Review of Behavioral Economics > Vol 3 > Issue 3-4

An Ultimatum Game with Multidimensional Response Strategies

Werner Güth, LUISS Guido Carli, Italy, and MPI on Collettive Goods and Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Germany, , M. Vittoria Levati, University of Verona, Italy, , Chiara Nardi, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Germany, , Ivan Soraperra, University of Verona, Italy,
Suggested Citation
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Chiara Nardi and Ivan Soraperra (2016), "An Ultimatum Game with Multidimensional Response Strategies", Review of Behavioral Economics: Vol. 3: No. 3-4, pp 281-310.

Publication Date: 23 Dec 2016
© 2016 W. Güth, M. V. Levati, C. Nardi and I. Soraperra
Economic theory,  Behavioral decision making
JEL Codes: C72C91D63D74
UltimatumSocial preferencesIncomplete informationExperiments


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In this article:
1. Introduction 
2. The Multidimensional Response Format 
3. Behavioral Predictions For the Responder 
4. The Experimental Design 
5. Results 
6. Concluding Remarks 
A. Derivation of Predictions About Investment Decisions 
B. Experimental Instructions 


We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative approach to type classification, we find that the majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer’s demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer. According to our data, this result can be explained by a concern for moral integrity rather than by a strong preference for equality.