Review of Behavioral Economics > Vol 8 > Issue 2

Social Preferences in a Chinese Cultural Context

Saileshsingh Gunessee, University of Nottingham Ningbo, China, Tom Lane, University of Nottingham Ningbo, China, tom.lane@nottingham.edu.cn , Shangjue Xie, University of Nottingham Ningbo, China
 
Suggested Citation
Saileshsingh Gunessee, Tom Lane and Shangjue Xie (2021), "Social Preferences in a Chinese Cultural Context", Review of Behavioral Economics: Vol. 8: No. 2, pp 125-145. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/105.00000135

Publication Date: 19 Jul 2021
© 2021 S. Gunessee, T. Lane and S. Xie
 
Subjects
Behavioral economics,  Experimental economics
 
Keywords
JEL Codes: C93, D91
Social preferencessocial distancenetworknationalismdictator game
 

Share

Download article
In this article:
1. Introduction 
2. Experimental Design 
3. Empirical Results 
4. Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of social distance and national bias on social preferences in China. In a field experiment featuring a diverse subject pool, we implement an incentivised dictator game, in which we vary the way decision-makers are primed to think about their social distance from the potential recipients of their generosity, as well as the nationality of these recipients. We find that decision-makers become substantially less pro-social when primed social distance increases. However, national bias is not found – there is no evidence subjects are willing to give more money to Chinese strangers than to unknown foreigners. The effects of social distance emerge more strongly at closer levels of distance for those who are rural, low-educated and poor, while they appear more strongly at greater levels of distance for their urban, high-educated and rich counterparts.

DOI:10.1561/105.00000135

Online Appendix | 105.00000135_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/105.00000135_app

Replication Data | 105.00000135_supp.zip (ZIP).

This file contains the data that is required to replicate the data on your own system.

DOI: 10.1561/105.00000135_supp