Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 7 > Issue 3–4

Special Issue: International Environmental Agreements

Edited by:
Charles F. Mason, University of Wyoming, USA, bambuzlr@uwyo.edu

The special issue International Environmental Agreements is comprised of five original articles. The first three papers address climate treaties using conventional non-cooperative game theory. The fourth paper in this special issue addresses climate treaties from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. The final paper in this special issue addresses a completely different topic, namely international fisheries

Published: 12 Feb 2018

Volume 7, Issue 3–4

Introduction to the Special Issue: International Environmental Agreements

 Charles F. Mason
Volume 7, Issue 3–4

Unilateral Emission Pricing and OPEC's Behaviour

 Christoph Böhringer  |  Knut Einar Rosendahl  |  Jan Schneider
Volume 7, Issue 3–4

Global Environmental Agreements and International Trade: Asymmetry of Countries Matters

 Thomas Eichner  |  Rüdiger Pethig
Volume 7, Issue 3–4

Strategic Environmental Policy, International Trade and Self-enforcing Agreements: The Role of Consumers' Taste for Variety

 Michael Finus  |  Alaa Al Khourdajie
Volume 7, Issue 3–4

Stability of Global Climate Cooperation Under Uncertainty

 Jan Kersting
Volume 7, Issue 3–4

Modeling Fisheries Agreements with Side Payments: The Case of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna

 Dimitrios Reppas