Journal of Historical Political Economy > Vol 4 > Issue 4

A Theory of Trade Policy Transitions

T. Renee Bowen, McDonough School of Business and Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, USA, t.renee.bowen@georgetown.edu , J. Lawrence Broz, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, USA, jlbroz@ucsd.edu , B. Peter Rosendorff, Department of Politics, New York University, USA, peter.rosendorff@nyu.edu
 
Suggested Citation
T. Renee Bowen, J. Lawrence Broz and B. Peter Rosendorff (2025), "A Theory of Trade Policy Transitions", Journal of Historical Political Economy: Vol. 4: No. 4, pp 471-507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/115.00000082

Publication Date: 19 Feb 2025
© 2025 T. R. Bowen, J. L. Broz, and B. P. Rosendorff
 
Subjects
American political development,  Congress,  Formal modelling,  Game theory,  Government,  International political economy,  Legislatures,  Political economy,  Political history,  Political parties
 
Keywords
Trade policybargainingfree tradeprotectionismtariffssocial transfersstatus quopolitical economypolitical economy of trade policy
 

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In this article:
Theoretical Framework 
Party Positions, Political Process, and Power Shifts 
Specific-Factor Political Economy of Trade 
Model Interpretation 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

We provide a formal model that revises and extends Irwin's (Irwin, D. A. 2020. "Trade Policy in American Economic History." Annual Review of Economics 12: 23–44.) interpretation of US trade policy history from the Civil War to current period. Trade policy is set by domestic political bargaining between globalists and protectionists, representing owners of factors specific to export- and import-competing sectors, respectively. Treating the party in power as the agenda setter, and given the status quo tariff policy, we make several observations. Consistent with the post-Civil War Era of Restriction, protectionists implement high tariffs when status quo tariffs are low. When status quo tariffs are high, reciprocal free trade combined with domestic transfers to protectionists are implemented, explaining the 1930s Era of Reciprocity with Redistribution. Consensus emerges for Retreat from free trade when imports are high and domestic transfers are low, suggesting that US protectionist turn in the late 2010s was in part due to low levels of social transfers.

DOI:10.1561/115.00000082

Online Appendix | 115.00000082_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/115.00000082_app