mixed sectarian	
		N	Y
Mixed class	N	6	6
	Y	6	6

Panel B: Target participated ($n = 24$)

		Mixed sectarian	
		N	Y
Mixed class	N	4.5/9 = .50	4.5/9 = .50
	Y	5/10 = .50	6/12 = .50

Panel C: Proportion of those assigned who are 'very enthusiastic'

		Mixed sectarian	
		N	Y
Mixed class	N	4.5/6 = .75	4.5/6 = .75
	Y	5/6 = .83	6/6 = 1

Panel D: Proportion of those who participated who are 'very enthusiastic'

Implementing randomization in this way would still yield unbiased estimates of treatment effects as long as those who actually participated in the discussion were a random sample of the pool that was assigned. We worked with the implementing partner to design a procedure to try to ensure that this would be the case. First, the partner pre-screened all eligible participants for willingness to participate in a discussion on political and economic issues (without providing any information on the differing sectarian compositions of the groups). This resulted in a pool of potential discussion participants who were all willing to join in the activity. We asked our implementing partner to schedule the discussions such that every person in the pool would show up at one discussion in accordance with their treatment assignment, ensuring that we always had more individuals than necessary of each profile type at each session. The implementing partner was then supposed to randomly select (for each profile type) who would actually stay to participate and who would be asked to go home (after receiving compensation) or invited to a different session. In actuality, however, the partner typically ended up getting only the target number of participants to show up for each discussion, which introduces the possibility that there was some differential selection into who ended up participating.

To see why this is an issue, assume that there is some (unobserved) variable like *enthusiasm* that affects willingness to participate in a discussion. Assume also that treatment assignment achieved balance in this variable across the four experimental conditions. For illustrative purposes, we assume that 50 percent of all assigned individuals are *very* enthusiastic and the rest were only moderately enthusiastic. Panel C of Table A.1 shows the proportion of individuals assigned who were very enthusiastic and we can see that this is balanced across the four experimental conditions. Assume then that all very enthusiastic individuals were the easiest to schedule and were therefore

[2]Specifically, we planned to over-recruit by 50 percent. For example, for poor Sunnis in homogeneous groups there was one discussion and we needed six participants and 3 backups ($6\times1 + 3\times1 = 9$). The mixed sect/same class treatment required two poor Sunnis for three discussions and one backup for each discussion ($2\times3 + 1\times3 = 9$). The same sect/mixed class treatment required three poor Sunnis for two discussions and two backups for each discussion ($3\times2 + 2\times2 = 10$). And the fully mixed treatment required one poor Sunni for six discussions plus one backup for each discussion ($1\times6 + 1\times6 = 12$).

more likely to participate (regardless of their treatment assignment, which they did not know before arrival). Panel D of Table A.1 shows how, if this were the case, the enthusiasm proportion would now be imbalanced across the treatment conditions among those who actually participated. We emphasize that this issue is not related to the treatment assignment itself but rather to the fact that we assigned a varying number of individuals in each experimental condition in order to reach our target of six participants of each profile.

One way to avoid this problem would have been to over-recruit even more individuals, for instance if we had a pool of 48 of each profile type rather than 40 (meaning that we would have had 12 people assigned to each experimental condition rather than the configuration shown in Panel A). This would have required the partner to over-recruit an additional 8 individuals from 6 profiles for each of 5 sets for a total of recruiting an additional 240 people. At the time of design our implementing partner strongly preferred the plan described above because they felt it would be more manageable and cost-effective that over-recruiting even more as they were already at the maximum of what they felt they could do.

So, how concerned should we be? After we discovered this, we discussed extensively with our partner and it seems that in most cases attendance was driven by idiosyncratic scheduling factors rather than systematic differences. Moreover, for this to be a problem, there would have to be not only non-trivial differential participation but also that this disparity would have to have non-trivial impacts on the outcomes. While we think this unlikely, some might find this only somewhat reassuring. We are further reassured by the fact that the checks in Appendix B suggest balance on a large number of pre-treatment covariates between treatment and control. We include covariates in all analysis to address concerns. Finally, we note that any imbalance is most likely to bias the estimates of the effect of group 4 relative to group 1, but our main findings come from the comparison of group 2 to group 1, for which imbalance should not be a concern.

A.2 Treatment assignment probabilities

Our main analysis employs inverse probability weights to correct for unequal treatment assignment probabilities. We use two different weights. As described above, we block randomly assigned participants based on profile and set using the same probabilities in each block ($\frac{9}{40}$, $\frac{9}{40}$, $\frac{10}{40}$, and $\frac{12}{40}$). In practice we stratified treatment assignment not only on set and profile type but, where possible, we created even smaller strata using additional information on recruiter and participant neighborhood and randomly assigned individuals using proportional probability assignment within these small strata. We used these small strata to minimize the chances that discussion participants would know each other, which was more likely if they came from the same neighborhood and/or same recruiter network. In going from our pool of 40 of each type to our 24 participants, we lose observations in small strata cells, resulting in a large number of empty cells. Panel A of A.2 provides an illustration of this, showing the number of participants as assigned in small strata (left) and the number of participants that actually took part in the discussions (right).

We address this issue through post-stratification where we collapse the strata until we have no empty cells and then create new weights so that those who participated are weighted up to reflect the pool of potential participants originally assigned. We create two versions of weights based on two ways of collapsing the strata. First we created new 'smaller' strata where we collapsed cells such that we had no empty cells but where we retained information on recruiter or neighborhood were possible. Panel B in Table A.2 provides an example of how this was done. We then construct

probability weights to weight individuals who participated up to reflect the 'population' as assigned. Second, we create 'bigger' strata where we collapse such that strata are formed by profile and set only, as in Panel C. We again create weights to weight those who participated up to the population of those assigned.

Table A.2: Example of post-stratification

Panel A: Example of treatment assignment and participation in small strata

	Assigned (n=40)		Participated (n=24)	
Small strata 1	1	1	1	0
	1	1	0	1
Small strata 2	1	1	0	0
	1	2	0	1
Small strata 3	1	1	1	1
	2	2	1	1
Small strata 4	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	1
Small strata 5	2	2	0	2
	2	2	1	2
Small strata 6	2	2	2	1
	2	3	2	0

Panel B: Example of treatment assignment and participation in 'smaller' strata after collapsing strata

	Assigned (n=40)		Participated (n=24)	
New small strata	6	6	3	3
(collapsed 1, 2, 5, 6)	6	8	3	4
Small strata 3	1	1	1	1
	2	2	1	1
Small strata 4	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	1

Panel C: Example of treatment assignment and participation in 'bigger' strata

	Assigned (n=40)		Participated (n=24)	
'Big' strata	9	9	6	6
	10	12	6	6

Our main analysis uses weighted least squared regression employing the weights created for the smaller strata. In Appendix K we check the robustness of results to several additional specifications, including estimates of treatment effects on the sample, estimates using the weights for bigger strata, and estimates with block fixed effects using smaller and bigger strata.

B Balance Checks

The screening and pre-treatment surveys contain a large number of pre-treatment covariates that can be used to check balance. Table B.1 shows the results of the balance test using 42 pre-treatment covariates. While we check balance using the individual covariates, we also use inverse covariance weighting to create pre-specified indices for measures that capture a common underlying concept, as described in the Research Design section of the main paper. Inverse covariance weighting assumes one latent trait of interest—which is consistent with how we pre-specified indices—and constructs an optimal weighted average by weighting-up index components that have lower covariance (and thus provide more 'new' information). In Table B.1 we present results of the balance tests for the individual covariates as well as for the indices, but note that if there is an imbalance in an index component there is likely to be imbalance in the index itself.

We test for balance by running a weighted least squares regression of each covariate on the treatment assignment indicator (excluding other covariates), where weights account for unequal treatment assignment probabilities in 'smaller' strata (see Appendix A). As can be seen in Table B.1, only two of the 42 are significant at the 95 percent confidence level for mixed sect/same class groups; none were significant for same sect/mixed class groups; and three were significant for fully mixed groups, which is about what we would expect to happen by chance. Also as expected, the coefficients are close to zero for most covariates. These results help to address concerns about the integrity of the randomization described in Appendix A. In our main analysis we nevertheless control for indices and individual variables to address further concerns. In Appendix K we check the robustness of all results to excluding controls.

	Same sect, class	Mixed sect, same class		Same sect, mixed class		Mixed sect, class	
	mean	**b**	**p**	**b**	**p**	**b**	**p**
Demographics							
Gender	0.40	0.00	1.000	0.00	1.000	0.00	1.000
Christian	0.33	0.01	0.916	0.00	1.000	0.00	1.000
Sunni	0.33	0.00	1.000	0.00	1.000	0.00	0.961
Shia	0.33	-0.01	0.914	0.00	1.000	0.00	0.961
Age	31.79	-0.92	0.403	0.32	0.773	-0.32	0.775
Marital status	0.45	0.07	0.184	0.07	0.219	0.07	0.171
Education	0.66	0.03	0.609	-0.01	0.821	0.01	0.785
Work status	1.72	-0.03	0.688	0.00	0.952	-0.08	0.241
Economic wealth index	-0.04	0.08	0.466	0.03	0.795	0.04	0.741
Assets (screening)	1.67	-0.03	0.699	-0.07	0.426	-0.01	0.870
HH area (screening)	1.73	0.01	0.950	-0.07	0.356	0.00	0.975
Summer house (screening)	2.04	-0.02	0.855	0.00	0.973	0.03	0.794
Electricity (screening)	1.53	0.02	0.732	0.06	0.374	0.02	0.722
Vacation (screening)	1.93	-0.07	0.434	-0.11	0.242	-0.04	0.639
Dineout (screening)	2.11	-0.01	0.941	-0.03	0.695	0.04	0.626
Household income (screening)	6.67	0.12	0.469	0.06	0.731	0.07	0.666
Income subjectie (screening)	3.31	-0.05	0.712	-0.01	0.937	-0.01	0.962
Household income (pre-treatment)	6.26	0.01	0.968	-0.02	0.929	-0.06	0.779
Self-identified class (pre-treatment)	0.97	0.10	0.203	0.10	0.183	0.05	0.511
Prejudice index	0.01	-0.09	0.427	0.11	0.353	-0.04	0.714
Marrying someone from a diff confession	2.33	-0.14	0.233	-0.09	0.455	-0.11	0.363
Diff confession as physician	1.32	-0.07	0.315	0.07	0.297	0.06	0.454
Dif confession as neighbor	1.55	-0.09	0.286	0.04	0.609	-0.08	0.307
Discussion politics with diff confession	1.93	0.13	0.257	0.25	0.034	0.00	0.997
Discussing issues with diff confession	1.62	-0.07	0.482	-0.01	0.913	0.04	0.690
Supervised by diff confession	1.64	-0.03	0.766	0.12	0.193	0.00	0.977
Friends with diff confession	1.39	-0.09	0.224	0.04	0.640	-0.09	0.214
Political action index	0.03	-0.06	0.590	0.01	0.955	0.00	0.974
Discuss issues	0.71	0.02	0.686	-0.01	0.831	-0.02	0.708
Talked to party members	0.15	-0.03	0.453	-0.05	0.195	-0.02	0.676
Signed a petition	0.06	-0.03	0.345	0.02	0.489	0.00	0.983
Attended protest	0.34	-0.01	0.916	0.04	0.418	0.04	0.452
Well connected to sectarian elite	-0.08	0.17	0.146	0.15	0.183	-0.01	0.895
Help from zaim	1.77	0.19	0.080	0.17	0.104	0.07	0.554
Help from religious leader	2.08	0.10	0.390	0.09	0.452	-0.09	0.408
Social homgeneity index	0.11	-0.17	0.114	-0.02	0.827	-0.23	0.038
Friends from same class	2.93	-0.06	0.583	-0.03	0.785	-0.23	0.025
Friends from same sect	2.76	-0.23	0.046	-0.01	0.940	-0.13	0.274
How often do you discuss when disagree	2.33	0.06	0.537	-0.03	0.778	-0.05	0.534
Sectarian identity index	0.08	-0.09	0.405	-0.11	0.304	-0.15	0.208
Willing to change sect	3.53	-0.10	0.207	-0.12	0.177	-0.27	0.006
Support sectarian political party	2.03	-0.06	0.590	-0.15	0.190	-0.09	0.438
Strong sectarian identity	4.17	0.02	0.932	0.17	0.451	0.28	0.237
Economic identity	3.76	0.18	0.434	0.24	0.276	-0.05	0.814
Lebanese identity	5.69	0.03	0.871	-0.31	0.164	-0.13	0.560
Implementation variables							
Moderator 1 (of 2)	0.40	-0.06	0.232	0.03	0.549	0.01	0.814
Groups with six participants	0.90	0.04	0.164	0.07	0.013	0.07	0.009
Knew people in group	0.04	0.08	0.067	0.03	0.333	0.09	0.074

Notes: *P-values are from a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=713.*

Table B.1: Balance check

C Power Calculations

This appendix contains the power calculations that we ran prior to the study. We anticipated that discussion would have noisy effects (since it is hard to control discussion dynamics). We also had to stick with rather specific numbers of discussions and participants within discussions in order to achieve the desired randomization. We therefore determined in advance our total number of clusters and number of participants within clusters based on our budget and then used the power analysis to ascertain the effect sizes we would be able to detect given assumptions about intra-cluster correlations (ICCs). We calculated power for two main dependent variables: a standardized continuous outcome (akin to the map measure) and a binary dependent variable (akin to the petition).

We pre-registered the following specification:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 MS_{is} + \beta_2 MC_{is} + \beta_3 MS * MC_{is} + X_i'\gamma + \mu_s + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where Y_{ij} is the outcome for individual i in discussion session j. MS is an indicator for whether a participant was assigned to a mixed-sect discussion and MC for whether they were assigned to a mixed-class discussion. Thus, β_1 captures the effect of mixed-sect, same-class discussion; β_2 is the effect of mixed-class, same-sect discussion; and β_3 is their interaction. We focused our power analysis on our ability to detect effects for our main coefficients of interest: β_1 and β_2. We present power analysis below for β_1 and note that the results apply equally to β_2 since the structure of our experiment is symmetric. We also note that our power analysis is conservative in that we do not include covariates or treatment block fixed effects, both of which could help to improve precision.

Continuous DV. We conducted power calculations by simulation for a standardized continuous dependent variable. We assumed 60 discussion groups in total (30 in each arm) and 6 participants per group, following our design. We used a significance level of $\alpha = .05$. Our goal was to investigate our power to detect effects ranging in size from .10 to .50 standard deviations (in .05 increments). Additionally, we wanted to investigate how possible intra-cluster correlations (ICCs) would impact our ability to detect effects given clustered standard errors. The ICC is the variance within discussion groups over the total variance, or $\rho = \sigma_j^2/(\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_j^2)$, where σ_i^2 is the variance within clusters and σ_j^2 is the variance between clusters. We aimed to test power given four ICCs that we believed were reasonable in our setting: $\rho = .00$, .08, .16, and .24. We ran 500 simulations for each effect size and ICC combination in which we generate outcomes distributed σ_i^2 and a random group effect distributed $\sim N(0, \sigma_j^2)$. The results are presented in Figure C.1. They show, for instance, that when $\rho = 0$ we could detect an effect size of about .30 standard deviations at 80 percent power; if $\rho = .24$ then we could detect an effect size of .45 standard deviations at 80 percent power. We remind readers that these estimates are conservative in that we do not include efficiency gains from covariates or blocking in our simulations. Upon implementation, we observed that most of our continuous outcomes exhibited ICCs ranging from .03 to .13. Our actual effect sizes for continuous measures like the map allocations, the learning index, and the social pressure index all had standard deviation changes of about .20-.25.

Binary DV. We calculate statistical power for a binary DV using Stata's *clustersampsi* command, which allows us to determine power given different effect sizes and ICCs. Figure C.2 presents power analysis for effect sizes ranging from .02-.24 percentage points. Again these calculations are conservative as we do not include gains from covariates or blocking fixed effects but they show that

for $\rho = .00$ we can detect a 16 percentage point gain with 80 percent power. These power analyses show that we are under-powered to detect effects for our actual petition results, where we observed an increase of .10 percentage points with $\rho = .24$



Figure C.1: Simulation-based power calculations (continuous DV)



Figure C.2: Power calculations (Binary DV)

D Comparison of Discussion Sample to Lebanese Population

To provide supplementary data for the discussion experiment, we conducted a nationally representative survey of Lebanese citizens from December 2015-February 2016. We use information from this survey to assess the comparability of our discussion participants to the population of the Beirut/Mount Lebanon area and the entire country (in the Research Design section of the main text). We briefly summarize the survey methodology here. More detailed information is available from the authors upon request.

The survey was conducted with 2,496 adult Lebanese citizens (18-65 years of age). Respondents were selected through multi-stage cluster sampling. Primary sampling units (PSUs) were villages in rural areas and cities or neighborhoods in urban areas. PSUs were randomly sampled—within strata defined by district, population size, and predominant sect—using simple random sampling. Households (and individuals within households) were randomly sampled within PSUs, with one respondent per household. To achieve a similar number of men and women in the sample, a target sex was set for each household.

To draw population level inferences we employ a number of different design and post-survey weighting strategies. The analysis presented here uses entropy balancing as a re-weighting method as in Hainmueller (2012), although we get similar results if we use design weights, raked weights, or entropy balancing weights.

Appendix Table D.1 uses 25 comparable questions on both the nationally representative survey and the discussion pre-treatment survey to compare our discussion participants to the population in the Beirut/Mt Lebanon areas as well as nationwide. As discussed in the main text, our experimental design required that our discussion participants be more male, wealthier, and more balanced by sect than the Beirut/Mount Lebanon population at large. Additionally, discussant participants were on average older and better connected to Zaim and religious leaders but otherwise the characteristics of the sample are quite close to those of the population.

	Variable Range		Discussion sample			Beirut/Mt. Lebanon population			All Lebanon population		
	Min	Max	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Demographics											
Female	0	1	0.41	0.49	713	0.51	0.50	767	0.53	0.50	2495
Age	18	65	32	10	713	42	15	767	40	14	2495
Married	0	1	0.50	0.50	713	0.56	0.50	767	0.58	0.49	2495
At least secondary education	0	1	0.67	0.47	713	0.63	0.48	767	0.54	0.50	2495
Christian	0	1	0.33	0.47	713	0.50	0.50	767	0.39	0.49	2495
Sunni	0	1	0.33	0.47	713	0.14	0.35	767	0.28	0.45	2495
Shia	0	1	0.34	0.47	713	0.23	0.42	767	0.25	0.43	2495
Economic welfare											
Income (scale 1-15)	1	12	6.22	1.84	713	5.23	0.75	767	4.93	0.95	2495
Employed (at least part-time)	0	1	.61	0.49	713	0.66	0.47	767	0.64	0.48	2495
Perceived economic class	1	5	3.05	.76	690	2.46	0.62	767	2.44	0.60	2495
Subjective income	1	5	3.29	1.32	713	2.33	0.64	767	2.29	0.67	2495
Unemployment is top three concern	0	1	0.29	0.45	713	0.31	0.46	767	0.30	0.46	2495
Rising prices are a top three concern	0	1	0.25	0.44	713	0.45	0.50	767	0.48	0.50	2495
Clientelist connections											
Connected to Zaim	1	4	1.89	0.98	713	1.54	0.80	767	1.72	0.92	2495
Connected to religious leader	1	4	2.10	.99	713	1.70	0.89	767	1.87	0.99	2495
Political action											
Talk to party members/MPs/Zaim	0	1	0.12	0.33	713	0.13	0.33	767	0.09	0.28	2495
Signed a petition	0	1	0.06	0.23	713	0.12	0.32	767	0.08	0.28	2495
Attended protest	0	1	0.35	0.48	713	0.32	0.46	767	0.19	0.39	2495
Comfortable [...] a non co-sectarian											
Marrying	1	4	2.26	1.05	713	2.47	1.17	767	2.76	1.18	2495
Being neighbors with	1	4	1.51	0.72	713	1.37	0.66	767	1.58	0.81	2495
Being supervised by	1	4	1.66	0.83	713	1.34	0.64	767	1.64	0.88	2495
Being friends with	1	4	1.35	0.65	713	1.23	0.53	767	1.55	0.85	2495
Network Homogeneity											
Friends from same sect	1	5	2.66	1.08	713	2.18	0.76	767	2.80	1.11	2495
Friends from same class	1	5	2.85	0.97	713	2.34	0.72	767	2.82	1.03	2495
Discuss with those with whom you disagree	1	4	2.33	0.80	713	2.24	0.80	767	2.67	0.92	2495

Table D.1: Comparison of discussion participants to Lebanese population

E Discussion and Data Collection Details

Table E.1 shows the format of each discussion session including pre- and post-discussion data collection and provides further detail on the format of the actual discussion. The complete discussion guide is available from the authors' upon request.

Sequence	**Content**	**Time Allocated (min)**
1	Participant check-in and consent	10
2	Pre-treatment self-administered survey	15
3	Intro to discusion (group type revealed)	5
4	Public goods game, part 1	25
5	Discussion	70
	(i) Reaction to protests	*10*
	(ii) Economic concerns	*20*
	(iii) Political/sectarian concerns	*20*
	(iv) Oil and gas	*10*
	(v) Possibilities for reform?	*10*
6	Map exercise	10
7	Public goods game, part 2	5
8	Post-treatment survey + petition opportunity	20
9	Participants receive payout from pgg	5
10	Moderator(s) complete moderator survey	15
	TOTAL SESSTION TIME:	180

Table E.1: Comparison of discussion participants to Lebanese population

F Measures

F.1 Petition

This appendix contains the cover sheet for the petition in Figure F.1 and the text of the actual petition in Figure F.2. The petition was handed out and explained with the post-treatment survey. Both the cover sheet and the petition text were translated into Lebanese Arabic. Participants made a decision whether or not to sign and then sealed the petition inside the provided envelope before turning it over to the moderator. The envelope was labeled with the participant's unique identification number. To follow through on the guarantee to participants, all signed petitions are being released by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) in conjunction with a policy report.

PETITION COVER SHEET

The petition on the next page is an important document. We ask that you read this section carefully before reading the petition itself so that you can make an informed decision.

On the next page is a petition organized by LCPS, an independent, non-partisan, non-government organization. The petition calls for fundamental changes to Lebanon's political system. Specifically, it calls for an end to the confessional system and putting socio-economic priorities for the country ahead of confessional politics.

*Before making your decision, you should be aware that the petition **does** require you to sign your name. This means there is **some** chance that political leaders will know that you personally signed the petition.*

All petitions will be gathered together and the results will be shared with leaders around the country, including members of government, political parties, your MPs, and your Zaim, so that the voices of those who support this petition can be heard.

Just to be clear, signing this petition means that you are in favor of taking a stand on this issue, even if your political leaders do not share the same position.

In order for your petition to be considered valid, you must complete all information in the bottom portion of the petition.

Also please rest assured that any information you provide on the petition will not be linked by personal information to the surveys you are also being asked to complete.

Once you have made your decision, please put the petition back in the envelope and seal it until it can be opened by LCPS. This way neither the moderators nor anyone else in your discussion group will be able to know what you decided to do.

Figure F.1: Cover sheet introducing the petition to participants.

RESPONDENT ID:

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

CROSS-SECTARIAN PETITION FOR SYSTEM CHANGE IN LEBANON

Preamble

The recent protests that sparked mobilization across Lebanon originated with dissatisfaction over trash removal but quickly tapped into a larger sense of prolonged dissatisfaction with public goods and poor service provision in Lebanon as well as the overall inability of the government to ensure the economic welfare of people in the country.

The current structure of the Lebanese state, political system and electoral system has heavily contributed to the spread of corruption, the development of sectarian politics and sect-based parties, and the expansion of clientelistic and mafioso practices. This has resulted in the lack of proper regional or national development and the absence of basic public services as the political elite argue over how to divide state resources and maximise private gain. Since the civil war, we have witnessed time and time again how confessional interests are put ahead of the wider economic needs and priorities for the country.

Petition

We, the undersigned, demand that a constitutive entity be formed and tasked with radically revising the political structure in such a way that confessionalism is phased out and the nation's interests are put ahead of sectarian, regional, and personal interests.

We specifically call for:

1. Abolishing confessional politics in accordance with the Lebanese constitutional amendment, which states that: "The abolition of political confessionalism shall be a basic national goal and shall be achieved according to a staged plan."

2. Dropping the sectarian division of power and positions for the three heads of state as well as eliminating quotas related to the parliament, government positions, public servant jobs, the judiciary and military.

3. Holding accountable, based on sound mechanisms for investigation and fair trial, individuals (including leaders and politicians) who are proven guilty of crimes and mismanagement of public resources.

4. Reducing the influence of sectarian parties and encouraging the emergence of programmatic parties that organise along economic interests and prioritise need-based development.

5. Ensuring that revenue and services from the state - including all future revenue associated with oil and gas - are allocated ***on the basis of need and priorities for economic development and not on the basis of traditional confessional politics.*** This means that no MP, political party, or Zaim should dictate the allocation of public funds nor directly receive any income from public resources.

_____	_____
Name	Electoral district
_____	_____
Age	Confession
_____	
Date	

Figure F.2: Text of the petition.

F.2 Map Exercise

This appendix contains the map illustration (Figure F.3) and accompanying response sheet (Figure F.4) used in the map exercise. All respondents were provided with a calculator to make sure their allocations across districts totaled 100 percent. The map and estimates of district development level were provided by LCPS, using data from 2004.[3]



Figure F.3: Illustration provided for respondents in the map allocation exercise.

[3]LCPS located the data on sectarian distribution by district at http://daleel-madani.org/content/confessional-geographic-distribution-lebanons-population in October 2015. Sectarian distribution is based on registered voters in each district (not residents). To determine the predominant sect in each district, they focused on the distribution of Sunni, Shia, Christian and Druze populations. The development indicator is based on a combined index that takes into account two different indices of development and poverty. This data was generated by CRI Lebanon and used by LCPS in another project on decentralization.

District (Qada)	Major Confession	Development & Prosperity	Revenue allocated (%)
Beirut			
Beirut	Mixed	1 Rich and well developed	%
Bekaa			
Baalbek	Shia	4 Somewhat underdeveloped	%
Hasbaya	Christian/Druze	5 Very underdeveloped	%
Hermel	Shia	5 Very underdeveloped	%
Rashaya	Druze	4 Somewhat underdeveloped	%
West Bekaa	Sunni	2 Somewhat developed	%
Zahle	Christian	2 Somewhat developed	%
Mount Lebanon			
Aley	Druze	3 Neither developed nor underdeveloped	%
Baabda	Christian	2 Somewhat developed	%
Chouf	Druze/Christian	3 Neither developed nor underdeveloped	%
Jbeil	Christian	2 Somewhat developed	%
Keserwan	Christian	2 Somewhat developed	%
Metn	Christian	2 Somewhat developed	%
Nabatieh			
Bint Jbeil	Shia	4 Somewhat underdeveloped	%
Marjayoun	Shia	5 Very underdeveloped	%
Nabatieh	Shia	3 Neither developed nor underdeveloped	%
North			
Akkar	Sunni	4 Somewhat underdeveloped	%
Batroun	Christian	2 Somewhat developed	%
Becharre	Christian	2 Somewhat developed	%
Koura	Christian	2 Somewhat developed	%
Minieh-dinieh	Sunni	4 Somewhat underdeveloped	%
Tripoli	Sunni	3 Neither developed nor underdeveloped	%
Zgharta	Christian	3 Neither developed nor underdeveloped	%
South			
Jezzine	Christian	3 Neither developed nor underdeveloped	%
Saida-Zahrani	Sunni	3 Neither developed nor underdeveloped	%
Sour	Shia	3 Neither developed nor underdeveloped	%
			Total 100 %

Figure F.4: Response sheet provided for respondents in the map allocation exercise.

F.3 Survey Measures

This appendix provides wordings for the questions used in the main analysis. The complete survey instrument is available on the authors' websites.

Learning index:

- Q1G: For each of the following items...please circle the number corresponding to the option that best describes how you feel about what happened during the discussion: "You learned something new about the perspective of others" 1 = agree a lot, 2 agree a little, 3 = disagree a little, 4 = disagree a lot (recoded for analysis so that 1 is high).
- Q2: "Do you feel like you learned anything from this discussion of economic similarities or differences? 1 = learned a lot, 2 learned somethings, 3 = I didn't learn too much, 4 = I didn't learn anything at all (recoded for analysis so that 1 is high).
- Q5: "Do you feel like you learned anything from this discussion or similarities or differences on confessional issues?" 1 = learned a lot, 2 = learned some things, 3 = didn't learn too much, 4 = didn't learn anything at all (recoded for analysis so that 1 is high).

Agreement index:

- Q2: "When it came to economic concerns, how similar were the perspectives of the six participants in this discussion group?" 1 = very similar, 2 = somewhat similar, 3 = not too similar, 4 = not similar at all (recoded for analysis so that 1 is high).
- Q4: "How would you describe the level of agreement in your discussion group on potential changes to the confessional political system?" 1 = agreed a lot, 2 = agreed a little, 3 = disagreed a little, 4 = disagreed a lot (recoded for analysis so that 1 is high).

Social pressure index:

- Q10A: "I am reluctant to take action on political issues because it creates enemies" 1 = always, 2 = sometimes, 3 = rarely, 4 = never (recoded for analysis so that 1 is high).
- Q10B: "I am reluctant to take action on political issues because I worry about what people will think of me." 1 = always, 2 = sometimes, 3 = rarely, 4 = never (recoded for analysis so that 1 is high).

Social identity measures:

- Q8A-F: Figure F.6 presents the pictorial spatial measures adapted from Schubert and Otten (2002) to capture social identification. We used this question to create four main measures of: (1) closeness to cosectarians of own class, (2) closeness to non-cosectarians of own class, (3) closeness to cosectarians from the other class, and (4) closeness to non-cosectarians from the other class. We created (2) and (4) by taking the simple average of responses for a respondent's two non-cosectarian groups.

Below are a series of questions that ask you to look at a figure like the one below. In this figure, imagine that the small circle on the left represents you and the big circle on the right represents a group in Lebanon (e.g. the lower class, or Sunnis). For each of the groups listed below, please indicate which picture you think best represents how close you feel to that group.

Q8 Which picture do you think best represents how close you feel to each of the following groups of people? Remember the circle on the left represents you and the circle on the right represents each group.

A	**Sunnis** that are in **the lower** economic class	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Don't know ☐ Prefer not to answer ☐
B	**Christians** that are in **the lower** economic class	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Don't know ☐ Prefer not to answer ☐
C	**Shia** that are in **the lower** economic class	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Don't know ☐ Prefer not to answer ☐
D	**Sunnis** that are in **the upper** economic class	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Don't know ☐ Prefer not to answer ☐
E	**Christians** that are in **the upper** economic class	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Don't know ☐ Prefer not to answer ☐
F	**Shia** that are in **the upper** economic class	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Don't know ☐ Prefer not to answer ☐



To help you understand the circles above, note that:

1 Indicates that you feel far from the group
2 Indicates that you feel far from that group but a little closer
3 Indicates that you feel close to that group but are not a part of it
4 Indicates that you feel a little bit part of that group
5 Indicates that you feel half a part of that group
6 Indicates that you feel a part of that group but on the fringe
7 Indicates that you feel wholly a part of that group.

Figure F.5: Measure of self, ingroup, outgroup overlap

Miscellaneous measures mentioned in main analysis:

- Q10C (cross-pressure): "I am reluctant to take action on political issues because I sometimes don't know where I stand on certain issues." 1 = always, 2 = sometimes, 3 = rarely, 4 = never (recoded for analysis so that 1 is high).
- Q14 (Lebanese ID): "Would you say that you: belong to your confessional identity more than your Lebanese identity (recoded 1=2), your Lebanese identity more than your confessional identity (recoded 2=4), are only Lebanese (recoded 3=5), belong to your confessional identity only (recoded 4=1), belong to your Lebanese and confessional identities equally (recoded 5=3).
- Q9A-F (Group distance): Figure F.6 presents the pictorial-spatial measures adapted from Schubert and Otten (2002) to capture group distance. This question is similar to that in Figure F.6 except that here the circles are equally sized, reflecting perceived closeness between social groups rather than between the individual and the social group. For this reason, while we pre-specified looking at this measure, we think it has less construct validity as a measure of social identity. We nevertheless use this question to create three pre-registered measures. We create a measure of perceived closeness between different class groups within the same sect by averaging the responses in A-C; between the poor of different sects by averaging responses for D-F; and between the rich of different sects by averaging responses for G-I. The results are reported in Appendix J.

Q9 I would now like to show you another picture where each circle represents two groups. For each row from A-I, imagine that the circle on the left represents that group and the circle on the right represents the other group listed. For each row, which picture do you think best represents the closeness of the two groups (how much they have in common)? **These questions are very important so please take your time to think carefully about each response.**

	Left Circle	Right Circle		
A	Lower income Christians	Upper income Christians	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Don't know □ Prefer not to answer □
B	Lower income Sunnis	Upper income Sunnis	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Don't know □ Prefer not to answer □
C	Lower income Shia	Upper income Shia	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Don't know □ Prefer not to answer □
D	Lower income Shia	Lower income Sunnis	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Don't know □ Prefer not to answer □
E	Lower income Sunnis	Lower income Christians	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Don't know □ Prefer not to answer □
F	Lower income Christians	Lower income Shia	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Don't know □ Prefer not to answer □
G	Upper income Shia	Upper income Sunnis	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Don't know □ Prefer not to answer □
H	Upper income Sunnis	Upper income Christians	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Don't know □ Prefer not to answer □
I	Upper income Christians	Upper income Shia	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Don't know □ Prefer not to answer □



Figure F.6: Measure group overlap

G Summary Statistics

This appendix provides summary statistics for all data used in the paper. Specifically, Table G.1 presents summary statistics for all main outcome and mechanism measures used in the analysis. Table G.2 presents summary statistics for all pre-treatment covariates used as controls. All means and standard deviations here employ probability weights and incorporate 10 rounds of missing data imputation using predictive mean matching. The variable range (the min and mix in the first two columns) are also based on the 10 rounds of missing data imputation. The N is the total number of respondents for each variable in each of the 10 datasets.

	Min	Max	Mean	SD	N
Panel A: Support for Ethnic Versus Programmatic Politics					
Petition Signing					
Proportion Signed	0	1	0.33	0.47	713
Main Map Measures					
Share for non-cosectarian districts	0	1	0.55	0.21	713
Share for cosectarian districts	0	1	0.36	0.19	713
Share for Beirut	0	1	0.09	0.14	713
Share for poor districts	0	1	0.44	0.23	713
Share for poor cosectarian districts	0	0.86	0.16	0.16	713
Share for poor non-cosectarian districts	0	1	0.28	0.18	713
Additional Map Measures					
Share for middle income districts	0	1	0.24	0.13	713
Share for mid cosectarian districts	0	1	0.09	0.10	713
Share for mid non-cosectarian districts	0	0.50	0.15	0.10	713
Share for rich districts (Excl. Beirut)	0	1	0.22	0.17	713
Share for rich cosectarian districts	0	1	0.10	0.16	713
Share for rich non-cosectarian districts	0	0.70	0.11	0.12	713
Cross-Pressure					
Uncertainty about political position	1	4	2.27	1.08	713
Panel B: Mechanism Results					
Learning about shared preferences index	-4.58	2.33	0.01	0.99	713
Learning Index	-3.20	2.09	-0.01	1.00	713
Learning something about others' perspectives	1	4	3.44	0.80	713
Learned from econ discussion	1	4	2.19	0.87	713
Learned from political discussion	1	4	2.60	0.93	713
Agreement Index	-3.92	1.20	0.03	0.99	713
Agreement on econ concerns	1	4	3.35	0.67	713
Agreement on political concerns	1	4	3.26	0.84	713
Social Identification					
Sectarian and class in-group	1	7	4.74	2.13	713
Sectarian in-group and class out-group	1	7	3.87	2.13	713
Sectarian out-groups and class in-group	1	7	3.70	1.83	713
Sectarian and class out-groups	1	7	3.27	1.84	713
Closeness btwn diff classes in same sect	1	7	3.74	1.99	713
Closeness btwn poor of diff sects	1	7	4.00	2.03	713
Closeness btwn rich of diff sects	1	7	3.78	1.98	713
Strength of Lebanese (vs. sect) ID	1	5	4.21	1.03	713
Social Pressure Index	-1.40	1.73	0.00	1.01	713
Fear of creating enemies	1	4	2.55	1.09	713
Worried about what others will think	1	4	2.15	1.08	713
Empathy Index	-2.81	0.99	0.00	1.00	713
Empathized with them	1	4	3.10	0.95	713
They empathized with you	1	4	3.32	0.88	713
Anxiety	1	4	3.30	0.97	713

Table G.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables

	Min	Max	Mean	SD	N
Demographics					
Gender	0	1	0.40	0.49	713
Christian	0	1	0.33	0.47	713
Sunni	0	1	0.33	0.47	713
Shia	0	1	0.33	0.47	713
Age	18	65	31.57	10.26	713
Marital status	0	1	0.51	0.50	713
Education	0	1	0.67	0.47	713
Work status	1	4	1.69	0.62	713
Economic wealth index	-2.29	2.38	-0.01	1.00	713
Assets (screening)	1	3	1.64	0.76	713
HH area (screening)	1	3	1.70	0.72	713
Summer house (screening)	1	3	2.04	0.97	713
Electricity (screening)	1	3	1.55	0.66	713
Vacation (screening)	1	3	1.88	0.84	713
Dineout (screening)	1	3	2.11	0.73	713
Household income (screening)	1	10	6.73	1.50	713
Income subjective (screening)	1	5	3.29	1.31	713
Household income (pre-treatment)	1	12	6.25	1.83	713
Self-identitied class (pre-treatment)	0	2	1.03	0.70	713
Prejudice index	-1.28	4.15	0.00	1.00	713
Marrying someone from a diff confession	1	4	2.26	1.05	713
Diff confession as physician	1	4	1.34	0.63	713
Diff confession as neighbor	1	4	1.52	0.74	713
Discussing politics with diff confession	1	4	2.03	1.07	713
Discussing social or econ issues with diff confession	1	4	1.62	0.83	713
Supervised by diff confession	1	4	1.66	0.83	713
Friends with diff confession	1	4	1.35	0.65	713
Political action index	-1.24	3.42	0.01	1.01	713
Discuss issues	0	1	0.71	0.45	713
Talked to party members	0	1	0.12	0.33	713
Signed a petition	0	1	0.06	0.24	713
Attended protest	0	1	0.37	0.48	713
Well connected to sectarian elite	-1.17	2.33	-0.01	1.00	713
Help from zaim	1	4	1.88	0.98	713
Help from religious leader	1	4	2.11	1.00	713
Social homogeneity index	-2.19	2.79	0.00	1.00	713
Friends from same class	1	5	2.85	0.98	713
Friends from same sect	1	5	2.66	1.08	713
How often do you discuss when disagree	1	4	2.32	0.81	713
Sectarian identity index	-2.85	1.58	0.00	1.00	713
Willing to change sect	1	4	3.41	0.84	713
Support sectarian political party	1	3	1.96	0.99	713
Strong sectarian identity	1	7	4.29	2.08	713
Economic identity	1	7	3.87	1.84	713
Lebanese identity	1	7	5.60	1.83	713
Implementation variables					
Moderator 1 (of 2)	0	1	0.40	0.49	713
Knew people in group	0	5	0.09	0.45	713
Groups with six participants	0	1	0.95	0.22	713

Table G.2: Summary Statistics for Pre-Treatment Covariates

H Participant priorities

This appendix provides information on participant priorities overall and how they varied by sect and class. We examine policy priorities using a pre-treatment survey question that asked participants to list their top three policy priorities from a list of more than 20 options (with additional space for write-in options available).[4]

Table H.1 provides information on participants' policy preferences. The first column shows the overall mean number of participants who listed a policy priority as among their top three. We can see, for instance, that 29 percent of those in our study listed unemployment as among their top three priorities while 25 percent listed rising prices. Importantly, as shown in Appendix I unemployment and rising prices were also the economic issues that came up most frequently in the discussions themselves. Columns 2-7 show the means by sectarian and class group, while columns 8-11 show the overall means for the lower and upper class respondents. The test of the difference in means by class (reported in column 12) shows that the poor on average are more likely to prioritize unemployment, rising prices, and poverty than the rich. Moreover, this is true regardless of sectarian group. Conversely, the results suggest that the rich might care more about political issues like sectarianism, corruption, and radicalization.

While agreement on policy priorities does not necessarily translate into agreement on specific policy solutions, these findings support the potential for social interaction to facilitate learning about shared class-based preferences across ethnic groups and divergent class-based preferences within them.

[4] We follow the measures used by Lieberman and McClendon (2012).

	Overall	Means by sect and class subgroups						By Class				
	All	Poor Chr.	Poor Sun.	Poor Shi.	Rich Chr.	Rich Sun.	Rich Shi.	Poor Overall Mean	Poor Overall SD	Rich Overall Mean	Rich Overall SD	Test of diff in means
Panel A: Economic and Public Goods Priorities												
Unemployment	0.29	0.30	0.33	0.34	0.19	0.23	0.33	0.33	0.47	0.25	0.43	0.030
Rising prices	0.25	0.37	0.37	0.30	0.18	0.16	0.15	0.35	0.48	0.16	0.37	0.000
Poverty	0.14	0.19	0.12	0.24	0.13	0.11	0.08	0.18	0.39	0.11	0.31	0.004
Health and education costs	0.11	0.15	0.12	0.08	0.14	0.13	0.07	0.11	0.32	0.11	0.32	0.989
Deficit	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.04	0.11	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.24	0.07	0.26	0.557
Inequality	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.23	0.744
Food safety	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.21	0.06	0.24	0.404
Electricity/water supply	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.19	0.04	0.19	0.994
Lack of support for manufacturing	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.14	0.01	0.12	0.558
Public transportation	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.09	0.702
Local development	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.11	0.707
Oil/gas sector	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.12	0.741
Panel B: Political and Security Priorities												
Terrorism	0.34	0.30	0.29	0.40	0.29	0.30	0.46	0.33	0.47	0.35	0.48	0.599
Civil war	0.29	0.25	0.36	0.28	0.20	0.32	0.31	0.30	0.46	0.28	0.45	0.547
Sectarianism	0.16	0.12	0.10	0.14	0.13	0.27	0.21	0.12	0.33	0.20	0.40	0.003
Garbage crisis	0.16	0.19	0.14	0.12	0.17	0.14	0.20	0.15	0.36	0.17	0.37	0.484
Personal weapons	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.03	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.12	0.33	0.17	0.38	0.058
Corruption	0.14	0.15	0.10	0.08	0.18	0.16	0.17	0.11	0.31	0.17	0.38	0.013
Crime	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.15	0.09	0.17	0.09	0.12	0.32	0.12	0.32	0.918
Armed groups	0.11	0.12	0.08	0.14	0.12	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.32	0.11	0.31	0.801
Radicalization	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.03	0.11	0.09	0.18	0.07	0.26	0.13	0.33	0.012
War with Israel	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.11	0.04	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.25	0.06	0.25	0.872
Regional instability	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.04	0.21	0.07	0.25	0.197
Electoral reform	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.16	0.03	0.18	0.511
Judicial system reform	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.14	0.03	0.17	0.466

Table H.1: Policy priorities (pre-treatment survey)

I What Was Discussed?

This appendix uses data from the moderator survey to provide more information on what was actually discussed in the sessions. Following each discussion, the moderator recorded the economic and political topics raised in the discussions. Tables I.1 and I.2 show the frequency with which specific topics came up and whether the frequency differed in cross-cutting versus reinforcing discussions. While we consider this evidence circumstantial, it is broadly consistent with the notion that cross-cutting discussion resulted in less support for sectarian politics.

These tables yield a few notable results. First we see in Table I.1 that jobs/unemployment and prices are the economic topics most frequently discussed. Jobs came up in about 86 percent of all groups and prices in about 53 percent. This is important since (a) these were the economic issues of greatest concern to participants; and (b) these are also issues were we observe some shared preferences across sectarian groups and divergent preferences within sectarian groups (see Appendix H). This reinforces the viability of the learning mechanism and helps to substantiate the finding that there was greater learning about shared or divergent preferences in cross-cutting relative to reinforcing discussions.

Appendix Table I.2 shows the probability with which discussion groups proposed making specific political reforms. The first row of Panel A shows suggests that—from the perspective of the moderators—mixed-sect, same-class discussion and fully mixed discussion resulted in greater support for ending sectarianism (the result is also statistically significant in the latter). We also see that fully mixed discussion resulted in less support for electoral reforms, although it is unclear exactly what type of electoral reform was discussed (e.g. whether they were less likely to support electoral reforms like the Orthodox Law, which would have made the system more sectarian).

	(Overall)	**Same sect, class** (Group 1)	**Mixed sect, same class** (Group 2)	**Same sect, mixed class** (Group 3)	**Mixed sect and class** (Group 4)
	mean	*mean*	*b*	*b*	*b*
Jobs	0.86	0.77	0.02	0.14	0.20**
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Prices	0.53	0.50	0.04	-0.07	0.13
			(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Healthcare	0.48	0.47	0.05	0.03	0.00
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Econ general	0.43	0.53	-0.01	-0.36***	-0.03
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Immigration	0.40	0.33	0.06	0.07	0.13
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Education (cost and access)	0.29	0.30	-0.09	0.13	-0.07
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Housing (cost and access)	0.25	0.13	0.21*	0.20*	0.07
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Electricity (cost and access)	0.20	0.20	-0.08	0.09	0.00
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Social services	0.18	0.30	-0.10	-0.17	-0.20**
			(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Corruption	0.13	0.20	-0.13	-0.10	-0.03
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Security	0.13	0.07	0.16**	0.07	0.00
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Water (cost, access, quant)	0.12	0.10	-0.02	0.03	0.07
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Infrastructure	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.07
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Food security	0.03	0.00	0.07	0.03	0.03
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)

Table I.1: Effect of discussion on perceptions of shared economic preferences

	(Overall)	**Same sect, class** (Group 1)	**Mixed sect, same class** (Group 2)	**Same sect, mixed class** (Group 3)	**Mixed sect and class** (Group 4)
	mean	*mean*	*b*	*b*	*b*
Panel A: Proposed changes					
End sectarianism	0.53	0.40	0.17	0.06	0.30**
			(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Change political leadership	0.34	0.33	-0.04	0.07	0.00
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Want electoral reforms	0.29	0.37	-0.09	0.03	-0.23**
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Want governance reform	0.29	0.30	0.00	-0.07	0.03
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Regime change	0.19	0.17	-0.07	0.07	0.10
			(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Want econ policy reform	0.06	0.03	0.10	0.03	-0.03
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Want social policy reform	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.03
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Security policy reform	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel B: Support status quo					
Keep status quo	0.15	0.27	-0.11	-0.20**	-0.17*
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
No hope for change	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
No agreement reached	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.00
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)

Table I.2: Effect of discussion on perceptions of shared political preferences

J Main Results and Additional Related Analysis

This appendix contains three sets of analysis. Appendix J.1 contains the regression tables corresponding to the figures in the main text; Appendix J.2 presents the main results using the preregistered interaction specification; and Appendix J.3 contains regression results and additional analysis for the public goods game.

J.1 Main regressions

This appendix presents the regression results corresponding to the figures in the main text. We present results for both indices and index components. We also present regression results for the additional analysis referred to in the main text. The first column in each table presents the mean in homogeneous discussions (the control) while the remaining columns show the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values (two-tailed tests) for each of the three types of cross-cutting discussion.

The main results tables have the following correspondence:

- Table J.1 Panel A → main text Figure 1
- Table J.1 Panel B → main text Figure 2
- Table J.1 Panel C → main text discussion on p. 23
- Table J.1 Panel D → main text discussion on p. 24
- Table J.2 Panel A → main text Figure 3
- Table J.2 Panel B → main text Figure 4 and discussion on p. 27-28.
- Table J.2 Panel C → main text Figure 5
- Table J.2 Panel D → main text Figure 6

Table J.1: Support for sectarian versus cross-sectarian, programmatic politics

	Same sect, class (Group 1)	**Mixed sect, same class** (Group 2)			**Same sect, mixed class** (Group 3)			**Mixed sect and class** (Group 4)		
	mean	β_1	*se*	*pval*	β_2	*se*	*pval*	β_3	*se*	*pval*
Panel A: Petition signing										
Proportion signed	0.29	0.10	(0.08)	0.211	0.05	(0.07)	0.509	0.03	(0.08)	0.688
Panel B: Main map measures										
Share for cosectarian districts	0.36	0.02	(0.03)	0.520	0.00	(0.02)	0.897	-0.01	(0.02)	0.493
Share for non-cosectarian districts	0.53	0.03	(0.03)	0.221	0.02	(0.03)	0.550	0.03	(0.03)	0.176
Share for Beirut	0.11	-0.05	(0.02)	0.004	-0.01	(0.02)	0.533	-0.02	(0.02)	0.317
Share for poor districts	0.43	0.05	(0.02)	0.029	-0.01	(0.02)	0.705	0.00	(0.03)	0.979
Share for poor cosectarian districts	0.16	0.02	(0.01)	0.159	0.00	(0.01)	0.952	0.00	(0.01)	0.882
Share for poor non-cosectarian districts	0.27	0.03	(0.02)	0.113	-0.01	(0.02)	0.648	0.00	(0.02)	0.955
Panel C: Additional map measures										
Share for middle income districts	0.24	0.01	(0.01)	0.680	0.00	(0.01)	0.818	0.02	(0.01)	0.254
Share for mid cosectarian districts	0.10	-0.01	(0.01)	0.650	-0.01	(0.01)	0.388	-0.01	(0.01)	0.555
Share for mid non-cosectarian districts	0.14	0.01	(0.01)	0.336	0.01	(0.01)	0.217	0.02	(0.01)	0.034
Share for rich districts (excl. Beirut)	0.22	-0.01	(0.02)	0.647	0.02	(0.02)	0.278	0.00	(0.02)	0.845
Share for rich cosectarian districts	0.10	0.00	(0.02)	0.946	0.01	(0.02)	0.670	-0.01	(0.01)	0.542
Share for rich non-cosectarian districts	0.11	-0.01	(0.01)	0.417	0.01	(0.01)	0.362	0.01	(0.01)	0.407
Panel D: Cross-pressure										
Uncertainty abt preferences (1-4)	2.29	-0.12	(0.11)	0.278	-0.02	(0.14)	0.888	-0.11	(0.13)	0.410

Table J.2: Mechanism Results

	Same sect, class (Group 1)	**Mixed sect, same class** (Group 2)			**Same sect, mixed class** (Group 3)			**Mixed sect and class** (Group 4)		
	mean	β_1	*se*	*pval*	β_2	*se*	*pval*	β_3	*se*	*pval*
Panel A: Learning about shared preferences										
Learning about shared preferences index	-0.06	0.24	(0.11)	0.033	-0.08	(0.11)	0.468	0.04	(0.15)	0.809
Learning index	-0.11	0.16	(0.12)	0.180	0.08	(0.11)	0.477	0.08	(0.14)	0.588
Learned something about others' perspectives (1-4)	3.35	0.11	(0.11)	0.291	0.14	(0.10)	0.160	0.05	(0.11)	0.664
Learned from econ discussion (1-4)	2.14	0.09	(0.09)	0.339	-0.08	(0.10)	0.403	0.09	(0.12)	0.439
Learned from political discussion (1-4)	2.57	0.06	(0.10)	0.551	0.06	(0.10)	0.544	-0.02	(0.11)	0.880
Perceived agreement index	0.04	0.23	(0.11)	0.050	-0.20	(0.13)	0.121	-0.06	(0.14)	0.677
Agreement on econ concerns (1-4)	3.35	0.06	(0.07)	0.424	-0.12	(0.08)	0.157	0.01	(0.08)	0.918
Agreement on political concerns (1-4)	3.27	0.23	(0.09)	0.018	-0.12	(0.11)	0.293	-0.09	(0.11)	0.428
Panel B: Social Identification										
Sectarian and class in-group (1-7)	4.91	-0.16	(0.25)	0.512	-0.32	(0.23)	0.164	-0.29	(0.24)	0.240
Sectarian in-group and class out-group (1-7)	3.69	0.08	(0.25)	0.736	0.07	(0.23)	0.746	0.45	(0.29)	0.128
Sectarian out-groups and class in-group (1-7)	3.58	0.14	(0.19)	0.456	-0.05	(0.21)	0.825	0.22	(0.26)	0.395
Sectarian and class out-groups (1-7)	3.11	0.08	(0.22)	0.716	-0.08	(0.18)	0.633	0.53	(0.25)	0.033
Closeness btwn diff classes in same sect (1-7)	3.44	0.43	(0.22)	0.053	0.25	(0.22)	0.262	0.63	(0.22)	0.005
Closeness btwn poor of diff sects (1-7)	3.74	-0.05	(0.21)	0.812	0.01	(0.23)	0.957	0.14	(0.21)	0.505
Closeness btwn rich of diff sects (1-7)	3.88	0.17	(0.25)	0.489	0.01	(0.22)	0.946	0.15	(0.27)	0.579
Strength of Lebanese (vs. sect) ID (1-5)	4.07	0.15	(0.12)	0.185	0.16	(0.12)	0.195	0.21	(0.10)	0.041
Panel C: Social Pressure										
Social pressure index	0.11	-0.24	(0.10)	0.017	-0.04	(0.10)	0.714	-0.30	(0.12)	0.011
Fear of creating identities (1-4)	2.62	-0.17	(0.11)	0.143	0.03	(0.10)	0.781	-0.32	(0.13)	0.017
Worried about what others will think (1-4)	2.28	-0.30	(0.10)	0.005	-0.10	(0.12)	0.406	-0.27	(0.12)	0.027
Panel D: Emotions										
Empathy index	-0.09	0.11	(0.12)	0.368	0.15	(0.11)	0.169	0.08	(0.14)	0.573
Empathized with others (1-4)	3.06	0.08	(0.11)	0.473	0.06	(0.10)	0.512	0.01	(0.12)	0.946
Others empathized with you (1-4)	3.23	0.09	(0.10)	0.376	0.18	(0.10)	0.087	0.11	(0.12)	0.357
Anxiety	3.21	0.11	(0.10)	0.252	0.18	(0.10)	0.082	0.17	(0.11)	0.105

J.2 Main results with pre-registered interaction specification

We pre-registered the following specification:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 MS_{is} + \beta_2 MC_{is} + \beta_3 MS * MC_{is} + X_i'\gamma + \mu_s + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where Y_{ij} is the outcome for individual i in discussion session j. MS is an indicator for whether a participant was assigned to a mixed-sect discussion and MC for whether they were assigned to a mixed-class discussion. Thus, β_1 captures the effect of mixed-sect, same-class discussion; β_2 is the effect of mixed-class, same-sect discussion; and β_3 is their interaction. We report results for the three cross-cutting groups separately in the main paper but we think it is still useful here to report the interaction effects to shed light on whether the effect of mixed-sect interaction varies depending on whether participants also have class in common. We thus present main results with interaction effects in Tables J.3 and J.4 below. In both tables, Panel A presents β_1, β_2, and β_3 from the specification above while Panel B presents the calculated marginal effect of being in a mixed-sect discussion (conditional on mixed-sect) and being in a mixed-class discussion (conditional on mixed-sect).

We find little evidence of statistically significant interaction effects. This means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of mixed-sect discussion is similar in same-class and mixed-class environments. At the same time, however, there are several results for which the coefficient magnitudes provide at least suggestive evidence that mixed-sect discussion had a bigger impact on preferences in same-class than in mixed class environments. For instance, in Table J.3 mixed-sect discussion apparently resulted in allocating five percentage points more to poor districts in same-class environments and only one percentage point more in mixed-class. More clearly, in Table J.4, the effect of mixed-sect discussions in same-class environments was .24 standard deviations more learning about shared preferences compared to .12 standard deviations in mixed-class environments. All in all, while we can't rule out that the effect of mixed-sect discussions is similar in same-class and mixed-class environments, we clearly find the most pronounced effects when focusing on the effects of mixed-sect, same-class discussion relative to homogeneous discussion.

	Petition	Map exercise: Share for					
		Cosect districts	Non-cosect districts	Beirut	Poor districts	Poor cosect districts	Poor non-cosect districts
Panel A: Regression results							
Effect of mixed-sect	0.10	0.02	0.03	-0.05***	0.05**	0.02	0.03
(same-class) (β_1)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Effect of mixed-class	0.05	0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
(same-sect) (β_2)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Mixed-sect*Mixed-class (β_3)	-0.11	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Panel B: Marginal effects							
Effect of mixed-sect	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
(in mixed-class)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Effect of mixed-class	-0.06	-0.03	0.00	0.03	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.03
(in mixed-sect)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	713	713	713	713	713	713	713

Table J.3: Interaction Effects: Petition and Map Exercise Results

	Learning abt shared prefs			Social Identification with				Pressure	Emotions	
	Shared prefs index	Learning index	Perceived agreement	Cosect., same class	Non-cosect, same class	Cosect., diff class	Non-cosect, diff class	Social press index	Empathy index	Anxiety
Panel A: Regression results										
Effect of mixed-sect	0.24**	0.16	0.23*	-0.16	0.14	0.08	0.08	-0.24**	0.11	0.11
(same-class) (β_1)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.25)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Effect of mixed-class	-0.08	0.08	-0.20	-0.32	-0.05	0.07	-0.08	-0.04	0.15	0.18*
(same-sect) (β_2)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Mixed-sect*Mixed-class (β_3)	-0.12	-0.16	-0.08	0.20	0.12	0.29	0.54	-0.02	-0.18	-0.12
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)
Panel B: Marginal effects										
Effect of mixed-sect	0.12	0.00	0.14	0.03	0.27	0.38	0.62**	-0.26**	-0.08	-0.01
(in mixed-class)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Effect of mixed-class)	-0.20	-0.08	-0.28**	-0.12	0.08	0.37	0.45	-0.06	-0.03	0.06
(in mixed-sect)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)
N	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713

Table J.4: Interaction Results: Mechanisms

J.3 Additional public goods game results

This appendix presents regression results and additional analysis for the public goods game. Appendix Table J.5 presents the regression results that correspond to Figure 7 in the main text. While the results reported in the table are not statistically significant at conventional levels, many of the magnitudes are quite large, providing suggestive evidence for the effects discussed in the main text.

Table J.5: Public Goods Game

	Same sect, class (Group 1)	**Mixed sect, same class** (Group 2)			**Same sect, mixed class** (Group 3)			**Mixed sect and class** (Group 4)		
	mean	*b*	*se*	*pval*	*b*	*se*	*pval*	*b*	*se*	*pval*
Panel A: All Groups										
Round 1	3341	301	(525)	0.567	603	(587)	0.306	-272	(450)	0.547
Round 2	3613	-131	(555)	0.814	182	(608)	0.765	-638	(493)	0.198
Difference	271	-432	(315)	0.173	-421	(290)	0.150	-366	(310)	0.241
Panel B: Omitting Outlier Group										
Round 1	3448	175	(525)	0.740	473	(588)	0.423	-407	(445)	0.362
Round 2	3392	42	(538)	0.939	363	(601)	0.547	-454	(483)	0.349
Difference	-56	-133	(214)	0.534	-110	(165)	0.505	-47	(198)	0.813

We also present results in the main text (and above) including and excluding one outlier group in homogeneous discussions that coordinated its contributions (despite agreed-upon rules not to). To see the outlier group, we show the mean contribution level in all 120 discussions in round 1 and round 2 in Figure J.1; Figure J.2 shows the difference in round 2 minus round 1 contributions *for each discussion group*. Here it is easy to see the spike in contributions for group 26 (upper left figure). For those interested, Figures J.3 and J.4 show the contribution distributions for each discussion group type and the difference between rounds.



Figure J.1: Mean public goods game contributions for each discussion: Rounds 1 and 2



Figure J.2: Public goods game contributions for each discussion: Difference between rounds 2 and 1



Figure J.3: Distribution of public goods game contributions: Round 1 and Round 2



Figure J.4: Distribution of public goods game contributions: Difference between rounds 2 and 1

K Robustness Checks for Main Results

In this appendix we present evidence as to the robustness of the main results. The first subsection presents results from additional specifications. The second subsection presents results from randomization inference based tests of the sharp null.

K.1 Alternate regression specifications

This section presents robustness checks for main results. Appendix Table K.1 presents a list of all robustness checks we perform. The table includes our main specification (row 6) along with up to eleven other specifications.

Specifications 1 and 2 in Panel A are treatment effects estimated on the sample with and without controls. In Panel B we estimate results for 'smaller' blocks or strata as discussed in Appendix A and shown in Appendix Table A.2. Here we check four different IPW specifications that differ in whether we do or do not include controls and treatment assignment fixed effects. Panel C shows the same checks using the probability weights and fixed effects for 'bigger' blocks, as shown in Appendix Table A.2. Finally, Panel D shows that we also implement ordinal logistic regression (using the probability weights for 'smaller' blocks) for the ordinal scales used to measure social identity. As can be seen in the tables that follow, the main results are remarkably consistent across different specifications.

Specification	Regression	Controls	Inverse prob weights	Block fixed effects
Panel A: Results for Sample				
1	OLS	No	No	No
2	OLS	Yes	No	No
Panel B: Results using 'smaller' strata				
3	WLS	No	Yes	No
4	WLS	Yes	Yes	No
5	WLS	No	Yes	Yes
6	WLS	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel C: Results using 'bigger' strata				
7	WLS	No	Yes	No
8	WLS	Yes	Yes	No
9	WLS	No	Yes	Yes
10	WLS	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel D: Ordinal logistic regression using 'smaller' strata (scale vars only)				
11	Ord. logit	No	Yes	No
12	Ord. logit	Yes	Yes	No

Table K.1: List of robustness checks

	Results for sample		Results with smaller strata				Results with bigger strata			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Group 2	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Group 3	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Group 4	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
N	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IPW	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

Table K.2: Robustness check: Petition

	Results for sample		Results with smaller strata				Results with bigger strata			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Share allocated to co-sectarian districts										
Group 2	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group 3	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Group 4	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel B: Share allocated to non co-sectarian districts										
Group 2	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group 3	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group 4	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Panel C: Share allocated to Beirut										
Group 2	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group 3	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group 4	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel D: Share allocated to poor districts										
Group 2	0.05*	0.05**	0.05*	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05*	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group 3	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group 4	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel E: Share allocated to poor co-sectarian districts										
Group 2	0.02	0.03*	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03*	0.02	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Group 3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Group 4	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel F: Share allocated to poor non co-sectarian districts										
Group 2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03*	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group 3	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group 4	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IPW	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

Table K.3: Robustness check: Map Exercise

	Results for sample		Results with smaller strata				Results with bigger strata			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Learning about shared preferences index (measures 1-5)										
Group 2	0.27**	0.24**	0.27**	0.24**	0.27**	0.24**	0.28**	0.25**	0.28**	0.25**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Group 3	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.07	-0.05	-0.08	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Group 4	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.02
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Panel B: Learning index (measures 1-3)										
Group 2	0.21	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.20	0.16	0.22*	0.16	0.22*	0.18
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Group 3	0.12	0.09	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.08	0.13	0.09	0.13	0.09
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Group 4	0.10	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.12	0.09	0.12	0.09
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Panel C: Perceived agreement index (measures 4-5)										
Group 2	0.20	0.22*	0.22	0.24*	0.22*	0.23*	0.21	0.23*	0.21*	0.22*
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Group 3	-0.20	-0.17	-0.21	-0.19	-0.21*	-0.20	-0.19	-0.17	-0.19*	-0.18
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Group 4	-0.12	-0.10	-0.06	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06	-0.11	-0.08	-0.11	-0.10
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)
N	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IPW	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

Table K.4: Robustness Check: Learning about Shared Preferences

	Results for sample		Results with smaller strata				Results with bigger strata				Ordinal logistic reg	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: ID Sect and class in-group												
Group 2	-0.11	-0.11	-0.18	-0.16	-0.18	-0.16	-0.10	-0.11	-0.10	-0.12	-0.08	-0.04
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Group 3	-0.26	-0.30	-0.27	-0.31	-0.27	-0.32	-0.26	-0.30	-0.26	-0.31	-0.21	-0.23
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Group 4	-0.23	-0.28	-0.25	-0.29	-0.25	-0.29	-0.26	-0.31	-0.26	-0.31	-0.12	-0.13
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Panel B: ID Sect in-group, class out-group												
Group 2	0.19	0.11	0.15	0.06	0.15	0.08	0.19	0.12	0.19	0.14	0.13	0.04
	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.23)
Group 3	0.15	0.11	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.07	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.12	0.08
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Group 4	0.48	0.44	0.47	0.44	0.47	0.45	0.47	0.45	0.47*	0.47*	0.40	0.38
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Panel C: ID Sect out-groups, class in-group												
Group 2	0.26	0.22	0.19	0.14	0.19	0.14	0.27	0.23	0.27	0.22	0.15	0.15
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Group 3	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.04
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Group 4	0.26	0.20	0.30	0.23	0.30	0.22	0.27	0.19	0.27	0.20	0.28	0.22
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Panel D: ID Sect and class out-groups												
Group 2	0.10	0.05	0.12	0.06	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.07	0.12	0.09	0.07	0.03
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Group 3	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08	-0.09	-0.08	-0.08	-0.07	-0.08	-0.07	-0.08	-0.07	-0.05
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Group 4	0.56**	0.50**	0.59**	0.52**	0.59**	0.53**	0.57**	0.50**	0.57**	0.52**	0.51**	0.48**
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)
N	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IPW	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No

Table K.5: Robustness Check: Social Identification

	Results for sample		Results with smaller strata				Results with bigger strata			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Social pressure index										
Group 2	-0.19*	-0.21**	-0.20*	-0.23**	-0.20*	-0.24**	-0.18*	-0.21**	-0.18*	-0.22**
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Group 3	0.04	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.04	0.04	0.00	0.04	-0.01
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Group 4	-0.27**	-0.27**	-0.26**	-0.27**	-0.26**	-0.30**	-0.26**	-0.27**	-0.26**	-0.28**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Panel B: Empathy index										
Group 2	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Group 3	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.15	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.13
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Group 4	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Panel C: Anxiety										
Group 2	0.12	0.14	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.12
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Group 3	0.15	0.19*	0.14	0.18*	0.14	0.18*	0.15	0.19*	0.15	0.19*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Group 4	0.17*	0.21**	0.13	0.17	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.20*	0.16	0.20**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
N	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713	713
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IPW	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

Table K.6: Robustness check: Social pressure and emotions

K.2 Randomization inference

As discussed in the "Estimation" section of the main text, any experimental design in which individuals are randomly assigned to interact in groups raises concerns about partial interference. Interference in our context is also of an unknown form, making it difficult to model (Rosenbaum, 2007; Sävje, Aronow and Hudgens, 2018). To check the robustness of our results to the presence of interference, we implement randomization inference following the framework first developed by Fisher (1935). In Fisher's framework, the null hypothesis of no effect means that ever unit's outcome would be the same regardless of its treatment assignment, implying (if it holds) no primary or interference effects of the treatment (Rosenbaum, 2007). Randomization inference enables a test of this sharp null, where a rejection provides evidence for treatment effects that could be due to primary and/or interference effects (Rosenbaum, 2007; Bowers, Frederickson and Panagopoulos, 12; Sävje, Aronow and Hudgens, 2018). In other words, while randomization inference does not allow us to distinguish between treatment effects due to primary or interference effects, it provides a valid, design-based test of the existence of treatment effects.

Fisherian randomization inference involves the computation of a test statistic for every possible treatment assignment, which generates the randomization distribution of the test statistic under the sharp null null hypothesis of no effect. The exact p-value is the probability of seeing the observed test statistic given this null distribution. We implement randomization inference by running 10,000 simulations in which we randomly re-assign units to our four different experimental arms within 'bigger strata' assignment blocks (see Appendix A.2).[5] We then compare our observed coefficients to the coefficients under the null distribution, calculating exact p-values for one-tailed and two-tailed tests.

The results are presented in Figures K.1-K.4 where the x-axis shows the range of coefficients under the null distribution and the vertical line denotes the location of our observed test coefficient. We report the p-values for the one-tailed test (which are roughly doubled for the two-tailed tests). The results from the randomization tests are very consistent with those obtained from the regression analysis, meaning that we reject the same hypotheses through our regression and design based tests. The one notable difference is for the petition results: randomization inference allows us to reject the sharp null of no treatment effect for mixed-sect, same-class discussion with probability $p = .049$ (one-tailed) and $p = .099$ (two-tailed). Our p-values from the regression analysis were higher due to a relatively high ICC for this outcome ICC ($\rho = .24$). The randomization inference results presented here offer a valid test of the sharp null even in the presence of such clustering.

[5] We remind readers that our analysis in the main text employs the weights and treatment assignment blocks associated with the 'smaller' strata. As such, the test statistics used for the randomization inference differ slightly from those presented in the main analysis and correspond most closely to those presented in column 10 in Appendix K.1.



Figure K.1: Randomization inference results for petition outcome



Figure K.2: Randomization inference results for main map outcomes



Figure K.3: Randomization inference results for learning mechanism



Figure K.4: Randomization inference results for social identity and pressure mechanisms

L Heterogeneous Effects

This appendix presents the results for the heterogeneous effects analysis mentioned in the "Discussion of Results" section of the main text. We focus on analyzing heterogeneous treatment effects by class and sect. These are the main conditional effects on which to focus given our design and we pre-registered our interest in analyzing them. Additionally, we explore how the effects of cross-cutting vary depending on social network homogeneity. We did not pre-specify any heterogeneous effects hypotheses, however, and all analysis in this section is exploratory. We also note that we are likely under-powered to detect differences, so many of the results are suggestive.

L.1 By class

We examine variation in results for lower and upper class participants to shed light on which class groups might be most responsive to cross-cutting discussion. This is important because, while lower income individuals might be more embedded in sectarian clientelist networks—and therefore more supportive of sectarian politics—this is also the group that could arguably materially benefit the most from programmatic or class-based politics (Huber, 2017). Alternatively, upper income individuals might be more willing to switch support a cross-sectarian, programmatic alternative precisely because they are less dependent on clientelism (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). While it is difficult to predict the direction of the variation, this is important to investigate empirically.

While we find little evidence of statistically significant differences in the effects of cross-cutting discussion on lower versus upper class participants, the results nonetheless yield some insights. First, the results in Appendix Tables L.1 and L.3 suggest that mixed-sect, same-class had the most pronounced effect on increasing petition-signing, reducing contributions to Beirut, reducing social pressure, and reducing anxiety among higher class participants. Conversely, mixed-sect, same-class discussion possibly had a bigger effect on learning about shared preferences for poor participants. While these results are suggestive at best, they indicate that upper-class voters might in fact be more willing to switch support from sectarian politics and towards a cross-sectarian, programmatic alternative. This is also consistent with the evidence in Appendix H showing that upper income participants were generally more concerned about sectarianism than lower income participants.

	Petition			Map exercise					
				Share for Beirut			Share for Poor Districts		
	Group 2	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***
Disc.	0.14	0.00	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.05	-0.05	0.04	0.01	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Poor	-0.08	0.03	-0.07	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.03	0.01
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Disc. * Poor	-0.07	0.11	0.11	0.03	0.06*	0.05	0.02	-0.01	0.02
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
N	355	356	356	355	356	356	355	356	356

Table L.1: Heterogeneous Effects by Class: Main Results

	Learning			Social Identity					
	Learning abt shared prefs index			Diff sect, same class			Same sect, diff class		
	Group 2	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***
Disc.	0.02	-0.18	-0.10	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.39	0.47
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.36)
Poor	-0.08	0.05	0.02	-0.12	0.23	0.01	-0.05	-0.17	0.09
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.41)
Disc. * Poor	0.39*	0.18	0.20	0.22	-0.19	0.32	-0.10	-0.59	0.00
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.48)
N	355	356	356	355	356	356	355	356	356

Table L.2: Heterogeneous Effects by Class: Mechanism Results Part 1

	Social Pressure Index			Empathy Index			Anxiety		
	Group 2	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***
Disc.	-0.29*	-0.04	-0.28*	0.07	0.13	0.18	0.10	0.23	-0.31**
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Poor	-0.01	-0.16	0.06	0.24	0.28	0.30	0.07	0.04	0.18
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)
Disc. * Poor	0.15	0.08	-0.02	0.06	0.02	-0.18	0.04	-0.08	-0.23
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)
N	355	356	356	355	356	356	355	356	356

Table L.3: Heterogeneous Effects by Class: Mechanism Results Part 2

L.2 By sect

We also check whether results vary by sect, drawing on substantial evidence that upper and lower status groups can experience cross-cutting interaction very differently (Myers and Mendelberg, 2013; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011). In the Lebanese context, Christian groups have historically held a higher status and have benefited disproportionately from Lebanon's power-sharing institutions.[6] Christians might thus feel more threatened by the possibility of reforming the sectarian political system and more resistant to the effects of cross-cutting discussion. Conversely, Shia have historically been more politically and economically marginalized, although this has changed significantly in recent years. Nevertheless, if Shia feel more discriminated against, they might be more resistant to benefitting from engagement with other more-advantaged groups (Pettigrew et al., 2011).

While the results again yield little evidence of statistical differences across groups, they lend themselves to a few conclusions. First, the magnitude of the petition coefficient on *Cross-cutting disc*Shia* for group 2 suggests that Shia might have been more willing to sign the petition than either Christians or Sunnis. Shia were also significantly more likely to report learning about shared preferences (Appendix Table L.5). Mixed-sect, same-class discussion caused participants in all three sectarian groups to reduce allocations to Beirut and increase allocations to poor districts. While it is difficult to interpret all the results presented here, it is important to examine in future studies how the effects of cross-cutting discussion might vary by ethnic and economic groups.

[6] For instance, Maronites retain 50 percent of the seats in the legislature and the council of ministers despite being only 25-30 percent of the population.

	Petition			Map exercise					
				Share for Beirut			Share for poor districts		
	Group 2	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***
Panel A: Shia									
Cross-cutting disc.	0.03	0.07	0.00	-0.05**	-0.01	-0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Shia	0.07	0.05	0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05**	0.11***	0.10**	0.11***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Cross-cutting disc*Shia	0.21	-0.05	0.09	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel B: Sunni									
Cross-cutting disc.	0.15	0.04	0.04	-0.06***	-0.05**	-0.03	0.05	-0.01	0.00
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Sunni	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.02
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Cross-cutting disc*Sunni	-0.15	0.04	-0.02	0.03	0.11	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.00
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Panel C: Christian									
Cross-cutting disc.	0.12	0.05	0.05	-0.04**	0.02	0.00	0.06*	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Christian	-0.13	-0.11	-0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03	-0.08**	-0.10***	-0.09***
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cross-cutting disc*Christian	-0.05	0.02	-0.07	-0.03	-0.10	-0.06	-0.03	0.03	0.07
	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	355	356	356	355	356	356	355	356	356

Table L.4: Heterogeneous Effects by Sect: Main Results

	Learning abt shared preferences (index)			Social Identification with diff sect, same class			Social Identification with same sect, diff class		
	Group 2	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***
Panel A: Shia									
Cross-cutting disc.	0.04	-0.21	-0.13	0.16	-0.22	0.38	0.08	0.15	0.44
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.37)
Shia	-0.47**	-0.41**	-0.50**	-0.20	-0.08	0.04	-0.11	0.09	0.06
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.41)
Cross-cutting disc*Shia	0.53**	0.31	0.39	0.04	0.46	-0.59	-0.20	-0.11	0.15
	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.51)	(0.60)	(0.56)
Panel B: Sunni									
Cross-cutting disc.	0.37***	-0.06	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.11	-0.10	-0.18	0.37
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.36)
Sunni	0.44**	0.45**	0.45**	0.30	0.26	0.22	-0.88**	-0.91**	-0.82**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.39)
Cross-cutting disc*Sunni	-0.45*	-0.09	-0.38	0.36	-0.21	0.24	0.27	0.81	0.29
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.53)
Panel C: Christian									
Cross-cutting disc.	0.24*	-0.04	0.01	0.30	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.37	0.65*
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.36)
Christian	0.01	-0.06	0.03	-0.12	-0.20	-0.33	1.04***	0.93**	0.88**
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.38)
Cross-cutting disc*Christian	-0.08	-0.19	-0.02	-0.38	-0.21	0.40	-0.19	-0.88	-0.55
	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.58)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.53)	(0.54)
N	355	356	356	355	356	356	355	356	356

Table L.5: Heterogeneous Effects by Sect: Mechanism Results Part 1

	Social Pressure Index			Empathy Index			Anxiety		
	Group 2	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***	***Group 2***	***Group 3***	***Group 4***
Panel A: Shia									
Cross-cutting disc.	-0.31**	-0.15	-0.38**	0.24	0.20	0.27*	0.07	0.14	0.19
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Shia	-0.16	-0.14	-0.22	0.16	0.23	0.25	-0.17	-0.08	-0.04
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Cross-cutting disc*Shia	0.25	0.44*	0.25	-0.36	-0.18	-0.48*	0.14	0.16	0.01
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Panel B: Sunni									
Cross-cutting disc.	-0.14	0.16	-0.25	0.10	0.04	0.08	0.10	0.32**	0.27**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Sunni	0.29	0.26	0.26	-0.09	-0.11	-0.08	0.20	0.13	0.17
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Cross-cutting disc*Sunni	-0.23	-0.46*	-0.12	0.06	0.27	0.07	0.07	-0.38	-0.22
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Panel C: Christian									
Cross-cutting disc.	-0.22	-0.02	-0.25*	0.01	0.17	-0.04	0.19	0.11	0.13
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Christian	-0.14	-0.15	-0.05	-0.09	-0.11	-0.20	-0.03	-0.08	-0.15
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Cross-cutting disc*Christian	-0.01	0.07	-0.13	0.32	-0.10	0.44	-0.21	0.25	0.22
	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.24)
N	355	356	356	355	356	356	355	356	356

Table L.6: Heterogeneous Effects by Sect: Mechanism Results Part 2

L.3 By network type

The main objective of this paper is to shed light on what happens when people talk politics in social environments with cross-cutting versus reinforcing cleavages. In Beirut, as in many large urban areas, there is substantial variation in the extent to which individuals engage in cross-cutting interaction, depending, for instance, on their social networks or degree of residential or workplace segregation (Allport, 1954; Enos, 2017) As such, our sample consists both of those who already have relatively heterogeneous social networks and of others who do not. Specifically, among our discussion participants, approximately 23 percent have networks that are heterogeneous in both class and sect, 37 percent have networks that are homogeneous on both dimensions, and the rest report networks that are mixed on one dimension but homogeneous on the other. This raises questions about how the effects shown here might vary across those who may or may not already engage in regular cross-cutting political discussion.

We focus here on looking at how the effects of mixed-sect, same-class discussions vary for for individuals whose actual social networks differ in their sectarian and class compositions. The results in Appendix L.7 present somewhat mixed results. We see that mixed-sect, same-class discussion reduced allocations to Beirut and increased allocations to poor districts for those with homogeneous networks. The relatively large coefficient magnitudes suggest that these results could be driven by learning, identity, or social pressure mechanisms. Conversely, mixed-sect, same-class discussion had a pronounced effect on increasing petition-signing and decreasing allocations to Beirut for those with very mixed networks, driven by learning about shared preferences and possibly social identity. These results suggest that mixed-sect, same-class discussion might be increasing support for programmatic over ethnic politics via different mechanisms for different types of individuals. For instance, it makes sense that cross-cutting discussion had a bigger effect on reducing social pressure for those with homogeneous social networks. It is surprising, however, that those with more mixed networks would have learned more from mixed-sect, same-class interaction, unless these participants were already more predisposed to benefit from such interactions and they benefited from the kind of focused discussion with non-coethnics of the same class that maybe is hard to achieve when social networks are fully diverse.

	Main Results			Mechanisms						
	Petition	Map exercise		Learning		Social ID		Pressure	Emotions	
	Signed petition	Share for Beirut	Share for poor districts	Shared prefs index	Agreement index	Non-cosect of same class	Cosect of diff class	Social pressure index	Empathy index	Anxiety
Effect of Mixed-sect, same-class discussion										
Same sect and class network	-0.03	-0.04**	0.11***	0.13	0.27	0.14	-0.24	-0.23	0.08	-0.11
(n=139)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.45)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Mixed-sect, same-class network	0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.22	0.22	-0.18	0.36	-0.06	0.01	-0.08
(n=107)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Same-sect, mixed-class network	0.09	-0.02	-0.04	0.23	0.46*	-0.14	0.92	-0.17	-0.82**	0.47**
(n=31)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.57)	(0.79)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.21)
Mixed sect and class network	0.19*	-0.05**	0.03	0.48**	0.36*	0.31	-0.61	0.00	0.31*	0.12
(n=78)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.17)

Table L.7: Heterogeneous Effects by Actual Social Networks Networks

M Relationship Between Paper and Pre-Analysis Plan

The pre-analysis plan for this paper was registered with the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) network (see egap.org/registration/2208). This appendix discusses the similarities and differences between the paper and the pre-analysis plan (PAP). Pre-analysis plans have become more common in political science in recent years as a means to prevent publication bias and to draw a bright line between confirmatory hypothesis testing and exploratory analysis. We note that the purpose of a pre-analysis plan is not to tie researchers' hands and prevent any deviations during the natural course of research but rather to encourage researchers to be transparent about those deviations and provide justifications (Humphreys, de la Sierra and van der Windt, 2013; Monogan III, 2015; Olken, 2015).

Theory and hypotheses

We pre-registered one main hypothesis, that "social interaction that cuts across ethnic (sectarian) and class cleavages will weaken individual tendencies towards ethnic politics and strengthen tendencies towards programmatic politics." The pre-analysis plan also stated our interest in analyzing three-types of cross-cutting interaction (p. 5), following naturally from the design of the experiment. While we hypothesized that mixed-sect, same-class and same-sect, mixed-class discussion could reduce support for sectarian relative to cross-sectarian, programmatic politics, we did not pre-register hypotheses involving fully mixed discussion. We state in the PAP (as we do in the paper) that all analysis involving that arm is exploratory.

Outcomes and mechanisms

The PAP is clear that the main goal of this project is to study how cross-cutting discussion affects support for ethnic versus multi-ethnic, programmatic politics. We pre-specify our main outcomes of interest in Section 6.1 of the PAP. The PAP was insufficiently clear, however, on which outcomes we considered 'main' (meaning that they capture political preferences) and which we considered 'proximate' (meaning that they were more like mechanisms). Thus, we discussed social identity as a 'proximate outcome' while also talking separately about mechanisms like learning, anxiety, empathy, and conformity pressure.

The paper adds organization and conceptual clarity by distinguishing main outcomes and proximate outcomes/mechanisms based on the intent of the pre-analysis plan. The paper classifies 'main' outcomes as those that directly capture political preferences (e.g. the petition and map exercise). It classifies as 'mechanisms' those proximate outcomes and mechanisms that we discuss in the PAP as channels by which the ultimate political preferences of interest might be affected (e.g. learning, social identity, pressure, and empathy/anxiety). We note that this has no effect on the estimation, just on how we present and interpret the results.

Finally, we analyze cooperation in the public goods game as pre-registered. While the focus of this paper is on preferences rather than cooperation *per se*, it is possible that our theorized mechanisms contribute to preference change by strengthening cross-ethnic, class-based cooperation or weakening intra-ethnic, cross-class alliances. We therefore we think impacts on cooperation are an important channel to investigate.

Data and measures

We largely followed the PAP in the measures we used to test the effects of cross-cutting discussion on political preferences and mechanisms, with some exceptions noted here.

- ***Petition.*** We pre-specified the petition as our main behavioral measure of support for sectarian versus cross-sectarian, programmatic politics. We analyze the petition results as pre-registered.

- ***Map exercise.*** We pre-specify that our main map outcomes of interest are allocations to cosectarian and non-cosectarian districts, with additional breakdowns possible. We analyze these as pre-specified but analyze allocations to Beirut separately as the only district that does not have a predominant sect. In addition to the aggregate measures based on sect, we also create aggregate measures based on level of development (e.g. poor, middle-income, and rich districts overall) as well as the complement of disaggregated measures (allocations to poor, middle, and rich cosectarian and non-cosectarian districts). We discuss all results in the main text and report the full set of results in Appendix J.

- ***Learning about shared preferences.*** We pre-specified this as a mechanism to be studied using an index of five variables, including three variables that measured 'learning' and two variables that measured 'agreement' (shared preferences). We pre-specified creating a 'learning about shared preferences' index of all five measures and sub-index of 'agreement' using the last two measures. We implement this as pre-registered. For the paper we also create a sub-index of 'learning' with just the learning variables to complement the pre-specified 'agreement' index.

- ***Social identity.*** We pre-specified this as a 'proximate outcome', which we refer to as a mechanism in the paper. We analyze the main self-categorization and social identity variables as pre-specified using the spatial-pictorial measures of self, ingroup, and outgroup overlap. Additionally, we pre-specified three group distance measures. We mention these in the main text and report the results in Appendix J to save space in the main paper and because the results are similar to those for our preferred measures of social identity.

- ***Social pressure and cross-pressure.*** We pre-specified that we wanted to study social (conformity) pressure *and* cross-pressure as important possible mechanisms/explanations for a null result. Unfortunately, with respect to social (conformity) pressure, we did not pre-register measures aside from those pre-registered for our 'agreement' index. This was an oversight on our part and one that makes it impossible to distinguish genuine learning about shared preferences from social pressure to conform on common preference (Farrar et al., 2009). Fortunately, however, we had included two measures of social pressure as part of our pre-registered cross-pressure index, which also included a measure of uncertainty.[7] In the end, we disaggregated the cross-pressure index into its two conceptually distinct components—social pressure and uncertainty—and analyzed these separately. This has the benefit of greater clarity in presenting and interpreting results. We note that analyzing the pre-registered cross-pressure index yields almost identical results to those from the social pressure index alone, which is not surprising given that the uncertainty measure is contributing little to the results.

[7] This index followed on cross-pressure as conceptualized by Mutz (2002).

- ***Empathy and anxiety.*** We pre-specified wanting to examine these emotional responses as mechanisms, creating an empathy index of two measures and using a sole measure of self-reported anxiety. We analyze these pre-specified.
- ***Public goods game.*** We pre-specify an interest in the amount contributed in round 1, in round 2, and the difference between rounds. We analyze these results as pre-specified in the main text, with additional analysis in Appendix J.3.
- ***Strength of Lebanese identity.*** We pre-specify wanting to analyze the strength in Lebanese (relative to sectarian identity) as a possible alternative outcome. We do this as intended, with results discussed in the main text and reported in Appendix J.

Data preparation

Section 6.4 of the pre-analysis plan provides details on our plans for cleaning and preparing the data, and we follow these closely. We pre-specify that we will perform 10 rounds of missing data imputation using multivariate imputation via chained equations. We pre-specify recoding variables for directionality and using outcome variables in their original form (e.g. scales) for the main analysis. We also pre-specify that we will use inverse covariance weighting to create indices using variables that are intended to measure the same construct (and are pre-registered as such). We also specify in Appendix A the variables that we will use for controls and for control indices. In our main analysis, we add controls for the number of participants in the discussion (since not all discussions had six individuals), for whether individuals knew each other in advance, and for moderator fixed effects (there were two moderators). We believe these additions are well motivated but these changes are not consequential as the results are highly robust to the exclusion/inclusion of controls, as shown in Appendix K.

Estimation

The specification in our main text is as pre-registered. We pre-specified a regression of outcomes on an indicator for being in a mixed-sect discussion, an indicator for being in a mixed-sect discussion, and the interaction of the two 'mixed' treatments (see Appendix J.2). We also pre-specified that we would do IPW using weights to account for unequal treatment assignment probabilities within blocks; treatment assignment block fixed effects; and a vector of control variables. We also pre-registered that we would cluster standard errors at the discussion-level, following our discussion about partial interference in the "Estimation" section of the main text. We note that, while we report results for the three separate cross-cutting treatments in the main text, our specification is essentially the same.

Heterogeneous Effects

The PAP states our interest in exploring heterogeneous effects along a number of different dimensions, including sect, class, and network homogeneity. We do not, however, specify any heterogeneous effects hypotheses and state that any such analysis would be exploratory. In Appendix L we focus on heterogeneous effects by sect and class since these are the most central to our design and inquiry. We also present results for network homogeneity.

N Selected Transcripts

As discussed in the Data and Measures section of the paper, to provide qualitative insights on the discussions, we translated and transcribed eight discussions (four same-sect and four mixed-sect). We present two transcripts in full here for interested readers. We encourage readers to see Appendix I for summaries (according to the moderator surveys) of the topics that came up in the discussions.

The following transcripts from the group discussions were translated from the original Lebanese Arabic into English. Participants are indicated with unique identification numbers. Where the identity of the participant cannot be confirmed, we refer to the speaker as "Unidentified respondent."

N.1 Transcript of heterogeneous sectarian discussion

Group ID: 408

- **Mixed sectarian (and mixed economic class) group**
- **Women only**

Moderator: As I mentioned in the beginning, we have invited you here today to engage in a discussion with members from [DIFFERENT] sectarian groups [AND DIFFERENT] economic classes so that you can share with each other your thoughts and feelings about your economic and political hopes and concerns. Some of what we discuss today could be sensitive and at times people might disagree – that is ok. We just ask that you engage with one another with honesty and respect so that we can all learn more about how people who we do not know personally are thinking and feeling on the issues that we all face...

[Play public goods game]

[Moderator presents Visual 1 via LCD projector: an image of the YouStink protests in Beirut.]

Moderator: Do you remember that day? When was it?
All: That's the protest of March 14, 2015, but there are no political flags.
PID1446: These protests were peaceful in the beginning but they turned violent. This protest was in Riad Al Solh during the garbage crisis.
Unidentified respondent: This is the Bedna n'Hasseb protest.
Unidentified respondent: It's You Stink.
PID1067: There are no political flags, so this must be during the civil movement's protests.
Moderator: When you see this image, how do you feel? [Probe about hope, fear, apprehension, distrust, indifference, etc.] Why?
All: Seeing such protests happen gives us hope for the country, it shows that we are united under the same cause.
Unidentified respondent: It is good to see all sects participating and raising their voice together.
PID1552: These protests bring all religions together for one cause.
Unidentified respondent: This protest shows that there is a huge problem. Without that problem, there would be no protest.
Moderator: Were you there? Why or why not?

PID1159: I participated in these protests twice to raise my voice against all the problems we are facing, just like the rest of the Lebanese people did.
PID1577: I did not participate in these protests because I know that no politician will listen. The authorities either shoot us or beat us, or just look at us through the television screen and laugh at us.
PID1552: If everybody participates, things will change. Unfortunately, very few people participated in these protests. I participated 3 times. The activists who started the hunger strike were my friends. I wanted the trash crisis to be resolved.
PID1446: I didn't participate because I don't encourage such protests. I also had no reason to participate because I live in Tripoli, where there was no garbage problem.
PID1067: My friends always participate, and I wanted to go with them. But I didn't go because there were too many people and I feared getting hurt in the crowd.
PID1475: I didn't participate because I felt it useless and I don't think protests achieve anything.
PID1159: Nothing works in this country and we know nothing will change, but we needed to participate in the hope of changing something – even if just a little bit.
PID1552: Many people participated because they don't have jobs and cant afford a decent standard of living. I currently have a job, there is no garbage piling up next to my house, and I'm lucky to live comfortably, but I don't believe that's reason not to participate. I participated because I believe everyone should raise their voice in support of people living without jobs or in areas where garbage is piling up.
Moderator: Some people might say that concerns about social and economic welfare were at the root of the protests. What are your major economic concerns today? Please feel free to share with us examples from your personal experience so that we can better understand your concerns.
All: Poverty, unemployment, oil prices, cost of living, garbage issue, corruption, health issues (food safety, pollution), low income.
Unidentified respondent: Corruption, electricity, and even access to water is limited. All of these are basic needs, for us as human beings, that are not being fulfilled.
Unidentified respondent: Many Lebanese citizens have jobs with low salaries, they pay for electricity that is not available, so they have to pay another bill for the generator in order to receive electricity. Even on low salaries, people pay all their taxes but get nothing in return. For example, we pay all the car mechanic fees for nothing because our cars get broken from the roads that are never maintained. People live in poverty and yet the state gets taxes without giving anything in return. This country is full of corruption.
PID1552: Job opportunities are very hard to find. If you don't have work experience, you can't get a job, but to get experience you need to get a job. The only thing you can do is start working from your first year at university, to take any job, in order to be able to find a good job once you graduate.
PID1475: A year ago, I had to undergo surgery and I asked the Ministry of Health for help but they never gave it to me. The hospital wouldn't admit me before paying the full amount as a guarantee. The fees were very high so my parents had to give away their savings in order for me to get the surgery. If this happens to someone whose parents can't afford the expenses of the surgery, they wouldn't be able to get it.
PID1067: I am afraid I won't find a job after I graduate. The majority of my friends who graduated are not able to find jobs. Most of them are working as cashiers in supermarkets and cell shops.
PID1446: My life is good and I have everything I need with a good salary, but I am afraid that one day this situation will change. I am concerned about my son's future and I hope he will be able to live well.

PID1577: I'm not scared for myself but I worry about my children's future. I'm afraid I won't be able to support them if they ever get sick and I can't afford to give them a good education and other basic needs. Currently in Lebanon, if a kid's parents are not able to give him a job or a house, the kid grows up having nothing and unable to provide anything for himself.
PID1159: My biggest concern is that foreigners are being employed more than Lebanese people are, and this is affecting us deeply. Lebanese people can't find any jobs because many places employ Syrians. Apart from this, everything is expensive – from houses to bills and taxes. This is caused by foreigners, who are taking everything, and by the government, that allows them to do so.
Moderator: I am now going to describe two different characters that represent different types of people in Lebanon. I'd like you to think about which character you feel closest to.

[Moderator shows the visual and uses the cards with women characters]

For women's groups:

Character 1: *Ms. Hind lives in Beirut. Her parents could not afford to give her a university education, so she underwent some vocational training. She works on a part-time basis in a medium enterprise in Lebanon, does not have health coverage, and earns an income but often has trouble making her ends meet.*

Character 2: *Ms. Roula also lives in Beirut. Her parents were able to pay for her education in a private university in Lebanon. She occupies a high position in a well-established company in Lebanon, has a private insurance and earns an income that allows her to afford a comfortable living.*

Moderator: In your opinion, what are the economic concerns of each of these two characters?

[Moderator probes about differences and similarities and writes them in two separate columns on a flipchart in front of all participants]

PID1446: Hind has more fears and problems than Roula: she fears getting sick because she doesn't have health insurance, and she fears losing her job because, without a job, she won't be able to afford her basic needs.
Unidentified respondent: Her income doesn't cover her basic needs.
Unidentified respondent: Hind's biggest concern is that she doesn't have a future in this country.
Unidentified respondent: She could have a future, but with a lot of difficulty. She'd have to get lucky.
Unidentified respondent: Hind might have a better future if she gets married, since she cannot afford her basic needs on her salary.
Unidentified respondent: Even without a university education, Hind could get a better job because of her work experience. Some employers prefer people with experience and prioritize them over graduates who have no experience. There is a possibility for her to have a better future, although that is not guaranteed.
Unidentified respondent: Regarding Roula, she doesn't have all the concerns that Hind has because she can afford all her basic needs. She might worry about things like electricity and water, but she has the money to pay for them.
Unidentified respondent: The only thing in common between Roula and Hind is the fact that both live in Beirut.

Unidentified respondent: Although their lives are very different, both of them work and have an education.
Unidentified respondent: They may have a common concern, which is their future and the security situation in Lebanon.
Moderator: Which of these characters do you feel closest to? Why?
Unidentified respondent: Roula is somewhat closer to me as I finished my university education. But unlike her, I do not live a comfortable life and I sometimes struggle to afford my basic needs.
PID1159: Hind is closer to me in that I constantly think about how I am going to pay for my daughters' education. This is currently my biggest concern.
PID1475: I am like Hind. I work like Hind and I can barely afford my basic needs. My parents are still helping me financially.
PID1067: I am more like to Roula because my parents are doing well financially, I am still studying, and I even have a part time job as a teacher.
PID1552: Roula is more like me because I have studied in a private university (AUST) and I have a job and health insurance.
Moderator: Now I am going to ask you a question and I do not want you to immediately answer out loud but I want you to think about this privately. Imagine that you were to learn that the character you just said that you feel closest to is from a different confessional group and the character you said you feel less close to is from your same confessional group. Would the character that you feel closest to change or remain the same?
Unidentified respondent: Of course my opinion would stay the same because religion doesn't matter we all come from the same country.
Unidentified respondent: Religion doesn't make a difference; it only creates problems.
PID1577: I don't see why I would change my answer. What matters to me is living a comfortable life. Every religious community is made up of people from different social classes, and I would feel closer to someone who's in the same economic situation as me regardless of their religion.
PID1446: We live in a sectarian country; I can't imagine Lebanon without sectarianism.
Moderator: Why does religion control politics in Lebanon, in your opinion?
Unidentified respondent: Politicians built this country and its political system on religion.
Unidentified respondent: Without religion, Lebanon wouldn't exist.
PID1552: The political parties control this country. They made us sectarian because it strengthens their power and their control over the country.
PID1067: Everybody is looking for their own gains and self-interest. People care about their economic interest and sectarian parties garner support by providing people everything they need.
Unidentified respondent: It's not only about economic interest, sometimes it's political or religious. Some people have religious beliefs, others have political beliefs based on sectarianism. I believe a few powerful people control religion, and these people are the ones controlling the whole country.
Unidentified respondent: I agree with PID1577. However, not all people support politicians for the financial benefits they receive. During the election period, some people get paid to vote and some people don't – not everyone votes for politicians of the same religion to get something in return. I think Lebanon and religion go hand in hand; there is no Lebanon without sectarianism.
Moderator: In other countries, like France or Holland, can we identify the religion of presidents? Is it required that candidates belong to a certain religion or sect?
Unidentified respondent: No, because these countries are not divided like we are.
Unidentified respondent: They want us to stay as we are and they are contributing to our division.

Unidentified respondent: They are the ones who created sectarianism. They divided the country according to religion.
Moderator: The recent protests in Lebanon raise important questions about how people view their economic and confessional interests and what changes (if any) people would like to see made to the current system. When thinking of all these protests and the overall movement recently taking place in Lebanon, what is the slogan that you remember the most? Why? Does it bring hope or despair, confidence or fear?
Unidentified respondent: Some of the slogans such as "the people want the system to be abolished."
[**All agree**]
PID1446: This slogan scares us because we all saw what happened in other countries in the region and we don't want that to happen in Lebanon. It is better to have things as they are now.
PID1552: This doesn't scare me. What scares me the most is the fact that even if our politicians are exposed, people will elect them again, or elect their children because there are no competitors, there is no one else. And then nothing will change. This has always been the case; the same families have been elected since always.
PID1577: It is a vicious circle and I blame the people for this. The people chant this slogan, they want the system to be abolished, but they are the ones who elected our politicians.
Unidentified respondent: Not all people were demanding the abolishment of the system. They wanted certain politicians to be removed from their positions, not all of them.
PID1475: What the people are asking for is right, but, in the end, they are the ones who elected them.
Unidentified respondent: Not everyone was asking for the abolishment of the sectarian system. Some people participated because of the garbage crisis and against the Environment Minister.
Unidentified respondent: Some of the protesters participated only because their political leader asked them to. A lot of them didn't know what they were protesting against. The protests were also called for by university professors who asked their students to participate.
PID1159: No one asked me to participate; it was something I did on my own. I was motivated by what was being said on television. I wanted the garbage crisis to be solved. The protesters did make a change; the garbage crisis has been partially solved now. Although we did not get the result that we asked for, I think the protests had a certain effect.
PID1552: It was also a personal decision to participate. I don't believe that politicians were being affected by, or even cared about the protests. For example, the activist who was on a hunger strike ended up breaking his strike because he knew that politicians would leave him to die.
Unidentified respondent: Politicians sent people to disturb these peaceful protests they even started shooting at people.
Unidentified respondent: I don't have any hope in these protests.
Unidentified respondent: We should always remember that the power of the people is stronger than politicians. We can't keep watching on television what is happening in the country and we need to participate in these movements if we want to see change happen.
Moderator: What happens if the sectarian system is abolished in Lebanon?
PID1475: When the sectarian system collapses, hatred and war will disappear. There will be stability.
PID1577: Everything will change and citizen will become equal. Public positions will no longer be based on a person's religion.
Unidentified respondent: I don't believe this can happen because any regime or system is based on the people's decision. In our country, the system will be established by those who are currently controlling the country, so no change will happen.

Unidentified respondent: I fear that if the sectarian system collapses, we will have war just like in Syria.
PID1446: There will be a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites and the level of terrorism will increase. There will be many conflicts between different sects in Lebanon.
PID1577: I don't agree that there will be civil war. People will start electing those that represent them and their interests.
Unidentified respondent: I don't believe this can happen because the country is based on a sectarian system and people are raised to believe that sect matters above everything.
Moderator: You may have heard about the recent announcement regarding Lebanon's potential significant reserves of oil and gas. This resource, if developed, could bring in significant revenue in the future that could be used to finance public services and attract investment vital to the development of the country. How would you like these revenues to be spent? Please indicate regions, confessions, communities, sectors, etc. What did you base your choice upon? Discuss.
Unidentified respondent: These revenues should be spent on the agriculture sector.
Unidentified respondent: Public transportation.
Unidentified respondent: The revenues should be spent on electricity and water services, and on improving the agriculture and industrial sectors in order to generate more incomes.
All: More money should be spent in deprived areas, for example: Tripoli, especially Bab Al Tabbaneh; Nabaa, Bourj Hammoud, Sabra, Akkar, Dahieh, Hay El Selloum, Arsal, Hermel.
Unidentified respondent: I would like the money to be spent on an area in the Bekaa called "Tfeil," which has a lot of poverty. Residents of this area use Syrian currency instead of Lebanese currency.
Moderator: In your opinion, how will these revenues eventually be allocated given the current system?
Unidentified respondent: People wont get anything from this money because of corruption.
Unidentified respondent: Not long ago, the Lebanese government received a huge amount of money to fix the Electricity, but nothing has changed.
Unidentified respondent: Some politicians are working on improving the situation, like ministers Elie Abou Saab and Wael Abou Faour. For example, one of the things Elias Bou Saab did in the public school system is allow some students who cannot afford tuition fees to attend school for free.
Unidentified respondent: This is not true. I have a university degree, and I wanted to teach in a public school but they did not hire me because I do not have any connections.
Unidentified respondent: All my friends teach in public schools and none of them has any connections.
Unidentified respondent: They must be affiliated to the Free Patriotic Movement to be able to get accepted as public school teachers.
Unidentified respondent: Regarding the education system, it is well known that all over the country, public schools are for Aoun (FPM) and Public Institutes are for the Amal Movement.
Unidentified respondent: If this were true then only Amal Movement supporters would be working in Lebanon. I don't believe the situation is as bad as you say it is.
Moderator: Do you think that Lebanese resources should be privatized according to sects or based on economic and social needs?
Unidentified respondent: Resources should be distributed equally between sects.
Unidentified respondent: It should be based on needs not on sects. I care about Lebanon more than I care about my sect and I think every citizen should equally benefit from these resources.
[All agree]
Moderator: Now I would like you all to discuss as a group what kinds of changes, if any, you would like to see to the confessional system based on what we have discussed today. Would you

prefer an alternative to the current political system or would you prefer to keep things as they are? If you prefer to change the system, please describe what this alternative would look like. Please take 15 minutes to discuss and see whether you agree or not and, if you do agree, what kind of changes you would like to make. It is also perfectly ok if you cannot agree – these are big questions and we only have a short time.

[Moderator allows discussion to flow with minimal intervention]

Moderator: Final question: In your opinion, to what extent would this alternative / these alternatives to the current political system [depending on the outcome] help address the kinds of socio-economic concerns you raised earlier including ensuring that oil and gas revenues are spent well? Why or why not?
PID1446: We want to change the system, but not with protests. Politicians need to start communicating and agreeing among themselves.
Unidentified respondent: We can't change anything; we are like puppets.
Unidentified respondent: We all are against sectarianism but we know that the protesters can't achieve anything.
Unidentified respondent: Politicians have been here for decades and they won't accept to leave. But if change can happen, we would prefer a secular system.
Unidentified respondent: I am ready to help in changing the system but I am not ready to participate in protests or give away my time and energy to do so. I am not ready to lose my life or risk the life of my family because of people who are holding tight to their political positions and refuse to leave or change anything.
Unidentified respondent: If every citizen says this, things will never change. Politicians have sent infiltrators to disturb the protests. I don't know which politicians did this but it has been reported on television.
Unidentified respondent: Every time a politician gets criticized, he sends infiltrators to disturb protests, like for example Nabih Berri does. Every politician has supporters who are ready to do this.
Unidentified respondent: Change will happen only when politicians form consensus, but doing so is not in their interest. Sectarianism is being fed by Saudi Arabia and Iran; and Lebanese politicians highly benefit from it. Hariri is controlled by Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah is controlled by Iran. Other countries are controlling us. Lebanon will always be sectarian and we will always be controlled like puppets.
Unidentified respondent: As long as our system stays sectarian, politicians will keep on fighting each other. When Geagea and Aoun formed an agreement, Geagea and Hariri started fighting. This is like a game to them.

N.2 Transcript of homogeneous sectarian discussion

Group ID: 304

- **Same sectarian (and mixed economic class) group**
- **Christians only (3 upper-class and 3 lower-class)**
- **Men only**

Moderator: As I mentioned in the beginning, we have invited you here today to engage in a discussion with members from [THE SAME] sectarian group [AND DIFFERENT] economic classes

so that you can share with each other your thoughts and feelings about your economic and political hopes and concerns. Some of what we discuss today could be sensitive and at times people might disagree – that is ok. We just ask that you engage with one another with honesty and respect so that we can all learn more about how people who we do not know personally are thinking and feeling on the issues that we all face...

[Play public goods game]

[Moderator presents Visual 1 via LCD projector: an image of the YouStink protests in Beirut.]

Moderator: Do you remember that day? When was it?
Unidentified respondent: That's a picture of the protest on March 14th, 2015.
PID1341: That is in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia.
PID1019: This is the You Stink Movement protest.
PID1217: On March 14th there were a lot of flags, but there are no flags here so this must be the protest of the You Stink Movement.
All: This is the You Stink protest. It happened about 3 or 4 months ago, during the garbage crisis between the end of August and the beginning of September.
Moderator: Were you there? Why or why not?
PID1019: I went to the You Stink protests once or twice. I participated in this one because I wanted to raise my voice. This country has fallen apart – there is nothing; no social security, no healthcare system, no education. Everything is difficult here, and the garbage crisis on top of this was too much.
PID1217: I did not participate in these protests because I did not know who was supporting them and who behind them. To me, it looked like they were politically driven. In my opinion, powerful people who found these protests beneficial were behind them – like for example Hezbollah. I definitely think they were politically driven and aimed at disrupting the situation.
PID1244: I wanted to participate but I couldn't as I live far from where the event took place. I support this movement and I don't think the protests were politically driven as participants came from all over the country and all sects.
PID1341: I did not participate because I found it useless. Nothing works in this country, and even a million protests won't change that. There's no point in participating – all the protests before and after this one did not change anything, and I did not feel this one would be any different.
PID1386: I'm motivated about going to such protests and I encourage them a lot, but I did not go to this one because I thought it was useless. The protesters' demands will not be answered – they will be forgotten and no result will come out of the protests.
PID1385: I did not participate. I have a small shop nearby which was open on that day, and I couldn't close it just to participate.
Moderator: When you see this image, how do you feel? [Probe about hope, fear, apprehension, distrust, indifference, etc.] Why?
Unidentified respondent: This image gives us hope. After seeing the image of this protest I feel like all politicians should resign.
PID1217: I agree with the protesters' slogan "all of them." Unfortunately, they don't really mean it. In certain protests, people were protesting against all politicians. But later, after all the chaos began and protesters started fighting, I realized that politicians were behind all of this.
Unidentified respondent: The protest wasn't properly organized. There were way too many groups and movements behind it. Participants were divided, which made the protest meaningless.

Also, some people who went started causing trouble – I think many of them were infiltrators from political groups, such as the Amal Movement.
Unidentified respondent: I agree that the protest was political. For example, some of the groups gathered and attacked the Minister of the Environment, Machnouk, and that is definitely not the person they should have targeted. He is the only minister who still lives in a rented house and yet, he is the only one they decided to attack. Their slogan is "all of them" but they did not go after all of them. They should have targeted more important politicians like for example Saad Hariri, not those who are much less corrupt.
Unidentified respondent: It is all up to Berri and Jumblatt. The solution to the garbage crisis is in their hands. Unfortunately, we are not like Europe and we are not a civilized people. Look at the Danish people, this is a people that understands how to make a change. When the Danish government raised meat prices, the whole Danish people stopped eating meet for a week, which pressured the government to reverse its actions. If we want to change the system, that's how we should deal with these issues – we should stop paying bills and government taxes. But the protests were political, people participated but did not take action to try to change anything.
PID1217: The protests were political because protesters' demands were supported by every politician.
Unidentified respondent: Every politician welcomed criticism against the others but no single one of them accepted criticism against themselves.
Unidentified respondent: For example, some Lebanese singers who participated in the protests belonged to political groups. One of them started singing to the FPM, another sang to Hassan Nasrallah.
Unidentified respondent: Our people are used to similar images. They don't scare us – on the contrary, they give us a little hope.
PID1244: We will start hoping for a better future when all Lebanese politicians die.
Unidentified respondent: People went to these protests and caused trouble, so I don't think these movements have any future.
Unidentified respondent: Nothing came out of these protests. They should have achieved something but they didn't.
Moderator: Some people might say that concerns about social and economic welfare were at the root of the protests. What are your major economic concerns today? Please feel free to share with us examples from your personal experience so that we can better understand your concerns.
Unidentified respondent: We don't have economic concerns in Lebanon. Lebanon cannot suffer economically. Our economy is driven by money laundering so it will always be strong.
Unidentified respondent: My concerns are finding a job and having good health care.
PID1244: I am concerned about education, as it is very expensive in Lebanon.
PID1386: I agree that education is one of my biggest concerns. I am married but don't have any children yet. My brothers, who have children, tell me how expensive it is to provide good education to their children.
PID1217: I am concerned about the Lebanese pound. I don't think it will remain stable for very long. Today, 2 million LBP are equivalent to 1,300 USD, but I think someday this wont even amount to 500 USD since Lebanon is hugely indebted.
PID1341: I am concerned about everything: hospitals, schools, rents, housing, and minimum wage. For example, if my children decide to get married, they won't be able to afford anything.
PID1385: The real estate price increase and the high cost of living worry me.
PID1386: The 3 most important things in life are having a house, an education and good health care. Regarding education, I haven't had to worry about it yet. Regarding housing, I still live in a rented house. In case I get injured or fall ill, I would need a loan to be able to go to hospital.

Unidentified respondent: The real estate price increases and the payment methods for housing loans scare me; houses are very expensive and interest rates are very high.
Unidentified respondent: I'm scared about the same things as well. Ensuring a decent standard of living for yourself is difficult here.
Moderator: I am now going to describe two characters that represent different types of people in Lebanon. I'd like you to think about which character you feel closest to.

[**Moderator shows the visual and uses the cards with male characters**]

For men's groups:

Character 1: *Mr. Karim lives in Beirut. His parents could not afford to give him a university education, so he undertook some vocational training. He works on a part-time basis in a medium enterprise in Lebanon, does not have health insurance, and earns an income but often has trouble making his ends meet.*

Character 2: *Mr. Ibrahim also lives in Beirut. His parents were able to pay for his education in a private university in Lebanon. He occupies a high position in a well-established company in Lebanon, has private health insurance, and earns an income that allows him to live comfortably.*

Moderator: In your opinion, what are the economic concerns of each of these two characters?

[**Moderator probes about differences and similarities and writes them in two separate columns on a flipchart in front of all participants**]

PID1217: Karim can't buy a house and can't fulfill his basic needs. I can't imagine him being optimistic about his future.
Unidentified respondent: I believe Karim can't afford being hospitalized in case anything happens to him. He can't get married or have a family.
PID1385: I don't think Karim has any fears he has nothing to lose. I am scared of becoming like him.
PID1244: Karim is scared of everything. He is scared of the future, although I am not sure he even has one.
Unidentified respondent: Ibrahim is concerned about losing his assets in case an economic crisis happens.
Unidentified respondent: But he has a university education, he can always find a job abroad if anything happens here.
PID1019: Ibrahim is scared of society. His life is good but he is scared of the poverty surrounding him – the poverty that may lead to crime.
Unidentified respondent: Ibrahim is only concerned about the security situation in the country. The difference between Karim and Ibrahim is that Ibrahim's money allows him to have a better life. For example, if he gets a fine, he can afford to bribe the policeman, which will save him the time he would have otherwise spent on paying the fine. But Karim wouldn't be able to get out of this situation.
PID1244: Economically speaking, Ibrahim doesn't have concerns. He is well educated, and if the economy collapses he will be able to find a job anywhere.

Unidentified respondent: Both Karim and Ibrahim have concerns. Each one of them has different issues to worry about.
PID1244: I don't think their situations are comparable. They have nothing in common.
PID1217: They are both concerned about their future in this country. Karim has no future here, but if anything were to happen in this country, Ibrahim would become the same.
PID1386: They are both concerned about getting sick. However, Ibrahim would be able to afford treatment or go on unpaid sick leave for some time.
PID1341: There is nothing in common between Ibrahim and Karim.
PID1385: Based on the cited example, Ibrahim has no concerns. Karim's biggest concern is not being able to have a decent future. He cannot get married, start a family – he lives his life day by day.
Moderator: Which of these characters do you feel closest to? Why?
PID1019: I feel Ibrahim is closer to me because, just like him, I have completed my university studies, have a decent job with a decent income which allows me to fulfill my basic needs, pay for a house and secure a better future.
PID1385: Ibrahim too. I am currently working on a good income.
PID1386: Karim is more like me because, just like him, I live my life day by day. In case I ever need to get hospitalized, I would have to rely on the ministry of health to cover some of my expenses.
Unidentified respondent: I think I am currently more like Ibrahim. However, if the business goes bad and the economy becomes even less stable, I won't be able to survive. For now, though, everything is fine.
PID1341: I am like Karim. I have no social security, I am worried about my children's future, I don't have a stable job, and I don't have any savings.
Unidentified respondent: I am like Karim. I am not able to save and I don't have the money to get health insurance.
Unidentified respondent: I am like Karim; my future is one of my biggest concerns. In Lebanon, the economic situation depends on the political one, the unemployment rate is high and the economy is very unstable. I am currently working, but if the slightest economic crisis occurs, I might lose everything.
Moderator: Now I am going to ask you a question and I do not want you to immediately answer out loud but I want you to think about this privately. Imagine that you were to find out that the character you just said you feel closest to is belongs to a different confessional group and the other one is from the same confessional group as you. Would the character that you feel closest to change or remain the same?
All: It wouldn't make any difference.
PID1385: I live in Tripoli, everything is cheaper there, bills and taxes are cheaper. Across the country, everything is cheaper in Muslim areas, unlike Christian ones, and this makes a difference for me. I don't relate to Ibrahim and him being from a different religion wouldn't change anything. However, if we are to speak specifically about religion, I prefer the person who has the same religion as me as we would support each other in times of conflict.
Unidentified respondent: My answer was based on our common lifestyles. Karim is the closest to me regardless of his religion.
PID1386: Looking at society, Muslims don't have the same lifestyle as Christians. For example, I shop in a Muslim area because it is a lot cheaper than Christian areas. I wouldn't change my mind if Karim were from a different religion because in the end we all are human beings.
PID1341: The person being from a different religion wouldn't change the choice I initially made.

Unidentified respondent: PID1385 is thinking about the worst scenario. He said that people of the same religion would support each other if war breaks out.
Unidentified respondent: Ibrahim doesn't have the same lifestyle as I do. Were an economic crisis to happen, both of us would become poor and religion wouldn't matter here. However, religion matters in times of war; in this situation, I would choose the person who belongs to the same religion as me.
Moderator: Who answered that the character they feel closest to changed? Who answered that the character they feel closest remained the same? Why?
PID1217: I had this answer because we were raised to follow our religion or politicians from our confessional group, which made us narrow minded. When a Lebanese person travels abroad, he usually changes the mentality he was raised to have in Lebanon. I believe the situation in Lebanon is a political decision made at the international level. 1400 years ago, Al-Hussein and Yazid were killed; Yazid was a Sunni and Al-Hussein was a Shiite. Until now, the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites goes on. Many countries want to maintain this conflict between us to protect Israel. They occupied and divided us.
PID1244: We have been taught to follow specific politicians since birth, no matter what. Till now, we have not changed. We hate our politicians and yet, we continue voting for them. I've never voted for anyone so far and I will never vote because they are all liars.
PID1019: The current political system in Lebanon states that all official positions be divided between different sects. This means that if you do not have enough connections in your confessional group to be hired, you might never find a job.
PID1386: I was raised to think that religion is the most important thing in this country, and I became convinced of this idea.
PID1385: Although a lot of residential areas are mixed in terms of religious groups, every person holds tight to his religion. There is no real unity among people. I do not even think mixed areas are really mixed.
Moderator: The recent protests in Lebanon raise important questions about how people view their economic and confessional interests and what changes (if any) to the current system people would like to see. When thinking of all these protests and the overall movement recently taking place in Lebanon, what is the slogan that you remember the most? Why? Does it bring hope or despair / confidence or fear?
Unidentified respondent: "Badna Nhasib" (we want accountability), "You Stink" and "All means all."
Unidentified respondent: "Badna Nhasib."
Unidentified respondent: All of the above.
PID1217: "All means all" and "You Stink."
Moderator: How did you feel when protesters started chanting: "The people want to abolish the system"? What system do they mean in your opinion? Why?
PID1341: I think this is the best thing they did because our corrupt system needs to be changed. The current system is a sectarian one. The demands for abolishing the system gave me hope but I was disappointed when these protests failed.
Unidentified respondent: I was afraid there would be chaos, like in Egypt. The protests lead to instability and the situation escalated very quickly. Regarding the system, I don't even believe there is one.
Unidentified respondent: I think these slogans are not legitimate. Considering the current situation in Lebanon, we can't abolish the system. Syria, Egypt and Libya are great examples. The slogans scared me because they could have led to war.

Unidentified respondent: I think they should abolish the military system, which has remained in place since the French occupation. The government, the structure of the government, and everything else related to the military system should be abolished.
PID1385: When I heard this demand, I apprehended the coming of a civil war. Regarding the sectarian system that we currently have in Lebanon, I am against abolishing it. We live in a country with a Muslim majority. If the sectarian system is abolished, Christians might lose their rights as they constitute a minority.
PID1217: I think the slogan is wrong – it should have been "the people demand the fall of the mafia." The mafia is the group of politicians who were behind the civil war and who, till now, control the people. I said these protests won't achieve anything because I think they are driven by the politicians themselves.
Unidentified respondent: After Geagea nominated Michel Aoun for the presidency, the situation in Lebanon became more stable. But now, the Shiites are asking for two important official positions – the positions of Vice President and Commander in Chief of the Army. These demands scare me because the Shiites are a big part of the Lebanese community and they are armed; therefore, they can get whatever they ask for. If the Sunnis had the same demands, it wouldn't scare me because the Sunnis are not armed. I don't have any hope for the country and I don't believe anything will change soon. We are affected by whatever is happening in the region, especially in Syria and Iran.
PID1244: If the Shiites – who are supported by Iran – hold these two official positions, Iran might offer free weapons to the Lebanese army. However, Lebanon might refuse this donation based on political reasons. The only hope for Lebanon is to change all our politicians.
Unidentified respondent: We can bring down these politicians if we stop paying taxes or anything that generates money to the government.
PID1341: I am only concerned that a civil war might break out if we elect a president. Conflict could arise if different sects do not agree on a candidate.
Unidentified respondent: Currently, people from different religions seem to be more open towards each other, and this might make a difference.
Unidentified respondent: I fear that Lebanon might stay the same, and I have no hope for this country. From my birth till now, we have stayed the same.
PID1019: I am also afraid of a civil war, and of the weapons in this country.
PID1385: To me, only when the state will have its hands on all weapons can we start improving our system. I'm not talking about personal weapons but of strategic ones.
Moderator: You may have heard about the recent announcement regarding Lebanon's potential oil and gas reserves. This resource, if developed, could bring in significant revenues in the future that could be used to finance public services and attract investment vital to the development of the country. How would you like these revenues to be spent? Please indicate regions, confessions, communities, sectors, etc. What did you base your choice upon? Discuss.
PID1341: These revenues should be spent on infrastructure, social security, free health care, free education, retirement plans and all other basic needs that the government is supposed to provide to its citizens.
PID1217: If the current politicians like for example Gebran Bassil and others are in charge of the oil and gas sector, we won't get anywhere near these revenues. However, I would like to see the government provide us all the services that were cited before. I also think that the revenues won't be big enough because oil extraction will have high costs.
Unidentified respondent: These revenues should be spent on providing better income, health care and education.
PID1019: I agree.

PID1217: I would like the government to open an airport in North Lebanon. This would boost the economic sector and create more job opportunities in the area.
Moderator: Should revenues be distributed on a confessional basis?
Unidentified respondent: Revenues should be distributed based on each areas' needs. They should be used to provide basic needs in all areas regardless of religion.
Unidentified respondent: I am for the equal distribution of these revenues between different Lebanese areas. The focus should be on improving infrastructure.
PID1386: I agree that they should provide to each area its basic needs regardless of the religion.
PID1019: Same as above.
PID1385: They should spend it based on the people's religion. I would like to see Christians benefit more from these revenues. Muslims always take the biggest shares and purchase weapons with their revenues. Their leadership is corrupt, they steal the money, and they never do anything that benefits the people, which is why I don't trust them.
Unidentified respondent: I believe that revenues should be distributed according to needs, but under the current situation I would rather see the money distributed equally between sects.
Unidentified respondent: For example, People in Hay el-Sellom have way more needs than we do but they are all criminals with a lot of money. Our areas may be nicer but it doesn't mean that we have more money than them. They are criminals and making their money illegally, so why should we let them take our money?
Moderator: Now I would like you all to discuss as a group about what kind of changes, if any, you would like to see to the confessional system based on what we have discussed today. Would you prefer an alternative to the current political system or would you prefer to keep things as they are? If you prefer to change the system, please describe what this alternative would look like. Please take 15 minutes to discuss and see whether you agree or not and, if you do agree, what kind of changes you would like to make. It is also perfectly ok if you cannot agree – these are big questions and we only have a short amount of time.
Unidentified respondent: In this country, we can't change anything. Things can only change for the worst.
Unidentified respondent: In my opinion we should have a military system.
Unidentified respondent: We should keep the democratic system, like it is, but with different politicians.
Moderator: Final question: In your opinion, to what extent would this alternative / these alternatives to the current political system [depending on the outcome] help address the kinds of socio-economic concerns you raised earlier including ensuring that oil and gas revenues are spent well? Why or why not?
Unidentified respondent: The current democratic system should remain the same, but all current politicians should be removed to give way to the younger generation. The new generation loves Lebanon, and in contrast to current politicians, they think about Lebanon's interest rather than their own personal interest.
Unidentified respondent: I agree with PID1217, but I would like to see a military system. I think it would be better for Lebanon.
Unidentified respondent: I agree with what PID1217 said.
Unidentified respondent: I also agree with PID1217.

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