Online Appendix
Paved with Partisan Intentions

A Derivations & Proofs

A.1 Result 1

Result 1 *The Speaker is more like to appoint an outsider as electoral adversity, μ, increases.*

Rather than assume a specific functional form for λ, we instead assume only that

1. $\lambda(\chi_i \mid \mu)$ is twice continuously differentiable in both χ_i and μ,
2. $\lambda(\chi_i \mid \mu)$ is strictly increasing in χ_i for all $\mu > 0$ $\left(\textit{i.e.}, \frac{\partial\lambda(\chi_i|\mu)}{\partial\chi_i} > 0\right)$, and
3. $\frac{\partial\lambda(\chi_i|\mu)}{\partial\chi_i}$ is strictly increasing in μ for all χ_i $\left(\textit{i.e.}, \frac{\partial^2\lambda(\chi_i|\mu)}{\partial\chi_i\partial\mu} > 0\right)$.

Substantively, the second of these properties implies that S has a strict preference for a legislator with higher ability, ceteris paribus. The third property implies that the marginal importance of ability is increasing in the electoral adversity faced by S.

Because we have assumed that discretion granted to a legislator i, d, does not affect S's leadership value from appointing *i and we assume that any legislator j would accept the job*, d_i^* will depend entirely on S's incentives (specifically, the function η). Thus, each legislator i can be represented as presenting S with a (sequentially rational) *policy value*, which we write as $v_i \in \mathbf{R}$, defined as follows:

$$v_i = \max_{d \in \mathbf{R}_+} \left[\eta(i, d) \right].$$

With this in hand, reorder the legislators in $\mathcal{L}$ (without loss of generality) according to v_i as follows:

$$i \leq j \Leftrightarrow v_i \geq v_j$$

Thus, any legislator with a "higher index" is *less* preferred by (or, *more* "distant from") S on policy grounds. Then, the set of abilities, $\chi = \{\chi_j\}_{j\in\mathcal{L}}$, that would appoint over any given legislator with policy value of v_i is equal to

$$R_\lambda(v_i \mid \chi) = \left\{ \{\chi_j\}_{j\in\mathcal{L}} \in \mathbf{R}^{n-1} : v_i + \lambda(\chi_i) < v_j + \lambda(\chi_j) \right\},$$

or, equivalently, as

$$R(v_i \mid \chi)_\lambda = \left\{ \{\chi_j\}_{j\in\mathcal{L}} \in \mathbf{R}^{n-1} : \lambda(\chi_j) > v_i - v_j + \lambda(\chi_i) \right\},$$

Remark 1 *Fix any n-dimensional vector $\{v_i\}_{i\in\mathcal{L}} \in \mathbf{R}^n$. To keep our analysis transparent, we refer to the "probability that S appoints a policy outsider" as increasing when changing from $\chi \in \mathbf{R}^n$ to $\chi' \in \mathbf{R}^n$ if*

$$R_\lambda(v_1 \mid \chi) \subset R_\lambda(v_1 \mid \chi).$$

Furthermore, our assumptions imply that

$$\max[\chi] < \max[\chi'] \Rightarrow R_\lambda(v_1 \mid \chi) \subseteq R_\lambda(v_1 \mid \chi').$$

The Speaker's optimal appointment function, denoted by $\alpha^* : \mathbf{R}^n \times [0,1] \to \{1,\ldots,n\}$, is any selection satisfying the following:

$$\alpha^*(\chi,\mu) = \underset{i\in\{1,\ldots,n\}}{\operatorname{argmax}}\ u_S(i, d_i^* \mid \chi_i).$$

For simplicity, we will suppose that S appoints according to the following selection:

$$\alpha^*(\chi,\mu) = \min\left[\underset{i\in\{1,\ldots,n\}}{\operatorname{argmax}}\ u_S(i, d_i^* \mid \chi_i)\right].$$

With this terminology in hand, we have the following result that states that increasing electoral adversity induces S to pick a policy outsider.

Proposition 1 *Suppose that S's leadership function, $\lambda : \mathbf{R} \times [0,1] \to \mathbf{R}$, is twice continuously differentiable in each of its arguments and satisfies the following conditions:*

1. *$\lambda(\chi_i \mid \mu)$ is insensitive to χ_i when $\mu = 0$:*

$$\mu = 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\partial\lambda(\chi_i \mid \mu)}{\partial\chi_i} = 0 \textit{ for all } \chi_i, \chi_j \in \mathbf{R}^2,$$

2. *$\lambda(\chi_i \mid \mu)$ is strictly increasing in μ, and*

3. *the marginal impact of χ_i on $\lambda(\chi_i \mid \mu)$ is increasing in μ:*

$$\frac{\partial^2 \lambda(\chi_i \mid \mu)}{\partial \chi_i \partial \mu} > 0.$$

Then for any $\chi \in \mathbf{R}^n$, S's optimal appointment function, $\alpha^*(\chi, \mu) : \mathbf{R}^n \times [0,1] \to \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$, is weakly decreasing in μ.

Proof: Suppose that S's leadership function, λ, satisfies Conditions 1, 2, and 3. Condition 1 implies that the following is an optimal appointment function for S when $\mu = 0$:[29]

$$\alpha^*(\chi, 0) = 1.$$

Now suppose that there exists $\mu' \in [0,1)$ such that $\alpha^*(\chi, \mu') > 1$. (If there is no such value $\mu' \in [0,1)$, the claim is true.) Then, to the contrary of the claim (for the purpose of reaching a contradiction), suppose that there exists $\hat{\mu} > \mu'$ such that

$$\alpha^*(\chi, \mu') < \alpha^*(\chi, \hat{\mu}).$$

This would imply that λ is decreasing in μ, resulting in a contradiction. ∎

A.2 Result 2

Result 2 *Holding each legislator i's reservation value, ρ_i, constant, the level of discretion S grants in equilibrium, $d^*_{i^*}$, increases as electoral adversity, μ, increases.*

Result 2 follows from the following logic. In equilibrium, the discretion granted to legislator $i \in \mathcal{L}$ conditional on $a = i$ will be

$$d^*_i \equiv d^*_i(\gamma_i, \chi_i) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \sup_{d \geq 0} [\eta(d \mid \gamma_i, \chi_i) + \lambda(\chi_i)] < 0, \\ \max[\rho_i, d^*_i] & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Thus, in equilibrium, S should appoint any legislator $i^*(\gamma, \chi, \rho)$ satisfying the following:[30]

$$i^* \equiv i^*(\gamma, \chi, \rho) \in \underset{i \in \mathcal{L}}{\operatorname{argmax}} \left[\eta(d^*_i \mid \gamma_i, \chi_i) + \lambda(\chi_i) \right].$$

[29] Note that satisfaction of Condition 1 implies that we can write $\lambda(\chi_i \mid \mu) = 0$ for all $\chi_i \in \mathbf{R}$ when $\mu = 0$.

[30] For simplicity, we suppose that i^* is unique.

A.3 Result 3

Result 3 *In equilibrium, as any legislator i's reservation value, ρ_i, increases,*

1. *the probability that the Speaker appoints i in equilibrium (weakly) decreases, but*

2. *when i is appointed, the level of discretion S grants to i, d_i^*, (weakly) increases.*

Result 3 follows from the following facts:

1. When $\rho_i < d_i^*$, the Speaker will assign legislator i d_i^* if S appoints i.

2. If $\rho_i > d_i^*$, the Speaker will assign legislator i ρ_i^* if S appoints i.

3. If ρ_i^* increases without bound, then S will "eventually" not appoint i in equilibrium, by the 2nd condition of Assumption 1 (that $\lim_{d \to \infty} \eta(d \mid \gamma_i) < 0$ for any $\gamma_i \neq 1$).

A.4 Result 4

Result 4 *Reducing the maximal level of discretion that the Speaker can grant, $\bar{d}$, might cause either or both of the following to occur:*

- ***Reduce the Ability of the Appointee.*** *If the third party has an interest in maximizing the ability of the appointed legislator, χ_{i^*}, then reducing $\bar{d}$ may be counter to the third party's interests because doing so induces the Speaker to appoint a different legislator with lower ability.*

- ***Change the Appointee's Policy Goals.*** *If the third party has strict preferences over the appointee's policy goals, then reducing $\bar{d}$ may be counter to the third party's interests because doing so induces the Speaker to appoint a legislator with different policy goals.*

Furthermore, both effects of reducing $\bar{d}$ are more likely to occur in equilibrium when electoral adversity, μ, is high.

Both claims in Result 4 follow from the same logic as Result 3. The second-order impact of electoral adversity, μ, follows from the same logic as Result 2.