Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay
Fabrizio Ferri, Columbia University, USA, ff2270@gsb.columbia.edu , Robert F. Göx, University of Zurich, robert.goex@business.uzh.chAbstract
This monograph explores the relation between corporate governance and executive compensation and evaluates the conditions under which shareholders can benefit from the right to interfere with the pay setting process by voting on the compensation proposed by the board of directors (Say on Pay). The first part of the monograph lays out the theoretical framework. The second part provides an overview of the origins and country-specific differences in Say on Pay regulation and a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical literature on the subject.
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay provides a comprehensive summary and survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on Say on Pay. The first part of the monograph theoretically studies how a poor governance structure affects the level and structure of executive pay and identifies conditions under which Say and Pay could help shareholders to improve it. The second part of this monograph explains the origins and the cross-country differences in Say on Pay regulation and provides a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical evidence on the subject. Finally, the authors discuss potential improvements and point out some fruitful avenues for future empirical and theoretical research.
