

Online Appendix

Legislative Organization and Political Representation

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A Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	25th	75th	Max
Adjusted CVP	118232	0.075	0.30	-3.55	-0.13	0.27	3.71
GOP Presidential Vote Share	118181	0.51	0.14	0.039	0.44	0.61	0.87
On Committee	118233	0.11	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
ln(Staff on Committee)	96145	4.39	0.35	3.28	4.17	4.56	5.39
ln(Staff per Committee Member)	96145	0.54	0.41	-0.39	0.27	0.85	1.72
Republican	118233	0.44	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Majority	118078	0.58	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Issue Area	118233						
... Agriculture	9095	8%					
... Appropriations	9114	8%					
... Defense	9115	8%					
... Economy	9122	8%					
... Education	9083	8%					
... Energy	9112	8%					
... Finance	9100	8%					
... Foreign Policy	9118	8%					
... Housing	9004	8%					
... Labor	9101	8%					
... Taxes	9074	8%					
... Trade	9080	8%					
... Welfare	9115	8%					
Committee	118233						
... Agriculture	9095	8%					
... Appropriations	9114	8%					
... Armed Services	9115	8%					
... Banking	18104	15%					
... Education & Labor	18184	15%					
... Energy & Commerce	9112	8%					
... Foreign Affairs	9118	8%					
... Ways & Means	36391	31%					

Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Adjusted CVP by Issue Area

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Issue Area: Agriculture							
Adjusted CVP	9095	0.036	0.159	-0.358	-0.101	0.173	0.667
Issue Area: Appropriations							
Adjusted CVP	9114	0.083	0.287	-0.596	-0.186	0.363	0.779
Issue Area: Defense							
Adjusted CVP	9115	0.074	0.276	-0.963	-0.174	0.328	0.845
Issue Area: Economy							
Adjusted CVP	9122	0.123	0.236	-0.723	-0.094	0.372	0.861
Issue Area: Education							
Adjusted CVP	9083	-0.09	0.225	-3.4	-0.269	0.119	1.082
Issue Area: Energy							
Adjusted CVP	9112	0.067	0.174	-0.444	-0.092	0.236	0.963
Issue Area: Finance							
Adjusted CVP	9100	-0.014	0.095	-0.365	-0.095	0.078	0.941
Issue Area: Foreign Policy							
Adjusted CVP	9118	0.059	0.213	-0.441	-0.142	0.277	0.906
Issue Area: Housing							
Adjusted CVP	9003	0.17	0.389	-2.611	-0.147	0.486	3.713
Issue Area: Labor							
Adjusted CVP	9101	0.166	0.431	-1.879	-0.237	0.618	3.059
Issue Area: Taxes							
Adjusted CVP	9074	0.054	0.171	-0.776	-0.032	0.148	2.105
Issue Area: Trade							
Adjusted CVP	9080	0.125	0.564	-3.554	-0.137	0.426	3.548
Issue Area: Welfare							
Adjusted CVP	9115	0.124	0.297	-0.502	-0.154	0.44	1.246






Figure A.1: Correlation Across Issue Areas by Legislator-Congress

Figure A.2: Distribution of Adjusted CVP Scores by Issue Area



Histograms show the distribution of adjusted conservative vote probabilities by issue area.

Figure A.3: Legislative Responsiveness to Constituency Preferences across Issues



Plotted points show the binned mean values of conservative vote probabilities across the range of values of *Republican presidential vote share*.

B Robustness Checks

B.1 Parallel Trends

Table B.1: Parallel Trends: Committee Service and Ideological Responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Adjusted Conservative Vote Probability					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Republican Presidential Vote Share	0.072** (0.022)		0.075** (0.024)		0.082** (0.031)	
On Committee	0.021 (0.016)	0.029** (0.015)	0.020 (0.021)	0.029 (0.020)	0.026 (0.038)	0.039 (0.034)
On Committee (t+1)	-0.0002 (0.016)	-0.0001 (0.015)	0.010 (0.022)	0.013 (0.020)	0.024 (0.033)	0.023 (0.029)
On Committee (t-1)			-0.022 (0.015)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.012 (0.023)	-0.016 (0.020)
On Committee (t+2)					-0.004 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.028)
On Committee (t-2)					-0.021 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.021)
Rep. Pres. Vote Share × On Committee	-0.043 (0.032)	-0.061** (0.029)	-0.035 (0.043)	-0.057 (0.040)	-0.035 (0.083)	-0.068 (0.075)
Rep. Pres. Vote Share × On Committee (t+1)	-0.023 (0.034)	-0.018 (0.031)	-0.053 (0.049)	-0.054 (0.045)	-0.113 (0.081)	-0.103 (0.070)
Rep. Pres. Vote Share × On Committee (t-1)			0.030 (0.027)	0.040 (0.026)	0.019 (0.041)	0.020 (0.037)
Rep. Pres. Vote Share × On Committee (t+2)					0.044 (0.072)	0.036 (0.055)
Rep. Pres. Vote Share × On Committee (t-2)					0.019 (0.042)	0.024 (0.036)
Member-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Congress-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Congress-by-Member Fixed Effects		✓		✓		✓
No. Unit FEs	20,306	20,306	17,990	17,990	13,039	13,039
No. Clusters	1,563	1,563	1,384	1,384	1,003	1,003
Observations	99,914	99,914	84,074	84,074	56,599	56,599

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legislators in parentheses. Observations are at the MC-by-issue-by-Congress level. *p<0.10, **p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

B.2 Sample Robustness

Each figure in this section plots estimates for the interaction between district presidential vote share and an indicator for committee membership, based on model from table 2, column 1, while sequentially omitting committees, issue areas, congresses, and states, respectively. Thick lines show the 90 percent confidence intervals and thin lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals when clustering on legislator. Table B.2 presents results estimated using only highly ideological issue areas – specifically, appropriations, the economy, education, labor, welfare, and taxes – and Table B.3 shows results using the un-transformed CVP scores.

Figure B.1: Estimate of “Rep. Pres Vote Share \times On Committee,” Dropping Committees




Figure B.2: Estimate of “Rep. Pres Vote Share \times On Committee,” Dropping Issue Areas




Figure B.3: Estimate of “Rep. Pres Vote Share \times On Committee,” Dropping Congresses




Figure B.4: Estimate of “Rep. Pres Vote Share \times On Committee,” Dropping States




Table B.2: Committee Service and Ideological Responsiveness, Only Ideological Issues

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Adjusted Conservative Vote Probability				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Republican Presidential Vote Share	0.051** (0.022)			0.258** (0.050)	0.132** (0.036)
On Committee	0.031** (0.011)	0.054** (0.010)	0.053** (0.011)	0.029 (0.020)	0.015 (0.014)
Republican					0.379** (0.007)
Rep. Pres. Vote Share × On Comm.	-0.084** (0.023)	-0.128** (0.024)	-0.128** (0.024)	-0.047 (0.041)	-0.050* (0.030)
Member-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓		
District-by-Issue Fixed Effects				✓	✓
Congress-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓		✓	✓	✓
Congress-by-Member Fixed Effects		✓	✓		
No. Unit FEs	10,724	10,724	10,724	16,897	16,897
No. Clusters	1,789	1,789	1,789	1,789	1,789
Observations	54,585	54,585	54,585	54,585	54,585

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legislators in parentheses. Observations are at the MC-by-issue-by-Congress level. *p<0.10, **p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

Table B.3: Committee Service and Ideological Responsiveness: Unadjusted CVP Measure

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Unadjusted Conservative Vote Probability				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Republican Presidential Vote Share	0.050** (0.018)			0.203** (0.041)	0.087** (0.027)
On Committee	0.003 (0.008)	0.018** (0.009)	0.013** (0.006)	0.043** (0.012)	0.025** (0.008)
Republican					0.342** (0.006)
Rep. Pres. Vote Share × On Comm.	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.038** (0.017)	-0.036** (0.012)	-0.079** (0.023)	-0.053** (0.016)
Member-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓		
District-by-Issue Fixed Effects				✓	✓
Congress-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓		✓	✓	✓
Congress-by-Member Fixed Effects		✓	✓		
No. Unit FEs	23,217	23,217	23,217	36,599	36,599
No. Clusters	1,790	1,790	1,790	1,790	1,790
Observations	118,181	118,181	118,181	118,181	118,181

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legislators in parentheses. Observations are at the MC-by-issue-by-Congress level. *p<0.10, **p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

B.3 Committee Exile

Table B.4: Committee Exile Analysis

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Adjusted Conservative Vote Probability			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Republican Presidential Vote Share	0.389** (0.082)	0.356** (0.093)	0.380** (0.100)	0.400** (0.102)
Exiled	-0.077 (0.110)	-0.077 (0.111)	-0.114 (0.116)	-0.118 (0.115)
Republican	0.343** (0.039)	0.316** (0.059)	0.292** (0.064)	
Rep. Pres. Vote Share × Exiled	0.185 (0.197)	0.174 (0.203)	0.233 (0.210)	0.251 (0.207)
Lagged DV		0.077 (0.114)	0.052 (0.122)	0.046 (0.123)
Constant	-0.296** (0.033)	-0.272** (0.047)		
Committee Fixed Effects			✓	✓
Congress Fixed Effects				✓
Observations	329	329	329	329

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

C Extensions: Heterogeneous Effects

C.1 Partisanship and Majority Status


We considered whether the effects of committee membership on responsiveness to district preferences varied across political parties. To do so, we distinguished the effects among Democrats and Republicans. We also distinguished the effects based on whether a legislator’s party had majority or minority status in the chamber. To do so, we add an additional (third) interaction with our moderator of interest to our base model.

The results are shown in Figure C.1. The left plot shows the results for comparing the effects of committee membership among Democrats and Republicans and the right plot shows the results when comparing legislators based on majority status. The plotted points are the coefficient estimates and the vertical lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals. Using the model specification from column (1) of Table 2, “Off Committee” (shown along the x -axis) plots the coefficient for *Republican presidential vote share* for legislators who do not serve on an issue-relevant committee. “On Committee” shows responsiveness among legislators who do serve on issue-relevant committees; this is calculated as the sum of *Republican presidential vote share* and its interaction with *On committee*. The right-most set of plotted points show the difference between “Off committee” and “On committee,” which corresponds to the interaction between committee membership and district preferences.

Figure C.1a shows that the effects of committee membership on district responsiveness are roughly equivalent among both Democrats and Republicans, although Democrats appear somewhat less affected by committee service. Non-committee members from both parties are similarly responsive to their constituents, and we do not find any statistically significant differences in responsiveness between Republicans and Democrats who do serve on committees. While the difference between these quantities is more than twice as large for Republicans as it is for Democrats, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effects are the same magnitude. As Fig-

Figure C.1b shows, however, we find some that evidence committee membership has greater effects among members of the minority party. Among both committee members and non-members, we find that minority party members are more responsive to district preferences than members of the majority party. However, the difference in levels of responsiveness are larger for minority party members, while the effects of committee membership are small and indistinguishable from zero for majority party members. We emphasize, however, that the moderating effects of committee membership are not distinguishable between majority and minority party members ($p = 0.082$).

Figure C.1: The Moderating Effect of Party Affiliation on Legislative Responsiveness




Plotted points characterize the coefficients for *Republican presidential vote share* for legislators “off committee” and “on committee,” the latter calculated by summing the off-committee estimate and the relevant interaction term. The points for “Difference” show the interaction between committee service and district ideological preferences, or the difference between these quantities. Vertical lines show the 90 percent (thick lines) and 95 percent (thin lines) confidence intervals. The interaction effects for Democrats and Republicans and for minority and majority party members are not statistically distinguishable from each other ($p = 0.234$ and $p = 0.082$, respectively).

C.2 Electoral Competition

We studied how individual legislators’ electoral incentives moderated the effect of committee membership. To the extent that electoral competition creates incentives for responsiveness to constituency preferences, we would expect that average rates of responsiveness are higher in more competitive districts. However, it is unclear whether the shifts in responsiveness among

committee members documented above are similar in magnitude across legislators from districts with varying levels of competition. We distinguish the effects of committee service among legislators from marginal and safe districts with a triple interaction between *Republican presidential vote share*, *On committee*, and an indicator for legislators from marginal districts. We characterize members’ districts as marginal if the MC’s party’s candidate received less than 55% of the vote in the most recent presidential election in the MC’s district. The results are presented in Figure C.2. Across the three quantities of interest, we find few differences between representatives of marginal and safe districts.

Figure C.2: The Moderating Effect of Marginality on Legislative Responsiveness




Plotted points characterize the coefficients for *Republican presidential vote share* for legislators “off committee” and “on committee,” the latter calculated by summing the off-committee estimate and the relevant interaction term. The points for “Difference” show the estimate for the interaction between committee service and district ideological preferences, or the difference between these quantities. Vertical lines show the 90 percent (thick lines) and 95 percent (thin lines) confidence intervals. The interaction effects for electorally marginal and safe members are not statistically distinguishable from each other ($p = 0.947$).

C.3 Variation across Committees

We distinguished the effects across each of the eight committees in our data by interacting indicators for each committee with the interaction between *Republican presidential vote share* and *On committee*. We do not have strong theoretical expectations about whether and how these effects are likely to vary. However, just as some committees may be more desirable than others for reasons related to prestige or access to distributive resources, committees may vary in the information they provide and in legislators' incentives to act upon it.

The results shown in Figure C.3 reveal that while the effect of committee membership on responsiveness is estimated to be negative for six of the eight committee, there is some heterogeneity in the patterns across them. The findings for Agriculture, Appropriations, Armed Services, Education and Labor, Foreign Affairs, and Ways and Means most resemble those shown in Table 2, even if the statistical significance does not. Legislators who do not serve on these committees are generally somewhat responsive to constituency preferences, while responsiveness is lower among committee members. For two other committees, Banking and Energy and Commerce, legislators not on the committee are largely unresponsive to constituent preferences, but committee membership does not meaningfully change this relationship.

Figure C.3: Committee-Specific Estimates of Changes in Responsiveness



Plotted points characterize the coefficients for *Republican presidential vote share* for legislators “off committee” and “on committee,” the latter calculated by summing the off-committee estimate and the relevant interaction term. The points for “Difference” show the interaction between committee service and district ideological preference, or the difference between these quantities. Vertical lines show the 90 percent (thick lines) and 95 percent (thin lines) confidence intervals.


D Iterating Over Committees and Issues

To explore the source of variation that produces our fixed effects estimates, we estimate a regression separately first by committee-year, to isolate a legislator being on versus off a given committee in a particular year, then by issue-year, to explore how responsiveness varies for those on versus off issue-relevant committees. For both iterative procedures, we estimate the following regression model:


$$\begin{aligned} \text{Conservative vote probability}_{ij} = & \beta_1 \text{Republican presidential vote share}_i + \\ & \beta_2 \text{Committee member}_{ij} + \\ & \beta_3 (\text{Republican presidential vote share}_i \times \text{Committee member}_{ij}) \\ & \beta_4 \text{Majority}_i + \epsilon_{ijc}, \end{aligned}$$

When we iterate over committee years, we omit member-issues for which members are on other committees, to ensure that we are comparing members with committee-specific information to those same members without such information. For both procedures, we save the estimates of β_3 , and plot those in a variety of forms below. We emphasize that when we iterate over committee years, our comparison is across issues, within member; when we iterate over issues, our comparison is across members, within issue.


D.1 Iterating Over Committee-Years



(a) Estimates of Interaction Coefficients Across Committee-Years



(b) Mean Interaction Coefficient Estimates over Time




Committee Type: Distributive Other Policy


(c) Interaction Coefficient Estimates by Committee Type

Figure D.1: Responsiveness Estimates: Iterating over Committee-Years


D.2 Iterating Over Issue-Years



(a) Estimates of Interaction Coefficients Across Committee-Years



(b) Mean Interaction Coefficient Estimates over Time



Committee Type: Distributive Other Policy

(c) Interaction Coefficient Estimates by Committee Type

Figure D.2: Responsiveness Estimates: Iterating over Issue-Years

E Additional Evidence of an Informational Mechanism

E.1 Committee Capacity

Table E.1: Committee Service and Ideological Responsiveness, Accounting for Committee Staffing

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Adjusted Conservative Vote Probability					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Republican Presidential Vote Share	0.016 (0.158)		-0.141 (0.243)	-0.065** (0.029)		-0.020 (0.044)
On Committee	-0.217* (0.131)	-0.175 (0.118)	-0.213 (0.165)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.0004 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.021)
Republican			0.359** (0.006)			0.359** (0.006)
Rep. Vote Share \times On Comm.	0.647** (0.260)	0.628** (0.229)	0.590* (0.332)	0.034 (0.034)	0.024 (0.032)	0.028 (0.042)
Rep. Vote Share \times ln(Staff)	-0.017 (0.036)	0.037 (0.033)	0.031 (0.055)			
On Committee \times ln(Staff)	0.051* (0.029)	0.043 (0.026)	0.051 (0.037)			
Rep. Vote Share \times On Comm. \times ln(Staff)	-0.150** (0.058)	-0.149** (0.051)	-0.138* (0.074)			
Rep. Vote Share \times ln(Staff per Member)				0.009 (0.029)	0.055* (0.029)	0.029 (0.047)
On Committee \times ln(Staff per Member)				0.029 (0.026)	0.032 (0.023)	0.033 (0.033)
Rep. Vote Share \times On Comm. \times ln(Staff P.M.)				-0.094* (0.052)	-0.112** (0.045)	-0.094 (0.065)
Member-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓	✓		✓	✓	
District-by-Issue Fixed Effects			✓			✓
Congress-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Congress-by-Member Fixed Effects		✓			✓	
No. Unit FEs	19,362	19,362	28,999	19,362	19,362	28,999
No. Clusters	1,490	1,490	1,490	1,490	1,490	1,490
Observations	96,144	96,144	96,144	96,144	96,144	96,144

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legislators in parentheses. Observations are at the MC-by-issue-by-Congress level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

E.2 Committee Membership and Ideological Extremism

Table E.2: Committee Service and Polarization

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Adjusted Conservative Vote Probability			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
On Committee	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)
On Committee × Republican	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)
Republican				0.337** (0.006)
GOP Pres. Vote Share	0.052** (0.020)			0.113** (0.031)
District-by-Issue Fixed Effects				✓
Member-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	
Congress-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓		✓	✓
Congress-by-Member Fixed Effects		✓	✓	
No. Unit FEs	23,217	23,217	23,217	36,599
No. Clusters	1,790	1,790	1,790	1,790
Observations	118,180	118,232	118,232	118,180

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legislators in parentheses. Observations are at the MC-by-issue-by-Congress level. *p<0.10, **p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

E.3 Committee Size


Table E.3: Committee Size and Ideological Responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Adjusted CVP	
	(1)	(2)
Republican Presidential Vote Share	0.306** (0.059)	1.011** (0.224)
On Committee	-0.033 (0.052)	-0.244 (0.211)
Rep. Vote Share \times On Comm.	0.029 (0.099)	0.338 (0.385)
Rep Vote Share \times No. on Committee	-0.006** (0.001)	
On Committee \times No. on Committee	0.001 (0.001)	
Rep. Vote Share \times On Comm. \times No. on Committee	-0.001 (0.002)	
Rep Vote Share \times ln(No. on Committee)		-0.254** (0.058)
On Committee \times ln(No. on Committee)		0.067 (0.054)
Rep. Vote Share \times On Comm. \times ln(No. on Committee)		-0.098 (0.098)
Member-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Congress-by-Issue Fixed Effects	✓	✓
No. Unit FEs	23,217	23,217
No. Clusters	1,790	1,790
Observations	118,180	118,180

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legislators in parentheses. Observations are at the MC-by-issue-by-Congress level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

E.4 Temporal Variation

Figure E.1: The Effect of Committee Service Responsiveness Before and After the Republican Revolution



Plotted points characterize the coefficients for *Republican presidential vote share* for legislators “off committee” and “on committee,” the latter calculated by summing the off-committee estimate and the relevant interaction term. The points for “Difference” show the interaction between committee service and district ideological preference, or the difference between these quantities. Vertical lines show the 90 percent (thick lines) and 95 percent (thin lines) confidence intervals. The interaction effects for before and after 1994 are not statistically distinguishable from each other ($p = 0.294$).