Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 2 > Issue 3

Populism and COVID-19: How Populist Governments (Mis)Handle the Pandemic

Michael Bayerlein, Kiel Institute for the World Economy and Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Germany, michael.bayerlein@ifw-kiel.de , Vanessa A. Boese, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, vanessa.boese@v-dem.net , Scott Gates, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), and Center for Global Health and Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway, scott.gates@stv.uio.no , Katrin Kamin, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Germany, katrin.kamin@ifw-kiel.de , Syed Mansoob Murshed, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands, and Centre for Financial and Corporate Integrity (CFCI), Coventry University, UK, murshed@iss.nl
 
Suggested Citation
Michael Bayerlein, Vanessa A. Boese, Scott Gates, Katrin Kamin and Syed Mansoob Murshed (2021), "Populism and COVID-19: How Populist Governments (Mis)Handle the Pandemic", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 2: No. 3, pp 389-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000043

Publication Date: 13 Nov 2021
© 2021 M. Bayerlein, V. A. Boese, S. Gates, K. Kamin, and S. M. Murshed
 
Subjects
Public policy
 
Keywords
PopulismCOVID-19pandemicgovernment policypublic health
 

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Open Access

This is published under the terms of CC-BY.

In this article:
Introduction 
Literature Review 
Theory 
Data 
Estimation 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

Populist parties and actors now govern various countries around the world. Often elected by the public in times of crises and over the perceived failure of ‘the elites’, the question stands as to how populist governments actually perform once elected, especially in times of crisis. Using the pandemic shock in the form of the COVID-19 crises, our paper poses the question of how populist governments handle the pandemic. We answer this question by introducing a theoretical framework according to which populist governments (1) enact less far-reaching policy measures to counter the pandemic and (2) lower the effort of citizens to counter the pandemic, so that populist governed countries are (3) hit worse by the pandemic. We test these propositions in a sample of 42 countries with weekly data from 2020. Employing econometric models, we find empirical support for our propositions and ultimately conclude that excess mortality in populist governed countries exceeds the excess mortality of non-populist countries by 8 percentage points (i.e., 98%). Our findings have important implications for the assessment of populist government performance in general, as well as counter-pandemic measures in particular, by providing evidence that opportunistic and inadequate policy responses, spreading misinformation and downplaying the pandemic are strongly related to increases in COVID-19 mortality.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000043

Online Appendix | 113.00000043_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/113.00000043_app

Companion

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Volume 2, Issue 3 Special Issue - The Political Economy of Populism, Part I
See the other articles that are part of this special issue.