Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 8 > Issue 3

International Environmental Agreements and Trading Blocks — Can Issue Linkage Enhance Cooperation?

Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Department of Economics, Concordia University, Canada, effrosyni.diamantoudi@concordia.ca , Eftichios Sartzetakis, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Greece, Stefania Strantza, Department of Economics, Concordia University, Canada
 
Suggested Citation
Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eftichios Sartzetakis and Stefania Strantza (2020), "International Environmental Agreements and Trading Blocks — Can Issue Linkage Enhance Cooperation?", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 8: No. 3, pp 269-310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000096

Publication Date: 12 Oct 2020
© 2020 E. Diamantoudi, E. Sartzetakis and S. Strantza
 
Subjects
International business: Trade theory,  Environmental Economics,  Environmental Economics:Climate Change,  Economic Theory:Game Theory,  International relations:International organization,  Environmental politics
 
Keywords
JEL Codes: D6Q5C7
Environmental agreementstrade
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
The Model 
Two Benchmark Cases 
Coalition Formation 
The Stability of an Agreement 
Numerical Analysis 
Conclusions 
Appendices 
References 

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of designing international agreements that jointly determine environmental and trade policies on the participation level and aggregate welfare. This paper builds on the non-cooperative game approach of the International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) literature extending the basic model by introducing firms that trade in a global market. Countries choose the level of a tax on emissions and a tariff on imports: signatories enjoy tariff-free trade among themselves, impose a tariff to nonsignatories and a common emissions tax; nonsignatories levy a tariff on imports and a tax on domestic emissions. Resorting to numerical simulations, the paper shows increased participation to the joint agreement of around 70% of the total number of countries. These coalitions are not only much larger than the two-country coalition derived in the case without trade, but they also achieve substantial welfare improvements of around 60% of the welfare improvement the grand coalition provides over the coalition of two. The paper presents a series of numerical simulations to confirm the robustness of these results to changes in the parameters values.

DOI:10.1561/102.00000096