

# Online Appendix for: Local Labor Markets and Party Elite: Crafting Trade Policy in the United States House of Representatives

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## A1 Data Details

Appendix A1 provides additional details about our data.

Legislator Turnover: We constructed a complete member file, which indicates each Member of Congress’s decision to or not to cosponsor for every bill introduced in the Congress in which he or she was serving. In a small number of cases, members departed the seat partway through a Congress and were replaced. Turnover is due to death, scandal, or retirement. In these cases, it is not possible to attribute the absence of cosponsorship to the appropriate member—the original seat-holder or their replacement. For this reason, districts represented by more than one member in a Congress were dropped. Because mid-term turnover is due to death, scandal, or retirement, these events can be safely regarded as exogenous and even if they were to appear in non-random ways, they are almost certainly unrelated to trade policy. Thus their omission should not affect our analysis. We note that this turnover problem does not apply to our sponsorship and roll call vote data since, in these cases, it is possible to attribute actions to the appropriate member.

Congressional Committees: Only a select few bills are reported out of Congressional committee. When a bill is assigned to several committees, one committee has primary oversight over the bill. It is common practice that the other committees will be discharged from consideration of the bill once the primary committee has reported the bill. A committee may also be discharged from consideration with a discharge petition signed by 218 members. Discharge petitions were filed for three bills in the data set, however all failed to obtain the necessary number of signatures. Our data accounts for legislator membership in the *primary* committee or subcommittee to which the bill is assigned.

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Occupation of Employment: In addition to our main variables, we account for the occupational skill-level of employment. We account for the possibility that occupational skill-level employment, rather than industry, is a meaningful determinant of trade policy preferences. This extension is driven by the idea that labor, a factor of production, can move across industry. The U.S. Department of Labor National Center for O\*NET Development classifies occupations according to education, training and experience requirements. We matched occupation codes to the Standard Occupational Classification codes in the U.S. Census to calculate employment within each occupation zone. Occupation zone 1 includes jobs that do not require a high school degree, English fluency or on-the-job experience and training. For instance, this includes agricultural laborers, restaurant kitchen workers, certain construction workers, etc. These jobs are at low risk of outsourcing and we expect trade shocks to have a relatively small effect on them. Occupation zones 2-3 include jobs that require high school degrees or on-the-job experience, or specialized skills. Most blue-collar work including manufacturing employment fall into this category. These jobs are at high risk of outsourcing. Thus we expect trade shocks to have a large effect on them. Employment in occupation zones 4-5, the highest skilled group that includes most white-collar work, is the omitted category.

Industry Type: Additionally, we consider features of district-level employment associated with reliance on or vulnerability to international trade. The shares of a district workforce employed in industries characterized as primary, secondary, tertiary are calculated. Agriculture and mining are primary industries, manufacturing is secondary, and service and retail are examples of tertiary industries. In the U.S., primary industries tend to be more export-focused and thus a larger employment share in these industries may be associated with more support for trade liberalization. By contrast, firms in secondary industries tend to have cross-cutting interests due to their integration into global value chains.

## A2 Supplementary Statistical Results

### DW-NOMINATE SCORES AND TRADE BILL SPONSORSHIP

Members of congress routinely sponsor trade bills that cut across the ideological divide. Figure A.1 shows histograms of trade bills sponsored in each Congress by the sponsor's first dimension DW-Nominate score. This is the dimension widely-used to summarize the legislator's ideological position on economic issues. A positive one (1) DW-Nominate score denotes a consistently conservative voting record while a negative one (-1) denotes a consistently liberal voting record across the vast range of issues raised in Congress. In Figure A.1, the colors indicate the mean policy content of legislation in each bin. We exclude from this analysis bills that modify duty rates for specific targeted products.

The trade policy positions of Democrats and Republicans vary over time (Figure A.1(a)). The majority of trade bills were introduced during the 109<sup>th</sup>, 110<sup>th</sup> and 112<sup>th</sup> Congresses. During this period, Congress debated several major free trade agreements. The 109th Congress passed the Central American Free Trade Agreement. The 110<sup>th</sup> Congress passed the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Act, and the House passed the U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement though progress stalled in the Senate. During the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress, legislators sponsored

more than 1300 bills and passed into law three bilateral trade deals with Korea, Colombia, and Panama respectively. Thus, the first four Congress saw a successful bipartisan effort to pass liberalizing trade policies. Partisan politics, however, emerges over time to disrupt further progress towards liberalization. Preoccupied with the 2008 presidential election, the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress delayed consideration of the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement. In the 113<sup>th</sup> and 114<sup>th</sup> Congresses, negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and executive fast-track authority collapsed under partisan politics.<sup>1</sup> Thus, we observe a divide between Republicans and Democrats emerging in the 113<sup>th</sup> and 114<sup>th</sup> Congresses.

[Figure A.1 here.]

#### SPONSOR REGRESSIONS WITH OCCUPATION AND INDUSTRY TRADE CONTROLS

In the main analysis, we examine whether a legislator’s decision to sponsor trade protection or liberalizing bills reflects economic characteristics of his or her district. We find that when a district has a negative weighted trade balance in the industries where most of the district workforce is employed the legislator representing that district is much more likely to sponsor trade protection bills than liberalizing ones. We also find a strong correlation using manufacturing trade balance.

Further to the main analysis, Tables A.1 and A.2 report additional tests using all trade bills and the non-duty bills samples, respectively. We consider the share of the district workforce employed in agriculture, manufacturing, entertainment and professional and financial services (model 2) We also consider the share of the workforce employed in low-skill and medium-skill occupations, where the omitted category is high-skill occupations (model 4). The employment weighted trade balances for each major category of industry are used in model 6. Models 3, 5, and 7 display interaction effects with the party of the sponsor. Legislators from districts with a large share of entertainment employment—which includes restaurant and hotel workers—appear to sponsor protectionist bills more often than liberalizing bills, an effect that could be driven by Democrats, although the partisan differences are insignificant. Democrats representing districts with a large workforce in manufacturing seem to display a slight preference toward sponsoring protectionist bills. Other industries show no discernible patterns. The occupational skill level variables are not strong predictors of sponsorship either. By comparison, the employment-weighted trade balance is a much stronger predictor of trade policy sponsorship than any of these metrics. This suggests that legislators are specifically crafting trade policy in response to trade pressures on workers or industry in their districts rather than general employment conditions.

For the employment weighted exports and imports in each industry—agriculture, manufacturing, and extraction—the regression results point in the expected direction. District with larger import industries are associated with the legislator sponsoring protectionist bills; districts with more exports in the main industries of employment promote liberalizing bills. There is little evidence of a partisan divide on this; legislators from both parties appear to

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<sup>1</sup>The only notable legislation to pass during this period is the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act which reformed the process for amended the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. The bill ended the practice of legislators sponsoring bills to adjust duties on specific industries. Companies now submit requests to the US International Trade Commission, who prepares a comprehensive list of adjustments for Congress to approve.

similarly sponsor trade bills reflecting industry trade balances.

[Tables A.1 and A.2 here.]

The main analysis uses a series of linear probability models to examine the correlations in the data. Table A.3 repeats the analysis using a logistic model where the dependent variable takes on values of 1 for protectionist legislation and 0 for liberalizing legislation. The results are not sensitive to the statistical model choice; we observe the same key patterns.

[Tables A.3 here.]

#### REGRESSION OF ROLL CALL VOTES ON DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS

In our main results, we analyze each legislator’s decision to cosponsor or not each trade bill introduced in the Congress in which he or she is serving. This sample contains 191 protectionist bills and 397 liberalizing bills that attract the support of at least one cosponsor. Using this indicator of policy support, we find evidence of partisan polarization.

We can compare this to an analysis of roll call votes on the tiny subset of bills that advance this far. In our sample, only five protectionist bills and sixteen liberalizing bills received a floor vote in the House. Once a bill passes the House and Senate, the chambers must resolve any differences between the bills before legislation is sent to the President for signature—we do not analyze roll call votes associated with this final stage since such an analysis would require data on Senate legislative actions and history. As noted in the main paper, this restricted sample reflects bills that party leadership supports. Table ?? presents results parallel to our cosponsor analysis, but here the outcome variable is the legislator’s roll call vote in favor of (1) or opposed to (0) the trade bill. Abstentions are omitted.

[Tables A.4 and A.5 here.]

For protectionist bills (A), we find only slight evidence of a polarized partisan response to industry employment. In districts with a significant workforce in entertainment, Democrats are more likely to cast “yea” votes for protectionism and Republicans to cast “nay” votes. However, these models make clear that votes on trade protection bills fall largely along party lines; local economic conditions explain less variation. The districts with significant entertainment employment—typically urban areas—appear to be driving this pattern (especially California, Florida, Nevada, New York). For liberalizing bills (B), the majority of trade legislation allowed through the political machinery of Congressional procedure, we see some slight evidence of polarized responses. Legislators from agriculture districts cast votes in support of trade liberalizing bills; legislators from manufacturing districts oppose them. Only for districts with significant employment in entertainment is the response polarized. Democrats from these districts support liberalizing bills while Republicans oppose it. This pattern appears to be driven largely by legislators from urban centers, especially in California, Florida, and New York, as well as from Nevada.

While the roll call analysis buttresses the cosponsorship analysis, it also reveals why there are difficulties in relying on roll call votes alone. There are so few bills, and they have already

been ushered by the majority party far along in the process, that they tend to receive votes along party-lines. For these bills, district economic characteristics are surely a factor—but somewhat less pronounced.

The roll call votes themselves are summarized in Figure A.2. The figure shows how many Republicans and Democrats voted for and against each trade bill. Nearly every bill brought forth for a roll call vote had sufficient bipartisan support to pass the House. On the 5 protectionist bills shown in Figure A.2(a), Republicans tended to cast the “nay” votes while the majority of Democrats supported passage. On the 16 liberalizing bills in Figure A.2(b), Democrats tended to cast the “nay” votes while the great majority of Republicans supported bill passage. These plots make clear that partisanship is pivotal for roll call votes.

[Figure A.2 here.]

#### COSPONSOR REGRESSIONS WITH ADDITIONAL COVARIATES, FIXED EFFECTS, AND LOGISTIC REGRESSION

In the main paper, we analyze cosponsorship patterns and find a politically-polarized response to economic conditions. The result is robust to other model specifications. Table A.6 examines the import and export data disaggregated by manufacturing and non-manufacturing trade. MCs from districts with significant employment in manufacturing import industries consistently sponsor protectionist bills. By contrast, MCs from non-manufacturing import industry-intensive districts do not support these protectionist efforts. No such patterns exist for the cosponsorship of trade liberalizing legislation.

Also considered in Table A.6 are the concentration of employment in industries using the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman-type index and the percentage of the district workforce employed in low- and mid-skill occupations. Legislators from districts with high concentration of employment in just one or a couple industries are very active in supporting protectionist legislation. There is no effect for liberalizing bills. These correlations lend support to the logic underpinning our Hypothesis 3. Legislators representing fairly narrow industry interests are the stronger proponents of protectionism; as the preferences of larger more diverse constituencies are taken into account, trade policy shifts in a liberalizing direction. We do observe partisan effects for occupation skill level. Democrats from districts with many workers employed in low-skilled occupations are less supportive of trade protection and more supportive of liberalization. This is largely consistent with our main results concerning industry of employment.

As a robustness check, in Table A.7 we examine trade bill cosponsorship using legislator fixed effects (in lieu of clustered standard errors). This accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across legislators and the districts they represent.

[Table A.7 here.]

The results are not sensitive to the modeling approach. The main results reported in the paper use linear probability models. When logistic regression is used instead, the same substantive results are obtained. Table A.8 presents those results:

[Table A.8 here.]

Next, we consider common support in the data for the interaction effects of interest. Specifically, are there Republican- and Democrat-represented districts with similar economic characteristics? We checked each interaction effect reported in Table 3 and found sufficient support across the range of the economic variables (weighted trade balance, industry employment) to draw meaningful comparisons between Republicans and Democrats. Figure A.3 displays the distributions of our key explanatory variables, disaggregated by legislator party. Each economic variable shows substantial overlap between Republican- and Democrat-represented districts. There are some slight differences in the density distributions. Districts with a large share of the workforce employed in manufacturing or, to a lesser extent, agriculture, are more often represented by Republicans (a, c). Districts with a large share of employment in professional and financial services, or to a lesser extent, entertainment, are more often represented by Democrats (b, d). Trade deficits and surpluses do not appear to be correlated with the party of the representative (e). The interaction effects estimated in our regression models are well-supported across the range of each variable.

[Figure A.3 here.]

We also examine whether the relationship between district trade conditions and cosponsorship activity has shifted over the period we study. For this test, we disaggregated our data by the years prior to the 2008 crisis (covering the 109<sup>th</sup> – 110<sup>th</sup> congresses) and the years during/following the crisis (111<sup>th</sup> – 114<sup>th</sup> congresses). For each subsample of protectionist and liberalizing bills, we re-ran the regression specification in Table 3, models 3A and 3B respectively. These regression results are shown in Table A.9. For trade protection bills, we observe a slight weakening in the partisan response to district trade conditions in the wake of the financial crisis; more legislators from both sides of the aisle are inclined to support protectionist legislation. For trade liberalizing bills, there are no significant differences between the two periods under study.


[Table A.9 here.]

Finally, we demonstrate that the estimated effects are significant. Figure A.4 shows the expected probability of a legislator cosponsoring a protectionist (a) or liberalizing (b) bill as a function of her party and the weighted trade balance in her district. Estimates are based on models with all controls and clustered standard errors; plots show 90, 95, and 99% confidence intervals. Figure A.4(a) shows that in districts with a large trade deficit, Democrats (blue) are far more likely to cosponsor protectionist bills than Republicans (red). When they represent districts with a trade surplus, legislators from both parties cosponsor protectionist bills at similar rates. Figure A.4(b) shows that overall discrepancies between Republicans and Democrats are slight when it comes to cosponsoring liberalizing bills.

[Figure A.4 here.]

## Figures and Tables


Figure A.1: Policy Positions of Trade Bills by Sponsor's Nominate Score



A-7

*Note:* Figures exclude duty adjustment bills. Trade bills introduced in the 109<sup>th</sup>, 110<sup>th</sup>, 111<sup>th</sup>, 112<sup>th</sup>, 113<sup>th</sup> & 114<sup>th</sup> Congresses where blue text denotes Democrat-majority Houses and red text denotes Republican-majority Houses.


Figure A.2: Roll Call Vote Counts By Party for Each Trade Bill



Notes: Dark red and dark blue denote “nay” votes cast by Republicans and Democrats, respectively. Light red and light blue denote “yea” votes cast by Republicans and Democrats, respectively.




Figure A.3: Density Distributions of Economic Variables, Comparing Democrat- and Republican- Represented Districts



*Notes:* Density distributions for Republican-represented districts are shown in red; Democrat-represented districts are shown in blue. There is substantial overlap for all explanatory variables.

Figure A.4: Expected Probability of Cosponsoring Trade Bill as a Function of District Weighted Trade Balance and Legislator's Party



*Notes:* Expected probability and 90, 95, and 99% confidence intervals calculated from linear regressions with all controls, as noted in Table 3. Vertical axis scale is held constant across sub-figures. Expected values for Democrats are shown in blue and Republicans are shown in red.

Table A.1: Linear Regression of Policy Content of Trade Legislation on Sponsor's District Characteristics, Additional Covariates

	Trade						
	Protectionist = 1, Liberalizing = -1						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Democratic Sponsor	0.149*** (0.032)	0.149*** (0.035)	0.156*** (0.036)	0.143*** (0.032)	0.143*** (0.032)	0.164*** (0.034)	0.236*** (0.043)
Agriculture Employment		0.004 (0.013)	0.006 (0.020)				
× Democrat			-0.013 (0.026)				
Manufacturing Employment		0.015 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.016)				
× Democrat			0.045 (0.040)				
Entertainment Employment		0.038* (0.019)	0.021 (0.019)				
× Democrat			0.046 (0.033)				
Professional/Financial Employment		-0.039 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.028)				
× Democrat			-0.085* (0.037)				
Low-Skill Employment				0.020 (0.017)	0.018 (0.015)		
× Democrat					0.006 (0.032)		
Mid-Skill Employment				0.027 (0.029)	0.007 (0.032)		
× Democrat					0.035 (0.026)		
Agriculture Imports						0.717** (0.220)	0.355 (0.260)
× Democrat							0.728 (0.494)
Manufacturing Imports						0.201*** (0.053)	0.160** (0.058)
× Democrat							0.140 (0.114)
Extraction Imports						-0.002 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.009)
× Democrat							-0.111 (0.057)
Agriculture Exports						-0.718** (0.218)	-0.359 (0.267)
× Democrat							-0.722 (0.488)
Manufacturing Exports						-0.156** (0.047)	-0.159** (0.054)
× Democrat							-0.039 (0.105)
Extraction Exports						0.011 (0.008)	0.0003 (0.005)
× Democrat							0.452** (0.155)
Bills	3,205	3,205	3,205	3,205	3,205	3,205	3,205
Sponsors	325	325	325	325	325	325	325
$R^2$	0.041	0.047	0.059	0.043	0.045	0.072	0.099

Notes: Models include controls (not shown) for sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, log mean income, and employment rate of district. Constants not shown. † Normalized. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001.

Table A.2: Linear Regression of Policy Content of Trade Legislation on Sponsor's District Characteristics, Non-duty Bills, Additional Covariates

	Trade (Non-Duty)						
	Protectionist = 1, Liberalizing = -1						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Democratic Sponsor	0.767*** (0.110)	0.770*** (0.115)	0.776*** (0.107)	0.771*** (0.112)	0.759*** (0.108)	0.773*** (0.109)	0.782*** (0.107)
Agriculture Employment		0.074 (0.041)	0.055 (0.038)				
× Democrat			-0.059 (0.151)				
Manufacturing Employment		0.099 (0.067)	-0.050 (0.077)				
× Democrat			0.283* (0.116)				
Entertainment Employment		0.123* (0.056)	-0.031 (0.082)				
× Democrat			0.260* (0.103)				
Professional/Financial Employment		-0.069 (0.090)	-0.074 (0.096)				
× Democrat			-0.103 (0.132)				
Low-Skill Employment				-0.004 (0.058)	-0.029 (0.074)		
× Democrat					0.070 (0.107)		
Mid-Skill Employment				0.123 (0.098)	0.040 (0.123)		
× Democrat					0.164 (0.114)		
Agriculture Imports						0.940** (0.346)	0.802 (0.473)
× Democrat							0.954 (1.211)
Manufacturing Imports						0.445* (0.174)	0.559** (0.198)
× Democrat							-0.316 (0.344)
Extraction Imports						-0.034 (0.059)	-0.053 (0.057)
× Democrat							-0.083 (0.146)
Agriculture Exports						-0.876* (0.341)	-0.759 (0.455)
× Democrat							-1.053 (1.395)
Manufacturing Exports						-0.320 (0.170)	-0.528** (0.191)
× Democrat							0.515 (0.339)
Extraction Exports						0.023 (0.038)	0.015 (0.034)
× Democrat							0.305 (0.235)
Bills	588	588	588	588	588	588	588
Sponsors	203	203	203	203	203	203	203
$R^2$	0.166	0.184	0.213	0.170	0.181	0.206	0.224

Notes: Models include controls (not shown) for sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, log mean income, and employment rate of district. Constants not shown. † Normalized. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A.3: Logistic Regression of Policy Content of Trade Legislation on Sponsor's District Characteristics

	TRADE					TRADE (NON-DUTY)				
	Protectionist = 1 Liberalizing = 0					Protectionist = 1 Liberalizing = 0				
	(1A)	(2A)	(3A)	(4A)	(5A)	(1B)	(2B)	(3B)	(4B)	(5B)
Democratic Sponsor	2.056*	1.426***	1.447***	1.423***	1.558***	1.915*	1.967***	2.022***	2.009***	2.157***
	(0.894)	(0.302)	(0.308)	(0.314)	(0.316)	(0.920)	(0.307)	(0.315)	(0.312)	(0.329)
DW Nominate Dim. 1	0.842					0.011				
	(0.967)					(1.121)				
DW Nominate Dim. 2	0.177					-0.712				
	(0.434)					(0.541)				
Imports		0.886**	1.027				0.580	0.767		
		(0.316)	(0.657)				(0.424)	(0.699)		
× Democrat			-0.190					-0.047		
			(0.738)					(1.162)		
Manufacturing Imports				1.198***	2.140***				1.114*	1.880*
				(0.350)	(0.644)				(0.513)	(0.746)
× Democrat					-1.160					-0.689
					(0.775)					(1.307)
Non-Manufacturing Imports				0.110	-0.173				0.037	-0.0001
				(0.178)	(0.223)				(0.205)	(0.243)
× Democrat					0.442					-0.273
					(0.416)					(0.489)
Exports		-0.696	-1.094				-0.244	-0.661		
		(0.367)	(0.771)				(0.424)	(0.752)		
× Democrat			0.571					0.624		
			(0.847)					(1.052)		
Manufacturing Exports				-0.998*	-2.377**				-0.776	-1.848*
				(0.388)	(0.821)				(0.489)	(0.851)
× Democrat					1.751					1.376
					(0.918)					(1.172)
Non-Manufacturing Exports				-0.049	0.151				0.135	0.082
				(0.192)	(0.209)				(0.190)	(0.199)
× Democrat					-0.321					0.803
					(0.401)					(0.681)
Bills	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	588	588	588	588	588
Sponsors	325	325	325	325	325	203	203	203	203	203
Log Likelihood	-676.29	-660.49	-658.15	-657.29	-649.71	-317.98	-313.25	-310.60	-309.96	-303.96

Notes: Data cover 109<sup>th</sup> – 114<sup>th</sup> Congresses. Models include controls (not shown) for sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, and log mean income, and employment rate of district. Constants not shown. † Normalized. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A.4: Linear Regression of Roll Call Votes for Protectionist Trade Bills (Non-Duty) on District Characteristics, 109<sup>th</sup> – 114<sup>th</sup> Congress

Did Member of Congress Vote for the Trade Bill?							
(A) Protectionist							
	(1A)	(2A)	(3A)	(4A)	(5A)	(6A)	(7A)
Democratic Cosponsor	-0.435*** (0.060)	0.209*** (0.022)	0.206*** (0.022)	0.213*** (0.022)	0.212*** (0.022)	0.205*** (0.022)	0.206*** (0.022)
DW Nominate Dim. 1	-0.791*** (0.070)						
DW Nominate Dim. 2	0.214*** (0.031)						
Imports		-0.022 (0.024)	0.112** (0.035)				
× Democrat			-0.296*** (0.042)				
Exports		0.005 (0.025)	-0.160*** (0.035)				
× Democrat			0.358*** (0.043)				
Agriculture				0.005 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.015)		
× Democrat					0.034 (0.019)		
Manufacturing				-0.005 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.017)		
× Democrat					-0.022 (0.021)		
Entertainment				-0.009 (0.010)	-0.056** (0.019)		
× Democrat					0.083*** (0.023)		
Professional and Financial				0.004 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.021)		
× Democrat					0.026 (0.022)		
Manuf. Imports						0.002 (0.031)	0.160*** (0.038)
× Democrat							-0.367*** (0.053)
Non-Manuf. Imports						-0.028* (0.012)	-0.029 (0.018)
× Democrat							0.018 (0.027)
Manuf. Exports						-0.021 (0.031)	-0.206*** (0.038)
× Democrat							0.423*** (0.055)
Non-Manuf. Exports						0.020 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.020)
× Democrat							0.053 (0.027)
N	2,106	2,106	2,106	2,106	2,106	2,106	2,106
Bills	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Legislators	779	779	779	779	779	779	779
R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.1	0.14	0.1	0.12	0.11	0.14

Notes: Models include controls (not shown) for number of cosponsors, sponsor and cosponsor are same party, sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, and log mean income and employment rate of district. Constants not shown. † Normalized. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001.

Table A.5: Linear Regression of Roll Call Votes for Liberalizing Trade Bills (Non-Duty) on District Characteristics, 109<sup>th</sup> – 114<sup>th</sup> Congress

Did Member of Congress Vote for the Trade Bill?							
(B) Liberalizing							
	(1B)	(2B)	(3B)	(4B)	(5B)	(6B)	(7B)
Democratic MC	-0.201*** (0.038)	-0.170*** (0.014)	-0.168*** (0.014)	-0.168*** (0.014)	-0.175*** (0.014)	-0.167*** (0.014)	-0.163*** (0.014)
DW Nominate Dim. 1	-0.038 (0.043)						
DW Nominate Dim. 2	0.119*** (0.022)						
Imports		-0.029* (0.013)	0.023 (0.015)				
× Democrat			-0.120*** (0.026)				
Exports		0.023 (0.013)	-0.028 (0.015)				
× Democrat			0.115*** (0.025)				
Agriculture				0.019*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)		
× Democrat					0.043*** (0.011)		
Manufacturing				-0.022*** (0.007)	-0.012 (0.007)		
× Democrat					-0.036** (0.014)		
Entertainment				0.005 (0.006)	-0.020* (0.008)		
× Democrat					0.041** (0.013)		
Professional and Financial				-0.020* (0.010)	0.006 (0.008)		
× Democrat					0.031* (0.013)		
Manuf. Imports						0.008 (0.017)	0.054** (0.021)
× Democrat							-0.113** (0.035)
Non-Manuf. Imports						0.017* (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)
× Democrat							0.037* (0.017)
Manuf. Exports						-0.017 (0.017)	-0.060** (0.021)
× Democrat							0.105** (0.035)
Non-Manuf. Exports						0.001 (0.009)	0.0001 (0.009)
× Democrat							-0.004 (0.015)
N	6,666	6,666	6,666	6,666	6,666	6,666	6,666
Bills	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Legislators	786	786	786	786	786	786	786
R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.16

Notes: Models include controls (not shown) for number of cosponsors, sponsor and cosponsor are same party, sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, and log mean income and employment rate of district. Constants not shown. † Normalized. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001.

Table A.6: Linear Regression of Decision to Cosponsor Trade Bills (Non-Duty) on District Characteristics

Did Member of Congress Cosponsor the Trade Bill?												
	(A) Protectionist						(B) Liberalizing					
	(1A)	(2A)	(3A)	(4A)	(5A)	(6A)	(1B)	(2B)	(3B)	(4B)	(5B)	(6B)
Democratic Cosponsor	0.028*** (0.002)	0.029*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.002)	0.029*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Manufacturing Imports	0.007* (0.003)	0.009* (0.004)					0.0003 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)				
× Democrat		-0.004 (0.006)						0.004 (0.002)				
Non-Manufacturing Imports	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)					0.0003 (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0004)				
× Democrat		0.001 (0.002)						-0.0004 (0.001)				
Manufacturing Exports	-0.0003 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)					0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)				
× Democrat		0.014* (0.006)						-0.006* (0.002)				
Non-Manufacturing Exports	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)					-0.001 (0.0004)	-0.001 (0.0004)				
× Democrat		-0.001 (0.002)						-0.00002 (0.001)				
Industry Concentration			0.006*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)					0.0004 (0.0003)	0.001 (0.0003)		
× Democrat				0.001 (0.002)						-0.0005 (0.001)		
Low-Skill Occupation					-0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)					-0.00001 (0.0003)	-0.001* (0.001)
× Democrat						-0.007*** (0.002)						0.002** (0.001)
Mid-Skill Occupation					0.001 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)					-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)
× Democrat						0.007*** (0.002)						0.0002 (0.001)
N	81,301	81,301	81,301	81,301	81,301	81,301	168,727	168,727	168,727	168,727	168,727	168,727
Bills	191	191	191	191	191	191	397	397	397	397	397	397
Legislators	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797
R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19

Notes: Data cover 109<sup>th</sup> – 114<sup>th</sup> Congresses. Models include controls (not shown) for number of cosponsors, sponsor and cosponsor are same party, sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, and log mean income and employment rate of district. Constants not shown. † Normalized. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001.



Table A.7: Linear Regression of Decision to Cosponsor Trade Bills (Non-Duty) with Fixed Effects by Congress, 109<sup>th</sup> – 114<sup>th</sup>

Did Member of Congress Cosponsor the Trade Bill?										
	(A) Protectionist					(B) Liberalizing				
	(1A)	(2A)	(3A)	(4A)	(5A)	(1B)	(2B)	(3B)	(4B)	(5B)
Democratic Cosponsor	-0.020*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.002)	0.030*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0005 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)
DW Nominate Dim. 1	-0.059*** (0.006)					-0.003 (0.002)				
DW Nominate Dim. 2	0.001 (0.004)					-0.002 (0.001)				
Trade Balance		-0.003** (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)				-0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0004)		
× Democrat			-0.008*** (0.002)					-0.001 (0.001)		
Agriculture				-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)				0.0001 (0.0003)	0.001 (0.0005)
× Democrat					-0.002 (0.002)					-0.001* (0.001)
Manufacturing				0.007*** (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)				0.001* (0.0004)	0.002*** (0.0005)
× Democrat					0.007** (0.003)					-0.003*** (0.001)
Entertainment				-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)				0.0005 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0004)
× Democrat					0.001 (0.002)					0.001 (0.001)
Professional and Financial				-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)				0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
× Democrat					-0.004 (0.002)					-0.002* (0.001)
N	81,301	81,301	81,301	81,301	81,301	168,727	168,727	168,727	168,727	168,727
Bills	191	191	191	191	191	397	397	397	397	397
Legislators	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797
R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19

Notes: Models include controls (not shown) for number of cosponsors, sponsor and cosponsor are same party, sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, and log mean income and employment rate of district. † Normalized. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001. All models include fixed effects by Congress.

Table A.8: Logistic Regression of Decision to Cosponsor Trade Bills (Non-Duty) on District Characteristics

Did Member of Congress Cosponsor the Trade Bill?										
	(A) Protectionist					(B) Liberalizing				
	(1A)	(2A)	(3A)	(4A)	(5A)	(1B)	(2B)	(3B)	(4B)	(5B)
Democratic Cosponsor	-1.037*** (0.208)	0.884*** (0.073)	0.906*** (0.073)	0.934*** (0.076)	0.935*** (0.077)	-0.265 (0.220)	0.086 (0.074)	0.098 (0.075)	0.054 (0.073)	0.034 (0.076)
DW Nominate Dim. 1	-2.344*** (0.239)					-0.381 (0.249)				
DW Nominate Dim. 2	0.193 (0.119)					-0.219 (0.135)				
Imports		0.414*** (0.073)	0.774*** (0.171)				0.085 (0.084)	-0.010 (0.095)		
× Democrat			-0.510** (0.185)					0.268 (0.173)		
Exports		-0.244** (0.077)	-0.735*** (0.179)				0.031 (0.090)	0.185 (0.099)		
× Democrat			0.703*** (0.196)					-0.416* (0.182)		
Agriculture				-0.189*** (0.043)	-0.239** (0.089)				0.010 (0.041)	0.091 (0.047)
× Democrat					0.069 (0.100)					-0.184* (0.079)
Manufacturing				0.215*** (0.037)	0.176** (0.065)				0.095* (0.045)	0.211*** (0.051)
× Democrat					0.057 (0.078)					-0.324*** (0.098)
Entertainment				-0.058 (0.030)	-0.134 (0.073)				0.089** (0.034)	0.027 (0.044)
× Democrat					0.106 (0.079)					0.113 (0.064)
Professional and Financial				-0.089 (0.056)	-0.071 (0.089)				0.020 (0.067)	0.081 (0.078)
× Democrat					-0.037 (0.092)					-0.179* (0.091)
N	81,301	81,301	81,301	81,301	81,301	168,727	168,727	168,727	168,727	168,727
Bills	191	191	191	191	191	397	397	397	397	397
Legislators	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797
Log Lik.	-10253.11	-10289.35	-10269.8	-10258.98	-10255.15	-7520	-7514.43	-7506.95	-7518.95	-7494.86

Notes: Data cover 109<sup>th</sup> – 114<sup>th</sup> Congresses. Models include controls (not shown) for number of cosponsors, sponsor and cosponsor are same party, sponsor is gatekeeper, sponsor is in majority, and log mean income and employment rate of district. Constants not shown. † Normalized. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001.

Table A.9: Linear Regression of Decision to Cosponsor Trade Bills (Non-Duty) on District Characteristics for Years Before vs. During/After 2008 Financial Crisis

Did Member of Congress Cosponsor the Trade Bill?				
	Trade Protectionist		Trade Liberalizing	
	(1A)	(2A)	(1B)	(2B)
Democratic Cosponsor	0.030*** (0.003)	0.024*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Imports	0.017** (0.006)	0.003 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.002)
× Democrat	0.002 (0.009)	0.006 (0.005)	0.004* (0.002)	0.007* (0.003)
Exports	-0.012* (0.005)	-0.004 (0.002)	0.003 (0.001)	0.005* (0.002)
× Democrat	0.005 (0.009)	0.008 (0.005)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.007* (0.003)
Congresses	109 <sup>th</sup> – 110 <sup>th</sup>	111 <sup>th</sup> – 114 <sup>th</sup>	109 <sup>th</sup> – 110 <sup>th</sup>	111 <sup>th</sup> – 114 <sup>th</sup>
N	43,478	37,823	98,257	70,470
Bills	102	89	231	166
Legislators	488	673	488	673
R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	0.28	0.13	0.21

*Notes:* Models include controls (not shown) for number of cosponsors, sponsor and cosponsor are same party, sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, and log mean income and employment rate of district. Constants not shown. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001.