Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 1 > Issue 1

The Administrative Presidency and Public Trust in Bureaucracy

Jon C. Rogowski, Associate Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University, USA, rogowski@fas.harvard.edu
 
Suggested Citation
Jon C. Rogowski (2020), "The Administrative Presidency and Public Trust in Bureaucracy", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 1: No. 1, pp 27-51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/112.00000006

Published: 10 Mar 2020
© 2020 J. C. Rogowski
 
Subjects
Bureaucracy: Appointments,  Bureaucracy: Public administration,  Bureaucracy,  Executive politics,  Presidential politics,  Public administration,  Public opinion,  Principal-Agent
 
Keywords
Presidential appointmentsbureaucracytrust in governmentpublic opinion
 

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In this article:
Public Opinion, Political Institutions, and the Bureaucracy
Data
Results
Conclusion
References

Abstract

Bureaucratic agencies occupy a politically perilous position in the American federal government. As agents of both Congress and the president, agencies are responsible to principals who often perceive political incentives to manage them in ways that appear to undermine agencies' policy missions. In this paper, I study how presidents' administrative strategies affect public confidence in bureaucratic agencies. Survey experiments embedded on a national sample of Americans provide evidence that the loss of expertise significantly reduces public confidence in bureaucracy. These patterns are consistent across several agencies, but are relatively stronger among political Independents and weakest among Republicans. Moreover, I find no evidence that other potential mechanisms of presidential control of bureaucracy, including changes in capacity or its ideological composition, affect public confidence. The results provide new evidence about how information and expertise affect Americans' attitudes toward the federal bureaucracy and shape the incentives for criticism and oversight from political elites.

DOI:10.1561/112.00000006

Companion

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Volume 1, Issue 1 Special issue - The Political Economy of Executive Politics
See the other articles that are part of this special issue.