

Supplementary Online Appendix for

“Executive Appointee Reliability under Separated Powers: Senatorial Constraints on Executive Branch Coordination via Leadership Appointments in U.S. Federal Agencies”

(Not intended for print publication)

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This supplementary online appendix contains additional results and robustness checks not reported in the main text. **Tables A-1** through **A-4** report the average marginal effects from the KRLS models reported in the main text, and **Tables A-5** through **A-8** report the estimated quantiles thereof. Significance stars are presented in **Tables A-1** through **A-4**, though these may be somewhat misleading due to the high degrees of nonlinearity inherent in the KRLS estimation procedure; even if the *average* marginal effect is not significant, there may be regions of the parameter space where significance holds. As such, the reader is encouraged to refer to the figures in the manuscript for the specific results of interest. Nonetheless, the consistent significance of *Fealty* in all models (that is, the average marginal effect of *Fealty* on *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is significant and negative in all models) indicates negative relationships between appointee ideological divergence and fealty, or positive relationships between ideological proximity and fealty, thus implying consistent complementarities, as discussed in the main paper. However, **Figure 1** also shows that these marginal effects are conditional on both partisan and ideological interbranch conflict, which are not picked up in the tables.

Tables A-11 through **A-14** present results aggregated from KRLS models fit on each of the 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty*. The presented point estimates are the mean estimates across all models, and the standard errors presented are the empirical standard errors across all models (conditional on divided government status and *Fealty* estimation procedure). With the exception of the EFA results for divided government, the results are quite comparable to those presented in **Tables A-1** through **A-8** and the main paper. This is further supported by the results in **Figures A-1** through **A-4**, which present the marginal effects of *Fealty* on *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* for each of the 1,000 models. Though the EFA-based results display much more variance than the OLS-based results, the broader trends are still present—complementarities dominate in all models, but the

strength of the complementarities decrease much more rapidly (in that the marginal effects increase) as *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* (regardless of which pivot is used to capture Senate preferences) increases under divided government than under unified government. That is, under unified government, the relationship between the marginal effect of *Fealty* and *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* is generally stable, albeit estimated with less precision (especially when using committee-based pivots), whereas it is generally positive under divided government. These results support those presented in the main text as well as those in **Tables A-1** through **A-8**.

The ordered logistic results discussed in the main text are presented in **Tables A-9** and **A-10**, and those based on the aggregated results of models presented on each posterior estimate of *Fealty* are presented in **Tables A-15** and **A-16**. As indicated by the shading in the table, the key coefficients are the interaction terms between *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* (depending on which pivot is used) and *Divided Government*. These are negative in *all* models (except for the model in **Table A-10** that is based on the committee median and uses the mean EFA-based score), which suggests that, under divided government, higher degrees of ideological divergence between the president and the Senate are associated with higher probabilities of substitutive-type appointees (and lower probabilities of complementary types), which is entirely consistent with the main hypotheses of interest. Additionally, **Figure A-5** presents a version of **Figure 4** from the main text that is instead based on the 1,000 models estimated on the individual posterior estimates, and the results are substantively similar to those presented in the manuscript.

Finally, **Tables A-17** through **A-20** relax the underlying ordered assumption of the substitute-complement scale and disaggregate appointee into five different types—high fealty/low ideological proximity, low fealty/high ideological proximity, low fealty/low ideological proximity, high fealty/high ideological proximity, and the baseline of “neither

substitute nor complement.” While these results show some heterogeneity across appointee types, they are broadly consistent with the ordered logit results reported in the manuscript, with less complementarity and more substitution under high levels of interbranch conflict. For example, **Table A-17** suggests that when the Senate median and/or filibuster pivot are used as the pivots of interest, the interaction term between *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* and *Divided Government* is negative, but only for the *Both High* category of complement-type appointees. This indicates that interbranch conflict is associated with lower rates of certain types of complementary-type appointees, consistent with **Hypothesis 1**. Conversely, when the committee chair and/or committee median are used as the pivots of interest, the interaction term between *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* and *Divided Government* is positive, but only for the *Low Fealty/High Ideological Proximity* category of substitute-type appointees, which suggests that interbranch conflict is associated with higher levels of substitution-type appointees, consistent with **Hypothesis 2**. The analogous results for the multinomial logistic models based on the EFA-type *Fealty* estimates (**Tables A-19** and **A-20**) provide substantively similar conclusions, though the effects there are limited to decreasing complements (of both types) under divided government, though not when the committee median is the pivot of interest. Overall, however, the results in this **Appendix** provide evidence that the results presented in the manuscript are robust to different empirical and estimation strategies, subject to the aforementioned caveats.

**Table A-1: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Senate Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)**

	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Score</i>	
	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>
Fealty	-0.326*** (0.082)	-0.160** (0.063)	-0.794*** (0.056)	-0.485*** (0.057)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.054 (0.037)	-0.056 (0.062)	0.014 (0.050)	-0.106 (0.087)
Senate Polarization	-0.013 (0.030)	0.004 (0.020)	0.037 (0.090)	-0.003 (0.034)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.133 (0.124)	-0.136 (0.105)	-0.132 (0.102)	-0.128 (0.116)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.176 (0.129)	-0.136 (0.105)	-0.205** (0.103)	-0.140 (0.115)
Policy Expertise	0.103 (0.132)	-0.070 (0.109)	0.220* (0.113)	-0.146 (0.126)
Priority Agency	-0.076*** (0.019)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.040* (0.022)	-0.007 (0.020)
Supervisory Position	-0.322** (0.129)	-0.098 (0.112)	-0.187* (0.100)	-0.028 (0.118)
Presidential Approval	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)
Congress	0.002 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.001 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.015)
R ²	0.303	0.207	0.757	0.471
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

**Table A-2: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)**

	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>
Fealty	-0.326*** (0.083)	-0.166*** (0.063)	-0.801*** (0.057)	-0.495*** (0.057)
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	0.024* (0.014)	-0.035 (0.050)	0.019 (0.026)	-0.080 (0.066)
Senate Polarization	-0.013 (0.030)	0.020 (0.022)	0.051 (0.115)	0.023 (0.034)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.130 (0.125)	-0.141 (0.105)	-0.127 (0.104)	-0.131 (0.116)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.178 (0.130)	-0.142 (0.106)	-0.208** (0.105)	-0.142 (0.115)
Policy Expertise	0.108 (0.133)	-0.081 (0.109)	0.225* (0.115)	-0.157 (0.125)
Priority Agency	-0.077*** (0.019)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.040* (0.022)	-0.007 (0.020)
Supervisory Position	-0.323** (0.130)	-0.101 (0.112)	-0.190* (0.102)	-0.030 (0.118)
Presidential Approval	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)
Congress	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.015)
R ²	0.298	0.205	0.749	0.469
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

**Table A-3: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Chair as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)**

	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>
Fealty	-0.499*** (0.120)	-0.151*** (0.053)	-0.857*** (0.056)	-0.482*** (0.055)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.072 (0.073)	-0.014 (0.031)	0.069 (0.071)	0.007 (0.047)
Senate Polarization	-0.106 (0.086)	0.014 (0.018)	0.086 (0.108)	0.036 (0.034)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.071 (0.143)	-0.122 (0.092)	-0.071 (0.101)	-0.120 (0.115)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.199 (0.147)	-0.120 (0.093)	-0.168* (0.101)	-0.132 (0.114)
Policy Expertise	0.197 (0.154)	-0.069 (0.096)	0.285*** (0.109)	-0.153 (0.125)
Priority Agency	-0.114*** (0.026)	-0.020* (0.012)	-0.045** (0.021)	-0.013 (0.019)
Supervisory Position	-0.367** (0.147)	-0.108 (0.100)	-0.217** (0.100)	-0.044 (0.118)
Presidential Approval	0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)
Congress	0.003 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.018 (0.029)	-0.005 (0.014)
R ²	0.454	0.172	0.794	0.467
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

**Table A-4: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)**

	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>
Fealty	-0.447*** (0.110)	-0.155*** (0.054)	-0.828*** (0.054)	-0.473*** (0.056)
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-0.033 (0.059)	-0.041 (0.040)	-0.004 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.060)
Senate Polarization	-0.037 (0.060)	0.011 (0.019)	0.085 (0.095)	0.034 (0.036)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.084 (0.139)	-0.114 (0.093)	-0.076 (0.098)	-0.098 (0.114)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.215 (0.144)	-0.122 (0.093)	-0.178* (0.101)	-0.137 (0.115)
Policy Expertise	0.191 (0.149)	-0.067 (0.097)	0.290*** (0.106)	-0.111 (0.125)
Priority Agency	-0.104*** (0.023)	-0.020* (0.012)	-0.038* (0.020)	-0.012 (0.019)
Supervisory Position	-0.369** (0.143)	-0.100 (0.100)	-0.220** (0.096)	-0.024 (0.117)
Presidential Approval	0.002 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)
Congress	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.039 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.015)
R ²	0.440	0.169	0.813	0.468
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

**Table A-5: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Senate Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)**

	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>
Fealty	-0.341 [-0.480; -0.186]	-0.170 [-0.257; -0.072]	-0.708 [-1.534; 0.068]	-0.506 [-0.923; -0.072]
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.052 [0.009; 0.088]	-0.050 [-0.152; 0.074]	0.003 [-0.059; 0.081]	-0.100 [-0.296; 0.134]
Senate Polarization	-0.020 [-0.061; 0.031]	0.006 [-0.019; 0.026]	0.026 [-0.062; 0.126]	-0.002 [-0.039; 0.034]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.139 [-0.261; -0.021]	-0.112 [-0.213; -0.043]	-0.094 [-0.359; 0.044]	-0.088 [-0.251; 0.039]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.148 [-0.287; -0.042]	-0.130 [-0.257; 0.000]	-0.148 [-0.338; 0.004]	-0.128 [-0.317; 0.048]
Policy Expertise	0.096 [-0.137; 0.333]	-0.058 [-0.252; 0.119]	0.189 [-0.189; 0.554]	-0.155 [-0.469; 0.169]
Priority Agency	-0.068 [-0.110; -0.045]	-0.021 [-0.040; 0.000]	-0.028 [-0.098; 0.022]	-0.010 [-0.045; 0.026]
Supervisory Position	-0.289 [-0.626; 0.007]	-0.070 [-0.175; 0.022]	-0.056 [-0.433; 0.127]	-0.005 [-0.156; 0.109]
Presidential Approval	0.001 [-0.007; 0.006]	0.000 [-0.003; 0.004]	0.000 [-0.014; 0.014]	0.005 [-0.005; 0.012]
Congress	-0.001 [-0.014; 0.017]	-0.007 [-0.015; -0.000]	-0.001 [-0.029; 0.029]	-0.005 [-0.019; 0.010]
R ²	0.303	0.207	0.757	0.471
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

**Table A-6: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)**

	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>
Fealty	-0.338 [-0.481; -0.189]	-0.180 [-0.258; -0.070]	-0.689 [-1.549; 0.059]	-0.517 [-0.944; -0.068]
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	0.025 [0.002; 0.040]	-0.042 [-0.107; 0.059]	0.020 [-0.010; 0.051]	-0.069 [-0.251; 0.088]
Senate Polarization	-0.013 [-0.053; 0.033]	0.016 [-0.009; 0.041]	0.037 [-0.059; 0.142]	0.013 [-0.026; 0.065]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.140 [-0.262; -0.020]	-0.114 [-0.233; -0.045]	-0.091 [-0.332; 0.039]	-0.088 [-0.272; 0.028]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.147 [-0.292; -0.041]	-0.125 [-0.245; -0.010]	-0.150 [-0.320; 0.001]	-0.128 [-0.338; 0.058]
Policy Expertise	0.098 [-0.140; 0.347]	-0.069 [-0.253; 0.108]	0.169 [-0.181; 0.528]	-0.157 [-0.476; 0.152]
Priority Agency	-0.067 [-0.114; -0.046]	-0.021 [-0.039; -0.000]	-0.024 [-0.094; 0.023]	-0.007 [-0.045; 0.026]
Supervisory Position	-0.283 [-0.629; 0.012]	-0.077 [-0.189; 0.016]	-0.068 [-0.417; 0.127]	-0.012 [-0.169; 0.102]
Presidential Approval	0.003 [-0.006; 0.007]	0.000 [-0.003; 0.003]	0.002 [-0.013; 0.014]	0.004 [-0.006; 0.010]
Congress	-0.006 [-0.016; 0.007]	-0.004 [-0.012; 0.004]	-0.014 [-0.040; 0.023]	-0.001 [-0.020; 0.011]
R ²	0.298	0.205	0.749	0.469
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

**Table A-7: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Chair as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)**

	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>
Fealty	-0.496 [-0.824; -0.238]	-0.161 [-0.228; -0.068]	-0.765 [-1.658; 0.115]	-0.513 [-0.942; -0.029]
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.051 [-0.006; 0.140]	-0.014 [-0.050; 0.029]	0.027 [-0.055; 0.198]	0.030 [-0.068; 0.117]
Senate Polarization	-0.078 [-0.200; 0.018]	0.012 [-0.005; 0.028]	0.095 [-0.042; 0.204]	0.024 [-0.005; 0.069]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.082 [-0.264; 0.067]	-0.108 [-0.196; -0.040]	-0.033 [-0.231; 0.111]	-0.072 [-0.238; 0.033]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.137 [-0.366; 0.021]	-0.104 [-0.206; -0.007]	-0.112 [-0.321; 0.066]	-0.097 [-0.334; 0.071]
Policy Expertise	0.141 [-0.275; 0.595]	-0.045 [-0.187; 0.077]	0.242 [-0.131; 0.656]	-0.173 [-0.480; 0.126]
Priority Agency	-0.094 [-0.188; -0.048]	-0.021 [-0.032; -0.008]	-0.029 [-0.096; 0.022]	-0.016 [-0.045; 0.014]
Supervisory Position	-0.252 [-0.782; 0.077]	-0.088 [-0.188; -0.014]	-0.101 [-0.462; 0.123]	-0.033 [-0.168; 0.083]
Presidential Approval	0.003 [-0.013; 0.016]	-0.001 [-0.003; 0.002]	0.001 [-0.013; 0.014]	0.002 [-0.007; 0.008]
Congress	0.001 [-0.020; 0.027]	-0.004 [-0.008; 0.003]	-0.020 [-0.051; 0.021]	-0.005 [-0.018; 0.008]
R2	0.454	0.172	0.794	0.467
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

**Table A-8: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)**

	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>
Fealty	-0.445 [-0.702; -0.227]	-0.174 [-0.228; -0.088]	-0.751 [-1.638; 0.110]	-0.502 [-0.920; -0.030]
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-0.017 [-0.160; 0.070]	-0.047 [-0.088; 0.007]	-0.009 [-0.114; 0.104]	-0.035 [-0.127; 0.110]
Senate Polarization	-0.036 [-0.115; 0.044]	0.010 [-0.009; 0.027]	0.090 [-0.062; 0.209]	0.021 [-0.012; 0.064]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.088 [-0.263; 0.051]	-0.097 [-0.185; -0.036]	-0.045 [-0.299; 0.117]	-0.051 [-0.245; 0.065]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.162 [-0.374; -0.019]	-0.104 [-0.221; -0.016]	-0.099 [-0.348; 0.075]	-0.102 [-0.338; 0.045]
Policy Expertise	0.150 [-0.168; 0.539]	-0.050 [-0.189; 0.068]	0.275 [-0.123; 0.644]	-0.123 [-0.395; 0.181]
Priority Agency	-0.095 [-0.142; -0.050]	-0.020 [-0.034; -0.007]	-0.033 [-0.091; 0.034]	-0.014 [-0.039; 0.013]
Supervisory Position	-0.276 [-0.730; 0.045]	-0.089 [-0.161; -0.004]	-0.129 [-0.429; 0.100]	-0.010 [-0.140; 0.111]
Presidential Approval	0.004 [-0.011; 0.013]	-0.001 [-0.004; 0.001]	-0.001 [-0.016; 0.015]	0.001 [-0.006; 0.007]
Congress	-0.014 [-0.051; 0.007]	-0.005 [-0.010; 0.004]	-0.035 [-0.088; 0.012]	-0.010 [-0.024; 0.007]
R2	0.440	0.169	0.813	0.468
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

Table A-9: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivots as Pivots of Interest)

	<u>Senate Median</u>		<u>Filibuster Pivot</u>	
	OLS-Based Scores	EFA-Based Scores	OLS-Based Scores	EFA-Based Scores
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.462*	0.453*	-	-
	(0.236)	(0.245)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	-	-	1.514**	1.525**
			(0.674)	(0.692)
Senate Polarization	-0.646*	-1.246***	-2.706**	-3.347***
	(0.356)	(0.368)	(1.249)	(1.281)
Divided Government	0.011	-0.096	-1.000*	-1.110**
	(0.319)	(0.332)	(0.528)	(0.543)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-1.434***	-1.385***	-	-
	(0.387)	(0.394)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-	-	-2.273***	-2.254***
			(0.731)	(0.747)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.341	0.579	2.727**	2.990**
	(0.345)	(0.362)	(1.226)	(1.260)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.031	-0.212	-0.029	-0.213
	(0.204)	(0.215)	(0.204)	(0.215)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.214	-0.413*	-0.220	-0.419*
	(0.211)	(0.220)	(0.211)	(0.221)
Policy Expertise	-0.403	-0.062	-0.424	-0.085
	(0.260)	(0.274)	(0.260)	(0.274)
Supervisory Position	-0.079	-0.201	-0.083	-0.204
	(0.168)	(0.177)	(0.168)	(0.178)
Priority Agency	-0.091**	-0.108***	-0.092**	-0.109***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Presidential Approval	-0.006	-0.012	-0.008	-0.014
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Congress	0.044***	0.220***	0.017**	0.195***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cutpoint 1	2.499***	19.571***	-1.080***	16.210***
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.120)	(0.126)
Cutpoint 2	4.156***	22.305***	0.588***	18.959***
	(0.102)	(0.138)	(0.152)	(0.180)
AIC	1217.451	1079.724	1213.046	1075.692
BIC	1277.992	1140.265	1273.587	1136.233
Log Likelihood	-594.725	-525.862	-592.523	-523.846
Likelihood Ratio Test	24.491**	32.259***	28.895***	36.291***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of <i>Divided Gov't</i>	12.827	23.106**	13.866	25.383**
Score Test	11.824	19.816*	13.753	20.867*
Number of Observations	558	558	558	558

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. The Score Test examines the null hypothesis that the parallel trends assumptions holds against the alternative that different coefficients are needed for different values of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

**Table A-10: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest)**

	<u>Committee Chair</u>		<u>Committee Median</u>	
	OLS-Based Scores	EFA-Based Scores	OLS-Based Scores	EFA-Based Scores
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.303 (0.270)	0.356 (0.286)	-	-
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-	-	0.163 (0.173)	0.031 (0.182)
Senate Polarization	-0.173 (0.437)	-0.960** (0.465)	0.216 (0.263)	-0.269 (0.276)
Divided Government	-0.271 (0.257)	-0.417 (0.273)	-0.165 (0.240)	-0.136 (0.255)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-0.827*** (0.313)	-0.894*** (0.331)	-	-
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-	-	-0.437* (0.248)	-0.340 (0.260)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.338 (0.437)	0.697 (0.466)	0.121 (0.276)	0.247 (0.292)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.012 (0.212)	-0.177 (0.224)	-0.083 (0.209)	-0.254 (0.221)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.205 (0.217)	-0.403* (0.227)	-0.233 (0.216)	-0.430* (0.228)
Policy Expertise	-0.467* (0.265)	-0.183 (0.280)	-0.487* (0.264)	-0.182 (0.279)
Supervisory Position	0.023 (0.175)	-0.089 (0.186)	0.048 (0.174)	-0.063 (0.185)
Priority Agency	-0.079** (0.037)	-0.101*** (0.038)	-0.067* (0.036)	-0.092** (0.037)
Presidential Approval	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)
Congress	-0.081*** (0.005)	0.118*** (0.005)	-0.116*** (0.005)	0.058*** (0.005)
Cutpoint 1	-10.133*** (0.021)	9.131*** (0.024)	-13.580*** (0.013)	3.351*** (0.014)
Cutpoint 2	-8.439*** (0.106)	11.990*** (0.148)	-11.915*** (0.103)	6.161*** (0.145)
AIC	1159.270	1012.787	1170.862	1023.785
BIC	1219.222	1072.738	1230.814	1083.737
Log Likelihood	-565.635	-492.393	-571.431	-497.892
Likelihood Ratio Test	30.654***	43.822***	19.062*	32.824***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of <i>Divided Gov't</i>	20.408**	35.902***	15.842*	31.153***
Score Test	9.506	14.663	11.135	15.683
Number of Observations	535	535	535	535

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Faalty* and *Ideological Proximity/Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. The Score Test examines the null hypothesis that the parallel trends assumptions holds against the alternative that different coefficients are needed for different values of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-11: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivots as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	<u>SENATE MEDIAN</u>				<u>FILIBUSTER PIVOT</u>			
	<u>OLS-Based Scores</u>		<u>EFA-Based Scores</u>		<u>OLS-Based Scores</u>		<u>EFA-Based Scores</u>	
	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>
Fealty	-0.324*** (0.087)	-0.155*** (0.032)	-0.225** (0.098)	-0.133* (0.072)	-0.333*** (0.089)	-0.154*** (0.031)	-0.225** (0.098)	-0.132* (0.072)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.052*** (0.011)	-0.049*** (0.016)	0.050** (0.021)	-0.047* (0.024)	–	–	–	–
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	–	–	–	–	0.023*** (0.005)	-0.027*** (0.010)	0.024** (0.010)	-0.028* (0.017)
Senate Polarization	-0.012 (0.025)	0.004 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.027)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.015 (0.032)	0.016*** (0.004)	-0.007 (0.033)	0.019** (0.008)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.130*** (0.014)	-0.129*** (0.015)	-0.122*** (0.034)	-0.119*** (0.025)	-0.127*** (0.014)	-0.129*** (0.014)	-0.121*** (0.034)	-0.121*** (0.023)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.177*** (0.022)	-0.133*** (0.016)	-0.175*** (0.037)	-0.126*** (0.026)	-0.182*** (0.023)	-0.134*** (0.015)	-0.177*** (0.037)	-0.128*** (0.024)
Policy Expertise	0.096 (0.077)	-0.027 (0.058)	0.107 (0.084)	-0.028 (0.061)	0.100 (0.079)	-0.034 (0.055)	0.112 (0.085)	-0.035 (0.060)
Priority Agency	-0.071*** (0.013)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.060*** (0.012)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.074*** (0.013)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.062*** (0.012)	-0.015*** (0.004)
Supervisory Position	-0.310*** (0.016)	-0.097*** (0.009)	-0.274*** (0.039)	-0.088*** (0.027)	-0.313*** (0.015)	-0.099*** (0.008)	-0.277*** (0.040)	-0.091*** (0.025)
Presidential Approval	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Congress	0.002 (0.005)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.003)
R ²	0.273	0.195	0.394	0.252	0.292	0.163	0.399	0.234
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty* and *Policy Expertise* (as these are initially estimated via a series of indicators); the listed coefficients are the mean estimates across all models and the indicated standard errors are the empirical standard deviations thereof.

Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

**Table A-12: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest;
Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)**

	<i>COMMITTEE CHAIR</i>				<i>COMMITTEE MEDIAN</i>			
	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>		<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>
Fealty	-0.435*** (0.133)	-0.150*** (0.031)	-0.249** (0.099)	-0.132* (0.072)	-0.435*** (0.117)	-0.141*** (0.029)	-0.248*** (0.095)	-0.126* (0.072)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.056** (0.022)	-0.012*** (0.004)	0.049* (0.029)	-0.009 (0.010)	-	-	-	-
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-	-	-	-	-0.022 (0.018)	-0.033*** (0.006)	-0.012 (0.032)	-0.028** (0.013)
Senate Polarization	-0.053 (0.062)	0.014*** (0.004)	-0.020 (0.046)	0.019* (0.010)	-0.022 (0.039)	0.009*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.041)	0.014 (0.009)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.099*** (0.023)	-0.120*** (0.013)	-0.090** (0.041)	-0.114*** (0.022)	-0.095*** (0.022)	-0.104*** (0.011)	-0.086** (0.041)	-0.100*** (0.020)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.188*** (0.025)	-0.123*** (0.013)	-0.171*** (0.041)	-0.119*** (0.023)	-0.206*** (0.028)	-0.113*** (0.013)	-0.185*** (0.041)	-0.115*** (0.024)
Policy Expertise	0.127 (0.088)	-0.028 (0.053)	0.133 (0.094)	-0.029 (0.058)	0.137 (0.087)	-0.026 (0.047)	0.142 (0.094)	-0.024 (0.054)
Priority Agency	-0.089*** (0.021)	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.067*** (0.016)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.090*** (0.017)	-0.018*** (0.002)	-0.069*** (0.015)	-0.017*** (0.003)
Supervisory Position	-0.346*** (0.018)	-0.107*** (0.007)	-0.307*** (0.040)	-0.099*** (0.024)	-0.350*** (0.018)	-0.096*** (0.006)	-0.314*** (0.041)	-0.087*** (0.022)
Presidential Approval	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Congress	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.004)
R ²	0.329	0.167	0.442	0.230	0.387	0.132	0.480	0.200
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty* and *Policy Expertise* (as these are initially estimated via a series of indicators); the listed coefficients are the mean estimates across all models and the indicated standard errors are the empirical standard deviations thereof.

Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-13: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Quartiles of Marginal Effects; Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivots of Interest;
Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	<i>SENATE MEDIAN</i>				<i>FILIBUSTER PIVOT</i>			
	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>		<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>	<u>Unified Gov't</u>	<u>Divided Gov't</u>
Fealty	-0.309	-0.153	-0.162	-0.099	-0.314	-0.151	-0.160	-0.099
	[-0.458; -0.182]	[-0.239; -0.066]	[-0.338; -0.054]	[-0.206; -0.030]	[-0.473; -0.182]	[-0.231; -0.070]	[-0.339; -0.051]	[-0.202; -0.033]
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.047	-0.040	0.043	-0.035	-	-	-	-
	[0.010; 0.085]	[-0.140; 0.062]	[0.003; 0.088]	[-0.149; 0.068]				
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	-	-	-	-	0.022	-0.029	0.022	-0.025
					[0.005; 0.036]	[-0.085; 0.040]	[0.004; 0.038]	[-0.095; 0.045]
Senate Polarization	-0.011	0.005	-0.009	0.005	-0.011	0.013	-0.007	0.013
	[-0.053; 0.031]	[-0.016; 0.022]	[-0.053; 0.035]	[-0.017; 0.026]	[-0.048; 0.028]	[-0.007; 0.034]	[-0.044; 0.032]	[-0.009; 0.039]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.131	-0.109	-0.115	-0.099	-0.130	-0.110	-0.114	-0.101
	[-0.241; -0.028]	[-0.205; -0.039]	[-0.230; -0.011]	[-0.199; -0.021]	[-0.240; -0.024]	[-0.209; -0.040]	[-0.229; -0.008]	[-0.203; -0.022]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.149	-0.115	-0.135	-0.098	-0.151	-0.113	-0.137	-0.099
	[-0.285; -0.044]	[-0.237; -0.003]	[-0.277; -0.032]	[-0.230; 0.004]	[-0.293; -0.045]	[-0.229; -0.013]	[-0.282; -0.033]	[-0.226; -0.001]
Policy Expertise	0.067	-0.025	0.075	-0.026	0.070	-0.029	0.078	-0.032
	[-0.103; 0.262]	[-0.165; 0.111]	[-0.105; 0.278]	[-0.178; 0.117]	[-0.108; 0.271]	[-0.158; 0.093]	[-0.106; 0.287]	[-0.175; 0.102]
Priority Agency	-0.062	-0.019	-0.051	-0.016	-0.063	-0.019	-0.051	-0.016
	[-0.095; -0.039]	[-0.035; -0.002]	[-0.083; -0.028]	[-0.031; 0.001]	[-0.100; -0.040]	[-0.034; -0.004]	[-0.086; -0.027]	[-0.030; -0.001]
Supervisory Position	-0.262	-0.073	-0.208	-0.065	-0.259	-0.077	-0.205	-0.074
	[-0.570; -0.014]	[-0.181; 0.011]	[-0.506; 0.005]	[-0.178; 0.026]	[-0.588; -0.004]	[-0.179; -0.001]	[-0.518; 0.010]	[-0.176; 0.016]
Presidential Approval	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	-0.000	0.001	0.000
	[-0.006; 0.005]	[-0.003; 0.003]	[-0.006; 0.005]	[-0.003; 0.004]	[-0.005; 0.006]	[-0.003; 0.002]	[-0.005; 0.007]	[-0.003; 0.003]
Congress	-0.001	-0.007	-0.002	-0.007	-0.006	-0.004	-0.007	-0.004
	[-0.012; 0.013]	[-0.015; 0.001]	[-0.015; 0.012]	[-0.016; 0.002]	[-0.016; 0.006]	[-0.010; 0.003]	[-0.020; 0.005]	[-0.012; 0.004]
R ²	0.273	0.195	0.394	0.252	0.292	0.163	0.399	0.234
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty* and *Policy Expertise* (as these are initially estimated via a series of indicators). The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same. Fit statistics are medians.

Table A-14: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Quartiles of Marginal Effects; Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest;
Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	<i>COMMITTEE CHAIR</i>				<i>COMMITTEE MEDIAN</i>			
	<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>		<i>OLS-Based Scores</i>		<i>EFA-Based Scores</i>	
	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>	<i>Unified Gov't</i>	<i>Divided Gov't</i>
Fealty	-0.390	-0.148	-0.182	-0.096	-0.403	-0.145	-0.185	-0.091
	[-0.617; -0.216]	[-0.230; -0.063]	[-0.375; -0.063]	[-0.202; -0.031]	[-0.629; -0.218]	[-0.206; -0.075]	[-0.379; -0.061]	[-0.189; -0.032]
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.040	-0.010	0.037	-0.008	-	-	-	-
	[0.010; 0.083]	[-0.046; 0.027]	[0.005; 0.081]	[-0.050; 0.036]				
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-	-	-	-	-0.009	-0.037	-0.002	-0.034
					[-0.096; 0.052]	[-0.073; 0.006]	[-0.076; 0.057]	[-0.080; 0.020]
Senate Polarization	-0.028	0.011	-0.014	0.013	-0.017	0.007	-0.005	0.009
	[-0.089; 0.024]	[-0.005; 0.029]	[-0.063; 0.034]	[-0.006; 0.036]	[-0.080; 0.044]	[-0.009; 0.023]	[-0.059; 0.055]	[-0.010; 0.030]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.105	-0.103	-0.085	-0.094	-0.095	-0.086	-0.079	-0.079
	[-0.229; 0.011]	[-0.195; -0.035]	[-0.210; 0.030]	[-0.192; -0.020]	[-0.227; 0.019]	[-0.168; -0.033]	[-0.210; 0.039]	[-0.167; -0.017]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.150	-0.099	-0.130	-0.089	-0.161	-0.092	-0.137	-0.086
	[-0.335; -0.012]	[-0.209; -0.009]	[-0.296; -0.005]	[-0.213; 0.002]	[-0.356; -0.016]	[-0.194; -0.019]	[-0.316; -0.006]	[-0.198; -0.007]
Policy Expertise	0.087	-0.021	0.095	-0.024	0.097	-0.019	0.104	-0.020
	[-0.127; 0.332]	[-0.139; 0.089]	[-0.107; 0.324]	[-0.159; 0.101]	[-0.117; 0.347]	[-0.111; 0.067]	[-0.102; 0.341]	[-0.129; 0.084]
Priority Agency	-0.072	-0.020	-0.054	-0.018	-0.078	-0.018	-0.059	-0.017
	[-0.126; -0.041]	[-0.033; -0.007]	[-0.096; -0.028]	[-0.031; -0.004]	[-0.126; -0.044]	[-0.029; -0.008]	[-0.099; -0.029]	[-0.029; -0.005]
Supervisory Position	-0.284	-0.087	-0.236	-0.083	-0.289	-0.082	-0.243	-0.074
	[-0.675; 0.027]	[-0.184; -0.014]	[-0.574; 0.020]	[-0.186; 0.004]	[-0.667; 0.009]	[-0.155; -0.014]	[-0.574; 0.006]	[-0.160; 0.006]
Presidential Approval	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.003	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	[-0.008; 0.008]	[-0.003; 0.002]	[-0.007; 0.008]	[-0.004; 0.002]	[-0.007; 0.010]	[-0.003; 0.001]	[-0.006; 0.009]	[-0.003; 0.002]
Congress	-0.005	-0.004	-0.008	-0.004	-0.011	-0.004	-0.012	-0.004
	[-0.019; 0.011]	[-0.010; 0.002]	[-0.022; 0.007]	[-0.012; 0.003]	[-0.033; 0.007]	[-0.009; 0.003]	[-0.032; 0.005]	[-0.012; 0.003]
R ²	0.329	0.167	0.442	0.230	0.387	0.132	0.480	0.200
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty* and *Policy Expertise* (as these are initially estimated via a series of indicators). The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same. Fit statistics are medians.

Table A-15: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivots of Interest;
Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	<i>Senate Median</i>		<i>Filibuster Pivot</i>	
	OLS-Based Scores	EFA-Based Scores	OLS-Based Scores	EFA-Based Scores
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.503*** (0.070)	0.384* (0.199)	–	–
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	–	–	1.554*** (0.161)	1.180** (0.547)
Senate Polarization	-0.846*** (0.154)	-0.961** (0.490)	-2.900*** (0.338)	-2.503** (1.110)
Divided Government	0.025 (0.049)	-0.042 (0.244)	-0.986*** (0.101)	-0.817* (0.417)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-1.497*** (0.073)	-1.150*** (0.362)	–	–
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	–	–	-2.311*** (0.158)	-1.741*** (0.610)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.427*** (0.114)	0.473 (0.302)	2.835*** (0.311)	2.299** (1.012)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.017 (0.040)	-0.029 (0.171)	0.018 (0.039)	-0.031 (0.171)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.219*** (0.035)	-0.188 (0.182)	-0.225*** (0.035)	-0.192 (0.182)
Supervisory Position	-0.109*** (0.025)	-0.204 (0.124)	-0.111*** (0.026)	-0.204 (0.124)
Policy Expertise	-0.230* (0.139)	-0.164 (0.196)	-0.247* (0.140)	-0.176 (0.195)
Priority Agency	-0.099*** (0.006)	-0.080** (0.034)	-0.099*** (0.006)	-0.079** (0.033)
Presidential Approval	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.010*** (0.001)	-0.009 (0.007)
Congress	0.091*** (0.029)	0.149 (0.091)	0.056* (0.029)	0.118 (0.084)
Cutpoint 1	7.326** (2.946)	12.868 (9.465)	2.937 (2.950)	9.058 (8.705)
Cutpoint 2	8.890*** (2.942)	15.482 (9.481)	4.509 (2.948)	11.676 (8.719)
AIC	1219.252	1107.305	1215.356	1106.214
BIC	1279.793	1167.846	1275.897	1166.755
Log Likelihood	-595.626	-539.652	-593.678	-539.107
Likelihood Ratio Test	21.509**	28.035***	25.404**	29.126***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of <i>Divided Gov't</i>	1.546	19.437***	3.281*	21.303***
Number of Observations	558	558	558	558

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity/Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of the dependent variable (as *Fealty* is initially estimated via a series of indicators); the coefficients and all fit statistics are medians. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-16: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest;
Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	<i>Committee Chair</i>		<i>Committee Median</i>	
	OLS-Based Scores	EFA-Based Scores	OLS-Based Scores	EFA-Based Scores
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.311*** (0.064)	0.249 (0.217)	-	-
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-	-	0.176*** (0.034)	0.070 (0.140)
Senate Polarization	-0.303 (0.186)	-0.593 (0.461)	0.048 (0.131)	-0.208 (0.361)
Divided Government	-0.222*** (0.067)	-0.227 (0.203)	-0.093** (0.039)	-0.057 (0.191)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-0.839*** (0.077)	-0.643** (0.257)	-	-
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-	-	-0.521*** (0.051)	-0.339* (0.202)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.378*** (0.121)	0.460 (0.355)	0.153** (0.075)	0.197 (0.232)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.035 (0.040)	-0.040 (0.177)	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.093 (0.176)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.210*** (0.034)	-0.168 (0.185)	-0.231*** (0.032)	-0.185 (0.183)
Supervisory Position	-0.021 (0.025)	-0.148 (0.133)	0.002 (0.025)	-0.130 (0.131)
Policy Expertise	-0.275* (0.142)	-0.206 (0.201)	-0.286** (0.142)	-0.210 (0.200)
Priority Agency	-0.088*** (0.006)	-0.068** (0.034)	-0.077*** (0.006)	-0.062* (0.033)
Presidential Approval	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.006)
Congress	-0.041 (0.029)	0.053 (0.079)	-0.067** (0.029)	0.025 (0.079)
Cutpoint 1	-6.092** (2.924)	3.138 (8.308)	-8.525*** (2.931)	0.469 (8.271)
Cutpoint 2	-4.501 (2.923)	5.788 (8.316)	-6.958** (2.930)	3.098 (8.275)
AIC	1162.525	1055.702	1172.968	1060.871
BIC	1222.477	1115.653	1232.920	1120.823
Log Likelihood	-567.263	-513.851	-572.484	-516.436
Likelihood Ratio Test	25.953**	31.918***	15.511	26.748***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of <i>Divided Gov't</i>	1.517	22.471***	1.666	21.263***
Number of Observations	535	535	535	535

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity/Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of the dependent variable (as *Fealty* is initially estimated via a series of indicators); the coefficients and all fit statistics are medians. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-17: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest, OLS Estimates of Fealty Used)

	<i>SENATE MEDIAN</i>				<i>FILIBUSTER PIVOT</i>			
	<u>Substitutes</u>		<u>Complements</u>		<u>Substitutes</u>		<u>Complements</u>	
	<u>High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Both Low</u>	<u>Both High</u>	<u>High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Both Low</u>	<u>Both High</u>
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	-0.810 (0.511)	-0.617* (0.368)	-0.245 (0.363)	0.315 (0.401)	-	-	-	-
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	-	-	-	-	-2.018 (1.496)	-1.225 (1.020)	0.026 (1.032)	1.422 (1.106)
Senate Polarization	1.629** (0.742)	0.696 (0.531)	0.784 (0.552)	-1.083* (0.608)	4.019 (2.730)	2.021 (1.874)	0.292 (1.918)	-3.114 (2.059)
Divided Government	0.701 (0.715)	0.224 (0.514)	0.476 (0.470)	0.058 (0.528)	1.571 (1.197)	0.492 (0.812)	-0.218 (0.796)	-1.238 (0.859)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	1.234 (0.838)	0.662 (0.587)	-0.832 (0.571)	-1.792** (0.729)	-	-	-	-
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-	-	-	-	2.105 (1.614)	1.239 (1.093)	-1.084 (1.114)	-2.580** (1.258)
Senate Polarization × Divided Gov't	-1.143 (0.726)	-0.453 (0.523)	-0.542 (0.552)	0.177 (0.583)	-3.825 (2.688)	-1.902 (1.846)	0.084 (1.887)	2.680 (2.010)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.420 (0.422)	-0.025 (0.318)	-0.170 (0.298)	0.462 (0.354)	0.442 (0.421)	-0.022 (0.317)	-0.150 (0.300)	0.472 (0.356)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.402 (0.477)	-0.160 (0.327)	-0.631** (0.313)	-0.170 (0.379)	-0.397 (0.477)	-0.149 (0.326)	-0.633** (0.314)	-0.171 (0.380)
Supervisory Position	0.681** (0.340)	-0.522* (0.274)	-0.649** (0.265)	0.454 (0.281)	0.665* (0.340)	-0.527* (0.273)	-0.665** (0.266)	0.448 (0.282)
Priority Agency	0.052 (0.075)	0.040 (0.049)	-0.057 (0.054)	-0.090 (0.071)	0.046 (0.075)	0.039 (0.049)	-0.062 (0.055)	-0.093 (0.071)
Presidential Approval	0.007 (0.018)	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.017)	0.004 (0.017)	0.005 (0.012)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.016)
Policy Expertise	-1.672*** (0.573)	0.978** (0.423)	0.325 (0.400)	-1.630*** (0.472)	-1.633*** (0.571)	0.990** (0.421)	0.319 (0.401)	-1.672*** (0.475)
Congress	-0.183*** (0.013)	-0.065*** (0.009)	-0.195*** (0.009)	0.246*** (0.011)	-0.117*** (0.015)	-0.029*** (0.010)	-0.155*** (0.011)	0.204*** (0.013)
Constant	15.723*** (0.052)	5.449*** (0.034)	19.856*** (0.041)	-26.016*** (0.044)	8.414*** (0.335)	1.598*** (0.166)	16.298*** (0.212)	-20.570*** (0.173)
AIC					1661.448			
BIC					1886.314			
Log Likelihood					-778.724			
Likelihood Ratio Test					109.129***			
Number of Observations					558			

Note: Multinomial logistic coefficients presented. The dependent variable is coded as “High Fealty, Low Ideological Proximity” if *Fealty* and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* are both in the top third of their ranges, “Low Fealty, High Ideological Proximity” if both are in the bottom third of their ranges, “Both Low” if *Fealty* is in the bottom third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the top third of its range, and “Both High” if *Fealty* is in the top third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the bottom third of its range. Observations are coded as *Neither*—the baseline category—otherwise. Values of *Fealty* under analysis are the means of 1,000 posterior draws. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-18: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivot of Interest, OLS Estimates of Fealty Used)

	<u>COMMITTEE CHAIR</u>				<u>COMMITTEE MEDIAN</u>			
	<u>Substitutes</u>		<u>Complements</u>		<u>Substitutes</u>		<u>Complements</u>	
	<u>High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Both Low</u>	<u>Both High</u>	<u>High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Both Low</u>	<u>Both High</u>
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.200 (0.683)	-0.928** (0.417)	-0.249 (0.401)	-0.106 (0.460)	-	-	-	-
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-	-	-	-	-0.035 (0.417)	-0.875*** (0.288)	-0.365 (0.259)	-0.317 (0.298)
Senate Polarization	0.366 (1.117)	1.439** (0.681)	1.271* (0.656)	0.067 (0.738)	0.710 (0.679)	1.267*** (0.411)	1.574*** (0.403)	0.798* (0.446)
Divided Government	0.432 (0.647)	0.281 (0.422)	-0.182 (0.374)	-0.262 (0.446)	0.698 (0.596)	0.270 (0.417)	0.011 (0.348)	0.041 (0.417)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-0.235 (0.765)	1.131** (0.479)	-0.297 (0.466)	-0.777 (0.580)	-	-	-	-
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-	-	-	-	-0.358 (0.581)	1.279*** (0.395)	0.169 (0.370)	-0.003 (0.458)
Senate Polarization × Divided Gov't	-0.411 (1.104)	-1.218* (0.681)	-0.620 (0.664)	-0.398 (0.740)	-0.866 (0.694)	-0.750* (0.428)	-0.568 (0.429)	-0.539 (0.474)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.730 (0.469)	-0.265 (0.334)	-0.224 (0.305)	0.434 (0.372)	0.730 (0.465)	-0.221 (0.332)	-0.274 (0.300)	0.378 (0.366)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.007 (0.519)	-0.121 (0.334)	-0.512 (0.317)	0.034 (0.391)	0.062 (0.523)	-0.210 (0.339)	-0.586* (0.315)	-0.046 (0.388)
Supervisory Position	0.364 (0.363)	-0.512* (0.289)	-0.514* (0.268)	0.441 (0.292)	0.362 (0.363)	-0.511* (0.290)	-0.499* (0.267)	0.478* (0.289)
Priority Agency	-0.011 (0.085)	0.050 (0.050)	-0.050 (0.054)	-0.082 (0.072)	-0.018 (0.083)	0.058 (0.050)	-0.037 (0.054)	-0.071 (0.072)
Presidential Approval	-0.006 (0.018)	0.003 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.012)	0.012 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.015)
Policy Expertise	-1.647*** (0.604)	0.925** (0.430)	0.224 (0.400)	-1.702*** (0.480)	-1.601*** (0.600)	0.945** (0.433)	0.227 (0.399)	-1.697*** (0.478)
Congress	-0.036*** (0.011)	-0.061*** (0.007)	-0.303*** (0.007)	0.086*** (0.009)	-0.041*** (0.011)	-0.145*** (0.008)	-0.384*** (0.007)	-0.074*** (0.009)
Constant	1.608*** (0.056)	5.211*** (0.030)	31.381*** (0.034)	-9.785*** (0.038)	2.156*** (0.034)	13.645*** (0.019)	39.439*** (0.021)	6.382*** (0.022)
AIC	1580.528				1588.257			
BIC	1803.206				1810.935			
Log Likelihood	-738.264				-742.128			
Likelihood Ratio Test	108.353***				100.624***			
Number of Observations	535				535			

Note: Multinomial logistic coefficients presented. The dependent variable is coded as “High Fealty, Low Ideological Proximity” if *Fealty* and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* are both in the top third of their ranges, “Low Fealty, High Ideological Proximity” if both are in the bottom third of their ranges, “Both Low” if *Fealty* is in the bottom third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the top third of its range, and “Both High” if *Fealty* is in the top third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the bottom third of its range. Observations are coded as *Neither*—the baseline category—otherwise. Values of *Fealty* under analysis are the means of 1,000 posterior draws. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-19: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest, EFA Estimates of Fealty Used)

	<i>SENATE MEDIAN</i>				<i>FILIBUSTER PIVOT</i>			
	<u>Substitutes</u>		<u>Complements</u>		<u>Substitutes</u>		<u>Complements</u>	
	<u>High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Both Low</u>	<u>Both High</u>	<u>High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Both Low</u>	<u>Both High</u>
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	-0.595 (0.496)	-0.107 (0.648)	0.231 (0.368)	0.541 (0.394)	-	-	-	-
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	-	-	-	-	-1.629 (1.464)	-0.384 (1.891)	1.005 (1.014)	1.857* (1.093)
Senate Polarization	1.133 (0.716)	0.283 (1.009)	-1.306** (0.545)	-1.392** (0.594)	3.141 (2.667)	0.868 (3.556)	-2.853 (1.879)	-3.896* (2.035)
Divided Government	0.478 (0.697)	-0.553 (0.803)	0.074 (0.491)	-0.213 (0.510)	1.329 (1.172)	-0.319 (1.435)	-0.778 (0.793)	-1.562* (0.848)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	1.148 (0.815)	0.297 (0.907)	-1.155** (0.587)	-1.909*** (0.712)	-	-	-	-
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-	-	-	-	1.846 (1.581)	0.648 (1.955)	-1.824* (1.105)	-2.958** (1.250)
Senate Polarization × Divided Gov't	-0.781 (0.702)	0.384 (1.022)	0.671 (0.531)	0.494 (0.573)	-3.074 (2.624)	-0.233 (3.531)	2.440 (1.842)	3.461* (1.985)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.502 (0.410)	0.963* (0.522)	-0.115 (0.301)	0.518 (0.343)	0.519 (0.409)	0.954* (0.522)	-0.107 (0.303)	0.522 (0.344)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.356 (0.466)	0.446 (0.550)	-0.862** (0.336)	-0.249 (0.372)	-0.353 (0.465)	0.456 (0.550)	-0.869*** (0.337)	-0.254 (0.373)
Supervisory Position	0.813** (0.331)	-0.332 (0.409)	-0.584** (0.284)	0.556** (0.274)	0.802** (0.331)	-0.323 (0.409)	-0.586** (0.285)	0.554** (0.275)
Priority Agency	0.031 (0.073)	0.014 (0.067)	-0.177*** (0.068)	-0.109 (0.069)	0.026 (0.073)	0.017 (0.067)	-0.179*** (0.068)	-0.111 (0.070)
Presidential Approval	0.005 (0.017)	0.023 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.017 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.023 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.023 (0.017)
Policy Expertise	-1.790*** (0.559)	0.898 (0.639)	0.490 (0.416)	-1.731*** (0.462)	-1.754*** (0.557)	0.890 (0.637)	0.474 (0.417)	-1.778*** (0.464)
Congress	-0.124*** (0.013)	-0.297*** (0.014)	0.218*** (0.009)	0.231*** (0.011)	-0.073*** (0.015)	-0.301*** (0.016)	0.225*** (0.011)	0.181*** (0.013)
Constant	9.405*** (0.051)	27.369*** (0.079)	-22.811*** (0.036)	-24.314*** (0.044)	3.615*** (0.332)	27.591*** (0.467)	-22.787*** (0.153)	-18.059*** (0.184)
AIC					1418.214		1413.550	
BIC					1643.081		1638.416	
Log Likelihood					-657.107		-654.775	
Likelihood Ratio Test					107.296***		111.961***	
Number of Observations					558		558	

Note: Multinomial logistic coefficients presented. The dependent variable is coded as “High Fealty, Low Ideological Proximity” if *Fealty* and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* are both in the top third of their ranges, “Low Fealty, High Ideological Proximity” if both are in the bottom third of their ranges, “Both Low” if *Fealty* is in the bottom third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the top third of its range, and “Both High” if *Fealty* is in the top third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the bottom third of its range. Observations are coded as *Neither*—the baseline category—otherwise. Values of *Fealty* under analysis are the means of 1,000 posterior draws. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-20: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest, EFA Estimates of Fealty Used)

	<u>COMMITTEE CHAIR</u>				<u>COMMITTEE MEDIAN</u>			
	<u>Substitutes</u>		<u>Complements</u>		<u>Substitutes</u>		<u>Complements</u>	
	<u>High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Both Low</u>	<u>Both High</u>	<u>High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity</u>	<u>Both Low</u>	<u>Both High</u>
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.503 (0.668)	-0.937 (0.655)	0.415 (0.401)	0.243 (0.445)	-	-	-	-
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-	-	-	-	0.205 (0.403)	-0.634 (0.452)	-0.045 (0.260)	-0.028 (0.286)
Senate Polarization	-0.368 (1.095)	1.772 (1.154)	-1.291** (0.651)	-0.499 (0.720)	0.056 (0.662)	1.212* (0.678)	-0.449 (0.399)	0.238 (0.431)
Divided Government	0.308 (0.636)	0.298 (0.722)	-0.435 (0.377)	-0.490 (0.442)	0.638 (0.584)	0.006 (0.667)	0.014 (0.366)	-0.072 (0.403)
President- Committee Chair Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-0.521 (0.750)	1.180 (0.735)	-0.978** (0.477)	-1.180** (0.570)	-	-	-	-
President- Committee Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-	-	-	-	-0.716 (0.566)	0.962 (0.604)	-0.435 (0.383)	-0.559 (0.456)
Senate Polarization × Divided Gov't	0.127 (1.081)	-1.164 (1.170)	1.007 (0.651)	0.111 (0.725)	-0.524 (0.676)	-0.433 (0.722)	0.343 (0.419)	-0.224 (0.463)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.849* (0.458)	0.571 (0.560)	-0.083 (0.306)	0.530 (0.360)	0.842* (0.455)	0.677 (0.547)	-0.164 (0.302)	0.464 (0.354)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.010 (0.508)	0.425 (0.566)	-0.799** (0.340)	-0.074 (0.384)	0.105 (0.512)	0.383 (0.565)	-0.799** (0.339)	-0.122 (0.381)
Supervisory Position	0.459 (0.355)	-0.477 (0.469)	-0.512* (0.287)	0.512* (0.285)	0.453 (0.355)	-0.492 (0.468)	-0.485* (0.286)	0.550* (0.283)
Priority Agency	-0.034 (0.083)	0.037 (0.070)	-0.170** (0.067)	-0.101 (0.070)	-0.045 (0.081)	0.036 (0.069)	-0.163** (0.067)	-0.094 (0.070)
Presidential Approval	-0.009 (0.017)	0.016 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.018)	0.018 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.015)
Policy Expertise	-1.705*** (0.590)	1.237* (0.678)	0.464 (0.418)	-1.745*** (0.468)	-1.666*** (0.586)	1.300* (0.680)	0.462 (0.415)	-1.750*** (0.467)
Congress	0.036*** (0.011)	-0.303*** (0.012)	0.128*** (0.007)	0.074*** (0.009)	0.062*** (0.011)	-0.364*** (0.012)	0.074*** (0.007)	-0.029*** (0.009)
Constant	-6.064*** (0.055)	27.613*** (0.055)	-13.185*** (0.031)	-8.366*** (0.038)	-8.654*** (0.033)	34.026*** (0.033)	-8.134*** (0.019)	1.957*** (0.022)
AIC	1334.511				1344.344			
BIC	1557.189				1567.022			
Log Likelihood	-615.255				-620.172			
Likelihood Ratio Test	107.601***				97.767***			
Number of Observations	535				535			

Note: Multinomial logistic coefficients presented. The dependent variable is coded as “High Fealty, Low Ideological Proximity” if *Fealty* and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* are both in the top third of their ranges, “Low Fealty, High Ideological Proximity” if both are in the bottom third of their ranges, “Both Low” if *Fealty* is in the bottom third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the top third of its range, and “Both High” if *Fealty* is in the top third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the bottom third of its range. Observations are coded as *Neither*—the baseline category—otherwise. Values of *Fealty* under analysis are the means of 1,000 posterior draws. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-21: Distributions of Appointee Types by President

President	Complements	Substitutes	Neither
Reagan	26.32% (<i>N</i> = 10)	31.58% (<i>N</i> = 12)	42.11% (<i>N</i> = 16)
Bush 41	33.64% (<i>N</i> = 36)	26.17% (<i>N</i> = 28)	40.19% (<i>N</i> = 43)
Clinton	42.93% (<i>N</i> = 88)	24.88% (<i>N</i> = 51)	32.20% (<i>N</i> = 66)
Bush 43	32.61% (<i>N</i> = 75)	27.39% (<i>N</i> = 63)	40.00% (<i>N</i> = 92)

Note: Row percentages and sample sizes listed. Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Figure A-1: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty (*Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Senate Median as Pivot of Interest*)




Figure A-2: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty (*Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest*)




Figure A-3: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty (*Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Committee Chair as Pivot of Interest*)




Figure A-4: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty (*Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Committee Median as Pivot of Interest*)




Figure A-5:
Predicted Differences in Probabilities of Substitutes and Complements
(Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw)

