

Online Appendix:
The Mechanisms of Direct and Indirect Rule:
Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa

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A1: *Geographic Balance at the Border*

Figure A1.1 visualizes potential geographic confounders on either side of Cameroon's internal border. This data includes the average altitude, annual precipitation and temperature and average soil suitability, as measured by soil CEC, of 5km grid squares on either side of Cameroon's internal border. Figure A1.2 shows a series of difference of means tests, with 95% confidence intervals, of these potential geographic confounders at different bandwidths from the Anglophone and Francophone sides of the border, thus that the 50km band includes estimates for all survey clusters that are within 50km of the border on either side. This figure also estimates whether levels of precolonial political centralization, as measured by Murdock (1981), varies at the border, another potential threat to the border's exogeneity.

We take the results of Figures A1.1 and A1.2 as further evidence that the Picot line was not drawn as a function of geographic characteristics or as a function of precolonial statehood. Still, both figures do highlight the presence of some notable geographic factors, such as Mount Cameroon or the highlands of the Bamenda Grasslands, on the Anglophone side of the border, leading us to opt to be conservative and include a set of geographic controls to capture any potential confounding effect of these environmental conditions on subsequent economic development.




Figure A1.1 Geographic Balance Across Anglophone-Francophone Border




Figure A1.2: Pretreatment Balance - Difference of Mean Estimates Across Border with 95% Confidence Intervals

A2: Replication of Lee & Schultz (2012)

We replicate and extend the findings of Lee & Schultz (2012) that there are long-run disparities in local economic development between Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon. Lee and Schultz (2012) find that households on the Anglophone side of the border are wealthier, measured through an asset index, and that they are more likely to have access to locally coproduced public goods such as piped water. We replicate these findings and build on them by distinguishing between development outcomes driven by local versus central government actions. Because the mechanisms of indirect rule act specifically at the local level, we expect the positive effects of indirect rule on economic outcomes to be driven by local processes, and not development strategies of the central state, such as the highly-centralized decision to connect communities to the national electricity grid.

To measure economic development, we draw on the 2004 and 2101 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).¹ The DHS surveys are collected through a nationally stratified sample such that households have equal probability of being sampled within each national census enumeration zone; 10,462 households were surveyed in 2004, and 14,214 households in 2011.² Each DHS survey records the coordinates of sampled villages, ‘jittering’ or displacing the coordinates by up to five kilometers in rural areas and up to two kilometers in urban areas to protect the confidentiality of respondents. Crucially, coordinates are only jittered within second-level administrative units, meaning that no sampling site could be reported as being on the wrong side of the border. This allows us to estimate the distance of each survey cluster to the Francophone-Anglophone border in addition to matching them to a range of control variables.

We regress two sets of dependent variables on the border to estimate the long-term effects of British colonial rule. First, we measure locally influenced development outcomes through the DHS surveys by examining locally coproduced *access to piped water*. Following Lee and Schultz, we estimate this as the percent of households within each survey cluster who report having access to piped water, either within their own compound, that of a neighbor or friend or in a publicly available standpipe. While numbers are approximate for urban respondents at about ninety-five percent reporting access to clean piped water, rural respondents’ likelihood of having access to clean water varies across the country’s internal boundary: 40.6% of rural Anglophone respondents have access to piped water compared to 22.2% in the two neighboring French regions. Second, we further examine the effect of the border on differences in *private household wealth* accumulation. Here again we follow Lee and Schultz by measuring household wealth as an additive index of whether a household possesses a car, motorcycle, bicycle, or radio as well as three measures of the quality of their home’s physical infrastructure: their floor material (from earthen floors to tiles or carpet), whether the home has a flush toilet, a latrine or no toilet

¹ Note that Lee and Schultz only employ the 2004 data.

² Institut National de la Statistique (INS) 2005; 2012.

facilities and, finally, the logged number of rooms used for sleeping.³ We calculate the cluster average and normalize the index around a mean of zero with a standard deviation of one.

We also draw on nightlight data from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program's Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) Nighttime Lights data series.⁴ The electric grid is managed by the central government, allowing us to distinguish between the logics of local versus top-down service provision and to gain important leverage on the potential postcolonial compound treatment of central government linguistic favoritism towards Francophone regions. The DMSP-OLS data reports the yearly average, cleaned to eliminate distortion from interference, for example from lighting, cloud cover or gas flares.⁵ Though nightlight data is sensitive to bottom-censoring, research suggests that nightlight data accurately captures distinctions between electrified and unelectrified villages in rural areas of the continent.⁶ To process the nightlight data into a useable dependent variable, we construct five kilometers by five-kilometer grid cells in ArcGIS and extract the average score by each grid. Grid squares traversed by the border are split.

Our findings, presented in Figure A2, largely mirror those of Lee and Schultz. Measures of local development – namely household wealth and access to clean water are, on average, higher in regions that were colonized by the British. Conversely, and consistent with our expectations, there is not any evidence that electricity access, as measured by nightlight data and provided by the central government, differs across the border. Notably, the effect for household wealth is strongest close to the border; anglophone DHS clusters have, on average, an approximately twenty-nine percentage point increase in cluster-average asset index scores, but this number jumps to sixty-six percentage points when looking at clusters less than fifteen-kilometers from the border. Results are less robust for piped water access: the discontinuity does not appear to be significant close to the border. Still, on average anglophone households are over a half standard deviation more likely to have access to piped water.

³ This deviates from Lee and Schultz's (2012) own measure in that we do not include possession that depends on proximity to an electric grid, notably a television, refrigerator or household electricity access itself.

⁴ Earth Observation Group 1991; following Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013; Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou 2016.

⁵ The dataset captures human-generated light from 8:30-10:00 pm (local time), calculated at 30-arc second grids, roughly equivalent to about one kilometer.

⁶ Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012; Min et al. 2013.




Figure A2: Average Treatment Effect of Indirect Rule on Wealth
MD Polynomial Estimation with 90% & 95% Confidence Intervals

Finally, Table A2 presents the results of these models using the linear modeling strategy of Lee and Schultz. Note that unlike Lee and Schultz (2012), however, we run all of our data with cluster averages to account for the threat of cluster randomization as recommended by McCauley and Posner (2015).

Table A2: Lee & Schultz Model Replication, Wealth Data

	a. Local Outcomes								b. Central State Outcomes			
	DV = Household Wealth				DV = Household Drinking Water				DV = Nightlight Intensity			
	Full	<30km	<20km	<10km	Full	<30km	<20km	<10km	Full	<30km	<20km	<10km
Legacy of indirect rule	0.502 (0.110)	0.293 (0.157)	0.085 (0.182)	1.007 (0.275)	0.625 (0.138)	0.198 (0.227)	0.140 (0.261)	0.069 (0.410)	-0.042 (0.007)	0.011 (0.009)	0.003 (0.010)	0.015 (0.013)
Dist Border (Brit.)	0.002 (0.006)	0.030 (0.009)	0.048 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.028)	0.010 (0.008)	0.042 (0.014)	0.073 (0.019)	0.102 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.000)	-0.009 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.001)	-0.009 (0.002)
Dist Border (Fr.)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.044 (0.012)	0.046 (0.040)	-0.021 (0.009)	-0.037 (0.011)	-0.041 (0.018)	-0.070 (0.051)	0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
Ln Dist to Capital	-3.056 (1.238)	-4.743 (1.401)	-7.119 (1.390)	-8.417 (2.372)	-4.032 (1.678)	-5.428 (1.969)	-7.931 (2.213)	-11.629 (3.494)	0.159 (0.053)	-0.040 (0.074)	-0.049 (0.080)	-0.105 (0.095)
Ln Dist to Coast	0.076 (0.053)	0.059 (0.057)	0.112 (0.063)	0.298 (0.148)	0.056 (0.048)	0.054 (0.051)	0.050 (0.055)	0.284 (0.184)	-0.056 (0.005)	-0.030 (0.008)	-0.055 (0.006)	-0.053 (0.007)
Ln Dist to Regional Capital	-0.150 (0.034)	-0.128 (0.041)	-0.214 (0.047)	-0.439 (0.192)	-0.058 (0.037)	-0.062 (0.040)	0.002 (0.051)	-0.198 (0.268)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.018 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.006)	0.002 (0.009)
Altitude	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Pop Density (ln)	0.068 (0.023)	0.082 (0.025)	0.104 (0.026)	0.082 (0.036)	0.102 (0.025)	0.095 (0.028)	0.115 (0.033)	0.112 (0.058)	0.034 (0.003)	0.018 (0.003)	0.009 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)
R2	0.578	0.536	0.567	0.546	0.425	0.420	0.451	0.368	0.188	0.508	0.470	0.532
Observations	424	331	220	95	424	331	220	95	7383	3276	2379	1446

Robust standard errors in parentheses; standard errors in nightlight models are clustered by commune. Models additionally control for whether or not a survey cluster is urban, its soil suitability (captation rate). Survey round fixed effects also included.

A3: Questions from the Afrobarometer

The Tables below provide the complete wording for the Afrobarometer questions and the distribution of resources.

Table A3.1: Measures of the Local Legitimacy Mechanism (% Respondents)

Local Government Evaluations				
	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	Option 4
How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Local government councilors?	Never (49.9%)	Only Sometimes (26.7%)	Often (17.1%)	Always (6.2%)
Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months: Your Elected Assembly man/woman?	Strongly Disapprove (16.6)	Disapprove (35.2)	Approve (39.4)	Strongly Approve (8.8)
During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: An official of a government agency?	Never (87.5)	Only Once (4.4)	A Few Times (5.8)	Often (2.3)
Could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: Some other voluntary association or community group?	Not a Member (44.9)	Inactive Member (18.7)	Active Member (28.5)	Official Leader (7.9)

Table A3.2: Measures of the Traditional Authority Mechanism (% Respondents)

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	Option 4
How much do you trust traditional leaders?	Not at all (19.7%)	Just a Little (26.6%)	Somewhat (32.1%)	A Lot (21.6%)
How many traditional leaders are involved in corruption?	None (13.7)	Some of Them (57.1)	Most of Them (19.0)	All of Them (10.1)
During the past year, how often have you contacted a traditional leader?	Never (63.2)	Once (9.0)	A Few Times (15.0)	Often (12.8)
Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months: Traditional Leader	Strongly Disapprove (8.98)	Disapprove (23.24)	Approve (53.22)	Strongly Approve (14.55)

Table A3.3: Measures of the Ethnicity Mechanism (% Respondents)

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	Option 4	Option 5
Suppose you had to choose between being a Cameroonian and being a member of your ethnic group	Only Ethnic Group (1.9%)	More Ethnic Group (6.3%)	Equal (43.0%)	More like a Cameroonian (10.7%)	Only Cameroonian (38.2%)
To what extent do ethnic networks provide access to top positions in public office?	Not at All (21.5)	Just a Little (15.3)	Somewhat (26.8)	A Lot (36.3)	--
Are elected leaders obliged to help their home community first or should they not do anything that favors their own group over others?	Home Community-Strongly Agree (10.8)	Home Community-Agree (7.0)	Help Everyone-Agree (35.4)	Help Everyone-Strongly Agree (46.9)	--

A4: Sample Model Results

Tables A4.1-A4.3 report the model results from Figures 3-5 in the main text. The models are run on all observations within 80km of the border. A base model excludes post-treatment controls, while a full model controls for proximity to the central state.

Table A4.1: Sample Model Replications- Local Government Legitimacy Mechanism

	Local Government Councilors Listen		Approve of Local Councilor Performance		Contacted a Government Agency		Member of a Community Group	
	<i>Base</i> (1)	<i>Full</i> (2)	<i>Base</i> (3)	<i>Full</i> (4)	<i>Base</i> (5)	<i>Full</i> (6)	<i>Base</i> (7)	<i>Full</i> (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.568 (0.161)	0.571 (0.156)	0.652 (0.132)	0.654 (0.130)	0.345 (0.087)	0.341 (0.093)	0.426 (0.172)	0.399 (0.179)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
R2	0.134	0.137	0.137	0.142	0.111	0.112	0.155	0.155
Observations	872	872	819	819	934	934	930	930

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

Table A4.2: Sample Model Replications - Traditional Authority Mechanism

	Trust in Traditional Leaders		Traditional Leaders are Corrupt		Contacted Traditional Leader		Approve Trad. Leader Performance	
	<i>Base</i> (1)	<i>Full</i> (2)	<i>Base</i> (3)	<i>Full</i> (4)	<i>Base</i> (5)	<i>Full</i> (6)	<i>Base</i> (7)	<i>Full</i> (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.516 (0.235)	0.587 (0.237)	-0.073 (0.207)	-0.112 (0.209)	0.156 (0.211)	0.162 (0.216)	0.632 (0.237)	0.643 (0.217)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
R2	0.058	0.064	0.056	0.067	0.164	0.167	0.103	0.110
Observations	458	458	443	443	476	476	414	414

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

Table A4.3: Sample Model Replications - Ethnicity Mechanism

	Ethnic Identity Stronger than National Identity		Ethnic Network Provides Jobs		Leaders Should Help Their Own Community	
	<i>Base</i> (1)	<i>Full</i> (2)	<i>Base</i> (3)	<i>Full</i> (4)	<i>Base</i> (5)	<i>Full</i> (6)
Legacy of indirect rule	1.004 (0.180)	1.008 (0.194)	-0.308 (0.197)	-0.316 (0.191)	0.191 (0.248)	0.287 (0.231)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
R2	0.270	0.281	0.107	0.111	0.021	0.026
Observations	896	896	797	797	445	445

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

A5: Robustness: *Afrobarometer cluster results*

Table A5 presents results for Afrobarometer cluster averages, as recommended by McCauley and Posner (2015) to account for problems of cluster randomization. Results are consistent with those presented in the main text and in Tables A4.1-4.3.

Table A5: Afrobarometer Replication; Cluster Averages

Panel A: Local Gov. Legitimacy Mechanism				
	Local Gov. Councilors Listen (1)	Approve of Local Councilor Performance (2)	Contacted a Government Agency (3)	Member of Community Group (4)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.526 (0.178)	0.686 (0.137)	0.294 (0.087)	0.388 (0.183)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	118	118	118	118
R2	0.511	0.562	0.252	0.459
Panel B: Traditional Authority Mechanism				
	Trust in Traditional Leaders (5)	Traditional Leaders are Corrupt (6)	Contacted Traditional Leader (7)	Approve Trad. Leader Performance (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.515 (0.252)	-0.041 (0.229)	0.133 (0.236)	0.612 (0.233)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	60	60	60	60
R2	0.253	0.310	0.332	0.461
Panel C: Ethnicity Mechanism				
	Ethnic ID Stronger than National ID (9)	Ethnic Network Provides Jobs (10)	Leaders Should Help Own Community (11)	
Legacy of indirect rule	0.987 (0.185)	-0.320 (0.227)	0.267 (0.278)	
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	
Observations	118	118	58	
R2	0.700	0.474	0.197	

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for whether a cluster is urban or rural and the average logged population density within 5km. Geographic controls and those measuring proximity to the central state are cluster averages. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

A6: Robustness: *Whole Country Sample*

Table A6 replicates our models using the whole country sample (all ten of Cameroon's regions). Again, results are generally consistent for our proposed mechanism, although here trust in traditional leaders, an indicator of the traditional authority mechanism loses significance while reported contacting of traditional leaders gains it.

Table A6: Model Replications; Whole Country Sample

Panel A: Local Gov. Legitimacy Mechanism				
	Local Gov. Councilors Listen (1)	Approve of Local Councilor Performance (2)	Contacted a Government Agency (3)	Member of Community Group (4)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.363 (0.073)	0.389 (0.079)	0.175 (0.044)	0.579 (0.077)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2088	1923	2239	2234
R2	0.107	0.093	0.053	0.083
Panel B: Traditional Authority Mechanism				
	Trust in Traditional Leaders (5)	Traditional Leaders are Corrupt (6)	Contacted Traditional Leader (7)	Approve Trad. Leader Performance (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.241 (0.173)	-0.022 (0.129)	0.260 (0.130)	0.303 (0.123)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1129	1066	1152	1010
R2	0.046	0.063	0.089	0.057
Panel C: Ethnicity Mechanism				
	Ethnic ID Stronger than National ID (9)	Ethnic Network Provides Jobs (10)	Leaders Should Help Their Own Community (11)	
Legacy of indirect rule	0.730 (0.086)	-0.469 (0.087)	0.007 (0.105)	
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	
Observations	2164	1832	1038	
R2	0.127	0.118	0.046	

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

A7: Robustness: *No Douala*

Douala, Cameroon's economic hub, is located in Francophone Cameroon in close proximity to the country's internal border. To account for the possibility that our results are driven by respondents in Douala, Table A7 replicates the full models presented in Tables A4.1-4.3 excluding respondents in the Douala urban area. Results are consistent with the exception of our last indicator for political action, belonging to a community group, which falls to the ten percent significance level.

Table A7: Model Replications; No Douala

Panel A: Local Gov. Legitimacy Mechanism				
	Local Gov. Councilors Listen (1)	Approve of Local Councilor Performance (2)	Contacted a Government Agency (3)	Member of Community Group (4)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.528 (0.169)	0.589 (0.142)	0.316 (0.100)	0.349 (0.155)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	646	633	688	685
R2	0.102	0.094	0.136	0.155
Panel B: Traditional Authority Mechanism				
	Trust in Traditional Leaders (5)	Traditional Leaders are Corrupt (6)	Contacted Traditional Leader (7)	Approve Trad. Leader Performance (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.632 (0.248)	-0.234 (0.205)	0.215 (0.240)	0.643 (0.217)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	342	333	348	414
R2	0.084	0.096	0.195	0.110
Panel C: Ethnicity Mechanism				
	Ethnic ID Stronger than National ID (9)	Ethnic Network Provides Jobs (10)	Leaders Should Help Their Own Community (11)	
Legacy of indirect rule	0.957 (0.200)	-0.330 (0.206)	0.301 (0.233)	
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	
Observations	668	613	331	
R2	0.245	0.101	0.031	

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

A8: Robustness: *Alternative Distance Measures*

Tables A8.1-8.3 reproduces the full models in Tables A4.1-4.3 using alternative polynomial estimates. First, we re-run all models with a local linear estimate of distance from the border (exposure to treatment, distance to the border and their interaction). Following Dell (2010), we secondly run the models with a cubic polynomial of distance, estimated as exposure to treatment, distance to the border, distance to the border² and distance to the border³. Finally, and also following Dell (2010), we estimate the models with a more demanding cubic polynomial using latitude and longitude. This is then exposure to treatment, a cluster's latitude, latitude², latitude³, longitude, longitude², longitude³, latitude*longitude, latitude²*longitude, latitude*longitude² and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border.

The results are broadly consistent. As in earlier robustness checks, Table A8.2 indicates that higher trust in traditional leaders in Anglophone regions loses significance across the board, suggesting that it is sensitive to specification.

Table A8.1: Model Replications; Alternative Polynomial Estimates

	Local Government Legitimacy Mechanism											
	Local Government Councilors Listen			Approve of Local Councilor Performance			Contacted a Government Agency			Member of a Community Group		
	Local Linear	Cubic Polynomial of Distance	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long	Local Linear	Cubic Polynomial of Distance	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long	Local Linear	Cubic Polynomial of Distance	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long	Local Linear	Cubic Polynomial of Distance	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Legacy of Indirect Rule	0.272 (0.163)	0.300 (0.173)	0.527 (0.164)	0.558 (0.12)	0.555 (0.133)	0.654 (0.131)	0.257 (0.089)	0.235 (0.089)	0.351 (0.098)	0.445 (0.137)	0.420 (0.150)	0.426 (0.171)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R2	0.125	0.120	0.144	0.129	0.129	0.143	0.105	0.109	0.113	0.148	0.148	0.159
Observations	872	872	872	819	819	819	934	934	934	930	930	930

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Estimations as follows: (a) Local Linear models calculated with exposure to treatment, distance to the border, and their interaction; (b) Cubic Polynomial of Distance to Border calculated as exposure to treatment, distance to the border, distance to the border squared and cubed; (c) Cubic Polynomial of Latitude/Longitude calculated as exposure to treatment, latitude, latitude squared, latitude cubed, longitude, longitude squared and longitude cubed of cluster, latitude interacted with longitude, latitude squared interacted with longitude, and latitude interacted with longitude squared as well as the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border.

Table A8.2: Model Replications; Alternative Polynomial Estimates

	Traditional Authority Mechanism											
	Trust in Traditional Leaders			Traditional Leaders are Corrupt			Contacted Traditional Leader			Approve Trad. Leader Performance		
	Local Linear	Cubic Polynomial of Distance	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long	Local Linear	Cubic Polynomial of Distance	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long	Local Linear	Cubic Polynomial of Distance	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long	Local Linear	Cubic Polynomial of Distance	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Legacy of Indirect Rule	0.360 (0.235)	0.255 (0.222)	0.352 (0.266)	-0.086 (0.175)	-0.080 (0.160)	-0.067 (0.233)	0.306 (0.183)	0.247 (0.175)	0.143 (0.256)	0.516 (0.192)	0.533 (0.179)	0.576 (0.207)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R2	0.053	0.049	0.096	0.057	0.059	0.087	0.166	0.163	0.170	0.096	0.102	0.143
Observations	458	458	458	443	443	443	476	476	476	414	414	414

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Estimations as follows: (a) Local Linear models calculated with exposure to treatment, distance to the border, and their interaction; (b) Cubic Polynomial of Distance to Border calculated as exposure to treatment, distance to the border, distance to the border squared and cubed; (c) Cubic Polynomial of Latitude/Longitude calculated as exposure to treatment, latitude, latitude squared, latitude cubed, longitude, longitude squared and longitude cubed of cluster, latitude interacted with longitude, latitude squared interacted with longitude, and latitude interacted with longitude squared as well as the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border.


Table A8.3: Model Replications; Alternative Polynomial Estimates

	Ethnicity Mechanism								
	Ethnic Id Stronger than National ID			Ethnic Network Provides Jobs			Leaders Should Help Their Own Community		
	Local Linear (10)	Cubic Polynomial of Distance (11)	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long (12)	Local Linear (13)	Cubic Polynomial of Distance (14)	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long (15)	Local Linear (16)	Cubic Polynomial of Distance (17)	Cubic Polynomial of Lat/Long (18)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.933 (0.161)	0.917 (0.172)	0.952 (0.158)	-0.342 (0.180)	-0.274 (0.153)	-0.311 (0.212)	0.059 (0.173)	0.124 (0.171)	0.140 (0.254)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prox. to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R2	0.266	0.266	0.287	0.110	0.116	0.122	0.024	0.022	0.036
Observations	896	896	896	797	797	797	445	445	445

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Estimations as follows: (a) Local Linear models calculated with exposure to treatment, distance to the border, and their interaction; (b) Cubic Polynomial of Distance to Border calculated as exposure to treatment, distance to the border, distance to the border squared and cubed; (c) Cubic Polynomial of Latitude/Longitude calculated as exposure to treatment, latitude, latitude squared, latitude cubed, longitude, longitude squared and longitude cubed of cluster, latitude interacted with longitude, latitude squared interacted with longitude, and latitude interacted with longitude squared as well as the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border.

A9: Robustness: *Secondary Measures of the Argument*

Further evidence for our argument can be found in performance assessments of the local government; here we use a series of questions asking respondents how well the local government: 1) maintains local roads, 2) maintains local markets, 3) maintains health standards, 4) keeps the community clean, and 5) manages the use of land. As seen in Figure A9, for all five questions, and across nearly every bandwidth specification, Anglophones are more likely to approve of the job of their local government. On a four-point scale “very badly” to “very well,” the effect of being on the anglophone side of border colonized ranges from 0.76 to 0.97 points higher. For each question, the average Francophone respondent replied that the local government was doing “fairly badly” at managing the problem, while the average Anglophone responded that the local government was doing “fairly well.” Taken together, this provides more evidence that indirect rule produced stronger ties between citizens and the institutions of local government.



A10. Robustness: *Spillover Effects*

It is possible that migration from French Cameroun to British Southern Cameroons or vice versa could bias our results because of sorting at the border, the idea that ‘treated’ individuals from the Anglophone side may migrate to the ‘non-treated’ side post-independence (McCauley and Posner 2015, 414-5). Sorting is a problem for two reasons. First, if citizens from the ‘control’ group (e.g. those ruled under French direct rule) migrate to areas exposed to the treatment (e.g. Anglophone regions ‘treated’ with indirect rule), the treatment effect will be weakened. We are less concerned about this because most of the migration from the Francophone side of the border occurred during the German colonial period, before the ‘treatment’ of British indirect rule. A second threat is self-selected sorting, which raises the risk of confounding the treatment effect with unobserved factors, such as ‘industriousness’ or community-level effects which might both encourage or discourage migration while also easing or hampering collective action.

We address the known migration from across Cameroon to work on plantations in the foothills of Mount Cameroon during the colonial era in two ways. First, we rerun our models with an interaction term between a survey clusters distance to Mount Cameroon and their exposure to treatment. We secondly drop all respondents in Fako Department, home to most of the colonial-era plantations. Even when excluding respondents who live in plantation zones – hence those who are most likely to be in-migrants, our results are consistent. These results can be found in Panel A of Tables A10.1 and A10.2. For ease of interpretation, the results are displayed graphically in Figures A10.1-A10.3.

If, on average, respondents living in the Mount Cameroon area were less exposed to indirect rule because of sorting, then we should expect to see stronger effects of living in anglophone regions *farther* from Mount Cameroon, where a more consistent treatment would theoretically have been had. We find no evidence of significant interaction effects. The figures do not provide robust support for the argument that distance from the plantation economies around Mount Cameroon mediates the effect of exposure to indirect rule. In general, we find nearly parallel lines in the marginal effects of falling on the anglophone side of the border at different distances from Mount Cameroon in most cases. The exception is Figure 10.2, but the differences do not suggest spillover effects. We take this as evidence that our results are not driven by potential confounding effects of sorting along the border due to migration by plantation laborers.

Unfortunately, the Afrobarometer asks respondents their region of origin, but results are also robust to excluding respondents in the Afrobarometer samples who report that they speak English at home if they live in Francophone regions and, in turn, respondents who speak French at home in Anglophone regions as these are likely migrants. Not surprisingly given the small number who meet this criteria, 12 and 4 respectively, this does not change our results.

Table A10.1: Model Replication to Account for Spillover Effects, Distance to Mt. Cameroon



Panel A: Local Gov. Legitimacy Mechanism				
	Local Gov. Councilors Listen (1)	Approve of Local Councilor Performance (2)	Contacted a Government Agency (3)	Member of Community Group (4)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.843 (0.301)	0.433 (0.321)	0.307 (0.149)	0.425 (0.295)
Dist Mt. Cameroon (km)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.009 (0.004)
Anglophone* Dist Mt. Cameroon (km)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	872	819	934	930
R2	0.137	0.142	0.111	0.159
Panel B: Traditional Authority Mechanism				
	Trust in Traditional Leaders (5)	Traditional Leaders are Corrupt (6)	Contacted Traditional Leader (7)	Approve Trad. Leader Performance (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	-0.989 (0.554)	1.376 (0.491)	1.012 (0.497)	0.110 (0.460)
Dist Mt. Cameroon (km)	0.015 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.007)	0.008 (0.011)
Anglophone* Dist Mt. Cameroon (km)	0.011 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	458	443	476	414
R2	0.084	0.091	0.175	0.115
Panel C: Ethnicity Mechanism				
	Ethnic ID Stronger than National ID (9)	Ethnic Network Provides Jobs (10)	Leaders Should Help Their Own Community (11)	
Legacy of indirect rule	1.585 (0.407)	0.822 (0.299)	0.451 (0.445)	
Dist Mt. Cameroon (km)	0.012 (0.004)	0.021 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	
Anglophone* Dist Mt. Cameroon (km)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	
Observations	896	797	445	
R2	0.286	0.125	0.028	

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

Table A10.2: Model Replication to Account for Spillover Effects, No Fako Department

Panel A: Local Gov. Legitimacy Mechanism				
	Local Gov. Councilors Listen (1)	Approve of Local Councilor Performance (2)	Contacted a Government Agency (3)	Member of Community Group (4)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.646 (0.172)	0.749 (0.127)	0.380 (0.105)	0.307 (0.221)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	794	743	855	851
R2	0.150	0.156	0.115	0.157
Panel B: Traditional Authority Mechanism				
	Trust in Traditional Leaders (5)	Traditional Leaders are Corrupt (6)	Contacted Traditional Leader (7)	Approve Trad. Leader Performance (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	-0.041 (0.046)	-0.147 (0.184)	0.198 (0.236)	0.609 (0.228)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	418	404	436	375
R2	0.044	0.082	0.184	0.117
Panel C: Ethnicity Mechanism				
	Ethnic ID Stronger than National ID (9)	Ethnic Network Provides Jobs (10)	Leaders Should Help Their Own Community (11)	
Legacy of indirect rule	1.135 (0.202)	-0.232 (0.222)	0.439 (0.226)	
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	
Observations	818	721	407	
R2	0.287	0.124	0.038	

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.







Figure A10.3: Interaction of Treatment & Distance to Mt. Cameroon: Ethnicity Mechanism



A11. Robustness: *Placebo Borders*

As a final robustness check, we rerun our models with placebo borders at twenty-kilometer intervals up to sixty kilometers to the east and west of the actual border, following Lee and Schultz (2012) and Mattingly (2017). This allows us to address the risk that some other southwest-northwest feature drives our results rather than the actual border. If placebo borders consistently return significant results, then perhaps any line roughly parallel to the border would generate support for our argument rather than it being related to Cameroon's dual colonial heritage.

Given the complicated form of our multidimensional polynomial models, we calculate the placebos using Lee and Schultz's specification reported in Appendix A2. The results can be found in the three figures below. As Figures A11.1-11.3 document, were the border to be displaced to the east or west, results would largely be consistent with those reported above. Notably, results for our argument suggest that a positive effect of exposure to indirect rule on our measures of the local legitimacy mechanisms are by and large only statistically significant difference at the actual border.







Figure A11.2: ATE at Placebo for Traditional Authority Mechanism
 Standardized dependent variables with 95% Confidence Intervals



A12: Robustness: Generalizability of Social Capital Findings

Table A12 examines whether the null effect of social capital reported in Figure 6 of the main text extends to the broader sub-Saharan African sample. Note that the findings mirror those of Cameroon with the exception that across the continent Anglophones are less trusting in both their social relations and their institutions.

Table A12: Generalizability of the Social Capital Finding

	Social Trust	Institutional Trust	Discuss Politics	Voted	Attend Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legacy of indirect rule	-0.481 (0.089)	-0.188 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.031)	-0.255 (0.110)	0.036 (0.055)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	37280	58661	77073	77570	76421
Country N	24	25	26	26	26

Results of mixed level models estimating the effect of exposure to indirect rule (residing in a former British colony). Model 4 run with mixed-level logit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all respondents in former British and French colonies sampled in Rounds 5 and 6 of the Afrobarometer. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. All models include controls for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit. Note that Proximity to the Central State is measured here with the logged distance to the national capital from the centroid of their second-level administrative unit. Models also include a dummy variable for whether or not the respondent comes from a former settler colony.

A13: Alternative Explanations: *Precolonial Centralization*

In light of recent findings that areas that were politically centralized in the precolonial era are correlated with better on-average development outcomes (Bandyopadhyay and Green 2016; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013), we control for the *degree of precolonial political hierarchy* as measured by Murdock (1981). Yet as seen in Table A13, we find no evidence that contemporary political attitudes and reported behavior are correlated with precolonial attributes. Importantly, this does not change our findings for the legacy of exposure to indirect rule, reinforcing our finding in A1 that precolonial statehood neither influenced the drawing of the Picot Line nor seems to be carrying substantial weight in determining contemporary outcomes.

Table A13: Model Replication with Murdock's Precolonial Centralization Measure

Panel A: Local Gov. Legitimacy Mechanism				
	Local Gov. Councilors Listen (1)	Approve of Local Councilor Performance (2)	Contacted a Government Agency (3)	Member of Community Group (4)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.577 (0.161)	0.649 (0.127)	0.357 (0.092)	0.409 (0.181)
Murdock's Jurisdictional Hierarchy	0.008 (0.048)	0.032 (0.041)	0.034 (0.028)	-0.039 (0.045)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	843	789	903	899
R2	0.123	0.144	0.113	0.152
Panel B: Traditional Authority Mechanism				
	Trust in Traditional Leaders (5)	Traditional Leaders are Corrupt (6)	Contacted Traditional Leader (7)	Approve Trad. Leader Performance (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.633 (0.248)	-0.075 (0.202)	0.167 (0.208)	0.708 (0.219)
Murdock's Jurisdictional Hierarchy	-0.029 (0.098)	0.061 (0.057)	-0.112 (0.078)	0.101 (0.062)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	435	421	453	391
R2	0.053	0.077	0.159	0.109
Panel C: Ethnicity Mechanism				
	Ethnic ID Stronger than National ID (9)	Ethnic Network Provides Jobs (10)	Leaders Should Help Their Own Community (11)	
Legacy of indirect rule	1.025 (0.199)	-0.302 (0.191)	0.335 (0.250)	
Murdock's Jurisdictional Hierarchy	-0.011 (0.047)	0.037 (0.060)	0.037 (0.072)	
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	
Observations	867	766	438	
R2	0.279	0.114	0.026	

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

A14: Alternative Explanations: *Distance to Nigeria*

One potential alternative explanation is that Anglophone regions might fare better economically because of their proximity to Nigeria and Nigerian markets, rather than exposure to indirect rule. Controlling for each cluster's logged distance to the Nigerian border does not alter our results as shown in Table A14.

Table A14: Model Replication with Logged Distance to Nigerian Border

Panel A: Local Gov. Legitimacy Mechanism				
	Local Gov. Councilors Listen (1)	Approve of Local Councilor Performance (2)	Contacted a Government Agency (3)	Member of Community Group (4)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.562 (0.157)	0.652 (0.132)	0.347 (0.093)	0.401 (0.179)
Ln D Nigeria	0.116 (0.119)	0.032 (0.139)	-0.093 (0.085)	-0.036 (0.124)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	872	819	934	930
R2	0.137	0.142	0.112	0.155
Panel B: Traditional Authority Mechanism				
	Trust in Traditional Leaders (5)	Traditional Leaders are Corrupt (6)	Contacted Traditional Leader (7)	Approve Trad. Leader Performance (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.585 (0.231)	-0.110 (0.205)	0.162 (0.216)	0.638 (0.214)
Ln D Nigeria	-0.401 (0.378)	0.217 (0.248)	0.083 (0.300)	-0.235 (0.172)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	458	443	476	414
R2	0.068	0.069	0.168	0.112
Panel C: Ethnicity Mechanism				
	Ethnic ID Stronger than National ID (9)	Ethnic Network Provides Jobs (10)	Leaders Should Help Their Own Community (11)	
Legacy of indirect rule	0.984 (0.192)	-0.307 (0.193)	0.299 (0.239)	
Ln D Nigeria	0.304 (0.115)	-0.089 (0.177)	-0.051 (0.189)	
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	
Observations	896	797	445	
R2	0.284	0.112	0.026	

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

A15: Alternative Explanations: *Bamileké/Bassa Exclusion*

Beginning in the 1950s and continuing in the 1970s, Bassa and Bamiléké populations engaged in the largest episode of government opposition during the UPC rebellion (see Joseph 1977). Bassa and Bamiléké populations were concentrated in the corridor between Douala and Bafoussam, located directly on the Francophone side of Cameroon's internal border. It is possible, therefore, that what we are capturing is not an attribute of Anglophone regions, but a legacy of the rebellions and subsequent government repression on the *Francophone* side of the border. Yet controlling for whether or not an Afrobarometer respondent is ethnically Bassa or Bamiléké as a proxy to exposure to state repression does not affect our main findings as reported in Table A15.

Table A15: Replication of Afrobarometer models with Bamileké/Bassa Dummy

Panel A: Local Gov. Legitimacy Mechanism				
	Local Gov. Councilors Listen (1)	Approve of Local Councilor Performance (2)	Contacted a Government Agency (3)	Member of Community Group (4)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.567 (0.154)	0.693 (0.127)	0.346 (0.093)	0.417 (0.192)
Bamileké/Bassa	-0.006 (0.093)	0.072 (0.078)	0.010 (0.050)	0.035 (0.091)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	872	819	934	930
R2	0.137	0.142	0.112	0.156
Panel B: Traditional Authority Mechanism				
	Trust in Traditional Leaders (5)	Traditional Leaders are Corrupt (6)	Contacted Traditional Leader (7)	Approve Trad. Leader Performance (8)
Legacy of indirect rule	0.497 (0.269)	-0.056 (0.225)	0.084 (0.232)	0.547 (0.219)
Bamileké/Bassa	-0.139 (0.155)	0.088 (0.119)	-0.120 (0.110)	-0.139 (0.111)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	458	443	476	414
R2	0.066	0.068	0.169	0.113
Panel C: Ethnicity Mechanism				
	Ethnic ID Stronger than National ID (9)	Ethnic Network Provides Jobs (10)	Leaders Should Help Their Own Community (11)	
Legacy of indirect rule	1.115 (0.198)	-0.193 (0.188)	0.362 (0.236)	
Bamileké/Bassa	0.190 (0.087)	0.228 (0.114)	0.141 (0.088)	
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y	
Observations	896	797	445	
R2	0.285	0.116	0.029	

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

A16: Alternative Explanations: *Central State Favoritism*

A second compound treatment concern relates to variations in investments in the post-Independence period. Of particular concern is the risk that the current regime of President Paul Biya favors Francophone regions. One way to address this question is to look at changes in the distribution of wealth measures across the border over time. Though Paul Biya becomes president in 1982, he only began to seriously reorganize government following a 1984 coup attempt, and by all reports, his reshuffling favored the south over the *north*. The Anglophone west largely remained out of Biya's political calculus until the democratization period, beginning in 1990, meaning that discrimination specifically targeted at Anglophone regions is unlikely to have begun until after the political opening of the early 1990s, when these regions came out in open opposition to the regime. As shown in Figures A16, however, there is no evidence that the relative provisioning of electricity – a high demand public good provided by the central state - to Francophone areas has shifted during the last twenty-five years of Biya's rule as allegations would predict. Crucially, if the central government really does favor the Francophone regions, this should bias the effect of the treatment against our predicted outcome because economic development would be better in the Francophone regions. While the slight bias towards Anglophone bias in 1991 does disappear by 2004, the pattern is largely consistent over time.




Figure A16: Average Treatment Effect of Indirect Rule on Electricity over time
Standardized dependent variables with 95% Confidence Intervals

A second means to evaluate this claim is to look at behavioral data. The Afrobarometer data asked three questions about perceptions of regional favoritism in Round 6 of the Cameroonian survey. Specifically, respondents were asked if they were satisfied with how proportional representation across the country's ten regions was implemented in three sectors: entry into prestigious public service schools, such as the *Ecole nationale d'administration et de magistrature (ENAM)*, appointments to public offices and placements in the military and police. In direct contrast to the expectations emanating from the current Anglophone crisis, Anglophone Cameroonians report being no more or less satisfied (as seen in model 1) or *more* satisfied (model 3 and model 2 at a ten percent significance level) than their Francophone counterparts.

Table A16: Perceptions of Central State Favoritism

	<i>Are you satisfied with how proportional representation is implemented in the following sectors?</i>		
	Placement in Public Service Schools (ENAM, ENS)	Appointments in Public Office	Placement in Military/Police
Legacy of indirect rule	0.303 (0.201)	0.399 (0.221)	0.792 (0.222)
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Proximity to Central State	Y	Y	Y
Observations	750	758	753
R2	0.143	0.109	0.200

Results of OLS regressions for all respondents within 80km of the border. Robust standard errors clustered by survey enumeration area in parentheses. Survey round fixed effects included when appropriate. Models control for the respondent's age, gender, education, whether they live in an urban or rural sampling unit and logged population density within 5km. Distance to the border measured via a multi-dimensional polynomial, measured by a cluster's latitude, longitude, their interaction, latitude squared, longitude squared and the latitude and longitude of the nearest point on the border longitude and dummies for survey round.

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