Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting > Vol 4 > Issue 2

Do Heads Roll?: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Turnover and Pay When the Corporation is Federally Prosecuted

Brandon L. Garrett, Duke University School of Law, USA, Nan Li, University of Minnesota, USA, Shivaram Rajgopal, University of Minnesota, USA
 
Suggested Citation
Brandon L. Garrett, Nan Li and Shivaram Rajgopal (2019), "Do Heads Roll?: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Turnover and Pay When the Corporation is Federally Prosecuted", Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting: Vol. 4: No. 2, pp 137-181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/108.00000036

Publication Date: 13 Dec 2019
© 2019 B. L. Garrett, N. Li and S. Rajgopal
 
Subjects
Corporate governance,  Executive compensation,  Law and economics
 

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In this article:
1. How Corporations and CEOs are Prosecuted (and Not) 
2. Data and Research Design 
3. Results: Corporate Prosecutions, CEO Turnover, and CEO Compensation 
4. Conclusion 
Appendix: List of Public Firms that were Prosecuted Between 2000–2015 
References 

Abstract

Does the criminal prosecution of a corporation affect the CEO? Or do criminal actions directed at the organization itself pose few consequences for the individuals at the top, and the CEO in particular? While CEO’s are rarely themselves prosecuted, organizations could discipline CEO’s through paycuts or outright replacing the CEO in response to a criminal prosecution. We sought to examine whether and how that occurs. We focus our analysis on a dataset of public companies that settled criminal cases brought by federal prosecutors from 2001 to 2014. We compared those companies to a matched control group, focusing on CEO compensation and turnover during the same time period. We examined the time period before and after prosecution, and the year that the company resolved the criminal charges against the company. We found that in the year that the company settled its prosecution, through a guilty plea or a deferred or non-prosecution agreement, there was a significantly higher level of CEO turnover. However, there was little evidence of any CEO pay cut. Second, for the prosecuted firms that did not have CEO turnover after prosecution, there is little evidence of a reduction in compensation. Indeed, we observed a spike in CEO bonuses in the year of prosecution—confirming concerns expressed by judges, prosecutors, lawmakers, and academics that corporate prosecutions do not sufficiently impact high-level decision-makers like CEOs. For the prosecuted firms that did have CEO turnover after prosecution, there is some evidence of a pay cut, both to salary and bonus, prior to the replacement of the CEO. These results raise larger questions whether federal prosecutors targeting the most serious corporate crimes sufficiently incentivize accountability at the top.

DOI:10.1561/108.00000036