Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 5 > Issue 1

The Public Meeting Paradox: How NIMBY-Dominated Public Meetings Can Enable New Housing

Allison K. Cuttner, Department of Quantitative Theory and Methods, Emory University, USA, allison.cuttner@emory.edu , Ryan Hübert, Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis, USA, rhubert@ucdavis.edu , B. Pablo Montagnes, Departments of Political Science and Quantitative Theory and Methods, Emory University, USA, pablo.montagnes@emory.edu
 
Suggested Citation
Allison K. Cuttner, Ryan Hübert and B. Pablo Montagnes (2024), "The Public Meeting Paradox: How NIMBY-Dominated Public Meetings Can Enable New Housing", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 5: No. 1, pp 1-28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000091

Publication Date: 02 Sep 2024
© 2024 A. K. Cuttner, R. Hübert, and B. P. Montagnes
 
Subjects
Law and economics,  Courts,  Formal modelling,  Game theory,  Political economy,  Public policy
 
Keywords
Formal modelshousing politicsNIMBYspublic meetings
 

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In this article:
Local Planning Meetings and NIMBYism 
A Model of Citizen Lawsuits 
Public Planning Meetings 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

Public meetings to consider new housing proposals often feature visible and vocal opposition from neighboring residents, creating a perception that these meetings impede the growth of the housing supply, contributing to inequality. We analyze a model where residents can legally challenge a developer’s housing proposal. A public meeting serves as a critical tool for developers to identify potential litigants, enabling them to adjust proposals and avoid legal action. Interestingly, developers prefer meetings dominated by opponents since it is easier to identify potentially litigious neighbors. Contrary to common belief, our findings suggest that public meetings dominated by NIMBY opponents can increase housing supply by fostering compromise projects. This challenges the prevailing conventional wisdom that unrepresentative meetings significantly restrict housing development. Our analysis instead focuses attention on the threat of litigation as the key driver of the undersupply of housing.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000091

Online Appendix | 113.00000091_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/113.00000091_app

Companion

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Volume 5, Issue 1 Special Issue - The Political Economy of Housing: Articles Overiew
See the other articles that are part of this special issue.