Populist support, institutional trust, and gender: the impact of foreign-imposed austerity during the European Debt Crisis

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Appendix

Table A1. Linear and logistic models predicting trust in national governance and support for populism on pre-crisis years.

	Model 5 Trust	Model 6 Populism
Intercept	3.70 (0.24) ***	-2.15 (0.42) ***
Year 2004 (ref. 2002)	-0.36 (0.22)	0.57 (0.41)
Year 2006	-0.32 (0.17)	0.88 (0.43) *

Year 2008	-0.29 (0.23)	0.84 (0.33) **
Conditionality	0.02 (0.15)	0.85 (0.86)
Female	-0.12 (0.03) ***	-0.07 (0.08)
Education	0.06 (0.01) ***	-0.05 (0.02) *
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00) *
Married	-0.02 (0.06)	0.10 (0.12)
Urbanization	-0.00 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)
Year 2004: Conditionality	0.60 (0.34)	-2.98 (1.06) **
Year 2006: Conditionality	0.53 (0.23) *	-4.58 (1.31) ***
Year 2008: Conditionality	-0.00 (0.36)	-2.59 (1.08) *
Num. obs.	136767	64066

 Notes: Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p <0.01; *p < 0.05.

Table A2. Logistic models predicting support for far-right and far-left parties by gender.

	Model 5 Far-right	Model 6 Far-left
Intercept	-0.79 (0.36) *	-3.43 (0.36) ***
Female	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.15 (0.08)
Post-Crisis	0.73 (0.22) ***	0.19 (0.13)
Conditionality	-2.60 (0.95) **	1.07 (0.31) ***
Education	-0.11 (0.01) ***	0.03 (0.01) *
Age	-0.01 (0.00) ***	-0.00 (0.00)
Married	0.06 (0.09)	-0.41 (0.05) ***
Urbanization	-0.06 (0.05)	0.12 (0.04) **
Post-Refugee Crisis	0.59 (0.22) **	0.02 (0.21)
Female: Post-Crisis	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.05) **
Female: Conditionality	-0.13 (0.22)	-0.08 (0.10)
Post-Crisis: Conditionality	1.85 (0.41) ***	0.09 (0.43)

Female: Post-Crisis: Conditionality	-0.04 (0.16)	0.23 (0.13)
Num. obs.	143258	143258

Notes: Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p <0.01; *p < 0.05.

Table A3. Linear and logistic models predicting trust in national governance and support for populism on pre-crisis years by gender.

	Model 7 Trust	Model 8 Populism
Intercept	3.71 (0.25) ***	-2.11 (0.45) ***
Year 2004	-0.40 (0.23)	0.58 (0.40)
Year 2006	-0.34 (0.19)	0.83 (0.40) *
Year 2008	-0.30 (0.25)	0.77 (0.30) *
Conditionality	-0.03 (0.18)	0.69 (0.81)
Female	-0.15 (0.04) ***	-0.17 (0.12)
Education	0.06 (0.01) ***	-0.05 (0.02) *
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00) *
Married	-0.02 (0.06)	0.10 (0.12)
Urbanization	-0.00 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)
Year 2004: Conditionality	0.69 (0.34) *	-2.79 (1.02) **
Year 2006: Conditionality	0.56 (0.22) *	-4.11 (1.28) **
Year 2008: Conditionality	-0.00 (0.36)	-2.32 (1.03) *
Year 2004: Female	0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.17)
Year 2006: Female	0.04 (0.04)	0.10 (0.14)
Year 2008: Female	0.00 (0.05)	0.16 (0.18)
Female: Conditionality	0.09 (0.06)	0.33 (0.17)
Year 2004: Conditionality: Female	-0.18 (0.07) **	-0.37 (0.24)
Year 2006: Conditionality: Female	-0.04 (0.13)	-1.13 (0.19) ***
Year 2008: Conditionality: Female	0.00 (0.08)	-0.55 (0.25) *

| Num. obs.	136767	64066

Trust in Institutions

Figure A1: Predicted Values of Trust in Institutions by year before the European debt crisis by country group

Figure A2: Predicted Probability of Supporting Populist Parties by year before the European debt crisis by country group.

Trust in Institutions

Figure A3: Predicted Values of Trust in Institutions by year before the European debt crisis by country group and by gender.

Populist Support

Figure A4: Predicted Probability of Supporting Populist Parties by year before the European debt crisis by country group and gender.

Table A4. Linear and logistic models predicting trust in national governance and support for populism with alternative proxy for refugee crisis.

	Model 9 Trust	Model 10 Populism
Intercept	2.91 (0.24) ***	-0.24 (0.69)
Post-Crisis	0.06 (0.18)	0.78 (0.14) ***
Peripheral	-0.12 (0.22)	-0.44 (0.76)
Female	-0.10 (0.02) ***	-0.17 (0.06) **
Education	0.04 (0.01) ***	-0.03 (0.02)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00) **
Married	0.06 (0.04)	-0.14 (0.06) *
Urbanization	0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.05)
Post-Refugee Crisis	1.02 (0.20) ***	-1.51 (0.63) *
Post-Crisis: Peripheral	-0.70 (0.23) **	0.92 (0.19) ***
Num. obs.	315557	138620

Notes: Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p <0.01; *p < 0.05.

Table A5. Linear and logistic models predicting trust in national governance and support for populism by gender with alternative proxy for refugee crisis.

	Model 11 Trust	Model 12 Populism
Intercept	2.92 (0.24) ***	-0.28 (0.69)
Female	-0.12 (0.04) ***	-0.07 (0.08)
Post-Crisis	0.04 (0.19)	0.82 (0.14) ***
Peripheral	-0.16 (0.22)	-0.50 (0.70)
Education	0.04 (0.01) ***	-0.03 (0.02)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00) **
Married	0.06 (0.04)	-0.14 (0.06) *
Urbanization	0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.05)
Post-Refugee Crisis	1.02 (0.20) ***	-1.51 (0.63) *
Female: Post-Crisis	0.03 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.06)
Female: Peripheral	0.07 (0.05)	0.10 (0.19)
Post-Crisis: Peripheral	-0.66 (0.23) **	1.03 (0.19) ***
Female: Post-Crisis: Peripheral	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.21 (0.12)
Num. obs.	315557	138620

Table A6. Logistic models predicting support for populism for far-right and far-left parties by gender with alternative proxy for refugee crisis.

	Model 5 Far-right	Model 6 Far-left
Intercept	0.22 (0.53)	-3.55 (0.45) ***
Female	-0.02 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.08)
Post-Crisis	1.18 (0.21) ***	0.17 (0.09)
Peripheral	-2.27 (0.71) **	0.98 (0.41) *
Education	-0.09 (0.01) ***	0.03 (0.01) **
Age	-0.01 (0.00) **	-0.01 (0.00)
Married	0.00 (0.05)	-0.41 (0.04) ***
Urbanization	-0.08 (0.04) *	0.12 (0.04) **
Post-Refugee Crisis	-1.95 (0.74) **	0.18 (0.26)
Female: Post-Crisis	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.16 (0.04) ***
Female: Peripheral	-0.27 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.10)
Post-Crisis: Peripheral	1.44 (0.43) ***	0.19 (0.44)
Female: Post-Crisis: Peripheral	0.08 (0.15)	0.25 (0.12) *
Num. obs.	138620	138620

Notes: Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p <0.01; *p < 0.05