Online Appendix

A Pink Slip for the Blue Reform:
Is Selection, Experience, or Ideology the Elixir of Populists' Survival?

Sirus H. Dehdari* Konstantinos Matakos†
Jaakko Meriläinen‡ Janne Tukiainen§

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*Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University, Universitetsvägen 10 F, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden, and Department of Government, Uppsala University, Gamla torget 6, 75320 Uppsala, Sweden; sirus.dehdari@sofi.su.se.

†Department of Political Economy, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom; konstantinos.matakos@kcl.ac.uk.

‡*Corresponding author.* Centro de Investigación Económica and Department of Economics, ITAM, Av. Camino Santa Teresa 930, Col. Héroes de Padierna, Del. Magdalena Contreras, 10700 Ciudad de México, Mexico; jaakko.merilainen@itam.mx.

§Department of Economics, University of Turku, Rehtorinpellonkatu 3, 20500 Turku, Finland, and VATT Institute for Economic Research, Economicum, Arkadiankatu 7, 00101 Helsinki, Finland; janne.tukiainen@utu.fi.

Data

This appendix provides additional information on the data that we use.

Data Sources

We combine data from a number of sources. All of the data are publicly available. First, we use candidate-level election data from the Finnish Ministry of Justice. These data are available on their website at https://tulospalvelu.vaalit.fi/ (accessed March 13, 2020). These data can be merged with the voting aid application data from *YLE* based on candidate IDs. For the 2019 data, see https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10725384, and for the 2015 data, see https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-7869597 (accessed March 13, 2021).

We also use survey data on voter ideology. The voter surveys were conducted by conducted by the Finnish Business and Policy Forum in 2015 and 2019 before the elections (EVA 2015, 2019). Researchers can acquire the data from the Finnish Social Science Data Archive after registering. The 2019 data can be found at https://services.fsd.tuni.fi/catalogue/FSD3330?study_language=en, and the 2015 data can be found at https://services.fsd.tuni.fi/catalogue/FSD3001?study_language=fi (accessed March 13, 2021).

Measuring Candidate Ideology

The voting aid application data allow us to measure candidate ideology. For some examples of papers using these data in the Finnish context, see Matakos et al. (2018), Meriläinen (2020), and Isotalo, Mattila, and von Schoultz (2020). The voting aid application data contain a number of questions that we compress into two metrics of ideology using a principal component analysis. One component captures the traditional left-right dimension of ideology, while the other component measures candidate positions in the GAL-TAN axis. Principal component analysis is commonly used to construct more compact measures of ideology from survey data (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Heckman and Snyder 1997).

2019 Voting Aid Application. The 2019 voting aid application contains 26 claims. We present these claims in Table SI1. The candidates responded to these claims with "completely disagree" (value 1), "disagree" (value 2), "agree" (value 4), or "completely agree" (value 5). Note that an intermediate option was not offered.

Once we run the principal component analysis, we see that claims that are associated with the GAL-TAN dimension of ideology get a stronger loading to the first principal component. This component explains 27% of the variation in the data. We multiply the predicted component value by minus one so that smaller values of the resulting ideology score would reflect a stronger leaning towards GAL. For example, the claim that "the growing number of immigrants has increased insecurity in Finland" is associated with this ideology score. Claims that are associated with the economic left-right ideology get a stronger loading to the second principal component which explains 12% of the variation in the data. One example of a claim that gets a higher loading to this principal component is that "public expenditures and revenues should be balanced rather by cutting down spending than increasing taxes".

2015 Voting Aid Application. The 2019 voting aid application contains 32 claims. We present these claims in Table SI2. The candidates responded to these claims with "completely disagree" (value 1), "disagree" (value 2), "do not agree or disagree" (value 3), "agree" (value 4), or "completely agree" (value 5).

The principal component analysis suggests that claims that are associated with economic ideology get a stronger loading to the first principal component. One example of a voting aid application claim associated with this component is "It is too easy to live on welfare benefits". Now this component explains 20% of the variation in the data. The second component captures claims that are associated with social ideology, and this component explains 11% of the variation in the data. Again, we multiply the resulting score by minus one so that smaller values of the resulting ideology score would reflect a stronger leaning towards GAL. For example, the claim that "immigration should be restricted due to the threat of terrorism" gets a higher loading for this principal component.

Measuring Voter Ideology

We use the survey data on voters in a similar manner as the voting aid application data on politicians' policy positions. To construct the voter ideology scores for 2019, we exploit 50 questions to which citizens would respond in a similar 1-5 scale (ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree".[1] We compress these responses to two proxies of voter ideology using a principal component analysis. The first two principal components capture voters' left-right and GAL-TAN ideology. More precisely, the inverse of the first principal component informs us about the survey respondents' GAL-TAN ideology and the inverse of the second principal component

[1]We use all questions in the Q1 category; see the codebook available at https://services.fsd.tuni.fi/catalogue/FSD3330/PIP/cbF3330e.pdf (accessed March 13, 2021).

captures their left-right ideology. The components explain 26% and 10% of the variation in the survey responses, respectively.

In the 2015 survey, we observe 48 similar questions to which survey respondents would respond in a five-point scale.[2] Now, the first principal component measures economic left-right ideology (explaining 14% of the variation) and the second principal component measures social GAL-TAN ideology (explaining 8% of the variation).

[2]We again use all questions in the Q1 category; see the codebook available at https://services.fsd.tuni.fi/catalogue/FSD3001/PIP/cbF3001e.pdf (accessed March 13, 2021).

Differences in Policy Positions

Table SI1 presents differences in policy positions for the Finns Party and the Blue Reform in the 2019 election. We see differences in the parties' policy positions that are both large and statistically significant. Table SI2 focuses on candidates who ran in both 2015 and 2019. We split the sample in two: candidates who ran for the Finns Party in both elections, and candidates who ran for the Finns Party in 2015 but the Blue Reform in 2019. Now, the differences are less obvious, although one claim that stands out is "Finland should take a greater responsibility of the refugees arriving in the EU".

We also report the (average) policy positions of all major parties in Figure SI1. Panel A shows parties' policy positions using data from the 2015 voting aid application, and Panel B uses data from the 2019 election.

Table SI1. Differences in policy positions, 2019 election.

	True Finns	Blue Reform	Difference	*p*-value
Climate and environment				
Finland must become a front runner in the battle against climate change even if it meant extra costs.	1.373	2.676	1.302	0.000
Finland should not hurry with banning the sales of new cars running on gasoline.	4.828	4.607	-0.221	0.005
The state should steer Finns towards eating less meat, for example, with the means of taxation.	1.236	1.688	0.452	0.000
Forests are harvested too much in Finland.	1.580	1.836	0.257	0.017
Economy				
Public expenditures and revenues should be balanced rather by cutting down spending than increasing taxes.	4.249	3.712	-0.537	0.000
Social welfare should be developed such that part of current welfare benefits would be replaced with a universal basic income.	2.091	2.477	0.386	0.009
Finland would be better off outside of the Euro Zone.	4.167	2.545	-1.621	0.000
Health				
Social and health care services should be primarily provided by the public sector.	4.335	3.902	-0.433	0.000
We should increase privitization in elderly care.	1.536	2.036	0.500	0.000
Terminally ill should be allowed to have euthanasia.	3.790	3.491	-0.300	0.078
Gender reassignment should be possible for individuals younger than 18 years.	1.370	1.709	0.339	0.002
Grocery stores should be allowed to sell wine and strong beers.	4.120	3.991	-0.129	0.396
Selling energy drinks to below-15-year-olds should be banned.	4.101	4.270	0.169	0.201
The maximum limit for passenger import of snuff and chewing tobacco should be reduced to one kilogram.	2.297	3.073	0.776	0.000
Family and education				
Parental leave should be reformed such that the leave would be more equally distributed among the parents.	2.082	2.450	0.369	0.024
High school or vocational education should be made compulsory.	2.641	3.125	0.484	0.005
Summer holidays in school should start and end two weeks later.	3.360	3.459	0.099	0.539
The number of higher education institutions should be reduced and the savings should be used to pursue excellence in teaching and research.	2.000	2.056	0.056	0.651
Immigration				
The growing number of immigrants has increased insecurity in Finland.	4.952	4.312	-0.640	0.000
Financing social and health care services requires having more work-related immigration.	1.476	2.649	1.173	0.000
Security				
Joining the NATO would improve national security in Finland.	1.932	2.299	0.367	0.009
Hate speech should be defined and made punishable in the law.	1.551	3.676	2.124	0.000
Values				
Traditional values provide a basis for a good life.	4.742	4.598	-0.143	0.037
Even drastic measures are needed to defend public safety and normal people in Finland.	4.411	3.748	-0.663	0.000
It is justified that some groups are better off than others in society.	2.510	2.273	-0.237	0.134
Finnish laws should let people make their own choices more freely as well as bear the consequences.	3.182	2.889	-0.293	0.071

Table SI2. Differences in 2015 policy positions for the rerunning True Finns candidates.

	True Finns	Blue Reform	Difference	*p*-value
Employment				
It is too easy to live on welfare benefits	3.132	2.955	-0.177	0.510
Stores should be allowed to choose their opening hours freely	4.237	3.818	-0.419	0.111
We should adopt universal basic income that would replace the current social welfare system.	3.133	3.318	0.185	0.505
Workers should be guaranteed a minimum number of working hours.	3.816	3.545	-0.270	0.372
The duration of earnings-related unemployment insurance should be shortened.	2.237	2.227	-0.010	0.974
Economy				
Finland would be better off outside of the Euro Zone.	4.276	4.182	-0.094	0.618
Food could be taxed more heavily.	1.132	1.091	-0.041	0.613
Municipal and national budgets should primarily be balances with spending cuts.	4.053	3.818	-0.235	0.302
Child benefits should be increased and taxed.	2.747	2.455	-0.292	0.336
We cannot afford the current social and health care services.	2.737	2.500	-0.237	0.430
Public safety				
Joining the NATO would improve national security in Finland.	2.027	2.000	-0.027	0.914
Finland needs more policemen.	4.632	4.455	-0.177	0.243
Immigration should be restricted due to the threat of terrorism.	4.618	3.682	-0.937	0.000
Russia's sphere of influence politics is a threat to Finland.	3.560	3.571	0.011	0.969
Security of the nation is more important than citizens' privacy when it comes to monitoring the Internet.	3.520	3.591	0.071	0.790
Finland should participate in the war against ISIS by training Iraqi troops.	2.307	2.545	0.239	0.455
Health				
Terminally ill should be allowed to have euthanasia.	3.711	3.545	-0.165	0.564
Social and health care services should be provided predominantly by the public sector.	4.211	4.091	-0.120	0.591
Public authorities should intervene more often when families with children have problems.	3.946	3.909	-0.037	0.877
Elderly people and their families should cover a greater share of the costs of elderly care.	1.959	2.045	0.086	0.698
Citizens' right to health care services is more important than municipal autonomy.	4.145	3.818	-0.327	0.109
Future				
Preventing the climate change is more important than competitiveness of the industry.	1.920	2.091	0.171	0.488
Gene-manipulated food is safe for people and the environment.	2.027	2.000	-0.027	0.919
Finland should take a greater responsibility of the refugees arriving in the EU.	1.092	1.545	0.453	0.000
We need to abandon the idea that whole Finland should be kept populated	1.763	1.455	-0.309	0.169
Class sizes should be capped at 20 students, for example.	3.474	3.364	-0.110	0.713
Other topics				
There should be a referendum about NATO membership.	2.934	2.864	-0.071	0.435
We should agree in principle to build a new nuclear power plant.	2.360	2.182	-0.178	0.432
Income taxation should be lowered for all income groups to stimulate the economy.	2.213	1.545	-0.668	0.005
Last Parliament's decision to allow same-sex marriage should be called off.	2.333	2.238	-0.095	0.652
Grocery stores should be allowed to sell mild wines and strong beers.	2.645	2.500	-0.145	0.439
Studying Swedish should be voluntary.	2.947	2.864	-0.084	0.338



Figure SI1. Average ideological positions of parties in 2015 and 2019.

Notes: The figure shows average policy positions of Finnish political parties in the 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections.

Additional Regression Results

In this appendix, we present additional regression results.

Cost of Governing

To quantify the cost of governing in municipal politics we use data on the Finns Party from the 2012 and 2017 municipal elections and estimate a fixed effects specification of the following form:

$$\textit{Vote share}_{pt} = \alpha \textit{Govern}_{p,2012} + \beta 1[\text{Year} = 2017] + \gamma_p + \varepsilon_{pt}. \quad (1)$$

Here $\textit{Govern}_{p,2012}$ is an indicator variable for party p holding the chairmanship of the municipal board, $1[\text{Year} = 2017]$ is an indicator for the 2017 election. δ_p are the party-municipality fixed effects and ε_{pt} is the error term.

Results from this specification are presented in column (1) of Table SI3. We see that the Finns Party lost around 3.5% of its vote share between 2012 and 2017, but the loss was larger if the party had a governing position: the sum of the coefficients implies a loss of around 7%. This loss is large also compared with the mean and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). However, note that the impact of governing is identified from a very small number of municipalities: the Finns Party governed only seven municipalities after the 2012 municipal election.

Using data on all parties and including additional interactions in the regression model yields a similar result. These regression results are reported in column (2) of Table SI3. Other parties do not appear to face a cost of governing. The coefficient for being the governing party is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, but the coefficient for its interaction with the Finns Party indicator is considerably larger. The regression results also demonstrate the general decline in the Finns Party vote share between the 2012 and 2017 municipal elections.

Determinants of Party Choice

Table SI4 presents multivariate regression results trying to understand the correlates of party choice. We study two samples separately. In Panel A, we only use data on candidates who ran in both 2015 and 2019. In Panel B, we use data on all candidates.

We first limit our attention to candidates who ran for either the Finns Party and Blue Reform and try to understand the party choice in this subsample. The regression results for rerunners (Panel A) and all candidates (Panel B) are mostly similar. Column (1) shows that incumbency is inversely associated with running as a Finns Party candidate. But, Finns Party candidates were seemingly not complete political outsiders. The estimation results suggest that they were more

Table SI3. Electoral cost of governing.

	Finns Party	All parties
	(1)	(2)
Govern (*t-1*)	-3.428**	-0.279
	(1.721)	(0.393)
1[Year = 2017]	-3.522***	0.620***
	(0.240)	(0.091)
Govern (*t-1*) × Finns Party		-2.351
		(1.759)
1[Year = 2017] × Finns Party		-4.142***
		(0.256)
N	509	3689
R^2	0.52	0.14
Mean of dependent variable	11.51	15.57

Notes: The dependent variable is party vote share. Column (1) uses data on the Finns Party only, and column (2) uses data on all parties. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

likely to be local politicians (although the point estimate in Panel A is not statistically significant) and also more likely to have run in the previous election. There are no apparent differences in terms of social background of the candidates, as university education or blue-collar background do not appear to be statistically significant determinants of the choice between the Finns Party and the Blue Reform. Column (2) then regresses the indicator for choosing the Finns Party instead of the Blue Reform on measures of loyalty and agreeableness, confirming the findings we already saw in the bivariate comparisons. In column (3), we look at the role of ideology in party choice. Overall, the Finns Party candidates were more left-wing than Blue Reform candidates. What is more, GAL-TAN ideology appears to be a very strong predictor of choosing the Finns Party.

The comparisons of Finns Party candidates and candidates from parties other than the Blue Reform echo these findings to some extent (columns 4-6). Being a local politician is associated with a 9% higher probability of running for the Finns Party instead of some other party, suggesting that the Finns Party had strong local roots also compared with other political parties. We also see that university education and having a blue-collar occupation is negatively associated with the probability of choosing the Finns Party. In terms of ideology, we see that a one-standard-deviation change in economic ideology makes it around 4% less likely that a candidate would run

for the Finns Party. The relationship is the opposite for the GAL-TAN dimension of ideology: a one-standard-deviation increase in the GAL-TAN ideology score is associated with a 15% higher probability of running for the Finns Party.

The last three columns study the choice between Blue Reform and parties other than the Finns Party. Blue Reform candidates were more likely to be incumbents than candidates from other parties, but the opposite is true for being a local politician or a rerunning candidate (suggesting that less non-elected candidates decided to run again for the Blue Reform). Similar to the selection to the Finns Party, university education is negatively associated with the propensity of running as a Blue Reform candidate as opposed to another party candidate, but having a blue-collar occupation does not seem to matter. The economic left-right ideology does not appear to be a major predictor of party choice in this subsample. However, the regression results hint that the GAL-TAN axis also played a role in choosing the Blue Reform, although the relationship is less nuanced than it is for the Finns Party.

Cost of Party Switching

We estimate the cost of party switching by using data on candidates who ran both in the 2015 and the 2019 parliamentary election. These data allow us to estimate the following fixed effects specification:

$$\textit{Vote share}_{it} = \zeta \textit{Switch}_{i,2019} + \eta \textit{Blue Reform}_{i,2019} + \theta 1[\textit{Year} = 2019] + \lambda_i + \mu_{it}. \qquad (2)$$

Here $\textit{Switch}_{i,2017}$ is an indicator variable for candidate i running for different parties in 2015 and 2019, $\textit{Blue Reform}_{i,2017}$ is an indicator for running as a Blue Reform candidate, and $1[\textit{Year} = 2019]$ is an indicator for the 2019 election that captures the general trend in vote shares. λ_i are the candidate fixed effects and μ_{it} is the error term.

Table SI5 reports the regression results. We can see that, on average, party switchers for parties other than the Blue Reform did not lose any more votes than other rerunners. In contrast, candidates from the Blue Reform—all of whom were party switchers—did worse in the 2019 election.

Table SI4. Determinants of party choice in 2019.

	Finns Party vs. Blue Reform			Finns Party vs. Others			Blue Reform vs. Others		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Rerunning candidates									
Incumbent	-0.255**			-0.018			0.042*		
	[0.127]			[0.036]			[0.024]		
Local politician	0.077			0.091***			0.005		
	[0.102]			[0.027]			[0.014]		
District vote share	0.063*			0.005			-0.003		
	[0.036]			[0.005]			[0.002]		
University	-0.034			-0.076**			-0.014		
	[0.084]			[0.032]			[0.018]		
Blue collar	0.060			0.044			-0.006		
	[0.096]			[0.043]			[0.023]		
Loyalty		0.055*			0.043***			0.005	
		[0.030]			[0.009]			[0.005]	
Agreeableness		-0.074***			-0.067***			-0.000	
		[0.024]			[0.014]			[0.006]	
Left-right ideology			-0.159***			-0.043***			0.000
			[0.051]			[0.010]			[0.006]
GAL-TAN ideology			0.460***			0.150***			0.036***
			[0.082]			[0.015]			[0.009]
N	106	99	84	721	661	556	663	602	508
R^2	0.06	0.10	0.31	0.03	0.10	0.23	0.01	0.00	0.03
Mean of dependent variable	0.77	0.80	0.79	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.04	0.03	0.04
Panel B: All candidates									
Incumbent	-0.227**			-0.011			0.058**		
	[0.114]			[0.029]			[0.022]		
Local politician	0.376***			0.088***			-0.041***		
	[0.051]			[0.014]			[0.009]		
Rerunning	0.168***			0.015			-0.039***		
	[0.055]			[0.015]			[0.010]		
University	0.023			-0.047***			-0.032***		
	[0.052]			[0.014]			[0.012]		
Blue collar	0.065			0.045**			-0.009		
	[0.056]			[0.019]			[0.016]		
Loyalty		0.043**			0.030***			0.009**	
		[0.019]			[0.005]			[0.004]	
Agreeableness		-0.078***			-0.041***			-0.003	
		[0.019]			[0.007]			[0.005]	
Left-right ideology			-0.172***			-0.032***			0.002
			[0.028]			[0.005]			[0.004]
GAL-TAN ideology			0.541***			0.124***			0.045***
			[0.037]			[0.008]			[0.005]
N	364	316	273	2310	2110	1817	2248	2014	1730
R^2	0.20	0.06	0.40	0.03	0.05	0.19	0.02	0.00	0.04
Mean of dependent variable	0.59	0.65	0.66	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.05

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for running for the Finns Party in columns (1)-(4) and an indicator for running for the Blue Reform in column (5)-(6). The estimation sample includes candidates running for the Finns Party and the Blue Reform in columns (1) and (2), candidates running for the Finns Party and other parties in (3) and (4), and candidates running for the Blue Reform and other parties in columns (5) and (6). We report results separately for rerunning candidates (Panel A) and all candidates (Panel B). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table SI5. Electoral cost of party switching.

	(1)
Switch party	0.189
	(0.441)
Blue Reform	-1.142**
	(0.478)
1[Year = 2019]	0.065**
	(0.028)
N	1492
R^2	0.01
Mean of dependent variable	1.03

Notes: The dependent variable is (district) vote share. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

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