Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 20 > Issue 2

Pivots or Partisans? Proposal-Making Strategy and Status Quo Selection in Congress

Jesse Crosson, Purdue University, USA, jcrosson@purdue.edu , Geoff Lorenz, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, USA, gmlorenz@unl.edu , Alexander Furnas, Center for Science of Science and Innovation, Kellogg School of Management, Department of Management and Organizations, Northwestern University, USA, zfurnas@gmail.com
 
Suggested Citation
Jesse Crosson, Geoff Lorenz and Alexander Furnas (2025), "Pivots or Partisans? Proposal-Making Strategy and Status Quo Selection in Congress", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 20: No. 2, pp 139-181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00023042

Publication Date: 14 Apr 2025
© 2025 J. Crosson, G. Lorenz and A. Furnas
 
Subjects
Congress,  Interest groups,  Lawmaking
 
Keywords
Congressinterest groupslawmakinglatent variable measurementstatus quo measurement
 

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In this article:
Proposalmaking and the Estimation of Bill Proposal and Status Quo Locations 
Using Position-Taking Data to Estimate Bill Proposal and Status Quo Locations 
Measurement Validation 
Using Bill Positions to Understand Proposal Strategies of Effective Lawmakers 
Discussion and Conclusions 
References 

Abstract

Lawmakers vary considerably in how effectively they advance their priorities through Congress. However, the actual proposal-writing strategies undergirding these differences have remained largely unexplored, due to measurement and methodological difficulties. These obstacles have included prohibitively small sample sizes, costly data requirements, and strong theoretical assumptions. In this paper, we address these obstacles and analyze the proposal strategies of effective lawmakers directly, using original measures of the spatial locations of congressional bill proposals and associated status quos generated by jointly scaling cosponsorship, roll-call, and interest group position-taking data for 1,007 bills from the 110th through 114th Congresses. Because interest groups take positions on bills before they receive votes, our measures cover many bills that die in committee, permitting comparisons between successful and unsuccessful bills. We demonstrate that legislative advancement favors moderate proposals over partisan ones, and that effective lawmakers are those who make proposals closer to the median even at the expense of their preferred policy.

DOI:10.1561/100.00023042

Online Appendix | 100.00023042_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/100.00023042_app

Replication Data | 100.00023042_supp.zip (ZIP).

This file contains the data that is required to replicate the data on your own system.

DOI: 10.1561/100.00023042_supp