

ONLINE APPENDIX

“Insuring Against Hunger? The Long-Term Political Consequences of Exposure to the Dutch Famine”


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A Treatment Distribution

Figure A.1: Variation in Treatment Proportion



NOTE: Between any 2 elections, about 66% of municipalities experience a *decrease* in the proportion of treated, about 0.3% experience no change and the remaining 33% experience an *increase*.

Figure A.2: Left Vote Share and $\Delta\%$ Treated Within West and East





Figure A.3: Average **Levels** and **Change** of Treated



B Alternative Treatment and Control Definition

Table B.1: Famine Effect on Left Vote Share Alternative Urban and Excluding the South

	(1)	(2)
Δ Treat Alternative Urban (SD)	0.008** (0.003)	
Δ Control Alternative Urban (SD)	-0.010*** (0.003)	
Δ Treat No South (SD)		0.008*** (0.003)
Δ Control No South (SD)		-0.013*** (0.003)
Observations	2,328	2,328
R-squared	0.329	0.335

NOTE: Outcome is total vote share (rescaled between 0 and 1) obtained by all left wing parties. Treatment in model (1) is defined based on the urban definition of more than 30,000 inhabitants during the famine. Treatment in model (2) is defined based on the urban definition of more than 40,000 inhabitants during the famine, excluding the South. All elections between 1998 and 2017 are included and models include election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table B.2: Main Specification Illustration with Time-Varying Controls

	(1)	(2)
Δ Treat (SD)	0.008** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)
Δ Control (SD)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.003)
Log Home Prices		-0.060*** (0.016)
Log Spending		-0.061*** (0.015)
% Female Population		0.011** (0.005)
% Foreign Population		0.006*** (0.001)
Observations	2,281	2,281
R-squared	0.331	0.446

NOTE: Outcome is total vote share (rescaled between 0 and 1) obtained by all left wing parties. Treatment is defined based on the urban definition of more than 40,000 inhabitants during the famine. All elections between 1998 and 2017 are included and models include election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.3: Main Results with Time-Varying Controls and Alternative Specification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Treat (SD)	0.008** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)		
Δ Control (SD)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.003)		
% Treat (SD)			0.010** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)
% Control (SD)			-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mun FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,281	2,281	2,687	2,687
R-squared	0.331	0.446	0.865	0.866
Number of munid	-	-	388	388

NOTE: Outcome is total vote share (rescaled between 0 and 1) obtained by all left wing parties. Treatment is defined based on the urban definition of more than 40,000 inhabitants during the famine. All elections between 1998 and 2017 are included and models include election fixed effects. Controls include the log of average home prices, municipality spending, proportion of women and foreign population. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C Alternative Left Definition

To measure the redistribution dimension we use the economic tax-spending dimension (Benoit and Laver, 2006, 2007). Positive statements include those referring to market regulation, economic planning, protectionism, controlled economy, nationalization, welfare, education, and labor groups. Negative statements refer to freemarket economy, incentives, (against) protectionism, economic orthodoxy, and (against) welfare. For the welfare dimension, we rely on welfare state expansion and welfare state limitation statements. Finally, for the insurance dimensions, we rely on positive incentives, negative protectionism, market regulation, economic planning, controlled economy, welfare state expansion and welfare state limitation, labor groups positive, and labor groups negative.

Table C.1: Famine Effect on Left Support (CMP)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Redistributive	Redistributive	Pro-Welfare	Pro-Welfare	Insurance	Insurance
Δ Treat (SD)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.003)
Δ Control (SD)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.005** (0.003)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.003)
Measure	Average	Median	Average	Median	Average	Median
Observations	2,328	2,328	2,328	2,328	2,328	2,328
R-squared	0.675	0.649	0.626	0.409	0.776	0.403

NOTE: Outcome is total vote share (rescaled between 0 and 1) obtained by all parties classified as being above the mean or the median based on their position on redistribution, pro-welfare and insurance in the Comparative Manifesto Project. Treatment is defined based on the urban definition of more than 40,000 inhabitants during the famine. All elections between 1998 and 2017 are included and models include election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

CPB analyzes the economic impacts of the election manifestos of the political parties, at their request. It aims to provide voters a more objective manner to compare parties. These projections play a key role in elections and most established parties (large and small) submit their manifesto for assessment. The main exception is the far right party: they submitted in 2 out of the 4 elections they competed in. Note that we have no data for 2003 because the CPB could not analyze the manifestos for these snap elections.

Table C.2: Famine Effect on Party Support (Budget Spending)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Health	Health	Welfare	Welfare	Placebo	Placebo
Δ Treat (SD)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Δ Control (SD)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Measure	Average	Median	Average	Median	Average	Median
Observations	1,940	1,940	1,940	1,940	1,940	1,940
R-squared	0.636	0.720	0.900	0.814	0.822	0.822

NOTE: Outcome is total vote share (rescaled between 0 and 1) obtained by all parties classified as being above the mean (models (1), (3), and (5)) or the median (models (2), (4) and (6)) based on their proposed budget spending on health care, welfare and order. Treatment is defined based on the urban definition of more than 40,000 inhabitants during the famine. All elections between 1998 and 2017 are included, except 2003 which was a snap election and for which data is not available. All models include election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

References

Benoit, Kenneth and Laver, Michael. 2006. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. Routledge.

Benoit, Kenneth and Laver, Michael. 2007. "Estimating Party Policy Positions: Comparing Expert Surveys and Hand-Coded Content Analysis." *Electoral Studies* 26 (1): 90–107.