Abstract

An important tension in Alaska Native politics concerns exploiting opportunities for economic development versus protecting subsistence rights. Often, groups located near a resource (e.g., minerals, oil, fish) support commercial activities, while more distant groups fear externalities might negatively impact subsistence activities (such as caribou hunting or salmon fishing). But what inhibits groups from bargaining to resolve conflicts over resource development? Using a formal model, I show that the existing “centralized” structure of resource governance, where a government official holds approval power, reduces compensation for negative externalities and inhibits communication of local knowledge relative to a “decentralized” procedure in which the affected group holds decision-making power. These factors (inadequate compensation and less informed policy) induce conflicting preferences between Native groups. Amid the transition to a clean energy economy, utilizing both local knowledge and scientific expertise—while protecting subsistence traditions—is a crucial goal of environmental policy. I suggest institutional reforms to these ends.