Online Appendix for "Deeper Roots: Historical Causal Inference and the Political Legacy of Slavery"

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1 The Southern Rights Elections Extended

Modeling and interpreting the secession crises of 1850 requires close attention to sequencing, to the prior relationship between enslavement and partisan affiliation, and to the state-specific pathways by which different party organizations 'converted' to either the Union or Southern Rights tickets.

A defining feature of most southern party systems was the deliberate effort that had been undertaken to reproduce the balancing between high- and low-enslavement areas that characterized the national "second party system" (Montgomery, 1940, 295). As a result, both parties generally had factions in both high- and low-enslavement regions, although some counties were either lacking an effective organization for one party or the other or saw their organizations sit out particular elections for (often factional) reasons (especially in campaigns for the state legislature or other state-wide assemblies). Just as important, however, is that for a variety of reasons Whigs tended to do best in regions dominated by large planters and by wealthy merchants. As a result, there was a modest correlation in many states for a county's electoral partisanship to be a function of the proportion of the population held in slavery, with more slavery-intensive districts more likely to support the Whigs. This base of support, however, did not translate into statewide majorities in Mississippi, where the Whigs were a distant second to the dominant Democrats; in Georgia, however, the party was much more competitive.

This background needs to be integrated into any account of the relationship between slavery and vote choice in the 1850-1851 secession crisis. While the crisis had its origins in the war against Mexico – and the subsequent question of whether slavery would be permitted to expand into the newly taken territories – its political character was shaped by the decisions of party leaders about how they might best use the crisis to advance their own careers. As Michael Holt describes the political context of 1850-51, Democrats who flocked to the Southern Rights banner "sought to exploit anti-Compromise sentiment to secure political power within the state," and believed the pro-Compromise stance of the Fillmore administration and the abolitionist sympathies of northern Whigs gave them the opportunity to win the support of "normally Whiggish slaveholders with [an] aggressive proslavery, Southern Rights platform" (Holt, 1999, 608, 609). At

the same time, Whigs "seized on the Union party as a way to advance their careers," and calculated that "whether or not new parties were necessary to stop secession, they seemed necessary to put Whigs in office," and Deep South Whigs "seized on the Union party as a way to advance their careers" (Holt, 1999, 616, 609).

This section provides the regression coefficients and model statistics for Figures 4 and 5 in the main text, while extending the analysis to include another state (Alabama) in which Southern Rights candidates squared off against Unionist candidates. Georgia and Mississippi are centrally important for Acharya et al.'s argument, and so are considered in the main text. Alabama, however, saw similar, albeit more complex, political dynamics, and so we include it both as supplemental evidence for our argument and to avoid 'cherry-picking' the data. With evidence from South Carolina in the text, and voting to the Nashville Convention in Tennessee presented below, we believe we will have examined "Southern Rights," "secessionist," or "southern convention" elections in each state where such elections were held.

1.1 Georgia and Mississippi

The temporal sequencing of the elections mattered for the patterns observed in each state. Georgia went first, and was "by far the most important" (Holt, 1999, 607). The careful partisan balancing of high- and low-enslavement regions in Georgia came under severe strain when, first, the planter wing of the Democratic party "seized control of the party machinery in 1849" and began "pushing the extreme proslavery, Southern Rights agenda" (Holt, 1999, 610); and, second, when Whigs organized the Union ticket to take advantage of Democratic talk of secession. In elections to a state convention called to determine a response to the Crisis of 1850, the Union Party secured a "crushing triumph" that effectively "ended the threat of secession throughout the South for ten years" (Holt, 1999, 608). Reflecting the enduring importance of the old parties, "the vast majority of Whigs and almost half of the Democrats joined the Union coalition" (Holt, 1999, 607), with the party-switching Democrats concentrated in "the two north Georgia [congressional] districts" where slavery was less prevalent (Brooks, 1917, 290). The same pattern appeared in the subsequent congressional and gubernatorial elections of 1851. Again, the Unionists performed as would be expected for a repackaged Whig party in their local strongholds, even high-enslavement districts, while gaining large numbers of voters in those low-enslavement districts that had leaned toward the Democrats.

The results are presented visually in the top panels of Figure A1, which reports the predicted probabilities from a model of county-level vote shares interacting the Whig share of the vote for governor in 1849 with the percent of the county held in slavery. The full results are shown in Table A1.[1]Because most Whig politicians

[1]For visualization purposes, Whig districts are defined as counties where the party received either 50% (MS) or 60% (GA) of the vote in elections since 1845; Democratic districts are counties where the party received either 70% (MS) or 60% (GA) of the vote in elections since 1845. The figures are not substantially changed if the same threshold is used for both states, but the differences reflect the much more competitive environment of Georgia than Mississippi. Gubernatorial elections and some congressional elections are from the United States Historical Election Returns, 1824-1968 (ICPSR, 1999). The remaining

Table A1: Vote for Unionist Candidate in Georgia, 1850-51

	Convention			Governor			Congress			Swing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
% Enslaved	−0.17		−1.42***	−0.086		−0.86***	−0.094		−0.94***	−0.49***
	(0.13)		(0.37)	(0.08)		(0.18)	(0.08)		(0.19)	(0.065)
% Whig		0.32*	−0.15		0.39***	0.25		0.39***	0.21	
(1845-1849)		(0.15)	(0.34)		(0.08)	(0.16)		(0.086)	(0.18)	
% Whig* % Enslaved			0.02**			0.01**			0.011***	
			(0.0072)			(0.0035)			(0.0038)	
N	91	89	89	94	92	92	94	92	92	92
Adj. R^2	0.0178	0.0491	0.222	0.0137	0.209	0.458	0.0148	0.185	0.433	0.386
F Stat.	1.615	4.490	8.081	1.282	23.84	24.83	1.378	20.46	22.40	56.60

Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A2: Vote for Unionist Candidate in Mississippi, 1851

	Convention			Governor			Congress			Swing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
% Enslaved	0.35**		−0.81	0.25**		−0.45	0.31***		−0.48	−0.13*
	(0.11)		(0.41)	(0.079)		(0.26)	(0.078)		(0.27)	(0.056)
% Whig		0.77***	−0.42		0.64***	0.39		0.70***	0.29	
(1845-1849)		(0.16)	(0.46)		(0.097)	(0.28)		(0.10)	(0.29)	
% Whig* % Enslaved			0.019*			0.0083			0.010	
			(0.0090)			(0.0056)			(0.0059)	
N	57	57	57	52	52	52	58	58	58	52
Adj. R^2	0.158	0.295	0.349	0.170	0.469	0.504	0.218	0.459	0.490	0.0926
F Stat.	10.29	23.03	9.457	10.23	44.24	16.27	15.62	47.42	17.26	5.104

Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001



Figure A1: Predicted Unionist Vote in Georgia and Mississippi

moved more or less seamlessly into the Union Party – organized as a tool for their political advancement – the party was likely to retain more votes in former Whig regions, regardless of slavery. It was in previously Democratic districts where the party had hopes of improving its share of the vote. In both Whig and Democratic districts, support for the new Union Party declined with the proportion of the county held in slavery. The party made its largest gains, relative to its former incarnation as the Whigs, in low-enslavement counties, while actually losing votes in many of the high-enslavement counties of the Black Belt and coast

results have been compiled from newspaper accounts.

(see the left panel of Figure A3 below, reproduced from the main text, showing the percentage swing to the Unionists over the Whig vote in 1849).

The Unionist convention drafted what became known as the Georgia Platform, conditionally accepting the Compromise. This would substantially shape developments elsewhere in the region. Following Georgia's lead, Mississippi Whigs formed a Union Party in November 1850, allying with Democratic Senator Henry S. Foote, who had been censured by his co-partisans for supporting the Compromise. With the support of "Democratic legislators from strongly unionist nonslaveholding districts" (Holt, 1999, 615), the Unionists were able to postpone a state convention until November 1851. Needing to expand their coalition in a Democratic state, the Union Party ran Whigs in Whig districts and anti-secession Democrats in that party's "nonslaveholding strongholds" (Holt, 1999, 615) for the convention and state legislative elections; all of the congressional nominations went to Democrats, and the party nominated Foote for governor.

After the promulgation of the Georgia Platform, the Southern Rights party found itself increasingly isolated in Mississippi. The lead up to the Mississippi convention elections had seen an exceptionally violent campaign, and what appeared to be a genuine reshuffling of party ties among newspaper editors and prominent politicians (Olsen, 2000, 45-47). The Union Party had attracted influential Democrats to run for office in Democratic strongholds, hoping to "demonstrat[e] to voters that they were not the Whigs 'in disguise"' (Olsen, 2000, 46). With the Georgia platform defanging extreme secessionism for the moment, the convention elections were a disaster for the Southern Rights party. Almost immediately Democrats began to reemphasize old party loyalties in order to make the gubernatorial and congressional elections a more familiar (and more favorable) choice between Whigs and Democrats. They replaced their extreme secessionist gubernatorial nominee with a relative moderate – Jefferson Davis – who immediately endorsed the Georgia Platform (Simonson and Strange, 1961; Hearon, 1913). "I am apprehensive that the Democratic Party is scattered to the four winds of Heaven," wrote one party operative, who continued by noting that "we are however making proper efforts to retrieve the fortunes of the day" (Olsen, 2000, 46).

Possibly as a result, the persistence of old party lines was more pronounced – and the prevalence of slavery less important – in Mississippi than in Georgia. The bottom panels of Figure A1, the same models as estimated for Georgia, show the Union party holding steady in Whig-dominated districts as well as a slight tendency to gain votes in low enslavement counties. The full results are shown in Table A2. The right panel of Figure A3 in the next section below (and reproduced from the main text), showing the swing from Whigs to Unionists in each district, again suggests that the Union party's gains were more pronounced in districts where slavery was less prevalent, although a few delta counties in Mississippi saw similarly large increases. In Mississippi, the patterns are more attenuated and highly collinear with party: with slavery being a predictor of Whig support, and the Whigs being for political reasons the organizers of the Union

ticket, it is effectively impossible to sort out the independent effect of slavery or party on the ultimate vote. This is especially true once the salience of the southern movement had been undermined by the Georgia Convention. Nonetheless, there was a distinct pattern of Unionists picking up votes over the Whigs in 1849 in low-enslavement districts (column 10 of A2).

1.2 Alabama

The case of Alabama was more complex than its neighboring states. Still, the overarching parameters described for Georgia and Mississippi applied here as well, with the major parties organized in an effort to deliberately balance high- and low-enslavement regions. The Alabama Union party in general followed the script of Mississippi and Georgia, with Whigs pushing a reorganization in order to gain political advantage in a state where they were otherwise a hopeless minority.

While both the Union and Southern Rights parties in Alabama were organized in conventions with, respectively, a majority and nearly all delegates coming from the Black Belt (Dorman, 1995, 49), the Unionists benefited from the at-times openly secessionist rhetoric of Southern Rights men among Democrats.[2] According to Lewy Dorman, this antagonized "many of the Democrats, particularly those in the mountain and southern counties" – with relatively few enslaved persons –who "refused to join the Southern Rights movement" (1995, 50). The Mobile Register insisted that "Dallas, Lowndes, and Montgomery" – 74%, 66%, and 65% enslaved, respectively, – "were the only counties in which there was any great disaffection" against the Compromise (1995, 50), while the Blount County [5% enslaved] Advocate Journal warned that "if you happen to get Alabama out of the Union, North Alabama will secede from the new kingdom and petition to be admitted again into the Union attached to Georgia or Tennessee" (1995, 51). As Dorman remarks, the problem confronting the leaders of the Southern Rights party was how "to hold the north Alabama Democrats in alliance with the secession Democrats of south Alabama" (1995, 53).

After the Georgia convention results had effectively taken the steam out of the southern movement, sitting-Democratic Governor Henry W. Collier drew on the Georgia platform to secure the endorsement of both tickets (1995, 51-52). His subsequent electoral victory was so complete that the gubernatorial results provides little information on the spatial distribution of party support. Instead, it is the congressional elections that best allow us to examine the relationship between the prevalence of enslavement and the Southern Rights/Unionist tickets.

Doing so, however, is complicated by the partisan distribution of congressional nominations to run on the

[2] "In this election the Whigs and Democrats of north Alabama united with the Whigs of the Black Belt to form the Union Party and to elect Unionists—many of whom were old Democrats—to the legislature. The Democrats in the Black Belt counties and in some of the counties which bordered on it united with the Whigs in the same counties to form the Southern Rights Party" (Dorman, 1995, 54-55).



Figure A2: Predicted Unionist Vote in Alabama Congressional Elections, 1851

Union ticket: while all Southern Rights and Secessionist candidates were Democrats, so too were three of the seven Unionist candidates. Whether the congressional candidate was aligned with county partisanship[3] was a major determinant of the position of the local organizations vis-à-vis the Unionists, and both parties ran campaigns tailored to their community's investment in slavery. In the Black Belt county of Montgomery, both candidates emphasized the importance of slavery, "the preservation of which is the interest of all of us" (1995, 56). In non-slaveholding regions, the Unionists emphasized the secessionist positions of Southern Rights men while the latter emphasized Democratic party loyalties.

In counties where the candidate's previous partisan affiliation was aligned with the locally-dominant party, partisanship mattered most while slavery was effectively irrelevant. Levels of enslavement, however, were negative associated with voting for a Unionist candidate in districts where the candidate was misaligned. Figure A2 shows the predicted Unionist vote share in 1851 as a function of levels of enslavement across

[3]Unlike in elections to a state legislature – for which systematic results are unavailable – the Union party could not neatly nominate Whigs to Whig counties and Democrats to Democratic ones in congressional elections. They instead had to nominate a single candidate for the entire congressional district, which would make some of the constitutive counties misaligned from a partisan perspective.

four types of counties: Democratic and Whig, and those where the candidate was aligned (a Whig Union candidate in a formerly Whig county, or a Democratic Union candidate in a formerly Democratic county) or misaligned. The results are reported in Table A3.

Table A3: Vote for Unionist Candidate in Alabama, 1851

	Aligned Candidate	Misaligned Candidate	Swing
	(1)	(2)	(3)
% Enslaved	−0.06	−0.47*	0.38*
	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.15)
% Whig	−0.27	1.01	
(1845-1849)	(0.14)	(0.46)	
N	29	13	42
Adj. R^2	0.1823	0.3889	0.1451
F Stat.	2.90	3.18	6.79

Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

More telling than the vote share results is the change in Unionists vote totals over previous Whig performances. This is shown in the middle panel of Figure A3 (the right and left panels reproduce Figure 3 from the main text, for comparison). Unionists picked up votes relative to the Whigs primarily in northern Alabama, especially in the low-enslavement counties although also in Madison and Limestone counties, deeply integrated into the Tennessee River valley regional economy. In general, the higher the level of enslavement, the more the Unionists gained ground over previous Whig performances.

The results in Alabama came long after the Georgia convention had effectively settled the issue in the South for the moment, and after the Compromise of 1850 had removed the controversy from the national agenda. They were heavily mediated by party organizations, and the choices made by these local organizations about how to take advantage of the situation for partisan gain (especially Whig organizations) or insulate themselves from the often extremist and secessionist positions of their fellow partisans in the Black Belt (especially concerning for Democrats in low-enslavement regions). But the aggregate picture nonetheless suggests that local levels of enslavement were an important factor shaping both these organizational choices and the response of the electorate.



Figure A3: Swing from Whigs to Unionists in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi

2 Emancipation and Secession in Kentucky and Tennessee, 1850

The Deep South was not the only subregion where slavery was on the agenda in the elections of 1850-1851.[4] Kentucky and Tennessee also saw public votes on questions immediately bound up with either slavery or the secession crisis.

In Kentucky, Cassius Clay and Robert J. Breckinridge were mounting a statewide campaign to elect Clay as governor, a continuation of their earlier, failed efforts to organize a constitutional convention that would gradually abolish slavery. Full election results for the constitutional convention, in which the Emancipationists were decisively defeated, are not easily recoverable from state newspapers. Still, some evidence remains and has been explored by historian Harrold Tallant. His description of the results suggests a modestly positive association between support for an "Emancipationist" candidate and the percentage of a county held

[4]Votes for a third party candidate, and county-level action to nominate convention delegates, are by no means sufficient or ideal measures of racial attitudes; rather than present voters with a clearly defined choice, they depend on local initiative and organized action, which is likely to have other and more important determinants than the mass distribution of public attitudes toward slavery or race. They have the advantage, however, of not being so immediately structured by existing patterns of partisan affiliation and organization.

in slavery. While defeated, Emancipationists nonetheless "did quite well in some areas."

> They carried the mountain counties of Knox [8.6% enslaved] and Harlan [2.9% enslaved] with 74.1 percent of the vote and the city of Newport [1% enslaved] with 59.9 percent.... [They] ran well in the city of Louisville [12.6% enslaved] and the western counties of Logan [32.9% enslaved] and Crittenden [13.4% enslaved], winning 45.2, 45.5, and 42.3 percent in those places respectively (Tallant, 2014, 149).[5]

Emancipationists, however, did not run in all counties, often ran as Whigs (or a few cases as Democrats) while subtly indicating their support for a gradual abolition proposal to local voters, and elected at best only a handful of candidates to the convention. This foreclosed any possibility of even a gradual emancipation in the state, and allowed pro-slavery delegates to pass new protections for slavery and to redress some of the democratic deficiencies of the constitution that the Emancipationists had been hoping to use to build a broader coalition in support of abolition.

Clay's 1851 gubernatorial bid was not much more successful, and any blurring of party lines that had occurred in the 1849 convention elections was effectively over. This was a contest between Whigs and Democrats, neither of which took a position on slavery other than that the new constitution had settled the question and that the rights of "property-holders" should be defended. As has been true of all the elections examined so far in this study – with the possible exception of South Carolina's 1851 convention elections – existing partisan loyalties and the actions of the dominant parties mean that this was in no way a straightforward vote on the question of slavery. County-level data on this election, however, is found in The United States Historical Election Returns series (ICPSR, 1999), and so allows us to examine the relationship between slavery and vote-choice in a non-deep southern state.

Unsurprisingly, the Emancipationist vote was highest in those districts where enslavement was less prevalent, although as always there are exceptions and deviations from this pattern. The relationship between enslavement and the Emancipationist vote is shown in Figure A4. The only high-enslavement counties where Clay won any considerable portion of the vote were Madison and Garrard counties: the former was Clay's home county, the future home of Berea College and of deliberate abolitionist in-migration, and the latter was a neighboring county. In a state where viva voce remained the rule, and where pro-slavery paranoia was high (Tallant, 2014), emancipationists could only secure votes in precincts where public opinion was not hostile toward it. It seems plausible that with the locally-influential "Lion of White Hall" taking such a definite emancipationist stance, antislavery sentiment in these counties could be expressed more forthrightly

[5] The state had a total enslavement rate of 21.5%, and the emancipationists tallied about 9.7% of the statewide total. While the numbers are imprecise, they suggest that with some exceptions the party did better in those counties where slavery was a less significant presence.



Figure A4: Gubernatorial Vote for Cassius Clay, Kentucky 1851

than elsewhere. Madison county is removed from the regression results and from the smoothed plot as an outlier.

In Tennessee, the question of slavery came up in a manner similar to its deep southern neighbors, with the calling of a convention to coordinate a southern response to California's request for admission. The Nashville Convention was intended to bring together all of the southern states, and a number of states did elect or nominate delegates (although turnout was often abysmal). The Tennessee state legislature, however, voted narrowly and along sectional lines against appointing delegates to the convention; as a result, the selection of delegates, and the number to send, was left to the individual counties to organize.

It was widely understood that the Nashville Convention was a major escalation in the sectional crisis and a possible prelude to secession, and so the county selection of delegates provides some indication of where support for a more hard-line stance was concentrated. In Tennessee, both the choice to send delegates to the convention and the number of delegates sent was strongly associated with the prevalence of slavery, a relationship that persists (although attenuated) even after controlling for a county's distance from Nashville



Davidson County (Nashville) excluded from smoothed line; distance included in logit regression.

Figure A5: Tennessee Counties Sending Delegates to Nashville Convention, 1850

(Figure A5).

The patterns in Kentucky and Tennessee provide additional evidence that the prevalence of slaveholding in a county produced divergent attitudes on the questions of coordinated southern action, secession, and emancipation.

3 Deep South

One limit to the roll call analyses of voting in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia, discussed in the main text, is that these states are located in what is often considered to be the "upper South." Evidence of variation in attitudes toward free persons of color is much scarcer for Deep-South states. This is in part because slavery here tended to be much more pervasive across the entire state.

In Mississippi, for example, there were few counties where less than twenty-five percent of the population was enslaved. Even in areas of "low-enslavement" – which in many other states would be areas of relatively medium- or even high-levels of enslavement – the affluent classes were disproportionately slave-owners, both

setting the standard for aspirations of upward mobility and likely exercising disproportionate influence over the positions of state legislators. With some exceptions, such as northern Alabama and the northeastern hills of Mississippi where settlers from the Appalachian regions of Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia were more common, much of the settlement of even the lower-enslavement regions came from former areas of high-enslavement in Georgia and South Carolina. Their immediate upbringing was in high-enslavement areas, and their migration westward was often with the express intent of either becoming slaveholders or of continuing to engage in coercive agriculture in the more fertile soil of the Black Belt. As a result, pro-slavery positions were undoubtedly more hegemonic in elite attitudes, in a broader public opinion, and in legislator positions; a map of white southerners' racial attitudes in the Deep South would likely fit much more neatly with the characterization of non-divergence between high- and low-enslavement areas offered by ABS.

There are few roll calls that would provide leverage on this question, and what we have found are at least partially inconsistent.[6] In Mississippi, however, there were a series of votes in 1831 on legislation explicitly intended to encourage free black out-migration from the state. On three roll calls to reject the bill, to postpone the bill, and to pass the bill, there was a consistent relationship between the proportion of the legislator's district held in slavery and support for the legislation (Figure A6).[7]

Again, this should not be interpreted as evidence of any substantial sympathy toward free persons of color in Mississippi's low-enslavement regions.[8] As we have noted, considerable historical work in fact underscores that anti-black racism was ubiquitous across the Deep-South. But it is further evidence that the behavioral and policy implications of such attitudes were not uniformly held across Mississippi, suggesting that the intensity, primacy, and prevalence of the attitudes themselves likely varied across the low- and high-enslavement divided in the Deep South as it did elsewhere.

[6] In Alabama, for instance, a law that would have vested in county courts the ability to emancipate enslaved persons, so long as the persons were removed from the state, and which also charged law enforcement with apprehending any freed person who attempted to return to the state, had only five opponents from scattered counties with both high- and low-levels of enslavement. Separating out the punitive aspects of the law from the potentially greater flexibility for emancipation is impossible given the roll call record.

[7] The only exception was an ambiguous and defeated proposal to strike the words "over twenty" from the section defining the age range for those who had to leave the state immediately. When the bill passed, this was replaced with "over sixteen," likely amended by the Senate. Striking "over twenty" might have required all free persons under fifty to immediately leave the state – possibly making the bill more likely to be a dead letter – and a contingent of legislators from high-enslavement districts joined with most of those from low-enslavement districts to oppose this amendment.

[8] An earlier bill in 1821 had also seen greater opposition from low-enslavement regions, but the votes were limited to sections of the bill that might be read as restricting the rights of whites: it would have punished whites with lashing for meeting with enslaved and free persons of color. While these were more strongly opposed in low-enslavement counties, it is not clear from the legislative record whether it was the overall severity or its application to whites that was at issue.



Figure A6: Mississippi's Expulsion Bill, 1831

4 The Secession Crises of 1860

The immediate run-up to secession fits awkwardly in the causal story outlined by ABS. On the one hand, they present evidence that opposition to secession was strongest in the low-enslavement regions of Tennessee, while arguing that this was not the activation or manifestation of a latent cleavage that had been suppressed in party presidential voting (their benchmark comparison for the state) but the emergence of such a divergence. On the other hand, the 1860 secession votes occurred before the shock and critical juncture of emancipation and Reconstruction.

The authors finesse this by referring to the entire period from the immediate lead-up to the Civil War through to Reconstruction as the critical juncture. The problem is that the secession crisis of 1860 precedes their causal account, and in particular the incentives of planters to regain political and economic control after emancipation.

At the time, the 1860 controversy was just the latest link in a chain of crises that included nullification, free African American seamen, the Missouri Crises, the Wilmot provision, the abolitionist mailing campaign



Figure A7: Secession Votes, 1861

and others. Each of these had seen southern legislators and states discuss coordinating around the defense of slavery. It is unclear why this latest crisis would have led to the sudden emergence of a divide in southern public opinion. This becomes especially unlikely since we have presented evidence that there was at least some

divergence related to slavery in the elections of 1850-51. For those who remembered the secession crisis of a decade earlier, the election of Abraham Lincoln might have been a crisis that would enflame southern opinion but eventually resolved short of disunion and war. Large unionist majorities had been elected to the Virginia, Missouri, and Arkansas secession conventions, and both Tennessee and North Carolina had voted against holding any their own.[9] South Carolina was decisive in turning these states toward secession. Fort Sumter, and President Lincoln's call two days later for troops, led to an immediate reversal of unionist fortunes: with the exception of Missouri, Union majorities in the state conventions evaporated, a new secessionist convention was approved in North Carolina, and Tennessee's legislature voted to secede, approved later by referendum.

The divide between high- and low-enslavement areas was evident across the South in 1861, well beyond Tennessee. Figure A7 shows the predicted values from bivariate regression plots from seven states for which we either have convention, ratification, or delegate election vote totals; as well as a scatterplot and polynomial fitted line of the relationship between the secessionist vote and the percentage held in slavery for all these states combined (top-left).[10] In every state but Louisiana and Mississippi, there was a significant and substantively important relationship between the vote for secessionist candidates, whether to hold a convention, or ratification of secession. We suggest that it is unlikely such a broad based cleavage emerged *de novo* in 1860-61. More plausible is that an existing divide in opinion was activated a secession movement that made the defense of slavery the clear organizing question of politics.

5 Cotton and Slavery in the 1830s

Was the observed relationship between enslavement and support for slavery or proscriptions on free Black southerners the result of slavery or unobserved factors such as distinctive settlement patterns? ABS attempt to answer this for the postbellum period through use of an instrumental variable strategy, namely cotton suitability. The narrow critique we advance in this paper is that the IV strategy is insufficient for addressing their specific causal claim, that geographical divergence in racial attitudes emerged after 1865 was a response to the coordinated (but varyingly intense) effort to reestablish racialized labor and political hierarchies. Our broader critique is that design-based and instrumental variable observational models might be of less use when the causal process does not provide the kind of discrete treatment that such approaches implicitly rely upon, in which case the hypothesized treatment loses its causal specificity and intuitive meaning.

Reviewers have suggested, however, that an IV strategy might nonetheless allow us to account for un-

[9] Both of Tennessee's referenda, before and after Ft. Sumter, saw low-enslavement regions largely rejecting secession.

[10] The data is primarily from Mario Chacon and Jeffrey Jensen (2020; 2019). Some additional data gathered from local records has also been included.

observables for our more modest claim that slavery was likely causally associated with racial attitudes before 1860. Since our claim does not rest on the more well-specified causal model of the sort advanced by ABS (whose critical specification is that slavery was not causally associated with these attitudes before 1860), an IV approach might provide us with a valid causal estimate of attitudes in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia. In short, precisely because our counter-claim about the timing of divergence is indifferent to any specific model connecting slavery to attitudes, it relies less on the sort of discrete treatment emphasized by ABS.

Like ABS, the following analyses use cotton suitability as an instrument for slavery's effect on voting in state legislatures and conventions on abolition and free Black rights in the 1830s. Before doing so, however, we want to stress some reasons for caution: (1) cotton suitability is not the primary quantity of interest and is only a contingently useful instrument for estimating the effect of what we actually care about, slavery; (2) a weakness of both our and ABS's historical analyses is the absence of county-level data on public opinion, and our reliance on imperfect proxies of partisan voting and a relatively small number of legislative roll calls. If cotton is a less relevant crop for slavery than tobacco, for example, in a given state, then the relative strength of the instrument will decline. The reliance on proxies means that any causal effect is likely to be affected by considerable noise, which would only be worsened once we move from our primary quantity of interest to an imperfect instrument for that quantity.[11] This can be mitigated partially by averaging across multiple roll calls.

The results for all three states are shown in Table A4. The first column shows the relationship between cotton suitability and the local prevalence of slavery in 1830. The second column shows the instrumented estimate of slavery's effect on votes on black suffrage (in North Carolina and Tennessee), the third its effect on abolitionism (in Virginia and Tennessee), and the fourth its effect on an average measure of anti-Black voting (all three states). Opposition to abolition and our averaged measure of anti-Black votes remain positive and significant, while the effect of enslavement on support for Black disenfranchisement declines in magnitude and is no longer significant.

While these patterns are generally supportive of our claim about the pre-1860 divergence of racial attitudes, we might also interpret them as saying that support for Black disenfranchisement – in contrast with opposition to abolition or our anti-Black average that includes all votes – is likely driven by other factors that correlate with enslavement but not slavery itself.

We believe such an interpretation would be mistaken. Tables A5 through A7 show the results from

[11] Two counties with the same mix of slaveholders and non-slaveholders, and the same proportion of the population held in bondage, might have legislators with different support bases. If a legislator with a support base in low-enslavement areas of a county were to vote against slavery or Black disabilities, and another with support from high-enslavement areas voted the opposite, our county-level analyses would underestimate the effect of slavery.

Table A4: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect of Slavery: NC, TN, and VA in the 1830s

	Proportion Enslaved, 1830	Black Disenfranchisement	Anti-Abolition	Anti-Black average
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cotton Suitability	58.13***			
	(3.557)			
Proportion Enslaved		0.00824	0.0215***	0.0143***
		(0.00553)	(0.0023)	(0.0016)
State Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Model	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	First stage	Second stage	Second stage	Second stage
N	439	178	181	439
F Stat.	106.82 (df=4, 434)			

(1) is the first-stage relationship from (4). Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

state-specific analyses across each state's specific roll calls and our averaged anti-Black measure.

Across all models, instrumenting for cotton suitability continues to show a positive and significant effect of slavery on the probability of taking anti-Black, pro-disenfranchisement, or pro-slavery positions in Tennessee and Virginia. It is only in North Carolina that instrumenting for slavery diminishes its effect and the confidence intervals now overlap zero. At the same time, it is evident that cotton is a less powerful predictor of slavery in North Carolina than in the other states.

This is in part because of how the relationship between cotton suitability and enslaved labor varied across the three states.[12] In Virginia, tobacco was by far the most important of the major crops in whose cultivation enslaved labor was a significant factor, its statewide output value in 1840 being sixteen times that of cotton. In Tennessee and North Carolina, cotton and tobacco were nearly equivalent, the former having one-and-a-quarter the output value of the latter. In North Carolina, cotton was king, but there was also significant (though comparatively modest) rice cultivation, effectively absent in Virginia and Tennessee: the output value of cotton was four times that of tobacco, and ninety-five times that of rice.[13]

Critically, the relationship between these crops and cotton suitability varied across the states. Table A8 shows the bivariate relationship of cotton suitability to the per capita county-level value of these three crops. It also shows the bivariate relationship of each crop to the local enslavement percentage. In Virginia, cotton suitability was closely associated with both tobacco and cotton production, and both crops were closely associated with the local prevalence of enslavement. In Tennessee, cotton suitability was associated with cotton but not with tobacco. Enslaved labor, however, was here much more likely to be directed towards cotton than tobacco production. The result in both states was a clear association between enslavement

[12]Crop specialization is varyingly associated with enslavement across the three states. In Tennessee, the adjusted R2 of a model predicting the level of enslavement in 1830 using the 1840 measures of per capita crop output for tobacco, rice, and cotton is 0.46; in Virginia it declines to 0.27; in North Carolina it is only 0.17.

[13]In Virginia, only four counties produced a total of 2,956 pounds of rice. In Tennessee, eight counties produced a total of 7,977 pounds. In North Carolina, twenty-five counties (out of 65) produced a total of 2,820,388 pounds. While eighty-five percent of this was from New Hanover and Brunswick counties, the remaining twenty-three rice-producing counties had similar or larger rates of production to the fewer counterparts in Tennessee and Virginia.

Table A5: Virginia

	Prop. Enslaved 1830	Restriction 1	Restriction 2	Abolition	Consensual Removal	Removal Bill	Police Bill	Anti-Black Votes
Cotton Suitability	74.31***							
	(6.881)							
Proportion Enslaved		0.0173***	0.0188***	-0.0203***	-0.00427	0.00768*	0.00893**	0.0153***
		(0.00292)	(0.00289)	(0.00219)	(0.00352)	(0.00335)	(0.00305)	(0.00141)
F	116.6							
N	96	113	110	124	118	113	115	253

Standard errors in parentheses in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A6: Tennessee

	Prop. Enslaved, 1830	Black Disenfranchisement	Oppose Abolition	Anti-Black Votes
Cotton Suitability	75.94***			
	(10.70)			
Proportion Enslaved		0.0196*	0.0291***	0.0266***
		(0.00783)	(0.00719)	(0.00684)
F	26.96			
N	60	55	57	59

Standard errors in parentheses in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7: North Carolina

	Prop. Enslaved 1830	Disenfranchisement 1	Disenfranchisement 2	Limited enfranchisement 1	Limited enfranchisement 2	Anti-Black Votes
Cotton Suitability	51.08***					
	(7.936)					
Proportion Enslaved		0.00292	0.00309	-0.00255	-0.00198	0.00213
		(0.00757)	(0.00755)	(0.00750)	(0.00745)	(0.00691)
F	41.42					
N	128	123	123	118	117	127

Standard errors in parentheses in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

and cotton suitability occurring through different pathways: through both tobacco (primarily) and cotton (secondarily) in Virginia and through cotton in Tennessee.

Table A8: Cotton suitability and the diverse uses of enslaved labor: NC, TN, VA in 1840

	Virginia (104 counties)		Tennessee (62 counties)		North Carolina (64 counties)	
	Cotton Suitability	Enslavement 1830	Cotton Suitability	Enslavement 1830	Cotton Suitability	Enslavement 1830
Tobacco	17.61***	0.18***	5.36	0.00163	1.57	0.10*
	(3.67)	(0.03)	(7.99)	(0.09)	(4.75)	(0.04)
Cotton	1.49	0.02*	30.56***	0.35***	29.93*	0.23
	(0.80)	(0.01)	(5.50)	(0.06)	(12.74)	(0.13)
Rice	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.31	0.01
	(3.67)	(0.03)	(7.99)	(0.09)	(0.58)	(0.01)
Slavery	75.42***		64.09***		51.08***	
	(6.78)		(8.27)		(11.31)	

Each row reports a bivariate county-level relationship with cotton suitability or enslavement.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Things were different in North Carolina. Tobacco production was associated here with enslavement but, unlike in Virginia, cotton suitability was only weakly associated with tobacco. Cotton suitability was associated with cotton cultivation, but with more variation than in Tennessee. Rice cultivation was, like tobacco, not associated with cotton suitability in the state. The result was a number of counties relatively more invested in tobacco and rice, with correspondingly high levels of enslavement, but less suitable for cotton.[14] This is shown visually in Figure A8, which plots the district level cotton suitability and enslavement rate and which highlights those districts that were above the 60th percentile in per capita tobacco or rice output. Fifty-six percent of legislators from these counties voted for disenfranchisement versus forty-one percent from the remaining counties, and the relationship between enslavement and voting on Black disenfranchisement is positive and significant across both sets of counties.[15] While the instrumented estimate of slavery is not significant, we suggest that this reflects the limits of the instrument given North Carolina's more heterogeneous use of enslavement outside areas of cotton suitability.

We interpret these results as being entirely compatible with slavery having the predicted effect on county-level attitudes – as shown in the main text of the paper – but being attenuated by a noisy instrument whose applicability across states is questionable, and by the rough proxy variables for public opinion.

Two points are worth stressing. First, our use of an IV strategy here has exactly the more general limits discussed in the text. If the relevant assumptions are met – and we make no sweeping claims in this regard – then a causal estimate for a specific relationship (prevalence of slavery and voting on abolition and Black rights) might be valid, but it would not be able to discriminate between any specific causal theory for this

[14] In North Carolina there was also a significant "naval stores" industry employing enslaved labor, initially centered in the northeast of the state before moving towards the Cape Fear region in the southeast. Neither of these regions was high in cotton suitability. While not included in the agricultural census, the naval stores industry is another indication of the diverse uses of slavery in the state (Outland, 1996).

[15] In Tennessee the estimated effect of enslavement on Black disenfranchisement is 0.012 (0.003)*** and in North Carolina it is 0.014 (0.005)***.



Figure A8: Cotton Suitability, Enslavement, and Tobacco or Rice Cultivation, North Carolina

effect. We gain confidence in the claim that slavery and legislator voting were related, but such an analysis says little concerning the more important theoretical and empirical questions of how.

Second, our state-level analyses are tests of an identifying assumption and are not addressed by changing the sample composition. It might be tempting to simply drop Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina (and possibly Mississippi) and re-estimate ABS's model on the remaining southern states. Doing so would misinterpret our critique. These states provide useful data for evaluating a key theoretical claim and corresponding identifying assumption. Admittedly imperfect, in general the limits of the data would make finding an effect less likely.[16] It is, of course, possible that the pattern we have found is exclusive to these three states, and would disappear were similar data available elsewhere. But we see no obvious theoretical reason to believe so.

And it is the validity of the assumption – not the specific patterns of these states – that is relevant. ABS's hypothesized mechanism (the need to rally white participation in suppressing Black laborers) might reasonably be expected to be present before and after emancipation. Our state-level findings are what we

[16]The number of observations is reduced, our outcomes are coarsely measured, and they are generated through a complex process of representation in which surely more than just racial attitudes of constituents mattered. In general, the bias would be against finding an effect.

would expect if there were such a continuity. Taken together, this should seriously undermine confidence in the theoretical claim that underlies ABS's identifying assumption, that it was only in the different context of the post-emancipation South that this mechanism began to operate.

The results might be robust to dropping these states, but we would have gained no additional confidence in the identifying assumption. Rather than a robustness check, it would be a replication of the original analysis on a smaller sample, leaving its potentially flawed identifying assumptions in place.

6 Stability in Slavery's Distribution in Antebellum Era

Over the course of the America's post-colonial and antebellum eras, the institution of slavery both receded and expanded: it was abolished in states where it had otherwise been an important and enduring feature of social and economic life, but was introduced into new regions expropriated from the indigenous nations. The territory in which slavery was a central feature of economic and social life was never entirely coterminous with areas of cotton suitability. Not only were other types of crop production dependent on enslaved labor – cotton, rice, sugar, indigo, for example – but not all cotton suitable regions were exploited for this purpose. Legal impositions, often emanating from Washington, DC, limited the opportunity to engage in cotton production by enslaved persons in free states with cotton suitable soil; and economic calculations by southern enslavers meant that cotton suitable soil was not as aggressively exploited before the Civil War as it would be afterwards, when cotton production expanded immensely.

Within each southern state, however, the gradual opening up of areas for cotton production did not substantially alter the distribution of slavery or of enslaved persons, at least not after the initial periods of expropriation and settlement. We examine this relationship through a series of scatterplots for the states focused on in this study, as well as through maps of the South across four distinct historical moments.

The first set of figures (Figures A9, A10, and A11) show simple scatterplots between the county level proportion of the population held in slavery in the states examined in this study during the relevant time period, usually 1830-1860 but also 1850-1860 for Georgia and Mississippi.

In each state, the actual relationship closely follows the 45-degree angle, suggesting little alteration in the distribution of the proportion of the population held in slavery and the proportion free. The two possible exceptions to this pattern are Tennessee and Mississippi (1830-1860), both of which were continuing to undergo extensive settlement during this period. In Tennessee, a cluster of counties in the middle and west of the state that were already more intensively invested in slavery in 1830 either expanded the number of persons held in bondage or saw a relative decrease in the white population. In Mississippi, almost every county saw an increase in the proportion of persons held in slavery between 1830-1860, and many new



Figure A9: County-level percentage enslaved in Tennessee and North Carolina, 1830 to 1860

counties were formed out of the Choctaw and other nations territories after these were forcible expropriated. In both states, however, the changes across thirty years worked primarily to either shift the line upwards or to slightly increase its angle, suggesting that there was no considerable alteration in the cross-county investment in slavery.

An alternative way of looking at the relative stability of the distribution of slavery and the African American population across the South is to compare maps of the region at four important junctures: 1830, 1850, 1860, and 1900. These were selected based on their connection to the time periods under study, and to extend it forward to the post-bellum era. The figures show the proportion of the county held in slavery, with darker values approaching 100 percent enslaved and lighter values approaching zero percent enslaved. They also show the path of navigable rivers (light blue), canals (dark blue), and, after 1850, railways.

While the period from 1830 to 1850 sees a considerable opening up of the deep South to white settlement and, with it, African American enslavement, within the Upper South and Atlantic seaboard states the geographic distribution of enslavement stays relatively stable.



Figure A10: County-level percentage enslaved in Virginia and Mississippi, 1830 to 1860

The two principal reasons given by ABS for why geographic variation in the distribution of enslavement would not lead to a similar variation in racial attitudes are the desire of poor farmers to acquire enslaved persons, and the region-wide fear of insurrection. We have discussed these in the text. In addition to these reasons, ABS briefly mention another factor potentially tying white southerners together in defense of slavery, namely Walter Johnson's claim that "it was the internal slave trade, not a common crop or 'shared mode of production,' that united the South into a 'single slave economy' in the antebellum period" (Acharya et al., 2018, 108). Johnson's account emphasizes the internal slave trade, which occurred primarily in the coastal shipping routes, along the region's navigable waterways, or along a few overland road routes. While the interstate trade in enslaved persons linked the Upper South and the Deep South in a common economy, a central theme of Johnson's account is that trade was tied to the landscape: it did not equally penetrate every region of the South, and the contradictions produced by this and the occasional boom cycle of the trade – a slaveholding region in which substantial subregions were not heavily invested in the institution and in which a growing class of whites could not afford to acquire or invest in slaves – encouraged a series



Figure A11: County-level percentage enslaved in Georgia and Mississippi, 1850 to 1860

of expansionist efforts that would culminate in secession.

Figures A11 to A15 provide a limited but useful visualization of these inter- and intrastate ties. Waterways did connect some low-enslavement regions with high-enslavement regions, but they had less penetration into Appalachia, the principal site of support for more racially liberal policies in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia (Figure A16 and A17, where darker counties have a higher proportion held in slavery), and opposition to secession in these states plus Alabama and Georgia. Interestingly, as railways were slowly gradually constructed in the antebellum South, these tended to integrate already high-enslavement regions or complement rivers that allowed crops to be brought to the coast for shipment abroad or to the industrializing northeast. While no part of the South was wholly cut off from the broader region – in trade, settlement, politics, or the dissemination of ideology – and the distinctive economies were each connected to slavery through the interstate market in enslaved persons, there was nonetheless a clear demarcation between both the Upper South and Deep south, as well as between regions of relative high- and low-enslavement in each. As Johnson has argued, the intense speculation in captive human laborers in the final decades of the



Figure A12: Distribution of enslavement in the South, 1830



Figure A13: Distribution of enslavement in the South, 1850



Figure A14: Distribution of enslavement in the South, 1860



Figure A15: Distribution of African American population in the South, 1900



Figure A16: Votes on abolition, dashed counties' representatives votes in favor.

antebellum era "had exacerbated the divergence in the fortunes and interests of the regions of 'the South."' The region was "increasingly seen as being composed of two interlocked economies: a Deep-South economy that imported slaves and produced a staple crop, and an Upper-South economy that produced and exported slaves" (Johnson, 2013, 404). To this must be added the Appalachian region that, for the most part, did neither.[17]

One of the central themes of Johnson's account is that this integration of the South, even for the two main "importing" and "exporting" regions, was unstable:

> "as at other moments of crisis—particularly the South Carolina Nullification crisis of 1831... and the Virginia slave emancipation debates of 1832—by the late 1850s several strains of thought that fed the ideological identification of 'the South' with slavery and slaveholding were beginning to produce rogue strains that threatened to metastasize into a real threat to slaveholding power.... [The conflict over the western territories] provided a frame that called attention to variation within the supposedly uniform space of 'the slaveholding South.' Indeed, the late 1850s, the high point of sectional thinking, produced an acute *awareness* of differences within the South—of

[17]Some regions in Appalachia did, however, serve as conduits for the interstate trade in persons. Abingdon and Knoxville in particular served as important way stations (and a "trading" hub in the latter case) en route to the Ohio River or Nashville, and from there further South. Most of the region, including almost all of West Virginia and western North Carolina, was bypassed in favor of the major river arteries and the coastal trade.



Figure A17: Votes on civil disabilities for free African Americans, dashed counties' representatives voted against.

> regional differences, class differences, and an emergent contradiction between the privileges of race and those of slavery" (Johnson, 2013, 373, emphasis added).

That this contradiction intensified during the Civil War and Reconstruction seems wholly plausible. The evidence provided by this paper, however, suggests that while it might be well-characterized as "emergent" in the 1850s, the association between racism and slavery had already appeared in southern politics at least two decades earlier.

7 The Effect of 1860-1865

The causal argument of ABS is that the geographical divergence in attitudes between areas of low and high-enslavement emerged in 1860-65. We believe the paper and supplemental analyses have provided substantial reason to doubt that. This does not mean that Reconstruction had no effect on this divergence. Indeed, we believe that it would be difficult to argue as much on the basis of the historical record, and that ABS are right in treating it as a period of causal significance for the subsequent distribution of racial attitudes (even if not exhaustive of the longer term effect of slavery as we suggest).

Including a measure of slavery's pre-1860 prevalence might allow for an estimate of the causal effect of

slavery after that year.[18] This would not speak to the question of whether racial attitudes diverged before the Civil War, but would begin to approximate the causal model offered by ABS.

We approach this in a few ways: by including a measure of enslavement from 1830 in the instrumental variables model; or, as ABS suggested in personal communication, by controlling for the difference between 1860 and 1830 in this model. For the latter, we estimate the effect of change itself as well as the effect of 1860 enslavement controlling for change from 1830.

The left panel of Figure A18 shows ABS's original estimates of slavery on the proportion Democrat, support for affirmative action, and racial resentment; the right panel shows the original estimates for the white-Black thermometer difference. The 95% confidence intervals are shown in blue.



Figure A18: Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen's instrumented coefficient estimates for 1860 slavery (2016, Table 2)

The three rows in Figure A19 show the estimated effect of slavery when attempting to account for the earlier periods. The first row reports the coefficients for 1860 slavery when controlling for the prevalence of slavery in 1830, across the four outcome variables given by ABS. The second row shows the effect of change from 1830 to 1860. The third row reports the estimated effect of 1860 enslavement when controlling for change since 1830. Across these specifications, the proportion enslaved in 1860 is sometimes signed correctly (racial resentment in rows 1 and 2; the feeling thermometer, proportion Democrat, and affirmative action in rows 2 and 3) but with considerably less precision.

We read these results as consistent with an interpretation that 1860-1865 had an important effect on the long-term divergence of racial attitudes, but far from conclusive.

[18]The measurement of enslavement in 1860 is assumed under the ABS framework to provide a reliable proxy for its distribution at the moment of emancipation. It is not thought of as capturing all of enslavement's pre-1860 effect on racial attitudes.



Figure A19: Instrumented estimates when controlling for earlier patterns of enslavement
Row (1) shows the effect of 1860 enslavement when controlling for 1830 enslavement, row (2) the effect of the change between those years, and row (3) the effect of 1860 enslavement when controlling for that change.

Our broader findings suggest, however, that the post-1860 period was not the origin point for this divergence, as claimed by ABS. How much of today's divergence can be attributed to the post-emancipation period, rather than to the longer history, is complicated by multicollinearity (row 1) and changes in interpretation (rows 2 and 3). When the treatment is the difference between 1860 and 1830, the question becomes how much of the contemporary divergence in racial attitudes can be accounted for by places that were growing in their proportional investment in slavery, rather than of the effect of emancipation. When the difference is included as a control, the treatment becomes the effect of emancipation conditional on change in enslavement proportions since 1830. In neither case is it evident how this is related to the causal theory. The imprecision that results from controlling for some of the longer history of enslavement suggests the difficulties of attempting to identify a discrete moment when slavery began to have a causal effect, and accordingly in our ability to establish the causal pathways through which this effect occurred and in the direct effect of these pathways on contemporary attitudes.

8 State Selection

It is possible that our finding of a pre-Civil War divergence in racial attitudes is a function of the particular states that were included in the analyses. Given that these were states in which conflict over slavery and free Black rights were pushed on to the agenda, one way or another, they might also be states where a pre-War divergence was most likely. In that case, the assumption of non-divergence relied on by ABS might still be valid in the remaining southern states.

While a potentially important critique, in this case it does not undermine our findings. The results presented in the main text and supplemental material cover, in different forms, a majority of southern states. ABS's operationalization of the South includes the eleven states of the Confederacy, plus Kentucky, West Virginia, and Missouri. The slaveholding states of Maryland and Delaware are not included, though this does not affect their results. Our analyses touch on nine of these fourteen states: Virginia (including West Virginia), Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and, in the supplemental material, Kentucky and Alabama. They also cover a wide diversity of states, including the upper or rim South, deep South, and trans-Appalachian states such as Tennessee. The only region for which we do not have data are the southern states west of the Mississippi, plus Florida.

Moreover, similar patterns of divergence and persistence as described in ABS (2016) are found in our subset of southern states.[19] Figure A20 reproduces Figure 4 of ABS (2016), which reported the estimated effect of the percentage held in slavery in 1860 on the Democratic vote share for president from 1840 to

[19] We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.



Figure A20: Replication of Figure 4 in Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016)

Citing ABS (2016, 635): "Figure 4. Effect of proportion slave on vote for Democratic presidential candidate in the South over time. Each point is the effect of a 25 percentage point increase in proportion slave from separate IV models of county-level Democratic share of the presidential vote on proportion slave. Results for Obama in 2008 are from white respondents in the CCES."

1964, with the 1968 Wallace election and 2008 Obama election also shown. Following ABS, "each point is the effect of a 25 percentage point increase in proportion [enslaved] from separate IV models of county-level Democratic share of the presidential vote on proportion slave" (2016, 635). This figure is used as evidence both for the post-War emergence of a political divergence associated with enslavement, as well as for its persistence to the Voting Rights Act (after which elections are less useful as a metric of white attitudes).

Figure A21 replicates ABS's analysis but only for the subset of states covered in our paper and supplemental material. The patterns are nearly identical, unsurprisingly given the inclusion of most southern states in the estimates. We recognize, however, that the evidence for a pre-War divergence in racial attitudes is stronger in some of these states than others. The Southern Rights elections had important countervailing tendencies, while the abolitionist vote in Kentucky was highly idiosyncratic. But the same basic pattern holds when we separate our sample in two: those states where we were able to analyze roll call data on free Black rights, and those states where we analyze 1850s election data.[20] These are reported in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. While the estimated effect of slavery on post-War Democratic vote share is strongest in the

[20]The "roll call" states include Virginia (including West Virginia), Tennessee, North Carolina, and Mississippi. The "elections" states include Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The patterns hold regardless of whether Mississippi is excluded from the first group, and Kentucky and Tennessee are excluded from the second.



Figure A21: Replication of ABS (2016, 635) on subset of states included in article and supplemental material. Same analysis as Figure A20 but including only VA, WV, TN, NC, SC, GA, MS, KY, and AL.

deep South states that participated in the Southern Rights movement, positive and significant coefficients are reported in both subsets.[21]

These patterns suggest our findings are not a product of a biased sample. More important, our critique of ABS is not about whether their identifying assumption does not hold for some states. Rather, it is about the plausibility of finding any discrete moment of treatment for slavery, and the implications of this for estimating an effect of specific causal models of the type provided in the Deep Roots project.

[21] They also hold when we restrict the sample to the non-deep South states that are included in the broader Appalachian region (not shown; see White 2019 for a discussion of the significance of Appalachia).



Figure A22: Replication of ABS (2016, 635) on subset of states voting on free Black rights.

Same analysis as Figure A20 but including only VA, WV, TN, NC, and MS.



Figure A23: Replication of ABS (2016, 635) on southern states with slavery-related elections in 1850s.

Same analysis as Figure A20 but including only MS, GA, SC, AL, KY, and TN.

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