

Online Appendix

Gilded Age Doughfaces: Northern Democrats and Black Civil Rights

Descriptive statistics

We begin with some descriptive statistic fleshing out the patterns and relationships shown in the main text. Table A. 1 shows the proportion of pro-Black racial policy bills passed by partisan control over (northern) state governments, by decade. This is the basis for Figure 1 in the main text. The Bills column provides the number of bills passed, while the Legislatures column provides the percentage of northern state legislatures during that decade that fit that description.

Table A. 1: Support for Civil Rights by Party Control of State Government

Decade	Republican Control		Divided Government		Democratic Control	
	Bills	Legislatures	Bills	Legislatures	Bills	Legislatures
1860	16	89%	1	5%	0	5%
1870	10	76%	4	15%	4	10%
1880	27	79%	7	12%	6	8%
1890	17	72%	11	19%	1	9%
1900	13	87%	1	8%	0	5%
1910	10	65%	0	19%	4	16%
1920	13	77%	4	19%	2	4%
Total	106	78%	28	14%	17	8%

The Bill column counts the number of bills passed by state governments of a particular configuration in a given decade; the Legislatures column shows the percent of state legislative sessions that were of that configuration in that decade.

Table A. 2 shows the degree to which the relative size of the Black population was an important statewide consideration, even if it was not a significant district level consideration. The first column shows the Black population at the state level at the moment when it adopted a civil rights bill. The second columns the Black proportion of the population for all states which adopted a civil rights bill in a given period, before the Supreme Court decision in 1883, between 1884 and 1885 when the majority of states passed legislation, and after 1885. For those states that did not adopt a public accommodations law, we use the size of the Black population in 1883.

It appears as though the size of the Black population did affect the timing of civil rights bills' adoption. Before 1883, only saw two states adopt substantial civil rights bills, New York and

Kansas (Iowa also established a right to nondiscrimination on conveyances in 1873, but through judicial decision). Kansas had the largest Black population outside of the historic South, which covered all states where slavery had been legally recognized as persisting in state law in 1860. New York had a concentrated and growing population, but was proportionally behind late adopters such as Connecticut (1884, but more substantially in 1905). New York’s civil rights bill, however would be strengthened in 1881 and again in 1895. Beginning in 1884, a wider range of states began adopting civil rights bills. This began with those states with a relatively large Black population, New Jersey, Ohio, Connecticut (though this was limited), but also Iowa. By 1885, even more states were passing legislation, many of which had Black populations below 1% of the total population. The last states to adopt a civil rights bill were Wisconsin and California, with Black proportions of 0.88% and 0.13% respectively (Pennsylvania also passed a public accommodations bill late, but it had also passed an antidiscrimination bill for public conveyances in 1867, which alleviated some of the demand for a broader bill. With the exception of Wyoming, with a small population, all of the non-adopters had Black populations below 1%.

Table A. 2: Statewide Population Size and Civil Rights Adoption

State	Year	% Black (1)	Period	Average % Black (2)
New York	1873	1.21	Before 1883	2.45
Kansas	1874	4.86	1883-1885	1.485
New York	1881	1.28	1886-1890	1.0725
Connecticut	1884	1.78	Not before 1900	0.39875
New Jersey	1884	3.39		
Ohio	1884	2.45		
Iowa	1884	0.58		
Massachusetts	1885	1.02		
Rhode Island	1885	2.25		
Illinois	1885	1.5		
Indiana	1885	2.02		
Michigan	1885	0.83		
Minnesota	1885	0.22		
Nebraska	1885	0.5		

Colorado	1885	1.28
Pennsylvania	1887	2.03
California	1893	0.88
New York	1895	1.25
Wisconsin	1895	0.13
Maine		0.21
New Hampshire		0.18
Vermont		0.31
North Dakota		0
South Dakota		0.34
Idaho		0.04
Nevada		0.64
Wyoming		1.23
Oregon		0.24

So far as the size of the Black electorate was a relevant factor in state adoption of civil rights bills, it seems to have primarily been at the state rather than district level.

Bivariate Regressions of Legislator Voting

The following tables show the bivariate regressions of demographic factors with legislator support for Black civil rights. This allows any individual associations, before the full battery of variables is included, to be examined. Table A. 3 shows the economic, urban, and Black population variables. Here, only the % foreign born is associated with support or opposition to civil rights. Given that no additional meaningful associations appear in the full models in the main text, we take this as strong evidence that these demographic factors were largely unrelated to legislator positions. Insofar as we would expect public opinion to vary along lines of race, nativity, class and occupation, or rurality/urbanness, this is strongly suggestive evidence that public opinion did not directly drive legislator positions.

Table A. 3: Demography and Support for Civil Rights Bills

% Black	-0.325	
	(0.780)	
Change in % Black	1.455	
Farm	(0.945)	0.00083

Output (per cap			(0.00045)			
% Mfg. Labor				-0.138		
				(0.284)		
% Foreign-Born					0.358*	
					(0.146)	
Small Towns						0.00897
						(0.0222)
Suburban						0.0201
						(0.0555)
Metropolitan						-0.0112
						(0.0545)
Observations	3660	3660	3660	3660	3660	3660

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A. 4 and Table A. 5 show the bivariate relationship between voting on Black civil rights and the proportion of the population from a particular religious denomination. In the bivariate relationships, only % Congregationalist, % Unitarian, and % Universalist are sizeable and significant predictors of support. This is likely due to their association with Republican partisanship, and once the full battery of political factors (-----) are included we see that most of the religious factors are no longer substantively or statistically significant. Again, we expect that public opinion would have been powerfully shaped by religious denominations, and interpret the relative inconsistency of a relationship between religion and civil rights as evidence that public opinion was less important than legislators' broader electoral calculations in determining their positions.

Table A. 4: Religion and Support for Civil Rights Bills

% Baptist	1.893				
	(2.276)				
% Congregationalist		13.78***			
		(3.416)			
% Episcopalian			5.686		
			(3.367)		
% Quaker				3.343	
				(1.791)	
% Lutheran					-1.055
					(0.835)
Observations	3660	3660	3660	3660	3660

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A. 5: Religion and Support for Civil Rights Bills

% Methodist	-0.928 (0.682)				
% Presbyterian		0.266 (0.954)			
% Catholic			-0.223 (0.310)		
% Unitarian				64.36* (23.97)	
% Universalist					69.47** (23.26)
Observations	3660	3660	3660	3660	3660

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Finally, Table A. 6 shows the bivariate relationship for the district level political factors. The relationships in the more fully specified models persist, except that of the two party vote margin. Again, we see no relationship with the percentage for Black suffrage, even in a model that does not include other factors such as Republican vote share.

Table A. 6: Political factors and support for civil rights

Republican plurality	0.370** (0.102)				
% Democratic		-1.82** (0.526)			
Two-Party Margin			0.163 (0.138)		
Black Churches per capita				0.550*** (0.147)	
% for Black Suffrage					0.675 (0.489)
Observations	3671	3659	3659	3660	2055

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Full Models

For space reasons some of the results shown in the main text were cropped, leaving out religious demographic variables that were included in the analysis. The religions include Congregationalism, Baptists, Methodists, Catholics, Quakers, Presbyterians, Episcopalians,

Unitarians, and Universalists. The size of the membership is included in the 1890 census of religions. We use the ratio of seating/membership in 1890 to estimate membership for earlier years (Finke and Stark 1986). The full models are included here.

Table A. 7 shows the district level models that were dropped, corresponding to columns (2) and (5) in the main text. Methodists were positively associated with civil rights, and Lutherans negatively, in column (2), which excludes most political factors. When these are included (column (5)), only Episcopalians were associated with civil rights positions. This suggests that so far as religion shaped positions on civil rights at this juncture, it was inconsistent and operated primarily through partisanship.

Table A. 7: District level, full version of columns (2) and (5) Table 2 in main text

	Corresponding to columns from Table 2 in main text	
	(2)	(5)
% Black	0.204 (0.461)	-0.0960 (0.405)
Change in % Black	0.768 (0.966)	1.375*** (0.367)
Black Churches	-0.749 (0.661)	-0.168 (0.511)
Farm Output (per cap)	0.000612 (0.000925)	0.00000684 (0.00101)
% Mfg. Labor	0.304 (0.336)	-0.165 (0.228)
% Foreign-Born	0.687 (0.372)	0.185 (0.224)
Small Towns	-0.00720 (0.0346)	0.00202 (0.0310)
Suburban	0.0724 (0.100)	0.0585 (0.0772)
Metropolitan	0.00201 (0.110)	0.00654 (0.0756)
% Baptist	0.915 (1.643)	0.196 (0.995)
% Congregationalist	0.786 (1.334)	-0.764 (1.045)
% Episcopalian	1.206 (0.761)	1.298* (0.576)
% Quaker	1.057 (0.763)	-1.317 (0.898)

% Lutheran	-1.369*	-0.0455
	(0.612)	(0.566)
% Methodist	1.201**	0.375
	(0.381)	(0.412)
% Presbyterian	0.876	0.274
	(0.528)	(0.391)
% Catholic	-0.646	0.128
	(0.421)	(0.176)
% Unitarian	-0.639	-5.689
	(8.555)	(7.156)
% Universalist	3.897	-7.828
	(7.085)	(6.958)
Republican plurality		0.220
		(0.109)
% Democratic		-0.841***
		(0.136)
Two-Party Margin		-0.281**
		(0.101)
Observations	3660	3652
Adjusted R^2	0.040	0.154

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The same information is shown in Table A. 8 for the Legislator models. In this case, once legislator level factors are included only the effect of Episcopalian membership remains positive. We also see that the size of the Friends (Quaker) membership is now negative and statistically significant. Given the latter's close association with antislavery, we take this as further evidence that public opinion was not a significant driver of legislator positions.

Table A. 8: Legislator level, full version of column (5) of Table 3 in main text

	Corresponding to column (5) of Table 3 in main text
Republican plurality	0.106 (0.0632)
Republican	0.320*** (0.0672)
3rd Party	0.363*** (0.0751)
Republican plurality # Republican	-0.121* (0.0506)
Republican plurality # 3rd Party	-0.285*** (0.0771)
Ideal Point Estimate	0.0660* (0.0262)

% Democratic	-0.359*
	(0.151)
Two-Party Margin	-0.174
	(0.0967)
% Black	-0.141
	(0.340)
Change in % Black	0.346
	(0.381)
Black Churches	0.138
	(0.405)
Farm Output (per cap)	0.000117
	(0.000713)
% Mfg. Labor	-0.369
	(0.259)
% Foreign-Born	0.0652
	(0.180)
Small Towns	0.0148
	(0.0222)
Suburban	0.101
	(0.0626)
Metropolitan	0.0481
	(0.0507)
% Baptist	0.152
	(0.901)
% Congregationalist	-0.0420
	(0.833)
% Episcopalian	1.491**
	(0.535)
% Quaker	-2.812**
	(0.990)
% Lutheran	-0.0488
	(0.502)
% Methodist	0.437
	(0.308)
% Presbyterian	0.0740
	(0.314)
% Catholic	0.182
	(0.156)
% Unitarian	-12.40
	(9.344)
% Universalist	-13.00
	(7.088)
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Observations	3652
Adjusted R^2	0.267
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
Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Growth of Black Population in North and Organizing Density

The Black population in the North was growing, but in an era of heightened immigration it was only slightly outpacing overall population growth. This can be seen in Figure A. 1, which shows the increase in the Black population and overall population in Northern states, starting from a baseline of 100 in 1860.

Figure A. 1: Black Population Growth Compared to Overall Population Growth



This is significant insofar as it underscores the electoral limitations of pursuing Black voters. Their relatively small numbers, plus their high levels of support for the Republican party, meant that Democrats likely had other more feasible options for attracting a sufficient number of additional voters to win statewide elections in the North. That the party moved towards racial liberalism on civil rights policy nonetheless suggests other factors were more important.

We have found consistent qualitative evidence in the historical and primary sources that Black organizing mattered to the outcome. We are limited in our ability to test for this statistically, given the available data. As a very imperfect proxy for Black organizing, we use the number of Black churches per capita in a district. These are derived from the 1890 census, the first where the numbers are available, and so are anachronistically when included in earlier years. We calculate this using the number of organizations as a function of the total population or total Black population. The results are shown in Table A. 9 and Table A. 10 and are substantively similar across both specifications, though the magnitudes vary, and are consistently estimated as larger than zero. The first measure – using total population – is presented in the main text.

Table A. 9: Black organizational density and civil rights positions, Black churches per capita (total population)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black Churches per capita (total)	0.241*** (0.0264)	0.333*** (0.0819)	0.117** (0.0368)	0.362*** (0.0773)
% Black		1.161 (0.811)	0.0440 (0.311)	0.154 (0.292)
Change in % Black			1.469** (0.500)	0.880* (0.411)
Republican plurality			0.208 (0.103)	0.123 (0.0669)
% Democratic			-0.890*** (0.145)	-0.445** (0.129)
Two-Party Margin			-0.310** (0.0926)	-0.177* (0.0805)
Republican				0.424*** (0.0992)
3rd Party				0.444*** (0.115)
Republican plurality # Republican				-0.144** (0.0509)

Republican plurality # 3rd Party				-0.325** (0.0983)
Observations	3660	3660	3652	3652
Adjusted R^2	-0.000	0.004	0.153	0.256

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A. 10: Black organizational density and civil rights positions, Black churches per capita (Black population)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black Churches per capita (Black pop.)	0.0701*** (0.00370)	0.106*** (0.0283)	0.316*** (0.0571)	0.0897* (0.0407)
% Black		1.206 (0.805)	0.0861 (0.294)	0.148 (0.302)
Change in % Black			1.567** (0.478)	0.929* (0.422)
Republican plurality			0.209 (0.102)	0.124 (0.0668)
% Democratic			-0.917*** (0.148)	-0.436** (0.132)
Two-Party Margin			-0.316** (0.0950)	-0.189* (0.0808)
Republican				0.425*** (0.0993)
3rd Party				0.420** (0.127)
Republican plurality # Republican				-0.142** (0.0510)
Republican plurality # 3rd Party				-0.305* (0.117)
Observations	3630	3630	3623	3623
Adjusted R^2	-0.000	0.004	0.157	0.258

The Newer Departure in Congress

There was a congressional counterpart to the “new departure.” This came in December, 1884, while debating Texas Democrat John Reagan’s Interstate Commerce bill. A Black Republican from North Carolina, James O’Hara, introduced an amendment that would “prohibit[] discrimination between fare-paying interstate railroad passengers holding the same class of ticket.” To the dismay of southern Democrats who supported the bill, the amendment passed, 134 to 99 with 48 northern Democrats providing the margin of victory.¹ Reagan immediately moved to adjourn, and the following day, after a motion to reconsider the vote was tabled by Republican and northern Democratic votes, the House voted on a series of amendments that sought to preserve the right of railroad companies to discriminate based on race. An amendment providing the companies with the right to “separate white and colored passengers at their own discretion,” and limiting the application of the act to transportation wholly within a state was passed with all but two southern Democrats and over 65% of northern Democrats voting in favor. This was in turn amended to require that there be no discrimination in accommodations on account of race or color, with 60% of northern Democrats in support. After an effort to reconsider this vote was defeated, Ethelbert Barksdale of Mississippi moved to amend the bill to add that “separate accommodations with equal facilities and comforts” shall not be considered discrimination. This passed with the support of 72% of northern Democrats and all but 4 southern Democrats (possibly looking to defeat the bill). A final effort to ensure that “such separate and equal facilities shall not be related to race and color” was defeated by the same margins.

A similar analysis of district and legislator correlates of voting for the O’Hara amendment is reported in Table A. 11 and Table A. 12. The results exclude all members from the sixteen

¹ Two Democrats from the former Confederacy also voted for the amendment, likely to kill the bill. The northern Democrats largely supported the bill.

southern states. Looking at the representative level (Table A. 11), we see that the effect of a Republican plurality persists (though not for those states where we have referenda data (models (3) and (7)), even when controlling for partisan identification. Greenbackers were more consistently more likely to support the civil rights position than Democrats, as were Republicans. The effect of the district level Democratic vote disappears, suggesting that it operated through the election of Democratic representatives who would be, on average, less inclined to support civil rights than the other parties. The percentage Black, and the percentage for Black suffrage, continue to be insignificant predictors of voting here.

Table A. 11: Correlates of Legislator Support for Civil Rights, House of Representatives

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Republican Plurality	0.132*** (0.0292)	0.126*** (0.0319)	-0.137* (0.0602)	0.132*** (0.0292)	0.126*** (0.0320)	0.0982** (0.0304)	-0.123* (0.0594)
Republican	0.529*** (0.0213)	0.531*** (0.0216)	0.484*** (0.0343)	0.529*** (0.0214)	0.530*** (0.0216)	-0.0190 (0.0488)	0.0326 (0.0944)
Greenbacker	0.425*** (0.0788)	0.423*** (0.0790)		0.426*** (0.0790)	0.424*** (0.0793)	0.153 (0.0783)	
% Democratic	0.0659 (0.158)	0.00330 (0.213)	-0.244 (0.333)	0.0626 (0.159)	0.00269 (0.214)	-0.111 (0.203)	-0.430 (0.332)
Two-Party Margin		-0.0544 (0.125)	-0.195 (0.222)		-0.0525 (0.125)	0.0229 (0.119)	-0.183 (0.223)
% for Black Suffrage			-0.0443 (0.137)				-0.247 (0.172)
% Black				0.00111 (0.00524)	0.000929 (0.00526)	0.00321 (0.00499)	-0.00874 (0.0101)
Ideal Point Estimate						0.346*** (0.0279)	0.295*** (0.0576)
Observations	1393	1393	603	1393	1393	1393	603
Adjusted R ²	0.477	0.477	0.402	0.476	0.476	0.529	0.425

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The pattern is less clear when we focus exclusively on non-Republicans (Table A. 12). It is possible that Democrats in districts where the support for the third party was greater than the margin between the two major parties were less supportive of civil rights, whether because they wanted to shore up their base or because of unobserved features of these districts. The clearest result speaks again to the different factions within the party – non-Republican legislators whose voting patterns (ideal points) were on aggregate closer to the Republicans, including Greenbackers, were by far the most likely to take the pro-civil rights position.

Table A. 12: Correlates of Non-Republican Support for Civil Rights, House of Representatives

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Greenbacker	0.443*** (0.110)	0.402*** (0.109)	0.392*** (0.110)		-0.177 (0.107)
% Democratic	-1.086*** (0.280)	-0.581 (0.476)	-0.555 (0.478)	-1.082 (0.679)	0.202 (0.427)
Two-Party Margin	0.415 (0.281)				
Republican Plurality		0.0816 (0.0623)	0.0860 (0.0627)	-0.117 (0.0969)	0.120* (0.0556)
Dem. with 3rd party threat		-0.152** (0.0504)	-0.153** (0.0505)	0.00566 (0.101)	-0.0274 (0.0457)
% Black			-0.00839 (0.0129)	-0.0116 (0.0212)	0.00156 (0.0115)
Ideal Point Estimate				0.870*** (0.147)	0.759*** (0.0589)
% for Black Suffrage				-0.790 (0.575)	
Observations	614	614	614	259	614
Adjusted R ²	0.180	0.195	0.194	0.362	0.368

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The debate over the O’Hara Amendment provides suggestive evidence for our interpretation that Democrats’ motivation for supporting civil rights reflected a top-down, electoral calculation by party leaders. It also points to the limits this might have imposed on a broader realignment. While the support of northern Democrats for the O’Hara amendment was presented in many papers

as a sign of their changing stance on race, and praised by George T. Downing and others, the tenor of debate on the floor suggests that the Democrats experienced this less as an opportunity to be seized than as a dilemma to be confronted. Roswell Horr mocked northern Democrats for their apparent angst now that they had to choose between following through on their campaign commitments and voting their partisan loyalties.

Now to my astonishment, in the very first legislation where the Democrats of this House have a chance to emphasize their new position in reference to the colored race they have jumped the track. [Laughter.] I do not wonder at it, because it is novel legislation to you gentlemen. You do not take kindly to it simply because you are not used to it. [Laughter.] I have been working, Mr. Speaker, for thirty years in good faith earnestly to benefit all the people of the United States, and especially those that were downtrodden and oppressed. And when I found that the entire Democratic party had changed front and was going to join me in this great work my heart was filled with joy. [Laughter.] And now think of my disappointment when sitting here to see that the very first opportunity they have had to do anything which will wipe out this race distinction and tend to give every man an even chance with his head and his hands to work for himself, instead of adopting such measures with cheerful countenances they sit here and look like men going to a funeral. [Laughter.] Why this despondency? Why this feeling that takes possession of you gentlemen in reference to this great question upon which you claim to have taken such advanced ground? You are certainly the best friends of these people, are you not? You all meant what you said, did you not?²

² Congressional Record, 48th Congress, 2nd Session, House, December 18, 1884, 339-40

While state-level institutional and ideological factors motivated subnational Democrats in the North to pursue civil rights, they were bound to a coalition that could not accept any nationalization of pro-civil rights policies, and which often insisted upon nationalization of anti-civil rights policies. Northern Democrats could embrace a “new departure” in their states and districts, but would not abandon the strength it got from its alliance with the Solid South. When the Federal Elections bill was before Congress in the 1890s, Grover Cleveland, who had earlier presented himself as a racial liberal, wrote a series of letters describing the Elections bill as “a direct attack upon the spirit and theory of our Government ...menac[ing] the welfare and prosperity of the South” (Cleveland 1892, 332). As president a few years later, he signed into law Democratic legislation repealing the remaining Federal Elections laws.

References

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