Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 3 > Issue 3–4

Divide and Conquer: Presidents, Parliaments, and Political Polarization during Electoral Campaigns

Kemal Kıvanç Aköz, Assistant Professor, Department of Theoretical Economics, HSE University, Russia, kakoz@hse.ru , Ekim Arbatli, Associate Professor, School of Politics and Governance, HSE University, Russia, ekimarbatli@hse.ru , Dina Rosenberg, Research Associate, Center on Democratic Performance, Binghamton University, USA, dbalala1@binghamton.edu
 
Suggested Citation
Kemal Kıvanç Aköz, Ekim Arbatli and Dina Rosenberg (2022), "Divide and Conquer: Presidents, Parliaments, and Political Polarization during Electoral Campaigns", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 3: No. 3–4, pp 295-315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000061

Publication Date: 01 Dec 2022
© 2022 K. K. Aköz, E. Arbatli, and D. Rosenberg
 
Subjects
Elections: Campaigns,  Elections: Electoral institutions,  Comparative politics,  Elections
 
Keywords
Political polarizationelectionspresidential regimesparliamentary regimes
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
Political Polarization, Institutions, and Executive Elections: Are Presidential Campaigns More Polarizing? 
A Model for Polarization of Opinions 
The Election 
The Model Results 
Hypotheses 
Data and Methodology 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

Although political polarization is in the center of contemporary debates on democratic backsliding, the institutional determinants of this phenomenon remain understudied. In this paper, we investigate how the form of government can affect polarization levels in a country. Specifically, we focus on the role of executive elections as the primary mechanism. Presenting both a formal model and cross-national empirical analyses, we show that executive elections under presidential regimes are significantly more likely to affect political polarization among citizens. Candidates in parliamentary systems are often party leaders who are committed to party policies and cannot deviate much to disclose new information. In contrast, presidential candidates can strategically design the discourse in their election campaigns, thus influencing voters' opinions and making mass polarization more likely. Our empirical analysis shows that this effect is nonlinear and especially profound when the initial polarization in a country is low.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000061

Companion

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Volume 3, Issue 3-4 Special Issue - The Political Economy of Polarization
See the other articles that are part of this special issue.