Online Appendix for At Least I Tried: Partial Willful Ignorance, Information Acquisition, and Social Preferences

J. Braxton Gately

OA1 Binding Budget Constraint

Consider a similar model of search to the one in the main paper. However, assume that information acquisition costs are now paid out of the decider's endowment rather than exogenously. The decider's utility is given by (as before):

$$U_D = u(\pi_D^i, \varphi_i) = \pi_D^i - n_\sigma c - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i]] \tag{OA1}$$

Further, let the decider's utility from acquiring an additional signal be expressed by:

$$U_D = u(\pi_D^{i+1}, \varphi_i) = \pi_D^{i+1} - (1 + n_\sigma)c - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i \cup \sigma_i]] \tag{OA2}$$

Further, define $\pi_D^{i+1} = \pi_D^i - n_\sigma c$. In order for the decider to acquire a signal, the expected utility from doing so must be greater than or equal to the decider's current utility. Combining (OA1) and (OA2) gives:

$$\pi_D^{i+1} - (1 + n_\sigma)c - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i \cup \sigma_i]] \geq \pi_D^i - n_\sigma c - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i]] \tag{OA3}$$

Distributing c on the left-hand side and re-arranging so that the expected values are on the same side gives:

$$\pi_D^{i+1} - c - n_\sigma c - \pi_D^i + n_\sigma c \geq E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i \cup \sigma_i]] - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i]] \tag{OA4}$$

Simplifying (OA4) gives:

$$\pi_D^{i+1} - \pi_D^i - c \geq E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i \cup \sigma_i]] - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i]] \tag{OA5}$$

Substituting $\pi_D^i - n_\sigma c$ for π_D^{i+1}:

$$\pi_D^i - n_\sigma c - \pi_D^i - c \geq E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i \cup \sigma_i]] - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i]] \tag{OA6}$$

Simplifying (OA6) gives:

$$-c(n_\sigma + 1) \geq E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i \cup \sigma_i]] - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i]] \tag{OA7}$$

Dividing (OA7) through by $(n_\sigma + 1)$ gives:

$$-c \geq \frac{E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i \cup \sigma_i]] - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i]]}{(n_\sigma + 1)} \tag{OA8}$$

Finally, multiplying both sides by -1 gives:

$$\frac{E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i]] - E[\varphi_i | E[\pi_R^i | s_i \cup \sigma_i]]}{(n_\sigma + 1)} \geq c \equiv c_\alpha \tag{OA9}$$

Recall that the unconstrained threshold cost, c_γ, is given by:

$$E[\varphi_i | s_i] - E[\varphi_i | s_i \cup \sigma_i] \geq c \equiv c_\gamma \tag{OA10}$$

The only scenario in which $c_\alpha = c_\gamma$ is when $n_\sigma = 0$. In all other cases, it is clear from equations (OA9) and (OA10) that $c_\gamma > c_\alpha$, which implies that fewer signals will be acquired under budget-constrained search than under unconstrained search.

OA2 Tests of Price Effects

I investigate whether there are price effects on information acquisition as a robustness check. Mann-Whitney U tests of the individual means of signals acquired in each treatment support the hypothesis that information acquisition in the the Free treatment and Costly counterparts are significantly different both overall and when broken out by the More Fair and More Unfair dimensions ($p < 0.001$ in all cases). Therefore, subjects behave according to both the hypothesis, implying that they are behaving in a rational manner, similar to the findings of Van Der Weele (2014) and Grossman and Van Der Weele (2017). The results of a random-effects regression are given in Column (1) of Table OA1. The dependent variable is the number of signals acquired, while the independent variable of interest is the indicator for the Costly treatment. I would expect the indicator for Costly to be negative and significant, which is indeed the case: subjects acquire approximately 3.5 fewer signals in the Costly

treatment than in the Free treatment.

Table OA1: Signal Acquisition, Known Allocation, and Other-Regarding Behavior

VARIABLES	(1) Number of Signals	(2) Other-Regarding
Costly	-3.545	
	(0.735)	
	[0.000]	
More Fair Known		0.454
		(0.010)
		[0.000]
Female	0.241	-0.001
	(0.734)	(0.016)
	[0.686]	[0.946]
Locus of Control	-0.324	0.012
	(0.375)	(0.023)
	[0.316]	[0.616]
Altruism		0.009
	(0.457)	(0.007)
	[0.769]	[0.215]
Fairness to Self	0.372	-0.007
	(0.455)	(0.011)
	[0.414]	[0.506]
Fairness to Others	-0.203	0.017
	(0.170)	(0.012)
	[0.234]	[0.166]
Constant	4.988	N/A
	(0.904)	
	[0.000]	
Controls	Yes	Yes
Random Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,880	2,400
Number of Subjects	96	80

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by session are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. P-values for each marginal effect are reported in brackets below the standard errors in brackets and specify difference from zero. Column (1) gives the results of a random-effects regression that takes the number of signals as a dependent variable. Column (2) reports the marginal effects of a random-effects probit that takes an indicator variable for "Other-Regarding" as a dependent variable. Sessions 1 and 2 did not contain the "Final Guess" used to generate the Other-regarding variable and were omitted from the probit model. Coefficients and/or marginal effects for all control variables are reported in the supplementary materials.

OA3 Tests of Other-Regarding Choices By Revealed Distribution

Next, I check to see whether the rate of other-regarding behavior will be higher when the a recipient payout of 5 is revealed than when the recipient payoff of 1 is revealed. I would expect the rate of other-regarding behavior to be greater in the More Fair treatment than in the More Unfair treatment. I define an "other-regarding" decision is one where the subject made a decision that led to the recipient earning 5, while also believing that the recipient would earn 5 if the allocation chosen was the hidden allocation. The rates of other-regarding behavior should be significantly greater in the More Fair treatments than the More Unfair treatments, since the decider knows the disutility (or utility) from the revealed case. The results support this expectation: the rates of other-regarding behavior in the More Fair treatments are both significantly greater than their More Unfair counterparts (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, $p \leq 0.001$ in both cases). I also estimate a probit model (Column (2) of Table OA1) that takes the other-regarding decision indicator as a dependent variable with a treatment indicator for More Fair as the primary explanatory variable. I would expect the marginal effects on the treatment indicator to be positive and significant; this is indeed the case. As before, this implies that subjects are behaving rationally, and is similar to the results from other papers in this literature – most notably Dana et al. (2007) and Grossman (2014) – where subjects tend to act other-regardingly when confronted with the outcomes of their actions.

OA4 Additional Signals

In addition to the analysis in Table 3, I estimate random-effects probits for subjects who acquired 4 – 5 signals, 5 – 6 signals, and so on. The results are reported in Table **??**. The marginal effects are negative and significant in all cases, indicating that any effect of beliefs changes towards subjects not acquiring further information once they have sufficiently convinced themselves the recipient will earn 5 in the hidden allocation.

OA5 Full Tables from the Main Text

All tables in this section are presented in the order that they are presented in the main text. All models retain the same control variables and utilize random effects with standard errors clustered by session.

Table OA2: Beliefs and Search Behavior

VARIABLES	(1) 4 - 5 Signals	(2) 5 - 6 Signals	(3) 6 - 7 Signals	(4) 7 - 8 Signals
Believed Hidden More Fair at X	-0.568	-0.547	-0.561	-0.598
	(0.108)	(0.0764)	(0.0791)	(0.134)
	[1.40e-07]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[7.66e-06]
Female	-0.0908	-0.0715	-0.0353	0.0957
	(0.0663)	(0.0440)	(0.0689)	(0.109)
	[0.171]	[0.105]	[0.608]	[0.380]
Locus of Control	-0.0828	-0.0186	0.00377	-0.0899
	(0.0872)	(0.0293)	(0.0379)	(0.0337)
	[0.343]	[0.525]	[0.921]	[0.00770]
Altruism	-0.00545	0.0366	-0.0615	0.0495
	(0.0220)	(0.0273)	(0.0609)	(0.0314)
	[0.804]	[0.180]	[0.312]	[0.115]
Fairness to Sellf	0.0155	0.0525	-0.0626	0.0778
	(0.0708)	(0.0229)	(0.0395)	(0.0368)
	[0.826]	[0.0216]	[0.113]	[0.0347]
Fairness to Others	0.0113	-0.0324	0.0175	-0.0704
	(0.0569)	(0.0317)	(0.0326)	(0.0468)
	[0.842]	[0.307]	[0.592]	[0.133]
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Random Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations (Individual Decisions)	336	263	197	150

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by session are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. P-values for each marginal effect are reported in brackets below the standard errors in brackets and specify difference from zero. Column headers denote the signals the beliefs are examined between.

Table OA4: Signal Acquisition and Known Allocation

VARIABLES	(1) Signals	(2) Signals Free	(3) Signals Costly
More Fair	0.005	0.005	-0.245
	(0.488)	(0.464)	(0.102)
	[0.991]	[0.992]	[0.035]
Costly	-3.419		
	(0.814)		
	[0.000]		
More Fair × Costly	-0.250		
	(0.501)		
	[0.617]		
Female	0.297	0.251	0.275

Table OA3: Beliefs and Search Behavior

VARIABLES	(1) 1 - 2 Signals	(2) 2 - 3 Signals	(3) 3 - 4 Signals
Believed Hidden More Fair at X	0.187	0.180	-0.506
	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.067)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Female	0.026	0.086	-0.106
	(0.046)	(0.066)	(0.065)
	[0.572]	[0.194]	[0.101]
Standardized values of locus	0.044	0.028	-0.025
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.028)
	[0.152]	[0.349]	[0.371]
Standardized values of altruism	0.010	0.045	-0.107
	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.034)
	[0.795]	[0.110]	[0.002]
Standardized values of fairself	-0.037	-0.042	0.047
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.052)
	[0.290]	[0.299]	[0.371]
Standardized values of fairothers	0.042	0.068	-0.085
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.037)
	[0.091]	[0.037]	[0.023]
Random Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations (Individual Decisions)	1,394	1,169	445
Number of Subjects	73	67	63

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by session are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. P-values for each marginal effect are reported in brackets below the standard errors in brackets and specify difference from zero. Column headers denote the signals the beliefs are examined between. Coefficients and/or marginal effects for all control variables are reported in the supplementary materials.

Table OA5: Heterogeneity in Search Behavior by Revealed Allocation

VARIABLES	(1) Searched Pooled	(2) Searched Free	(3) Searched Costly	(4) Searched Pooled	(5) Searched Free	(6) Searched Costly
More Fair Revealed	-0.095	-0.022	-0.177			
	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.074)			
	[0.030]	[0.538]	[0.017]			
Choose Hidden	-0.025	0.036	-0.096	0.163	0.142	0.173
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.083)
	[0.493]	[0.351]	[0.027]	[0.001]	[0.007]	[0.037]
Choose Hidden ×	0.146	0.067	0.230			
More Fair	(0.049)	(0.022)	(0.096)			
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.017]			
Max-Min				0.136	0.059	0.220
				(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.080)
				[0.009]	[0.251]	[0.006]
Equal				0.022	0.030	0.018
				(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.021)
				[0.273]	[0.261]	[0.393]
Joint Minimum				-0.057	-0.014	-0.121
				(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.082)
				[0.600]	[0.287]	[0.025]
Choose Hidden ×				-0.219	-0.113	-0.323
Max-Min				(0.072)	(0.050)	(0.131)
				[0.002]	[0.025]	[0.014]
Choose Hidden ×				-0.069	-0.072	-0.062
Equal				(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.055)
				[0.301]	[0.800]	[0.142]
Choose Hidden ×				-0.057	-0.014	-0.121
Joint Minimum				(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.082)
				[0.301]	[0.800]	[0.142]

Note: Corresponds to Tables 4 and 5 in the main text. Robust standard errors clustered by session are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. P-values for each marginal effect are reported in brackets below the standard errors in brackets and specify difference from zero. Column labels denote the dependent variable. All marginal effects utilize subject-level random effects. Coefficients and/or marginal effects for all control variables are reported in the supplementary materials.

Heterogeneity in Search Behavior by Revealed Allocation (Cont.)

VARIABLES	(1) Searched Pooled	(2) Searched Free	(3) Searched Costly	(4) Searched Pooled	(5) Searched Free	(6) Searched Costly
Female	0.057	0.128	-0.036	0.057	0.126	-0.033
	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.095)
	[0.490]	[0.112]	[0.701]	[0.483]	[0.118]	[0.729]
Locus of Control	-0.020	-0.006	-0.002	-0.020	-0.005	-0.001
	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.104)	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.104)
	[0.748]	[0.897]	[0.986]	[0.753]	[0.902]	[0.995]
Altruism	0.006	0.011	0.016	0.007	0.012	0.018
	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.047)
	[0.860]	[0.654]	[0.725]	[0.829]	[0.616]	[0.696]
Fairness to Self	0.092	0.045	0.148	0.092	0.045	0.149
	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.102)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.103)
	[0.033]	[0.114]	[0.148]	[0.034]	[0.121]	[0.148]
Fairness to Others	-0.049	-0.028	-0.049	-0.050	-0.029	-0.050
	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.052)	(0.035)	(0.012)	(0.052)
	[0.159]	[0.028]	[0.347]	[0.158]	[0.017]	[0.338]
Random Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Subjects	96	50	46	96	50	46
Observations	2,880	1,500	1,380	2,880	1,500	1,380

Note: Corresponds to Tables 4 and 5 in the main text. Robust standard errors clustered by session are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. P-values for each marginal effect are reported in brackets below the standard errors in brackets and specify difference from zero. Column labels denote the dependent variable. All marginal effects utilize subject-level random effects. Coefficients and/or marginal effects for all control variables are reported in the supplementary materials.

Table OA6: Heterogeneity in Beliefs by Revealed Allocation

	Subjects who Search			Subjects who Avoid		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Believe Fair, Percent:	Believe Fair, Percent:	Believe Fair, Percent:	Believe Fair, Final:	Believe Fair, Final:	Believe Fair, Final:
VARIABLES	Pooled	Free	Costly	Pooled	Free	Costly
Min-Max	-0.127	-0.113	-0.142	-0.057	-0.019	-0.154
	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.117)	(0.141)	(0.177)
	[0.000]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.624]	[0.892]	[0.384]
Equal	-0.059	-0.052	-0.071	-0.063	-0.129	-0.069
	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.072)
	[0.081]	[0.252]	[0.166]	[0.206]	[0.023]	[0.339]
Joint Minimum	0.110	0.130	0.090	0.119	0.054	0.067
	(0.045)	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.101)	(0.053)	(0.195)
	[0.015]	[0.049]	[0.136]	[0.237]	[0.313]	[0.730]
Choose Hidden	0.138	0.124	0.165	0.052	-0.174	0.136
	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.122)	(0.206)	(0.101)
	[0.000]	[0.008]	[0.000]	[0.667]	[0.399]	[0.178]
Choose Hidden × Min-Max	0.110	0.077	0.177	0.440	0.561	0.450
	(0.051)	(0.070)	(0.048)	(0.160)	(0.329)	(0.203)
	[0.031]	[0.271]	[0.000]	[0.006]	[0.088]	[0.026]
Choose Hidden × Equal	0.097	0.060	0.196	0.238	0.565	0.122
	(0.067)	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.149)	(0.206)	(0.209)
	[0.149]	[0.489]	[0.035]	[0.110]	[0.006]	[0.558]
Choose Hidden × Joint Minimum	-0.188	-0.209	-0.161	0.020	0.407	-0.099
	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.077)	(0.189)	(0.185)	(0.318)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.035]	[0.915]	[0.028]	[0.756]

Note: Corresponds to Tables 6 and 7 in the main text. Robust standard errors clustered by session are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. P-values for each marginal effect are reported in brackets below the standard errors in brackets and specify difference from zero. All marginal effects utilize subject-level random effects. Coefficients and/or marginal effects for all control variables are reported in the

Heterogeneity in Beliefs by Revealed Allocation (Cont.)

	Subjects who Search			Subjects who Avoid		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Believe Fair, Percent:	Believe Fair, Percent:	Believe Fair, Percent:	Believe Fair, Final:	Believe Fair, Final:	Believe Fair, Final:
VARIABLES	Pooled	Free	Costly	Pooled	Free	Costly
Female	0.020	-0.040	0.091	-0.037	-0.060	0.003
	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.124)
	[0.636]	[0.275]	[0.139]	[0.656]	[0.426]	[0.980]
Locus of Control	0.015	0.040	-0.026	0.048	-0.071	0.173
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.088)
	[0.501]	[0.131]	[0.391]	[0.465]	[0.036]	[0.049]
Altruism	0.012	0.001	0.026	0.065	0.109	-0.010
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.018)	(0.015)
	[0.465]	[0.970]	[0.322]	[0.062]	[0.000]	[0.516]
Fairness to Self	0.007	0.013	-0.023	-0.000	0.009	-0.081
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.030)
	[0.741]	[0.463]	[0.587]	[1.000]	[0.779]	[0.006]
Fairness to Others	-0.023	-0.018	-0.055	0.081	0.095	0.079
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.033)
	[0.178]	[0.440]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.017]
Random Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,914	1,280	634	584	220	364
Number of Subjects	87	50	37	53	30	23

Note: Corresponds to Table 6 and 7 in the main text. Robust standard errors clustered by session are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. P-values for each marginal effect are reported in brackets below the standard errors in brackets and specify difference from zero. All marginal effects utilize subject-level random effects. Coefficients and/or marginal effects for all control variables are reported in the

OA6 Experimental Instructions

INSTRUCTIONS

This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment.

This experiment will consist of 30 rounds. At the beginning of each round you will be assigned a type, X or Y. Half the players will be X, and half will be Y. These roles will be explained shortly. At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly paired with another subject of the opposite type, but you will not be told which role you have been assigned.

Earnings

You will be paid your earnings from one randomly selected round at the end of the experiment. In this experiment, we will use Experimental Currency Units. ECU's have an exchange rate of 1 ECU = 0.50 USD.

The Roles

Player X will choose which set of payouts she and Player Y will receive. Player Y will receive the payout given to them by Player X. You and your partner will both play as Player X. During the round, the computer will assign a random number to you and your partner. Whoever has the higher random number will be Player X. You will not know which role has been chosen for you. If you are Player X, the computer will use your choice to determine the payouts you and your partner receive.

Rounds

We will play 30 rounds, each 60 seconds long.

The Games

Each round, you will have the option of choosing between two sets of payouts, called "games." Let's call these Game A and Game B. Each game consists of an amount of money for you and an amount of money for the other player. Let's call these amounts of money "payoffs." You can see all the possible games in this experiment outlined below in Figure 1:

Set 1

	Game A	Game B
X	6 ECU	5 ECU
Y	5 ECU	1 ECU

Set 2

	Game A	Game B
X	6 ECU	5 ECU
Y	1 ECU	5 ECU

Set 3

	Game A	Game B
X	6 ECU	5 ECU
Y	5 ECU	5 ECU

Set 4

	Game A	Game B
X	6 ECU	5 ECU
Y	1 ECU	1 ECU

Figure 1: Possible payoff combinations

At the start of each round, you will be shown Player X's payoffs in both games, and you will be shown Player Y's payoff in one of the games but will not be shown Player Y's payoff for the other game. The payoff you know will be randomly determined each round. You may choose to acquire signals about Player Y's payoffs in the unknown game in the process described below. Each set of payoffs for player Y are equally likely each round. You and your partner may or may not see the same set of payoffs each round.

Signals

Each round, you will have the ability to acquire signals about player Y's payouts. There are two types of signal: "true" signals and "random" signals. Each signal will consist of a red or white ball containing a statement about the value of Player Y's payoff. These balls are drawn from two jars: one represents a true signal and one represents a random signal. The total number of balls in each jar will be equal; however, the ratio of red balls to white balls in each jar may change from round to round. You will be told the total number of balls in each jar, as well as the number of red and white balls in each jar. You will not be told which jar the ball has been drawn from, and the ball will be returned to the jar it was drawn from once your draw is complete.

Cost of signal

You will incur a cost of 0.10 ECU each time you draw a ball. These costs will be paid out of your show-up fee of $7 (14 ECU). This is referred to as your "signal budget." You will have a 14 ECU signal budget in each round.

Signal Acquisition

If you wish to acquire a signal, you may click the button in each information box that says "Draw Ball." You may draw as many balls as your 14 ECU signal budget will allow. You may choose to stop drawing balls at any time during the game (or may choose to not draw any balls at all) by clicking the "Finished Drawing Balls" button. This will cause the information box to disappear.

The Guess

After each ball you draw, you will be asked, "Based on the information to the left, what do you think Player Y's payout will be if you choose **Game B**?" To submit your guess, you can click the button labelled "1" or the button labeled "5." You will not be paid for your guess. Once you submit your guess, you will have the opportunity to draw another ball. You will also be asked to submit a guess about player Y's payout once you are finished drawing balls.

Game Choice

Once you have clicked the "Stop Drawing Balls" button, you will be able to choose between games by clicking the buttons labeled "Choose A" if you prefer game A, or "Choose B" if you choose game B. Only player X's decision will be used by the computer. After you and your partner have both chosen and the entire 60 seconds have elapsed, you will move straight into the next round. You will not see your partner's choices, nor will your partner see your choices. You will also not be told your role, nor will you be told your partner's role.

Example 1

You are presented with the following information on the game screen:

	Game A			Game B	
Player X	6			5	
Player Y	1			?	
	True Jar	Random Jar	Total Balls by Color:	Budget Information	
Red Balls	40	20	**60**	Ball Budget Remaining:	14.00
White Balls	10	30	**40**	Cost of each Ball:	0.1
Total by Jar	**50**	**40**	**100**	# Draws:	0
Your Draw					

Stop Drawing Balls | Draw Ball

You may now choose to acquire a signal about player Y's payoffs in Game B. You click the "Draw Ball" button, and you now see:

	Game A			Game B	
Player X	6			5	
Player Y	1			?	
	True Jar	Random Jar	Total Balls by Color:	Budget Information	
Red Balls	40	20	**60**	Ball Budget Remaining:	13.90
White Balls	10	30	**40**	Cost of each Ball:	0.1
Total by Jar	**50**	**40**	**100**	# Draws:	1
Your Draw					
	If you choose Game B, Player Y will earn 5 ECU.			Based on the information to the left, what do you think Player Y's payout will be if you choose **Game B**?	

1 | 5

Now, you see a red ball and a message at the bottom of your screen, as well as the opportunity to submit your guess about Player Y's payout. You submit your guess and now have the opportunity to draw another ball. You decide to draw another ball. You now see:

	Game A			Game B	
Player X	6			5	
Player Y	1			?	
	True Jar	Random Jar	Total Balls by Color:	Budget Information	
Red Balls	40	20	**60**	Ball Budget Remaining:	13.80
White Balls	10	30	**40**	Cost of each Ball:	0.10
Total by Jar	**50**	**40**	**100**	# Draws:	2
Your Draw					
	If you choose Game B, Player Y will earn 5 ECU.			Based on the information to the left, what do you think Player Y's payout will be if you choose **Game B**?	

1 5

Now, you see a white ball and a message at the bottom of your screen, as well as the opportunity to submit your guess about Player Y's payout. Notice that the red ball that you drew previously has been put back in its jar. You submit your guess and have the opportunity to draw another ball. You decide to stop drawing balls, so you click the "Stop Drawing Balls" button, and you see:

	Game A	Game B
Player X	6 ECU	5 ECU
Player Y	1 ECU	?
Based on the information you just observed, what do you think Player Y's payout will be if you choose **Game B?**		

1 5

You submit your guess, and you now see:

	Game A	Game B
Player X	6 ECU	5 ECU
Player Y	1 ECU	?

Choose A Choose B

You choose game A, and the round ends. Your decision will be used by the computer if you are Player X.

Example 2

You are presented with the following information on the game screen:

	Game A			Game B	
Player X	6			5	
Player Y	5			?	
	True Jar	Random Jar	Total Balls by Color:	Budget Information	
Red Balls	50	30	**80**	Ball Budget Remaining:	14.00
White Balls	15	35	**50**	Cost of each Ball:	0.10
Total by Jar	**65**	**65**	**130**	# Draws:	0
Your Draw					

Stop Drawing Balls | Draw Ball

You may now choose to draw a ball. You decide you do not wish to draw one, so you clock "Stop Drawing Balls." The game screen becomes:

	Game A	Game B
Player X	6 ECU	5 ECU
Player Y	1 ECU	?
Based on the information you just observed, what do you think Player Y's payout will be if you choose **Game B?**		

1 | 5

You submit your guess, and you now see:

	Game A	Game B
Player X	6 ECU	5 ECU
Player Y	5 ECU	?

Choose A | Choose B

You choose Game B and continue to the next round, and your choice will be used by the computer if you are Player X.

We will play 30 rounds. You will be paid based on Player X's choice for 1 randomly selected round of the 30, and you will not learn which round has been selected until all 30 rounds have

been completed. Following the completion of 30 rounds, you will be asked to answer a short questionnaire, part of which you will be paid for. Then, you will be paid your total earnings and dismissed. In addition to your earnings from the experiment, all subjects will receive a 14 ECU ($7) show-up fee, less the total cost of signals you acquired in the round chosen as the payment round. Are there any questions?

References

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