

## Supplementary Materials

**Table S.1**  
**Additional descriptive statistics**

The table presents summary statistics for the two subsets of the baseline control group (i.e., non-corporate freezeouts and toehold acquisitions) (Panel A) and over time (Panel B). To produce the summary statistics over time, I divided the sample into three important periods: pre-*Cox*, post-*Cox* and pre-*MFW*, and post-*MFW*. As explained in the text, more granular summary statistics (e.g., by year) would not produce meaningful information by period due to the small size of the sample.

### **Panel A. Descriptive statistics for each subset of the control group**

#### **Panel A.1. Toehold acquisitions**

Variable	Pre-MFW				Post-MFW				Difference (Post-Pre)
	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N	
<i>Procedural protections</i>									
Majority-of-the-minority (MOM)	0.21	0.00	0.42	42	0.20	0.00	0.41	20	-0.01
Special committed formed (SC)	0.50	0.50	0.51	42	0.55	1.00	0.51	20	0.05
MOM & SC	0.17	0.00	0.38	42	0.15	0.00	0.37	20	-0.02
<i>Deal outcomes</i>									
Premium	0.28	0.20	0.35	42	0.22	0.19	0.30	20	-0.06
CAR <sub>(-1,+1)</sub>	0.17	0.14	0.21	42	0.12	0.05	0.20	20	-0.05
Increase over first offer	0.04	0.00	0.09	42	0.03	0.00	0.06	20	-0.01
Completed	0.93	1.00	0.27	40	0.65	1.00	0.49	20	-0.28***
<i>Deal characteristics</i>									
Deal value	601.23	122.93	896.87	42	925.05	443.34	1133.15	20	323.82
Total assets	1642.39	236.62	3678.47	42	2840.74	1028.04	3622.84	20	1198.36
ROA	-0.15	-0.01	0.31	42	-0.10	0.00	0.27	20	0.05
Cash-only deal	0.79	1.00	0.42	42	0.65	1.00	0.49	20	-0.14
Public buyer	0.43	0.00	0.50	42	0.50	0.50	0.51	20	0.07
Financial buyer	0.33	0.00	0.48	42	0.25	0.00	0.44	20	-0.08
Breakup fee	0.62	1.00	0.49	42	0.30	0.00	0.47	20	-0.32**
Friendly deal	0.88	1.00	0.33	42	0.65	1.00	0.49	20	-0.23**
Competing bid	0.10	0.00	0.30	42	0.15	0.00	0.37	20	0.05

### Panel A.2 Freezeouts of unincorporated business entities

Variable	Pre-MFW				Post-MFW				Difference (Post-Pre)
	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N	
<i>Procedural protections</i>									
Majority-of-the-minority (MOM)	0.36	0.00	0.50	11	0.16	0.00	0.37	31	-0.20
Special committed formed (SC)	1.00	1.00	0.00	11	0.87	1.00	0.34	31	-0.13
MOM & SC	0.36	0.00	0.50	11	0.16	0.00	0.37	31	-0.20
<i>Deal outcomes</i>									
Premium	0.27	0.23	0.42	11	0.09	0.07	0.11	31	-0.18**
CARs <sub>(-1,+1)</sub>	0.06	0.08	0.15	11	0.09	0.08	0.09	31	0.03
Increase over first offer	0.07	0.00	0.12	11	0.02	0.00	0.05	31	-0.05**
Completed	0.80	1.00	0.42	10	0.84	1.00	0.37	31	0.04
<i>Deal characteristics</i>									
Deal value	341.04	184.67	340.01	11	1334.20	606.10	1392.65	31	993.16**
Total assets	1855.35	628.33	1940.72	11	4581.10	1619.10	6280.61	31	2725.75
ROA	-0.10	-0.01	0.26	11	0.05	0.04	0.06	31	0.16***
Cash-only deal	0.36	0.00	0.50	11	0.29	0.00	0.46	31	-0.07
Public buyer	0.64	1.00	0.50	11	0.81	1.00	0.40	31	0.17
Financial buyer	0.27	0.00	0.47	11	0.19	0.00	0.40	31	-0.08
Breakup fee	0.09	0.00	0.30	11	0.10	0.00	0.30	31	0.01
Friendly deal	1.00	1.00	0.00	11	0.94	1.00	0.25	31	-0.06
Competing bid	0.00	0.00	0.00	11	0.03	0.00	0.18	31	0.03

## Panel B. Descriptive statistics by more granular periods

### Panel B.1. Treatment group

Variable	Pre-Cox (2000-2005)				Post-Cox, Pre-MFW (2005-2013)				Post-MFW (2013-2020)			
	Mean	Median	S.D.	N	Mean	Median	S.D.	N	Mean	Median	S.D.	N
<i>Procedural protections</i>												
Majority-of-the-minority	0.31	0.00	0.46	91	0.49	0.00	0.50	51	0.81	1.00	0.40	42
Special committee	0.91	1.00	0.28	91	0.98	1.00	0.14	51	0.95	1.00	0.22	42
MOM & SC	0.31	0.00	0.46	91	0.49	0.00	0.50	51	0.81	1.00	0.40	42
<i>Deal outcomes</i>												
Premium	0.28	0.22	0.44	91	0.35	0.26	0.41	51	0.34	0.28	0.41	42
CARs <sub>(-1,+1)</sub>	0.19	0.16	0.29	91	0.25	0.20	0.24	51	0.19	0.16	0.20	42
ΔOffer	0.05	0.00	0.10	91	0.08	0.00	0.13	51	0.05	0.00	0.09	42
Completed	0.80	1.00	0.40	90	0.87	1.00	0.34	46	0.79	1.00	0.41	38
<i>Deal characteristics</i>												
Deal value	278.97	26.84	729.98	91	666.83	96.13	1134.47	51	516.38	135.96	865.07	42
Total assets	1188.76	115.28	3719.55	91	2858.63	375.75	5182.75	51	2995.84	440.91	5399.13	42
ROA	-0.11	0.00	0.26	91	-0.06	0.01	0.21	51	-0.07	0.00	0.24	42
Cash-only deal	0.64	1.00	0.48	91	0.75	1.00	0.44	51	0.64	1.00	0.48	42
Public buyer	0.43	0.00	0.50	91	0.45	0.00	0.50	51	0.45	0.00	0.50	42
Financial buyer	0.09	0.00	0.28	91	0.16	0.00	0.37	51	0.17	0.00	0.38	42
Breakup fee	0.12	0.00	0.33	91	0.24	0.00	0.43	51	0.36	0.00	0.48	42
Friendly deal	0.96	1.00	0.21	91	0.90	1.00	0.30	51	0.83	1.00	0.38	42
Competing bid	0.02	0.00	0.15	91	0.00	0.00	0.00	51	0.05	0.00	0.22	42

## Panel B.2. Control group

Variable	Pre-Cox (2000-2005)				Post-Cox, Pre-MFW (2005-2013)				Post-MFW (2013-2020)			
	Mean	Median	S.D.	N	Mean	Median	S.D.	N	Mean	Median	S.D.	N
<i>Procedural protections</i>												
Majority-of-the-minority	0.33	0.00	0.48	21	0.19	0.00	0.40	32	0.18	0.00	0.39	51
Special committee	0.48	0.00	0.51	21	0.69	1.00	0.47	32	0.75	1.00	0.44	51
MOM & SC	0.24	0.00	0.44	21	0.19	0.00	0.40	32	0.16	0.00	0.37	51
<i>Deal outcomes</i>												
Premium	0.25	0.20	0.36	21	0.29	0.21	0.37	32	0.14	0.08	0.21	51
CARs <sub>(-1,+1)</sub>	0.17	0.19	0.24	21	0.13	0.12	0.19	32	0.10	0.07	0.15	51
ΔOffer	0.03	0.00	0.07	21	0.06	0.00	0.11	32	0.02	0.00	0.06	51
Completed	1.00	1.00	0.00	20	0.83	1.00	0.38	30	0.76	1.00	0.43	51
<i>Deal characteristics</i>												
Deal value	586.63	140.91	880.99	21	521.37	122.93	785.94	32	1173.75	523.20	1300.89	51
Total assets	1479.36	228.82	2868.63	21	1822.58	462.67	3710.33	32	3898.61	1600.28	5421.39	51
ROA	-0.20	-0.02	0.34	21	-0.10	0.01	0.27	32	-0.01	0.03	0.19	51
Cash-only deal	0.71	1.00	0.46	21	0.69	1.00	0.47	32	0.43	0.00	0.50	51
Public buyer	0.52	1.00	0.51	21	0.44	0.00	0.50	32	0.69	1.00	0.47	51
Financial buyer	0.14	0.00	0.36	21	0.44	0.00	0.50	32	0.22	0.00	0.42	51
Breakup fee	0.57	1.00	0.51	21	0.47	0.00	0.51	32	0.18	0.00	0.39	51
Friendly deal	0.90	1.00	0.30	21	0.91	1.00	0.30	32	0.82	1.00	0.39	51
Competing bid	0.00	0.00	0.00	21	0.13	0.00	0.34	32	0.08	0.00	0.27	51

**Table S.2**  
**Additional robustness checks**

The table presents additional robustness checks. Panel A presents alternative estimation methods and Panel B presents results that exclude reverse stock splits or that use the Delaware Supreme Court in *MFW* as the time cutoff for the *Post-MFW* variable.. \* significant at 0.10, \*\* significant at 0.5, and \*\*\* significant at 0.01.

**Panel A. Alternative estimation methods**

Dependent variable	MOM	Premium 5-day	CARs <sub>-5,+5</sub>	ΔOffer	Closed
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat×PostMFW	2.630*** (3.51)	0.134 (1.04)	-0.062 (-0.27)	0.116 (1.48)	0.863 (0.96)
Treat	0.523 (1.13)	0.067 (0.69)	0.099 (0.54)	-0.029 (-0.57)	-0.630 (-0.90)
Post-MFW	-0.592 (-1.05)	-0.144 (-1.63)	0.189 (1.26)	-0.148** (-2.40)	-0.880 (-1.24)
Log(deal value)	0.355*** (2.92)	0.029 (1.27)	0.095*** (2.64)	0.036*** (2.75)	0.187 (1.26)
Cash-only	0.868** (2.28)	0.134* (1.89)	0.246 (1.62)	0.177*** (3.88)	0.979** (2.07)
Special committee	1.984*** (2.97)	0.053 (0.57)	-0.145 (-1.11)	0.169*** (2.68)	-0.558 (-0.89)
Log(assets)	-0.163 (-1.46)	-0.042* (-1.95)	0.073* (1.82)	-0.011 (-0.90)	-0.085 (-0.62)
ROA	0.703 (0.98)	-0.240 (-1.46)	-1.011*** (-3.27)	0.014 (0.18)	-0.709 (-0.74)
Public buyer	-0.536 (-1.39)	-0.183** (-2.39)	0.133 (0.82)	-0.063 (-1.52)	0.914* (1.76)
Financial buyer	-0.148 (-0.36)	-0.059 (-0.68)	-0.142 (-0.67)	-0.089* (-1.87)	-0.790* (-1.69)
Breakup fee	0.129 (0.35)	0.061 (0.87)	-0.033 (-0.24)	-0.072* (-1.73)	1.435** (2.28)
Friendly deal	-0.195 (-0.37)	-0.163* (-1.73)	0.313 (1.32)	-0.082 (-1.55)	2.046*** (4.08)
Competing bid	-0.319 (-0.43)	-0.047 (-0.33)	0.249* (1.84)	0.186*** (2.63)	-2.430*** (-2.80)
Estimation method	Logit	OLS	OLS	Tobit	Logit
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared		0.145	0.131		
Pseudo R-squared	0.231			0.303	0.200
N	288	288	288	288	275

### Panel B. Alternative subsample and time cutoff

Dependent variable	Subsample: excluding reverse stock splits					Delaware Supreme Court decision as time cutoff				
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treat×PostMFW	0.477*** (0.10)	0.114 (0.10)	-0.005 (0.06)	0.019 (0.03)	0.037 (0.10)	0.484*** (0.11)	0.094 (0.10)	-0.021 (0.06)	0.023 (0.03)	0.070 (0.10)
Treat	0.136* (0.07)	0.076 (0.07)	0.099** (0.04)	0.034 (0.03)	-0.006 (0.06)	0.158** (0.07)	0.085 (0.07)	0.108*** (0.04)	0.032 (0.03)	-0.038 (0.06)
Post-MFW	-0.102 (0.08)	-0.081 (0.06)	-0.017 (0.04)	-0.036 (0.02)	-0.069 (0.07)	-0.077 (0.08)	-0.061 (0.06)	-0.004 (0.04)	-0.033 (0.02)	-0.072 (0.07)
Log(deal value)	0.059*** (0.02)	0.038** (0.02)	0.019** (0.01)	0.017** (0.01)	0.012 (0.02)	0.058*** (0.02)	0.041** (0.02)	0.019** (0.01)	0.017** (0.01)	0.018 (0.02)
Cash-only	0.144** (0.06)	0.127*** (0.05)	0.104*** (0.03)	0.070*** (0.02)	0.090 (0.06)	0.132** (0.06)	0.141*** (0.05)	0.110*** (0.03)	0.070*** (0.02)	0.094 (0.06)
Special committee	0.308*** (0.05)	0.062 (0.07)	0.008 (0.04)	0.033 (0.02)	-0.088 (0.06)	0.288*** (0.05)	0.073 (0.07)	0.010 (0.04)	0.033 (0.02)	-0.049 (0.07)
Log(assets)	-0.022 (0.02)	-0.025 (0.02)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	0.003 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.028* (0.02)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.02)
ROA	0.070 (0.11)	-0.276** (0.13)	-0.159* (0.08)	-0.022 (0.03)	-0.088 (0.10)	0.080 (0.11)	-0.290** (0.13)	-0.168** (0.08)	-0.020 (0.03)	-0.076 (0.10)
Public buyer	-0.103 (0.06)	-0.096* (0.06)	0.003 (0.03)	-0.028 (0.02)	0.077 (0.06)	-0.101 (0.06)	-0.107* (0.06)	-0.003 (0.03)	-0.026 (0.02)	0.084 (0.06)
Financial buyer	-0.004 (0.07)	-0.016 (0.06)	0.024 (0.04)	-0.035* (0.02)	-0.093 (0.07)	-0.009 (0.07)	-0.023 (0.06)	0.022 (0.04)	-0.035* (0.02)	-0.090 (0.07)
Breakup fee	0.044 (0.07)	0.049 (0.05)	0.000 (0.03)	-0.010 (0.02)	0.120** (0.05)	0.052 (0.06)	0.053 (0.06)	0.002 (0.05)	-0.009 (0.03)	0.115** (0.05)
Friendly deal	-0.071 (0.07)	-0.080 (0.07)	0.007 (0.05)	-0.026 (0.03)	0.352*** (0.09)	-0.055 (0.07)	-0.081 (0.07)	0.007 (0.05)	-0.024 (0.03)	0.352*** (0.09)
Competing bid	-0.140 (0.11)	0.013 (0.12)	0.032 (0.06)	0.074 (0.05)	-0.311** (0.13)	-0.116 (0.10)	0.006 (0.12)	0.028 (0.06)	0.070 (0.05)	-0.320** (0.13)
R-squared	0.299	0.125	0.100	0.112	0.196	0.302	0.137	0.106	0.109	0.183
N	285	285	285	285	272	288	288	288	288	275

**Table S.3**  
**Analysis of heterogeneity in the treatment effects**

The table presents the analysis of heterogeneous effects. I examine six *mediating variables*: cash consideration, public status of the buyer, financial v. strategic buyer, friendly deal, the presence of competing bids, and indicator variables for large deals (i.e., above-the-median value of the deal), large targets (i.e., above-the-median assets), and high performance (i.e., above-the-median ROA). Due to space limitations, I only report the triple interactions from each model (i.e.,  $Treat \times PostMFW \times MediatingVariable$ ), which capture the heterogeneity in the treatment effects; however, all the models also include the second-order interactions and the stand-alone variables. Due to the small sample size, I run all the models using a parsimonious specification that includes only a control for the size of the deal (but the results are similar if I do not include any control). \*significant at 0.10, \*\* significant at 0.5, and \*\*\* significant at 0.01.

**Table S.4**  
**Cross-sectional analysis on legal protections and deal outcomes**

This table examines the cross-sectional correlation between different levels of legal protection and deal outcomes in freezeouts of Delaware corporations. To this end, I classify the deals based on three types of protection: *Procedural & Judicial* (if the deal was subject to MOM and SC approval and also to entire fairness review); *Procedural only* (if the deal was subject to MOM and SC approval but not to entire fairness review); and *Judicial only* (if the deal was subject to entire fairness review but not to MOM and SC approval). The base category is the *Judicial only* category – which is therefore omitted from the regression. \* significant at 0.10, \*\* significant at 0.5, and \*\*\* significant at 0.01.

**Table S.5**  
**MOM adoption and ranking of buyer's legal advisor among post-*MFW* freezeouts**

The table shows regression models in which the buyer's rank of the legal advisor predicts the adoption of MOM conditions after *MFW* (only the treatment observations are considered). To code the legal advisors' positions, I relied on the U.S. News ranking of M&A firms. \* significant at 0.10, \*\* significant at 0.5, and \*\*\* significant at 0.01.

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)
Buyer's legal advisor rank	-0.041 (0.04)	-0.041 (0.05)	-0.038 (0.05)
Log(value)		0.037 (0.05)	0.036 (0.05)
Cash-only		-0.103 (0.19)	-0.098 (0.19)
SC		0.689*** (0.18)	0.691*** (0.20)
Log(assets)		-0.036 (0.04)	-0.037 (0.04)
ROA		0.239 (0.33)	0.255 (0.34)
Public buyer		-0.248 (0.16)	-0.239 (0.15)
Financial Acquiror		0.241 (0.14)	0.228 (0.15)
Break fee		-0.086 (0.14)	-0.074 (0.15)
Friendly		0.014 (0.13)	0.015 (0.13)
Competing Bidder		-0.364 (0.31)	-0.383 (0.33)
Industry dummies	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.042	0.423	0.425
N	42	42	42