Online Appendix

Careerism, Status Quo Bias, and the Politics of Congressional Apportionment

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1 Appendix

The House also faced controversy over the size of the chamber during debate over apportionment after the 1910 census. The Census committee reported a bill calling for a 435 member House, but the majority party Republican caucus voted to support a measure that would have kept the House at 391 members. Republicans were unable to turn to the caucus decision into a floor victory, as a number of Republicans joined with minority party Democrats to defeat the amendment that would have set the House size at 391 members.

The argument put forward in this article is that the growth of careerism in the House contributed to the failure of apportionment legislation in the 1920s. The point of this appendix is to analyze the previous apportionment episode as a placebo test to see if the careerism variables are related to member behavior during consideration of apportionment legislation in 1911. If a member's careerist orientation predicts behavior in 1911 it would weaken the argument that the growth of careerism contributed to the 1920s failures. Unfortunately, most of the votes on apportionment occurred in the Committee of the Whole, which did not record the votes of individuals members during that time period. Fortunately, there was a recorded vote on the motion to recommit with instructions that would have had the effect of amending the original bill with a 435 member House to a 391 member House. The motion failed 150 – 193 (including pairs) due to more than two dozen Republicans voting against the party's position on the motion.[1]

Table 1 presents results of a logit model of this vote that closely parallels the models fit in the main part of the article.[2] Easily the best predictor of a member's vote on the motion is his or her party. Holding all other variables at their mean, the predicted probability of a Republican supporting the motion is 0.92, and the probability of a Democrat opposing the motion is 0.98. Only two other variables reach statistical significance, the indicator variables for same party state and split party state are both positive and significant, which suggest that members from these states were more likely to support a 391 person House than their colleagues from states that had unified opposite party control of the state government.

In contrast to the findings from the 1920s, the projected seat loss/gain for a members state does not appear to be related to his or her vote on the motion to recommit. The two most direct measures of careerism, committee portfolio value and seniority, also fail to reach statistical significance. A null finding does not mean that there is no effect of careerism, but it is worth noting that the average seniority and committee portfolio values are *lower* for members who voted for a 435 member House than for those who supported the status quo of 391. Therefore there is no statistical evidence to indicate the careerism concerns drove member behavior on apportionment during 1911.

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[1]This account taken from "House Votes to Have Membership of 435," *New York Times*, February 10, 1911.

[2]I do not have access to the years in office before entering the House variable for the 61st Congress. Instead I use the number of terms that a member has served in the House as a proxy for careerist orientation.

Table 1: 61st House Apportionment Vote

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Proportion Seat Gain/Loss	0.52	(1.75)
Urban/Rural District	0.35	(0.52)
Same Party State	1.92***	(0.65)
Split Party State	3.83***	(1.66)
Republican	6.71***	(0.86)
Committee Portfolio Value	0.13	(0.24)
House Seniority	0.08	(0.07)
Constant	-6.51***	(1.45)
N	343	
Log-likelihood	-68.11	
Pseudo R^2	0.71	

Note: Estimates are from a logistic regression model with the vote of the member as the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. $*** = p \leq 0.01$, $** = p \leq 0.05$., $* = p \leq 0.10$