Abstract

In the late 1990’s, modern grid operators known as regional transmission organizations (RTOs) formed and adopted or expanded power pool roles to oversee deregulated, competitive markets for electricity generation in response to orders from the FERC. In their respective footprints covering the northeastern United States, the PJM Interconnection, New York Independent System Operator, and ISO New England manage many of the technical, planning and market aspects needed in wholesale electric energy production and delivery. Each RTO contains stakeholder processes which are thought of as a key aspect of grid governance and democratic innovation: changes to market and operational tariffs occur based on the outcome of formal voting procedures; this comparative analysis uses a novel dataset composed of senior-level rule proposal voting from 2010 to 2019. The dataset extends to other sources to create relevant stakeholder heterogeneity. The empirical work assesses patterns of voting based on varying cross-sectional commercial interests. Additionally, a dynamic test of the pivotal voter model which incorporates a theoretical net return to voting is implemented. Lastly, for a stakeholder class deemed not highly participatory, a simple quantitative approach to determine if marginal participation could affect vote outcome is implemented.