Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting > Vol 6 > Issue 1

Consequences of More Frequent Reporting: The U.K. Experience

Suresh Nallareddy, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, USA, , Robert Pozen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA, , Shivaram Rajgopal, Columbia Business School, USA,
Suggested Citation
Suresh Nallareddy, Robert Pozen and Shivaram Rajgopal (2021), "Consequences of More Frequent Reporting: The U.K. Experience", Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting: Vol. 6: No. 1, pp 51-88.

Publication Date: 06 May 2021
© 2021 S. Nallareddy, R. Pozen and S. Rajgopal
Financial reporting
JEL Code: M41
Quarterly reportinganalyst followinginvestmentsdisclosure


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In this article:
1. Introduction 
2. Institutional Background and Related Literature 
3. Sample Selection and Research Design 
4. Empirical Results 
5. Consequences of Stopping More Frequent Reporting 
6. Reporting Frequency and Managerial Real Actions 
7. Conclusions and Interpretation of the Findings 
Appendix Tables 


The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is considering the pros and cons of (i) moving to semi-annual reporting from quarterly reporting, and/or (ii) making quarterly reporting less burdensome by allowing more qualitative disclosures. We exploit the start of less-burdensome and more frequent reporting by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in 2007 and the end of the requirement in 2014 in the United Kingdom to examine corporate and capital market behavior. After the imposition of more frequent reporting in 2007, we find (i) a dramatic decline in the number of companies that issue reports with quantitative information (defined as including both sales and earnings numbers for the quarter), (ii) a substantial increase in companies announcing managerial guidance for the upcoming year’s earnings or sales, and (iii) an increase in analyst following for all sample companies. Companies that voluntarily moved back from more frequent to semi-annual reporting after 2014 have experienced a reduction in analyst coverage. However, we find that the imposition of more frequent reporting and the end of such a requirement have virtually no impact on firms’ investment decisions.