Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 3 > Issue 3–4

Partisan Manipulation of Dimensionality and Party Polarization in the U.S. Congress

Hong Min Park, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA, hmpark1@uwm.edu
 
Suggested Citation
Hong Min Park (2022), "Partisan Manipulation of Dimensionality and Party Polarization in the U.S. Congress", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 3: No. 3–4, pp 371-393. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000064

Publication Date: 01 Dec 2022
© 2022 H. M. Park
 
Subjects
 
Keywords
Legislatureslegislative procedurespolitical parties
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
Party Polarization in Congress 
Dimensionality in Congress 
A Theory on Partisan Manipulation of Dimensionality 
Special Rules and Complex UCAs 
Empirical Analysis 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

I develop a theory that shows partisan manipulation of dimensionality in the U.S. Congress. The Party leadership manipulates the dimensional structure of legislation in order to construct easier voting coalitions, to avoid ugly defeats, and ultimately to build a clearer party brand name. Specifically, when the party considers certain legislation to be important for partisan purpose, it designs a restrictive rule in a way that makes the liberal-conservative dimension prevail on the floor. This party manipulation of dimensionality consequently leads to party polarization, which suggest that party polarization has been somewhat purposely inflated by our elites in government.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000064

Companion

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Volume 3, Issue 3-4 Special Issue - The Political Economy of Polarization
See the other articles that are part of this special issue.