Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 10 > Issue 1-2

Clear Skies: Multi-Pollutant Climate Policy in the Presence of Global Dimming

Matthew McGinty, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA, Frans P. de Vries, Department of Economics, Business School, University of Aberdeen, UK, frans.devries@abdn.ac.uk
 
Suggested Citation
Matthew McGinty and Frans P. de Vries (2024), "Clear Skies: Multi-Pollutant Climate Policy in the Presence of Global Dimming", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 10: No. 1-2, pp 39-78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000107

Publication Date: 18 Nov 2024
© 2024 M. McGinty and F.P. de Vries
 
Subjects
Carbon regulation,  Environmental economics,  Climate change,  Game theory,  International organization,  Collaborative strategy,  International strategy,  Strategic decision-making
 
Keywords
JEL Codes: D62H23Q50Q53Q54
Dimming effectinteractive pollutantsclimate changeclimate agreementpollution controlemissions tax
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
The Model 
Policy Analyses 
Main Results 
Implications for Climate Policy 
Conclusions 
Appendix A: Existence of Interior Abatement Solutions 
Appendix B: Proposition Proofs 
References 

Abstract

Multi-pollutant interactions can have crucial implications for the design and performance of environmental policy targeting single pollutants. This paper presents a two-region model where a global pollutant (CO2) and local pollutant (SO2) are produced jointly. The interaction between SO2 and CO2 gives rise to the global dimming effect, which relates SO2 emissions to the environmental damage caused by CO2 emissions. We analyze climate policy by comparing abatement of these pollutants in the presence and absence of the dimming effect. We then draw implications for the design of international climate agreements, which should reflect the interactive nature between pollutants. The paper also illustrates how a market-based policy in the form of emissions taxes can be embedded into climate agreements to facilitate an efficient coordination of multi-pollutant abatement across regions. Our model predicts that this involves a uniform tax on the global pollutant but differentiated (region-specific) taxes on the local pollutant.

DOI:10.1561/102.00000107