Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 9 > Issue 4

Multilateral War Bargaining

Colin Krainin, University of Texas at Austin, USA, colinkrainin@gmail.com
Suggested Citation
Colin Krainin (2014), "Multilateral War Bargaining", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 9: No. 4, pp 407-439. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00013130

Publication Date: 22 Dec 2014
© 2014 C. Krainin
Formal modelling,  Game theory,  International relations,  International conflict,  War


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In this article:
1. Literature Review 
2. The Model 
3. Examples 
4. Main Results 
5. Conclusion 


I build a static, complete information, three-player bargaining model of war. Without dynamics or incomplete information, war is always avoided. However, the threat of war determines the nature of alliances. The model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation. Given the assumptions of the model, a stable state always exists. Stronger allies increase the potential for war threats against a non-allied player. However, stronger allies also demand larger shares of an alliance's total payoff. Balancing (bandwagoning) alliances form when the within alliance utility of a player is uniformly decreasing (increasing) in the resources of an alliance partner.