Local Rule, Elites, and Popular Grievances:

Evidence from Ancien Régime France

Online appendix

Online Appendix

A   General information

Figure A.1: Provincial and tax district (généralité) boundaries

Notes: Left: map of provincial boundaries, as of 1789. Right: map of tax district (généralité) boundaries. The second and third legend entries refer to provinces where consent was suppressed before the 1700s. Late territorial additions are not included in the analyses. Provincial estates categorization based on Major (1980).

Figure A.2: Evolution of the area share of pays d'état in the French territory (1500-1789)

Table A.1: Provinces and consent to taxation

Province	Year of acquisition	Year of suppression of consent	Vote
Pays d'état: consent to taxation until 1789			
Northern estates [a]	1659-1678		by order
Pyrenean estates [b]	1607-1620		by order
Bourgogne	1477		by order
Bretagne	1534		by order
Comté De Foix	1607-1620		by order
Languedoc	1222-1271		by head
Provence	1486		by head
Pays d'élection: no consent to taxation			
Anjou, Aunis, Berry, Bourbonnais, Champagne,			
Ile de France, Maine, Nivernais, Orléanais,		N.A.	
Picardie, Saumurois and Touraine.			
Aunis, Limousin, Marche, Poitou and Saintonge		≈ 1450	
Former pays d'état: past consent to taxation			
Guyenne et Gascogne		1550-1672	
Auvergne		1672	
Beaujolais		1688	
Bresse, Bugey and Gex	1601	1601	
Dauphiné	1349	1628	
Forez		1649	
Lyonnais		1625	
Normandie		1655	
Pays d'imposition: recently conquered			
Alsace	1648	1683	
Maritime Flandre	1659	1659	
Franche-Comté	1674	1704	
Hainaut	1659	1659	
Lorraine	1766	1766	
Roussillon	1659	1789	

[a] Flandre, Artois and Cambrésis. [b] Labourd, Basse-Navarre, Béarn, Bigorre, Soule, and Marsan.

Sources: Barbiche (2015), Mousnier (1974), Major (1980)

.

Figure A.3: Main salt tax zones (*gabelles*) in 1789

Salt price:
- ■ Very expensive
- ■ Expensive
- ■ Cheap
- □ Very cheap
- □ No tax
- ▬ Pays d'etat/pays d'election border
- ···· Salt tax zone borders

Notes: Source: Bibliothèque nationale de France, GED-6510. A number of local exceptions are not shown on the map.

B Data sources and summary statistics

Table B.1: Data sources

Variable	*Geographic unit*	*Timeframe*	*Source*
Main outcome variables:			
Popular rebellions	City	1661-1789	Nicolas (2002)
Grievance lists	Bailliage cities	1789 villages	Shapiro et al. (1998)
Living standards and economic development:			
Soldiers' height	853 towns of birth	1716-1784	Komlos, Hau, and Bourguinat (2003)
Rural mortality	358 communes	1740-1829	Séguy (2001)
Conscripts height	2,289 cantons	1818-1830	Demonet, Dumont, and Le Roy Ladurie (1976)
Commune size	all communes	1793-1900	Motte and Vouloir (2007)
City size	341 cities	800-1850	Bairoch, Batou, and Chèvre (1988)
Taxation:			
Fiscal burden	Province	1780	Necker (1785)
Tax receipts 1600s	Pays d'état; pays d'élections	1660-1680; 1688-1695	European State Finance Database
Tax receipts 1700s	Pays d'état; pays d'élections	1771, 1774, 1776, 1781, 1782, 1787	European State Finance Database
Land tax	Arrondissements (224)	1802	Archives Nationales
Direct taxation	Province	1790	Archives Nationales

Table B.2: Summary statistics: rebellions

Riot type	Count	Freq.	Count	Freq.
Fiscal:				
Resistance to the state's fiscal or para-fiscal system	3284	41.1%	3284	41%
Local elites:				
Hostility to the seigneurial system and its agents	382	4.8%	770	10%
Actions against notables	142	1.8%		
Action against municipal authority	141	1.8%		
Hostility to the Church	96	1.2%		
Hostility to nobility and noble privilege	9	0.1%		
Food riots:	1257	15.7%	1257	16%
State (non-fiscal):				
Resistance to the judiciary, military or police state apparatus	1192	14.9%	1241	16%
Rejection of state reforms	49	0.6%		
Other:				
Religion, beliefs	260	3.3%	1448	18%
Work conflict	432	5.4%		
Regional particularism	16	0.2%		
Miscalleneous	740	9.3%		

Notes: Source and typology from Nicolas (2002).

Figure B.1: Examples of coding of taxation grievances

G TA IN GA AB O						Abolish a miscellaneous aspect of the *gabelle*.
G TA IN GA 0						Miscellaneous Action regarding the *gabelle*.
G TA IN GA 1						Do something about the *gabelle*.
G TA IN 0			AB			Abolish a miscellaneous indirect tax.
G TA IN 1			AB			Abolish all indirect taxes.
G TA 1			0			Miscellaneous Action regarding taxes in general.
G 0			AB			Abolish some miscellaneous aspect of government.

Source: Revolutionary Demands, Shapiro et al. (1998)

Table B.3: All grievance subjects: coding levels 1 and 2

Level 1	Level 2
Misc	colonies; foreign policy; local subjects; attitudes toward non-catholics
General	general
Constitution	constitution; estates-general-estates general; powers of nation; political liberties; powers of the monarch
Economy	economy; agriculture; commerce; finance; industry and manufacturing; transportation
Government	government; administrative agencies; government: finances; the king; military; regional and local government; government taxation
Judiciary	judiciary; criminal prosecution and penalties; the courts; civil law and procedure; due process; enforcement agents of the court; legal professions
Religion	religion; church finances; the clergy; church organization; church-state (and church-rome) relations; dime; morality and religious practices
Stratification system	stratification system; criteria of mobility; economic class relations; seigneurial regime; blank subject field

Notes: Source and typology from Shapiro et al. (1998).

Table B.4: Royal taxation grievance subjects: coding levels 3 and 4

Level 3	Level 4
government taxation - misc	taxation- misc; taxation- general; droit d'aubaine; domaine du roi; franc, fief; finances ordinaires; regie general; taxation- miscellaneous; taxation-general
tax advantages	tax advantages - misc; tax advantage - general; bourgeois; capitalistes; clergy; creditors of the state; guilds; locality; negociant; noblemen; province; regular clergy; rentiers; seigneur; venal officers,
direct tax agencies	direct tax agencies- miscellaneous; direct tax agencies- general; bureaux de finances; collecteurs des tailles; contrainte solidaire; controleurs du vingtieme; directeurs du vingtieme; recette generale; receveurs des tailles; direct taxation agencies, taille: tresoriers de finances
direct taxes	existing direct taxes- miscellaneous; existing direct taxes- general; impots accessoires a la taille; capitation; deuxieme brevet; premier brevet; impots personnels: impots reels: taille; taille personnelle; taille reelle; taille tarifee; vingtieme des biens fonds; vingtieme de l'industrie; vingtiemes; vingtieme des charges et offices
indirect taxes	indirect tax agencies- misc; indirect tax agencies- general; commis, indirect tax agencies; collecteurs, indirect tax agencies; company of general farmers; indirect taxation agencies, droits de controle; indirect taxation agencies, , droits domaniaux: employes, indirect tax agencies; fermier, indirect tax agencies; fermes generales; gabellous; greniers a sel; existing indirect taxes- miscellaneous; existing indirect taxes- general: aides; centieme denier accessoires: cuir; droits de controle; droits domaniaux; droits sur la fabrication; droits joints aux aides; droits d'entree et de sortie; fer; gabelle: huiles; insinuation; octrois des villes; centieme denier des offices: sel d'impot
new taxes	new taxes- miscellaneous; new taxes- general; dime royale; impot territorial: impot unique: luxe
tax administration	tax administration- miscellaneous; tax administration- general: perception, collection of taxes; repartition of taxes; rolls, tax administration

Notes: Source and typology from Shapiro et al. (1998).

Table B.5: Seigneurial regime grievance subjects: coding levels 3 and 4

Level 3	Level 4
misc	misc/general; land improvements
banalites	misc/general; four; moulin; pressoir
protection rights	misc/general; cens en commande; fouage; le guet et la garde; taille seigneuriale
symbolic deference patterns	misc/general; droits honorifiques; droit de port d'armes; droits de requisition; credit force
feudistes, terriers	feudistes terriers commissaires a terriers
fairs and markets	misc/general; redevances
seigneurs hauts justiciers	misc/general; desherence; foundling seigneur's obligations
labor services	labor services
periodic rental dues	misc/general; cens; champart; cens et rentes; rente fonciere; rente seigneuriale; solidite
dues on property transfers	misc/general; lods et ventes; rachat; retrait feodal
recognition of la directe	misc/general; aveu et denombrement; commise saisie; foi et hommage
recreational privileges	misc/general; chasse; colombiers; garennes; droit de peche
seigneurial agents	seigneurial agents
serfdom	misc/general; formariage; mainmorte; poursuite
seigneurial monopolies	misc/general; ban de fauchaison; ban de moisson; ban vin; ban de vendange
tolls	tolls
seigneurial courts	misc/general; efficiency, effectiveness; procureur fiscal; qualified judges
communal rights	seigneur's claim; seigneurial encroachment

Notes: Source and typology from Shapiro et al. (1998).

Table B.6: Summary statistics: grievances

Panel A: Third Estate

| | Pays d'élection | | | | | Pays d'état | | | | |
Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
N grievances	97	245	136	30	702	56	247	125	45	730
Government	97	80	45	5	276	56	79	40	15	257
Constitution	97	22	16	0	88	56	21	16	3	105
Economy	97	35	27	0	157	56	38	30	3	156
Justice	97	52	32	2	148	56	51	25	6	125
Religion	97	23	17	0	96	56	24	16	0	96
Society	97	20	13	0	63	56	21	14	0	66
Taxation	97	38	21	1	114	56	32	13	8	69
Seigneurial regime	97	15	10	0	49	56	16	12	0	57

Panel B: Nobility

| | Pays d'élection | | | | | Pays d'état | | | | |
Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
N grievances	93	174	90	30	505	34	147	76	17	329
Government	93	67	33	5	167	34	54	29	6	128
Constitution	93	26	16	0	75	34	24	17	2	87
Economy	93	15	13	0	73	34	10	7	0	25
Justice	93	34	23	2	132	34	31	20	0	83
Religion	93	11	11	0	49	34	12	8	0	30
Society	93	11	9	0	58	34	9	7	0	22
Taxation	93	26	16	1	96	34	18	12	0	58
Seigneurial regime	93	4	7	0	53	34	3	3	0	10

Panel C: Villages

| | Pays d'élection | | | | | Pays d'état | | | | |
Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
N grievances	398	36	24	2	172	106	9	6	1	21
Government	398	26	15	1	105	106	32	16	9	82
Constitution	398	16	11	0	91	106	19	15	0	66
Economy	398	2	3	0	15	106	3	4	0	19
Justice	398	5	5	0	32	106	7	5	0	22
Religion	398	5	6	0	49	106	5	6	0	30
Society	398	3	5	0	34	106	3	4	0	20
Taxation	398	3	3	0	20	106	5	6	0	46
Seigneurial regime	398	11	8	0	86	106	11	9	0	47

Notes: "Government" through "Society" variables correspond to the level one subjects in the classification of grievances in Shapiro et al. (1998).

Figure B.2: Characteristics of general lists corresponding to the village sample

Notes: Data on village-level grievance lists is available on a subset of the territory (20 out of 153 districts). The figure shows how this partial sample compares to the complete sample. Point estimates from model regressing the dependent variable on the left axis on a variable equal to one if a bailliage district is athe village sample.

C Comparison of grievances lists and rebellions

How do Third Estate grievances and rebellions relate to each other? Both derive from dissatisfaction with the regime in place, but their nature and timeframe are different.

The grievances lists are written outcomes from local-level deliberations. Their representativeness is debated among historians, as there is evidence that they were at least partially influenced by urban elites for the general lists, and noble or clergy elites for the village lists. Addressing this debate, Shapiro et al. (1998) argue that they are informative of societal demands and not simply an expression of elite preferences.

Rebellions are instances of collective resistance, aggregated over a 127 year period. They should be influenced by repression, but given that this was not a function of provincial estates, this is not a major problem for our purposes.

In order to validate the interpretation of rebellions and grievance lists, I analyze the correlation between type of grievances lists and type of rebellions. I calculate the share of rebellions of each type in a 20 km neighborhood around each district capital (the exact boundaries of the 1789 districts are not available), and analyze how this quantity relates to the topics of grievances, controlling for a number of potential confounders.

Figure C.1 shows the obtained results. On the left, we can see that districts with prominent taxation grievances in 1789 are slightly more likely to have had fiscal rebellions over the previous 100 years. Decomposing the effect between urban and rural districts, I find that this association is driven by rural districts. On the right, I find that rebellions against local elites and grievances against the seigneurial regime are significantly correlated, although this time urban districts drive the result. This pattern is consistent with the historical record on direct taxation under the Ancien Régime: not only clergy and noble elites, but also urban elites shifted the burden of taxation on the peasantry. In this context, it made sense for urban districts to put less emphasis on taxation as they benefited from the status quo. In contrast, relatively urban districts might have had less pressure not to denounce seigneurial abuses than rural districts.

Figure C.1: Relationship between 1789 Third Estate grievances and 1661-1788 popular rebellions


Notes: The dependent variable is the share of 1789 grievances about respectively taxation (left) and local elites (right). Independent variable is the number of 1700-1788 rebellions of each type in a 20 km neighborhood of 1789 district capitals. All models include the following controls: population, number of communes and largest city in neighborhood (based on 1793 census figures), wheat suitability, distance from Paris and urbanization in 1400. Urban and rural sample refer to districts whose largest city is respectively above or below the median population (7,871). 95% confidence interval, based on robust standard errors clustered at the généralité level.

D   Common subjects in Third Estate, village and Nobility grievances lists

I examine the extent to which general Third Estate lists reflect peasant concerns. I calculated the share of village grievances that are mentioned in general Third Estate lists. Results are shown on Figure D.1. 31% of peasant grievance subjects are also found in the general Third Estate lists, and the proportion reaches 35% and 37% for respectively taxation and seigneurial regime-related grievances. As a comparison, the proportions are 21, 26 and 7%

if we consider the nobility lists instead. This is consistent with the assumption that general

Third Estate lists represent peasant concerns to a much greater extent than nobility lists.

Figure D.1: Proportion of peasant grievances in urban Third Estate and Nobility lists

Notes: N = 20. share of village grievances subjects that are also found in the corresponding general lists. "all" = all grievances; "tax" and "seign" = only grievances related to respectively taxation and the seigneurial regime.

E   Local rule, living standards, taxation and elite rent-seeking

Table E.1: OLS: Local rule and living standards

			Dependent variable:				
	tall soldiers	age at death Ancien Regime	food riots	city growth	urban	tall conscripts post-1789	age at death
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
local rule	−0.056*	−0.101	−0.146*	−0.091	0.053	0.082	−0.253*
	(0.030)	(0.129)	(0.080)	(0.198)	(0.123)	(0.134)	(0.137)
Timeframe	1716-1784	1740-1790	1661-1788	1700-1800	1793	1818-1830	1800-1829
Geographic unit	commune	commune	commune	city	arr.	canton	commune
Locations	2,871	287	3,565	274	302	2,500	292
Observations	21,896	1,424	3,564	165	302	2,249	1,150
R^2	0.037	0.170	0.046	0.058	0.264	0.331	0.150
Adjusted R^2	0.036	0.159	0.042	−0.037	0.226	0.326	0.137

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Models 1, 2 and 7 include decade fixed effects. Standards errors are clustered at the généralité level.

Figure E.1: Per capita tax receipts and new direct taxes (1560-1780)

Source: European State Finance Database, Bonney (1999)

Figure E.2: Net per capita tax receipts from pays d'état and pays d'élection

Sources:
1600s: net receipts figures from Bonney (1999), based on J-R Malet, *Compte-Rendu* (1789).
1700s: net receipts figures from financial accounts by Terray (1771, 1774, 1776), Necker (1781), and Fleury (1782, 1787).
The per capita measure is based on 1784 population figures (Necker, 1785).

Figure E.3: RD: impact of local rule on per capita land tax in 1802

Notes: Points represent the estimated effect of local rule for RD models in a 20 to 50 km bandwidth. All models include latitude/longitude linear interaction and geographic controls. 95% confidence interval based on robust standard errors clustered at the généralité level.

Figure E.4: OLS and RD: grievances about various aspects of taxation

Notes: The black points are the OLS estimates of the effect of pays d'état on eight dependent variables. The white points are RD estimates of the same relationship on 10 to 50 km bandwidths. 95% confidence interval, based on standard errors clustered at the généralité level. *Indirect* and *direct* denote the share of grievances mentioning respectively indirect and direct taxation. *Universal* denotes two universal taxes which target both privileged and non-privileged individuals: capitation and vingtième. *Taille* denotes the main direct taxes, which fell almost exclusively on the peasantry.

18

F   Robustness checks

Figure F.1: Balance checks

Notes: Points represent the estimated effect of local rule for each dependent variable. The unit of analysis for "wheat suitability"-"distance from intendance capital" variables is 1793 commune locations. All models include latitude/longitude linear interaction. 95% confidence interval based on robust standard errors clustered at the généralité level.

Figure F.2: Robustness checks: drop border sections (rebellion data)

Notes: Lines represent the estimated effect of local rule for RD models in 10 to 50 km bandwidth (1 km increments). All models include latitude/longitude linear interaction and geographic controls. 95% confidence interval based on robust standard errors clustered at the généralité level. Each color corresponds to one excluded segment of the border between provinces with and without consent.

Figure F.3: Robustness checks: drop border sections (grievance data)

Notes: Dependent variable is the share of grievances about taxation (left panel) and the seigneurial regime (right panel). Points represent the estimated effect of local rule for RD models in a 10 to 50 km bandwidth. All models include latitude/longitude linear interaction and geographic controls. 95% confidence interval based on robust standard errors clustered at the généralité level.

Table F.1: Local rule and level of detail in the rebellion dataset

	Dependent variable: Missing info on riot size				
	All	Fiscal	No smuggling	Local elites	Seign. elites
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
local rule	−0.005	−0.003	−0.187***	−0.081	−0.067
	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.074)
Observations	7,314	3,045	1,088	635	310

Notes: The unit analysis is riot city-year. The dependent variable is a variable equal to one when the data from Nicolas (2002) does not provide information on the number of participants in the rebellion. Models 2-5 restrict the sample to rebellions of a given type. Geographic controls are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the généralité leve.

Figure F.4: Robustness checks: control for type of primary source rebellion data

Notes: All models use cross-sectional data on all popular rebellions happening in a given locality between 1661 and 1788 (from Nicolas, 2002), and control for the extent to which the locality's information on rebellions comes from the National Archives, Departmental Archives, Municipal Archives, or Library books. The dependent variable for (1) is the share of rebellion of a given type (bottom axis), controlling for 1793 population. The dependent variable for models (2) and (3) is rebellion per capita, using 1793 population.

Table F.2: OLS: Fiscal rebellion and grievance counts

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | |
	N fiscal rebellions		N fiscal grievances		
	All	No smuggling	Third Estate	Nobility	Village
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
local rule	−0.058*	0.064	−0.281**	−0.283***	−0.104
	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.137)	(0.108)	(0.234)
mean dep var	0.878	0.311	73.307	24.504	11.542
N	3565	3565	153	127	504
N cluster	31	31	30	30	19

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Rebellion data at the locality level, grievance data at the bailliage city level. Standards errors are clustered at the généralité level. Controls include the total count of rebellions and grievance.

Table F.3: OLS: local rule and rebellions (binary outcome)

|	Dependent variable:				
	Fiscal	No smuggling	Seign.	Local elites	Food riots
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
local rule	−0.275***	0.204*	0.232***	0.285***	−0.021
	(0.080)	(0.108)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.061)
mean dep var	0.501	0.171	0.078	0.147	0.221
N	3575	3575	3575	3575	3575
N cluster	34	34	34	34	34

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Rebellion data at the locality level. Outcome variables equal to 1 if a rebellion of the given type ever occurred in the locality, zero otherwise. Standards errors are clustered at the généralité level.

Figure F.5: RD: local rule and grievances (count outcome)

Notes: The unit of analysis is bailliage cities. The points are RD estimates of the same relationship on 20 to 50 km bandwidths. 95% confidence interval, based on standard errors clustered at the généralité level. All specifications control for the total number of grievances.

Figure F.6: RD: local rule and fiscal rebellions (count and binary outcome)

Notes: The unit of analysis is localities. The points are RD estimates of the same relationship on 10 to 50 km bandwidths. 95% confidence interval, based on standard errors clustered at the généralité level.

Figure F.7: RD: local rule and rebellions against local elites (count and binary outcome)

Notes: The points are RD estimates of the same relationship on 10 to 50 km bandwidths. 95% confidence interval, based on standard errors clustered at the généralité level.

Table F.4: OLS: Main results on grievances (restricted sample)

| | Dependent variable: share of grievances | | | | | |
| | Taxation | | | Seigneurial regime | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
local rule	−0.463	−0.835*	0.463	0.755*	0.699*	1.871**
	(0.453)	(0.441)	(1.502)	(0.365)	(0.378)	(0.768)
mean dep var	0.288	0.277	0.297	0.135	0.139	0.131
N	20	18	16	20	18	16
N cluster	14	12	12	14	12	12
Consent provinces included	All	Weak TE	Strong TE	All	Weak TE	Strong TE

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standards errors are clustered at the généralité level. General Third Estate grievance sample, restricted to the bailliages districts for which village lists are available.

References

Bairoch, Paul, Jean Batou, and Pierre Chèvre (1988). *Population des villes européennes de 800 à 1850: banque de données et analyse sommaire des résultats (la)*. Librairie Droz.

Barbiche, Bernard (2015). *Les institutions de la monarchie française à l'époque moderne*. Presses universitaires de France.

Bonney, Richard (1999). *The rise of the fiscal state in Europe c. 1200-1815*. Clarendon Press.

Demonet, Michel, Paul Dumont, and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1976). "Anthropologie de la jeunesse masculine en France au niveau d'une cartographie cantonale (1819-1830)". In: *Annales*, pp. 700–760.

Komlos, John, Michel Hau, and Nicolas Bourguinat (2003). "An anthropometric history of early-modern France". In: *European Review of Economic History* 7.2, pp. 159–189.

Major, James Russell (1980). *Representative Government in Early Modern France*. Yale University Press.

Motte, Claude and Marie-Christine Vouloir (2007). "Le Site cassini. ehess. fr: Un Instrument d'Observation pour une Analyse du Peuplement". In: *Bulletin du Comité français de cartographie* 191, pp. 68–84.

Mousnier, Roland (1974). *Les institutions de la France sons la monarchie absolue 1598-1789: Société et Etat*. Presses universitaires de France.

Necker, Jacques (1785). *De l'administration des finances de la France*. Vol. 1. Paris.

Nicolas, Jean (2002). *La rébellion française: mouvements populaires et conscience sociale, 1661-1789*. Éditions du Seuil.

Séguy, Isabelle (2001). *La population de la France de 1670 à 1829: l'enquête Louis Henry et ses données*. Ined.

Shapiro, Gilbert et al. (1998). *Revolutionary demands: A content analysis of the Cahiers de Doléances of 1789*. Stanford University Press.