Review of Behavioral Economics > Vol 12 > Issue 2

Did Strategic Behavior End Roe v. Wade?

Franklin G. Mixon, Center for Economic Education, Columbus State University, USA, mixon_franklin@columbusstate.edu , Rand W. Ressler, Department of Economics, Georgia Southern University, USA, Benno Torgler, School of Economics and Finance, and Centre for Behavioural Economics, Society and Technology (BEST), Queensland University of Technology, Australia
 
Suggested Citation
Franklin G. Mixon, Rand W. Ressler and Benno Torgler (2025), "Did Strategic Behavior End Roe v. Wade?", Review of Behavioral Economics: Vol. 12: No. 2, pp 215-230. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/105.00000210

Publication Date: 24 Mar 2025
© 2025 F. G. Mixon, R. W. Ressler and B. Torgler
 
Subjects
 
Keywords
JEL Codes: C70, D72, D90, J13, J52, L38, Z13
Roe v. Waderight to abortionconstitutional economicsgame theorycoalition buildingbargainingSupreme Court economics
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
Coalition Building in the U.S. Supreme Court 
The End of Roe v. Wade: A Primer 
Did a Strategic Move Spell the End of Roe v. Wade? 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

Decision making in the U.S. Supreme court offers a fascinating context in which to apply game theory. Landmark cases in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court are worth exploring in more detail from a game-theoretic point of view. We focus in this paper on the recent and much discussed ruling to overturn Roe v. Wade and, therefore, the constitutional right to an abortion. Using a game-theoretic framework, we discuss how leaking Justice Samuel Alito’s draft opinion to the national political media can be seen as an unconditional strategic move referred to as cutting off communication, making an action irreversible. In this case, it served conservative justices by cutting off communication between Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature demonstrating how straightforward game theory can be fruitfully applied to the study of constitutional economics.

DOI:10.1561/105.00000210