


Online Appendix

Coalitions, Indigenous Peoples and Populism in the Americas

Alberto Diaz-Cayeros

Figure A1



Source: QoG database from Association of Religion Data Archives
Without English Speaking Caribbean

Figure A2




Figure A3





Figure A4



Detailed microlevel census samples has been compiled by IPUMS International, giving a sobering picture of the sheer magnitude of reported indigenous identity shift in Latin America. It is important to note that the graphs have been constructed extracting the data from the census samples for 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, grouping individual records by age and the decade when the census was carried out. The first graph in Figure A3 provides the data for the share of Latin American and Caribbean inhabitants that spoke an indigenous language, by age cohort, in the censuses that were collected in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. The 1990s data conform to the idea that indigenous languages were a disappearing minoritarian feature of Latin American demography. But the remarkable feature of the period starting in the 21st century is the massive increase in indigenous language showing up for age cohorts older than 40, who presumably did not learn the language as adults. The share grows even more as the age cohorts are older. And in the most recent censuses the share is larger even for the youngest inhabitants. A similar pattern is observed in indigenous self-adscription. The graph presented in Figure A4 is slightly different in the way it is constructed, because it shifts the age cohorts by ten years, in order to be able to compare the same age groups over two different time periods. It does not report the population younger than 15 because it had not been born in the previous decade. Hence, although these are not strictly speaking the same individuals comparted through time, because the census samples vary on who is being included randomly in the dataset, they do compare cohorts that are identical from a statistical standpoint. They represent the same people, who are self-ascribing to the indigenous category in each census wave.

Table A1. Political opportunities (supply) and excluded identities (demand) for populism

Country	Political Constraints	Party Fragmentation	Number Elections	Share Indigenous	Protestant Conversion
Canada	0.86	3.37	0.31	4.9	0.0
United States	0.85	2.09	0.76	1.7	0.0
Trinidad & Tobago	0.77	2.27	0.27	0.0	14.6
Costa Rica	0.64	3.76	0.57	2.4	7.0
Venezuela	0.56	3.42	0.53	2.7	13.0
Brazil	0.51	8.51	0.57	0.5	20.0
Chile	0.48	5.53	0.47	11.0	8.1
Suriname	0.42	3.22	0.16	1.5	1.0
Colombia	0.41	4.59	0.65	3.4	14.1
Argentina	0.38	4.05	0.65	2.4	7.6
Dominican Republic	0.38	2.87	0.55	0.0	12.3
Mexico	0.38	4.59	0.51	15.1	12.4
Ecuador	0.37	6.23	0.69	7.0	1.0
Nicaragua	0.37	2.49	0.33	8.9	14.9
Honduras	0.36	2.66	0.45	7.0	29.1
Guatemala	0.34	6.27	0.73	41.0	33.2
Uruguay	0.34	2.91	0.39	2.4	9.7
Jamaica	0.34	1.92	0.22	0.0	0.0
Bolivia	0.33	4.12	0.53	62.2	8.1
Guyana	0.32	2.02 *	0.20	9.1	11.8
El Salvador	0.30	3.31	0.61	0.2	22.3
Peru	0.29	5.26	0.59	24.0	11.0
Paraguay	0.27	3.27	0.49	1.8	2.0
Panama	0.20	5.24	0.39	12.3	12.3
Haiti	0.11	1.67 *	0.57	0.0	0.0
Cuba	0.00	1.00 *	0.14	0.0	0.0

Source: Table reports averages 1970-2020, drawing the QoG dataset, for constraints (POLCON, Heinsz), effective number of electoral parties (DES, Bormann and Golder) and elections (NELDA, Hyde and Marinov). For the share of indigenous population, data from ECLAC and the World Bank, plus census data for the US and Canada. Protestant conversion from 1980 to 2010 based on data from the Association of Religion Data Archives. * Number of parties calculated from fragmentation in the legislature.

Table A2. Economic Models of Populist Onset

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ENEP		1.194***	1.108**	1.135***
		0.056	0.048	0.055
POLCON		0.166***	0.090***	0.131***
		0.088	0.041	0.071
Indigenous		1.024***	1.028***	1.027***
		0.005	0.005	0.005
Conversion		0.965***	0.987	0.977
		0.013	0.014	0.015
Urbanization	1.043***		1.041***	1.036***
	0.008		0.009	0.010
Income (GDP)	1.000***	1.000		1.000
	0.000	0.000		0.000
Observations	720	620	711	620

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3. Poverty and Inequality Models of Populist Onset

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ENEP		1.129***	1.135***	1.143***
		0.053	0.055	0.056
POLCONS		0.169***	0.106***	0.102***
		0.072	0.049	0.047
Indigenous		1.019***	1.029***	1.028***
		0.005	0.007	0.007
Conversion		0.965***	0.971**	0.971**
		0.012	0.012	0.012
Inequality	1.020	1.002	1.000	0.989
	0.016	0.014	0.015	0.022
Infant Mortality	1.019**		0.977*	0.978*
	0.009		0.012	0.012
Poverty Gap	0.992			1.018
	0.021			0.029
Observations	751	702	683	683

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1